Skip to main content

Full text of "Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War"

See other formats

Presented to the 


by the 




Carnegie Endowment for Internationar*Peac& tem^*' 


Publication No. 4 




To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct 








Washington, D. C. 



The circumstances which attended the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 were 
of such character as to fix upon them the attention of the civilized world. The 
conflicting reports as to what actually occurred before and during these wars, to- 
gether with the persistent rumors often supported by specific and detailed state- 
ments as to violations of the laws of war by the several combatants, made it im- 
portant that an impartial and exhaustive examination should be made of this 
entire episode in contemporary history. The purpose of such an impartial exami- 
nation by an independent authority was to inform public opinion and to make plain 
just what is or may be involved in an international war carried on under modern 
conditions. If the minds of men can be turned even for a short time away from 
passion, from race antagonism and from national aggrandizement to a contem- 
plation of the individual and national losses due to war and to the shocking 
horrors which modern warfare entails, a step and by no means a short one, will 
have been taken toward the substitution of justice for force in the settlement 
of international differences. 

It was with this motive and for this purpose that the Division of Inter- 
course and Education of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace con- 
stituted in July, 1913, an International Commission of Inquiry to study the recent 
Balkan wars and to visit the actual scenes where fighting had taken place and 
the territory which had been devastated. The presidency of this International 
Commission of Inquiry was entrusted to Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, 
Senator of France, who had represented his country at the First and Second 
Hague Conferences of 1899 and of 1907, and who as President Fondateur of the 
Conciliation Internationale, has labored so long and so effectively to bring the 
various nations of the world into closer and more sympathetic relations. With 
Baron d'Estournelles de Constant there were associated men of the highest 
standing, representing different nationalities, who were able to bring to this impor- 
tant task large experience and broad sympathy. 

The result of. the work of the International Commission of Inquiry is con- 
tained in the following report. This report, which has been written without 
prejudice and without partisanship, is respectfully commended to the attention of 
the governments, the people and the press of the civilized world. To those who 
so generously participated in its preparation as members of the International 
Commission of Inquiry, the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace offer an expression of grateful thanks. 

Nicholas Murray Butler, 

Acting Director. 
February 22, 1914. 


Austria : 

Dr. Josef Redlich, Professor of Public Law in the University of Vienna. 

France : 

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, Senator. 

M. Justin Godart, lawyer and Member of the Chamber of Deputies. 

Germany : 

Dr. Walther Schiicking, Professor of Law at the University of Marburg. 

Great Britain: 

Francis W. Hirst, Esq., Editor of The Economist. 
Dr. H. N. Brailsford, journalist. 

Russia : 

Professor Paul Milioukov, Member of the Douma. 

United States: 

Dr. Samuel T. Dutton, Professor in Teachers' College, Columbia University. 



Preface. By Nicholas Murray Butler iii 

Members of the Balkan Commission of Inquiry iv 

Introduction. By Baron d'Estournelles de Constant 1 

Why this Inquiry ? 1 

The Objections , 3 

Constitution and Character of the Commission 5 

Departure — Inquiry — Return of the Commission 9 

The Report 11 

The Lesson of the Two Wars 15 

Chapter I — The Origin of the Two Balkan Wars 21 

1. The Ethnography and National Aspirations of the Balkans 21 

2. The Struggle for Autonomy 31 

3. The Alliance and the Treaties 38 

4. The Conflict between the Allies 49 

Chapter II — The War and the Noncombatant Population 71 

1. The Plight of the Macedonian Moslems during the First War 71 

2. The Conduct of the Bulgarians in the Second War 78 

The Massacre at Doxato 79 

The Massacre and Conflagration of Serres 83 

Events at Demir-Hissar 92 

3. The Bulgarian Peasant and the Greek Army 95 

The Final Exodus 106 

Chapter III — Bulgarians, Turks, and Servians 109 

1. Adrianople 109 

The- Capture of the Town 110 

The Bulgarian Administration 117 

The Last Days of the Occupation 119 

2. Thrace 123 

3. The Theater of the Servian-Bulgarian War 135 

Chapter IV— The War and the Nationalities 148 

1. Extermination, Emigration, Assimilation 148 

2. Servian Macedonia 158 

3. Greek Macedonia 186 

Chapter V— The War and International Law 208 

Chapter VI — Economic Results of the Wars 235 

Chapter VII — The Moral and Social Consequences of the Wars and the Outlook for 

the Future of Macedonia g 265 



Chapter II — 

Appendix A — The Plight of the Macedonian Moslems during the First War 277 

Appendix B — The Conduct of the Bulgarians in the Second War 285 

Appendix C — The Bulgarian Peasant and the Greek Army 300 

Extracts from Letters of Greek Soldiers 307 

Appendix D — The Servians in the Second War 317 

Chapter Ill- 
Appendix E — The Accusation 326 

Report by a Russian Officer in the London Daily Telegraph. .. . 326 

Appendix F — The Defense 331 

Report to the Commander of the Kehlibarov Reserve 331 

The Miletits Papers v 333 

Appendix G — Depositions 338 

Letter of Baroness Varvara Yxcoull to Mr. Maxime Kovalevsky 338 

Evidence of Turkish Officers Captured at Adrianople 341 

Depositions of Bulgarian Officials 344 

Reports of the Delegation of the Armenian Patriarchate : The 

Disaster of Malgara 347 

Thrace 350 

Adrianople 353 

Statement of the Bulgarian Committee at Adrianople 354 

Appendix H — Theater of the Servian-Bulgarian War , 356 

Servian Documents 356 

The Medical Reports 361 

Destruction of Towns and Villages 364 

Bulgarian Documents 368 

Chapter VI— 

Appendix I — Bulgaria — Statistics 378 

Greece — Statistics 385 

Montenegro — Statistics 394 

Servia — Statistics 395 

Analysis of the Report 399 



Dialects of Macedonia. After A. Belits. From the Servian Point of View 29 

Boundaries of the Balkan States under the Treaty of St. Stefano. Conference of 

Constantinople, 1876-77 32 

Map Showing the National Aspirations of the Balkan People before the War. After 

Paul Dehn 38 

Contested Regions According to the Map Annexed to the Treaty of Alliance 45 

Regions Occupied by the Belligerents. End of April, 1913. After Balcanicus 55 

Territorial Modifications in the Balkans 70 

(1) Conference of London. 

(2) Treaty of Bucharest. 

Macedonia from the Bulgarian Point of View. Map in Colors. After Vasil 

Kantchev 418 

Macedonia from the Servian Point of View. Map in Colors. After Dr. Tsviyits 419 



1. Ruins of Doxato 79 

2. Finding the Bodies of Victims at Doxato 80 

3. Gathering the Bodies of Victims 81 

4. Bodies of Slain Peasants 82 

5. Victims Who Escaped the Serres Slaughter 84 

6. Ruins of Serres 85 

7. Ruins of Serres 86 

8. Ruins of Serres 86 

9. Ruins of Serres 87 

10. Ruins of Serres 88 

11. Ruins of Serres 88 

12. A Popular Greek Poster 96 

13. A Popular Greek Poster 98 

14. Isle of Toundja — Trees Stripped of Bark Which the Prisoners Ate 112 

15. Mosque of Sultan Selim — A Cupola of the Dome Rent by an Explosive Shell 116 

16. Victims Thrown into the Arda and Drowned 122 

17. Fragments of the Gospel in Greek Letters found in the Ruins of the Osrnanly 

Church 125 

18. Bodies of Five Murdered Bulgarian Officers 144 

19. Refugees Encamped Outside Salonica 152 

20. Refugees Encamped Outside Salonica 152 

21. Refugees Encamped Outside Salonica 152 

22. The Commission Listening to Refugees in the Samakov Square 153 

23. A Bulgarian Red Cross Convoy 217 

24. Roumanian Ravages at Petrohan 217 

25. Shortened Greek Cartridges 224 

26. In the Trenches 237 

27. The Dead Sharp-shooter 237 

28. The Assault Upon Aivas Baba 238 

29. A Funeral Scene 238 

30. In Barb-Wire Defences of Adrianople 238 

31. Scene from the Koumanovo Battle 238 

32. Service Burial 239 

33. A Battlefield 240 

34. Forgotten in the Depths of a Ravine 241 

35. Piece of Ordnance and Gunners 242 

36. Ruins of Voinitsa 245 

37. Ruins of Voinitsa 245 

38. Ravages of the War 248 

39. Ravages of the War 248 

40. Ravages of the War 249 

41. Ravages of the War 249 

42. Refugees 253 

43. Refugees 253 

44. Refugees 254 

45. Refugees 254 

46. Refugees 255 

47. Refugees 255 

48. Refugees 256 

49. Refugees 256 

50. Facsimile of a Letter Written by a Greek Soldier About the War 416 

51. Envelope of the Letter Opposite 417 




To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct 



Why This Inquiry? 

Why this report, this inquiry? Is it necessary after so many other reports 
and investigations, after so many eloquent appeals made in vain, — appeals to 
pity, indignation and revolt, ringing at one and the same time from all countries, 
and from all parties, uttered by the voices of Gladstone, of Bryce, of Pressense, 
of Jaures, of Victor Berard, of Pierre Quillard, of Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, of 
Denys Cochin, and how many more great hearted men of world wide au- 
thority? It seems as if all this had gone for nothing. The facts that face 
us today are a tragic and derisive denial that any good has come of all this 
eloquence and feeling. Would it not be better for us to remain silent, and 
let things, go ? 

We have been silent, we have let things go long enough. From the begin- 
ning of the first war, and in the terrible uncertainties of the following days, I 
denounced that one amongst the Balkan rulers, who took upon himself, — he 
being the only one who had nothing to lose by it, — except the lives of his 
subjects ! — to precipitate the war. But that being done, we could only wish 
for the triumph of four young allied peoples in shaking off the domination 
of the Sultans of Constantinople, in the interest of the Turks and perhaps of 
Europe herself. 

Let us repeat, for the benefit of those who accuse us of "bleating for 
peace at any price," what we have always maintained: 

War rather than slavery; 

Arbitration rather than war; 

Conciliation rather than arbitration. 

I hoped that this collective victory, heretofore considered impossible, of 
the allies over Turkey, — which had just concluded peace with Italy and which 
we still believed formidable, — would free Europe from the nightmare of the 
Eastern question and give her the unhoped for example of the union and co- 
ordination which she lacks. 

We know how this first war, after having exhausted, as it seemed, all that 
the belligerents could lavish, in one way or another, of heroism and blood, was 
only the prelude to a second fratricidal war between the allies of the previous 
day, and how this second war was the more atrocious of the two. 

Many of our friends urged us from that time to organize a mission, charged 
either to intervene or to become a witness in the tragedy. We refused to au- 
thorize any such premature manifestation, which could only be unavailing. As 
a matter of fact, none of the interested governments could admit, in the train 
of their armies, spectators who were independent judges. But peace at last 


accomplished, our caution had no further excuse. Our American friends under- 
stood this when they asked us to act, and we have not hesitated to respond to 
their insistence. The Americans, unlike Europe, do not approve of resignation, 
silence, withdrawal. They are young, and they can not endure an evil which is 
not proved to them to be absolutely incurable. Not the slightest doubt can 
be cast upon their impartiality in regard to the belligerents, the United States 
being the adopted country of important rival colonies, notably of an admirable 
Greek colony. For my part, I should not have accepted the responsibility 
of organizing a mission of whose disinterestedness and justice I had not 
been fully assured. 

I love Greece. The breath of her war of independence inspired my youth, 
I am steeped in the heroic memories that live in the hearts of her children, 
in her folk songs, in her language, which I used to speak, in the divine air of 
her plains and mountains. Along her coasts every port, every olive wood or 
group of laurels, evokes the sacred origin of our civilization. Greece was the 
starting point of my active life and labor. 1 She is for the European and the 
American more than a cradle, a temple or a hearth, which each of us dreams 
of visiting one day in pilgrimage. I do not confine myself to respecting and 
cherishing her past. I believe in her future, in her eager, almost excessive, 
intelligence. But the more I love Greece, the more do I feel it my duty in the 
crisis of militarism which is menacing her now in her turn, to tell the truth 
and to serve her by this, as I serve my own country, while so many others 
injure her by flattery. 

I presided over the famous Chateau d'Eau meeting on February 13, 1903, 
and came forward as a politician for Bulgaria and all the oppressed populations 
of the Balkan peninsula. That was a splendid year of agitation for great 
causes, for justice, liberty and peace; it was the unofficial but popular begin- 
ning of the Anglo-French entente cordiale. Generous year of 1903 ! My 
friends and I responded without any hesitation to the noble effort of growth and 
progress, of the material, intellectual and moral culture of Bulgaria. 

As for Servia, whom we have never held responsible for the sufferings 
she has undergone, I count among her diplomats, more than colleagues, friends, 
men of the finest character who have impressed themselves upon the esteem 
of the political personnel (staff) of all Europe. 

In Montenegro, where my duty as a Member of the International Com- 
mission appointed after the Berlin Treaty (1879-80), took me formerly to 
settle the boundaries of its rugged frontier, I knew some excellent men. I 
refrain from naming them, if they still live, for fear of compromising them, 
and I may say that I pitied them from the bottom of my heart, less for the 
heap of stones out of which fate made their country, than for the govern- 
ment that rules the stones. When European disagreements suspended our 

1 See footnote, page 3. 


labors, I profited by them to travel in solitude through High Albania. I 
crossed the sad and fertile country from Scutari to Uskub, allaying the suspicions 
of Ypek, of t)jyakoo and of Prisrend, then in full anarchy. I shall never forget 
the impression of sadness and astonishment that I carried away from this 
adventurous expedition. All these countries, not far from us, were then, and 
are still, unlike Europe, more widely separated from her than Europe from 
America; no one knew anything of them, no one said anything about them. I 
scarcely dared at this epoch, to publish, unsigned as a matter of professional 
discretion, a sketch of the ineffaceable impressions produced on me. 1 And 
nevertheless, all this horror will not cease to exist as long as Europe continues 
to ignore it. These peoples, mingled in an inextricable confusion of languages 
and religions, of antagonistic race and nationality, Turks, Bulgarians, Servians, 
Serbo-Croatians, Servians speaking Albanian, Koutzo-Valacks, Greeks, Alba- 
nians, Tziganes, Jews, Roumanians, Hungarians, Italians, are not less good or less 
gifted than other people in Europe and America. Those who seem the worst 
among them have simply lived longer in slavery or destitution. They are 
martyrs rather than culprits. The spectacle of destitute childhood in a civi- 
lized country is beginning to rouse the hardest hearts. What shall be said of 
the destitution of a whole people, of several nations, in Europe, in the Twentieth 
Century ? 

This is the state of things which the Americans wish to help in ending. 
Let them be thanked and honored for their generous initiative. I have been 
appealing to it for a long time, since my first visit to the United States in 1902. 
We are only too happy today to combine our strength, too willing to raise 
with them a cry of protestation against the contempt of the sceptics and ill- 
wishers who will try to suppress it. 

The Objections 

We have noted the objections that have been presented to us, and the 
principal ones are as follows: 

How is the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace going to make an 
investigation into the atrocities committed in the Balkans? Why should a 
Commission interfere? If it discover that the atrocities were inevitable, in- 
separable from the condition of war, what an exposure of the powerlessness 
of civilization ! If it find, as certain newspapers proclaim, that the evils are 
to be imputed to some and not to others, what hatred and bitterness will be 

1 Mach. Recit de mceurs de la Haute Albanie par P. H. Constant. Revue des Deux 
Mondes, 1 mars 1881. See in the same Revue several studies on Provincial Life in Greece, 
and under this same title a volume in 8°, Hachette 1878, id. Dionitza 1878; Galathee, Ernest 
Leroux, 1 vol. in 18 Paris 1878; Pygmalion, 1 vol. in 18; A. Lemerre, Paris, Les Trois 
Sceurs, text from a popular Greek tale, published in the Annual of the Association for 
Greek Studies; id. Vile de Chypre ; Lettres inedites de Coray; Superstitions of Modern 
Greece, Nineteenth Century, 1880, London. 


re-awakened between the scarcely pacified belligerents! We have heard this 
argument for thirty years. It has helped the evil to live and grow. We know 
what we must think about the results of European abstention. It is the fear 
of compromise, the fear of displeasing one or another of the nations, the 
terror, in short, of intervening reasonably and in time, which has brought 
about a crisis, the gravity of which is not only of yesterday and of today, but 
also of tomorrow. It is to the interest of all the governments, as well as of 
the peoples, that the light of truth should at last illuminate and regenerate 
these unhappy countries. The duty and the purpose of the Carnegie Endow- 
ment was to contribute in dissipating the shadows and dangers of a night in- 
definitely prolonged. 

It has been further asked: What are you going to do in the Balkans, 
you French, you Americans, you English, you Russians, you Germans? Have 
you not enough to do with Morocco to look after, with Mexico, with South 
Africa, India, Persia? Yes, we have plenty to do at home, but let us give 
up all exterior action if we pretend to wait until everything in our own house 
or conduct is reformed, before we can attempt to help others. I do not consider 
the French State more perfect than any other human organization, but never- 
theless my own imperfection need not prevent me from doing my utmost to be 

Other objections are of a less elevated order, but not less insistent. This 
for example : that everyone does not lose by war. Without speaking of the 
patriotism kept alive by war, the Great Powers lend their money to the 
belligerents and sell them the materials of war. This is good for trade and 
enriches both bankers and contractors. War is exhibited as an operation of 
twofold patriotism, of moral benefit, because it exalts heroism, and of material 
profit because it increases several important industries. A little more, and we 
shall be told that it nourishes the population! 

We have replied to these sophisms over and over again. Once more we 
shall set aside the war that is defensive and in the cause of independence. 
Such a war is not to be confounded with any other, because it is the resistance 
to war, to conquest, to oppression. It is the supreme protest against violence, 
and generally the protest of the weak against the strong. Such was the first 
Balkan war, — and for this reason it was glorious and popular throughout the 
civilized world. We are only speaking of real war, such as a State under- 
takes in order to extend its possessions, or to assert its strength to the detriment 
of another country ; — this was the case in the second Balkan war. Today no 
one gains in this sort of warfare. Both victor and vanquished lose morally and 
materially. It is false that peace encourages slothfulness. To speak only of 
France living under a rule of peace that has lasted for forty-three years, 
never has youth been more enterprising, more daring, more patriotic than in 
our day. In default of a war, courage applies itself to fertile invention, towards 


exploration, to dangerous scientific experiments, to aerial and submarine navi- 
gation. Is this a sign of decadence? 

And as for trade, which certainly gains by selling a battleship at nearly 
a hundred million francs, is it possible not to foresee the terrible stoppage of 
work and the consequent crisis, that must ensue when the peoples, tired of 
the ruinous competition, will claim a juster balance between the expenditure 
really necessary for national defense, and' that wanted for developing the re- 
sources of each country and its useful activity? Nobody will contest the fact 
that one or several industries do certainly profit by war. It will even be read 
in this report that a new and flourishing kind of business has been created since 
the two Balkan wars, that of artificial legs! But the main body of trade? The 
main body of the people? There is the whole question. On the one hand the 
increase of armaments leading inevitably to catastrophe, on the other emulation, 
economic competition leading to progress, always insufficient indeed, but better 
assured each day by general cooperation, and finally, to security. 

Must we allow these two Balkan wars to pass, without at least trying 
to draw some lesson from them, without knowing whether they have been a benefit 
or an evil, if they should begin again tomorrow and go on for ever extending? 

We have made up our mind. The objections that we have summarized 
are always the same, not one of them holds against the fact that the two 
Balkan wars, different as each was from the other, finally sacrificed treasures 
of riches, lives, and heroism. We can not authenticate these sacrifices without 
protesting, without denouncing their cost and their danger for the future. For 
this reason, I constituted our Commission, and today I am presenting the report 
which it has drawn up in truth, independence and complete disinterestedness. 

Constitution and Character of the Commission 

These words, truth, independence and disinterestedness, are not vain words. 
Men of great worth and of the sincerest good will, have been ready to suspend 
the occupations of their ordinary life, in order to respond to our appeal, and 
have made their investigations in exceptional conditions of impartiality and 
authority, and with untiring courage. They did not allow themselves to be 
baffled by fatigue or difficulties of any kind, numerous as these were; not 
even by cholera, nor were they led astray by the least illusion. Before leaving 
Paris, each one of them knew that owing obedience to no one, to no word of 
command, to no party or government, to no journal, to no representation, 
Balkan or European ; expecting no decoration, no reward of any sort, neither 
thanks nor compliments; coming after the brilliant scouts of the great press of 
all the great countries, after the prejudiced or sensational information seekers; 
serving, in a word, no particular interest, but a very general interest; that they 
would give full satisfaction to none, and would displease everybody more or 
less. Each one of them deliberately placed himself above suspicion, above 


criticism, truly even above inevitable attack. It would be impossible to question 
the disinterestedness of the Commission, no member of it being remunerated, and 
the expenses of travel, — very modest indeed, — being publicly administered. But 
the Commission had to expect that objections would be made in refusing to 
acknowledge or in disqualifying some of its members. We knew all that. We 
took our precautions, not to avoid attacks, merely that they might be proved 
unjustifiable, and this is how I came to constitute our Commission. An un- 
grateful task, for which I have felt well rewarded, when I saw our work, in 
spite of troublesome presages and natural enough anxieties, coming none the 
less to a successful issue. 

First, I consulted the men in Paris whom I consider to be masters of the 
question, Victor Berard to begin with, whose experience and knowledge are 
equal to his devotion; and that is no small thing to say. I should have liked 
him to be one of us, and I have in any case to thank him for much advice of 
which we took advantage. I would also have liked to be able to add to our 
number our admirable and regretted F. de Pressense and those of our valiant 
comrades of the struggle of 1903, of whom I have spoken. On his side, our 
friend President Nicholas Murray Butler is surrounded by men of generous 
sympathy, who form a phalanx, in the United States, of combatants always 
ready for the crusades of our own day, and he keeps us in constant touch 
with their views, aspirations and opinions. President Butler's collaborator, 
appointed to go to the Balkans, was Mr. Samuel T. Dutton, Professor at 
Columbia University, to whose impartiality and high moral integrity, I can pay 
no better tribute than by saying that he was not only a valiant fellow worker 
but an arbiter as well. I could say the same of Mr. Justin Godart, Deputy 
of Lyons, a politician of energy, accuracy and determination, whose rectitude 
can never be called in question even by his adversaries. The services rendered 
us by Mr. Godart were innumerable. Aside from the valuable part he took, 
like Mr. Dutton, in drawing up the report, he consented during the long journey 
through the Balkans to fulfil many other functions equivalent to those of 
president of the itinerary, — because the admirably united Commission over which 
I presided from Paris, had not thought it necessary to designate a vice president 
during its journey, — secretary general, treasurer, and reporter. Mr. Godart 
was all this and more, the trusted friend in whom every one could place 

Two of our friends in Germany responded to our invitation, Professor 
Paszkowski of Berlin University, and Professor Schucking of Marburg, both 
proved and excellent men, as impartial as they are enlightened. The former, 
just at the moment of his departure, was unfortunately refused the necessary 
permission by the University authorities. The latter was stopped at Belgrade, 
and was, I am bound to say, totally misled, owing to circumstances of which I 
will add a word or two later. 


Austria contributed in default of Professor H. Lammasch, our great and 
generous friend, whose health kept him at home, Professor Redlich, whose 
cooperation both in Vienna and Paris, has been invaluable. 

Mr. Francis W. Hirst of England, editor of the Economist, well known for 
his noble campaigns for international conciliation, and the high integrity of 
his character, together with his distinguished colleague, Mr. H. N. Brailsford, 
was constantly present at our preparatory meetings in Paris. Mr. Brailsford 
was appointed with Messrs. Dutton, Schucking and Godart, to make one of the 
subcommittee which we decided to send to the scene of war. 

From Russia, our friend Professor Maxime Kovalevsky and others were 
unsparing in their assistance. They were, in Europe, as Messrs. Root and 
Butler in the United States, the guarantors of the independence of the Com- 
mission. All our Russian friends were of the same opinion as ourselves in 
considering that the man best able to represent them, was Professor Paul 
Milioukov, member of the Douma, who gladly responded to their pressing invi- 
tation, as he did to ours. Professor Milioukov adds to his political authority, 
the distinction of being a scholar who not only knows the Balkan nations 
thoroughly, but their languages as well. He has been reproached for this, and 
so has Mr. Brailsford. Professor Milioukov was at once denounced as being 
violently hostile to the Servians, Brailsford as not less hostile to the Greeks. 
It is true that by way of balance I was represented as an impenitent Philhellene, 
Hirst as a Sectarian, and Kovalevsky as something still worse. Godart and 
Dutton alone escaped all criticism. 

I am aware of course from experience that in the Balkans as in some 
other countries, that I know of, it is impossible to avoid the reproach of a party, 
if one does not take sides with it against the others, and conversely. Milioukov 
was perfectly just to the Bulgarians when we in Europe were all unanimous 
in praising and upholding them. Later on he blamed them, as we all did. He 
censured the fault of the Servians when censure was unanimous, as he denounced 
the offenses of the Turks and of the Greeks. But he also paid sincere tribute, 
to their merits, as he did to the merits of the Greeks and the Turks. His 
only sin, in the eyes of each, was his perfect impartiality. He was nobody's 
man, precisely what we were looking for. Brailsford, on the other hand, had 
been frankly partisan, but for whom? For the Greeks. He took up arms for 
them and fought in their ranks, the true disciple of Lord Byron and of Glad- 
stone ; and in spite of this fact, today Brailsford is held to be an enemy of 
Greece. Why? Because, passionately loving and admiring the Greeks, he has 
denounced the errors that bid fair to injure them, with all the heat and vigor 
of a friend and of a companion in arms. This did not seem to be a sufficient 
motive for demanding his resignation. As we could not condemn Brailsford for 
being at one and the same time, both the friend and the enemy of Greece, we 
kept him, and have been very fortunate in so doing. 


At last our Commission was constituted, advised on all points, and ready 
to start on its journey. Before its departure, I notified the Turkish Ambassador 
of its existence and of its purpose, and also the three ministers in Paris of 
Bulgaria, Greece and Servia, formerly among my most distinguished colleagues. 
Only the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the beginning, made some reser- 
vations to which I replied, concerning the choice of Brailsford, accused of being 
a Bulgarophile. 

Thus prepared, we were assured that our inquiry, even if it did not please 
everyone, could not be regarded with suspicion, nor, in any case, stopped by 
anyone. The instructions accepted both by the sedentary members of the Com- 
mission and those delegated to go to the Balkans, are summarized in the follow- 
ing extract of the letter I wrote August 21, to Mr. Justin Godart and his 
companions : 

Creans, August 21, 1913. 
My Dear Colleagues, 

* * * Sceptics will ask you what you expect to do? You can reply 
that you intend to obtain some light, — a little light, — and this will be much. 
A little light means appeasement and progress. 

Your mission has as much economic as moral significance. When you 
return and publish your opinions, which I hope will be unanimous and 
which will certainly have the greater authority in that they are exceptionally 
disinterested, you will contribute to the better understanding in both hemi- 
spheres, of a very simple truth. That is, that these unhappy Balkan States 
have been up to the present, the victims of European division much more 
than of their own faults. If Europe had sincerely wished to help them in 
the past thirty years, she would have given them what makes the life in a 
country, that is, railways, tramways, roads, telegraphs and telephones, and 
in addition, schools. Once these fertile countries were linked to the rest 
of Europe, and connected like the rest of Europe, they would of themselves 
become peaceful by means of commerce and trade and industry, enriching 
themselves in spite of their inextricable divisions. 

Europe has chosen to make them ruined belligerents, rather than young 
clients of civilization, but it is not yet too late to repair this long error. 
You are the precursors of a new economic order, exceedingly important 
for each one of the governments; you will be, because you claim no such 
distinction and because of your disinterestedness, the auxiliaries of their 
salvation. After having verified the evil which is only too evident, you will 
assist each government in repairing it, by making known by your report 
the real aims and resources of the country. And thus you will reassure 
the public which never likes to despond, and which will not admit that 
even a small part of Europe must lie fallow, when it can share the general 
progress which is going on feverishly everywhere else. 

I hope that you will be able to suggest these views when you are 
conversing with such personages as you have occasion to meet. It is to 
the interest of each government that prejudicial legends should not be 
spread abroad. You will be able to confer a great benefit upon each of 


Our Commission will upon its return, publish both in Europe and in 
America, a report which will be translated, widely circulated and com- 
mented upon. This report will contain, not the recital, but the confirmation 
and correction of facts already published. We are inclined to add to this 
a brief statement of the situation, drawn up by those specially interested, in 
regard to the past, the present, and the future. 

The impartial juxtaposition of these diverse statements in the same 
international document, will be a powerful means of serving the truth and 
of disproving the accusation of injustice on our part. 

Our conclusions will then follow, and these conclusions can not be 
anything but one more effort to reduce the disorders from which all the 
world suffers, and to establish confidence where at present there is only 
discouragement and anxiety. 

Departure — Inquiry — Return of the Commission 

The Commission left Paris on August 2, stopped at Vienna, where Pro- 
fessor Paszkowski of Berlin and Professor Redlich were waiting for them, and 
then continued on to Belgrade. There began difficulties which need not be 
exaggerated. The Servian government could have taken either of two extreme 
courses. The first, which it did not adopt, consisted in itself supplying the 
Commission, as we asked it to do, with its own version of the events, and at 
the same time with a statement of the economic resources of its country. It 
knew that these statements would be published fully and impartially in our report. 
It had an excellent opportunity by so doing, of confounding its enemies and of 
instructing its friends, and what is more, of making Servia known to the world 
at large. I must confess that I could not understand its rather ungracious 
refusal, which we may call diplomatic, in order to offend no one. I know very 
well the reproaches directed against Mr. Milioukov; but Mr. Milioukov was not 
the whole Commission. They had the right to decline his testimony. That of the 
other members of the Commission then became of more value; it constituted a 
recourse. To speak quite fairly, the Commission came at the wrong moment 
to Belgrade; but I wonder if, in analogous circumstances, the governments 
of the great countries would not be more summary and intolerant than the 
Servian government. The matter stood thus : The Commission arrived at 
Belgrade just at the moment of the triumphant return of the army, a triumph 
both sad and glorious, when the sight of the line of victors woke in the silent 
crowds as much sorrow as pride. Servia's great losses in the two wars must 
be taken into consideration, all the splendid youth and strength she sacrificed with 
unheard-of courage, the blood spilt not only to secure independence, but in a 
struggle of brother against brother, a struggle where victory itself means mourn- 
ing. We must take into consideration too, there as elsewhere, the excitement 
of frenzied jingoist journals. 

The second course consisted simply in stopping our Commission. There 
were both pretexts and means : transports requisitioned by the army, interminable 


delays, the uncertainty of communication, the bad state of sanitation, fear of 
cholera. * * * In the interests of the Commission itself, a government, 
without being entirely hostile or insincere, could have obliged it to retrace its 
steps. The ministry at Belgrade did nothing of the kind ; it refused to communi- 
cate with the Commission and entirely ignored it, although its arrival had been 
announced both from Paris and upon reaching Belgrade, to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. An official communication of September 7, explains the gov- 
ernment's attitude, 1 but as a matter of fact it did not prevent the Commission 
from remaining, in spite of a slight animosity provoked by some of the news- 
papers against Mr. Milioukov, nor of continuing on its way. The Commission 
was provided by the government with every facility for reaching the frontier 
and Salonica. This was a good deal and I will do it so much justice. I do 
not consider either that the Servian government was responsible for the attempts 
which were made to prevent our German colleague, Professor Schiicking, from 
rejoining the Commission. In this connection, some strange maneuvers took 
place. Professor Paszkowski, being, as I said, detained at the last moment, 
Professor Schiicking was named hurriedly to take his place. He was then at 
Ostend, from whence he set out with praiseworthy dispatch and devotion, but he 
could not reach Belgrade until some time after the Commission had already left 
for Salonica. What happened then ? Who is to be blamed ? One fact emerges : 
Professor Schiicking was persuaded that there was nothing for him to do but 
go home; that the Commission had disbanded and had given up its work. 
Naturally enough Professor Schiicking returned home, and only heard the truth 
from me when he was back in his own country. 

The government of Greece was anxious above all things to base its attitude 
on that of its ally in Belgrade. The Commission was therefore welcomed 
under the strictest reservations. At first, Mr. Dragoumis, the Governor of 
Salonica, informed the Commission that, following the example of Servia, his 
government declined to acknowledge Mr. Milioukov, but that all the members of 
the Commission should have entire liberty of action. Then Mr. Brailsford 
in his turn and even more directly, was refused; his liberty was restricted to the 
point of twice trying to prevent him from going to Kilkich, which efforts of 
the authorities met with the congratulations of the press. 

In the face of so many difficulties from the very beginning, the Commission 

1 The press is authorized to announce that the Servian government declares categorically 
that it has never been hostile to an investigation, but that, on the contrary, it desires the 
inquiry of an impartial commission into the Bulgarian cruelties from which the Servians 
and the Greeks have so greatly suffered. It is entirely to the interest of both Greece and 
Servia that the civilized world should know of the Bulgarian atrocities. If therefore, the 
work of the Commission has miscarried, the cause must be sought for in one of its mem- 
bers, the declared enemy not only of Servia but of Greece, well known for what he has 
said against her, not only in speech but in writing. Moreover, the Commission has never 
made itself known until it presented itself here. No country could tolerate as a member 
of a Commission a man whose partiality and animosity are only too well known. 


asked itself if it should continue its work? It decided, strong in its independence 
and good faith, with the entire approbation of its President, not to discontinue, 
but to pursue its inquiry by all its means, where official aid failed it. The 
Commission has never ceased to protest, always with dignity, against the accu- 
sations of partisanship made against two of its members, and has never been 
divided for a single moment. The strength of its unity, so often and so roughly 
tested, will suffice to do away with any suspicion against its impartiality. Never 
for an instant were any of its members animated by the least desire to gather 
facts for prosecution against any particular people or State. On the contrary, 
they all desired to report nothing but the truth. They tried for instance, to 
get the replies of the Greeks and Servians to the accusations of the Bulgarians. 
It must be recalled that the Greeks welcomed with courtesy and kindness, 
the member of the Commission who was sent to Athens, while the others remained 
in and about Salonica. Indeed all these things must be taken into serious consider- 
ation, when one thinks of the previous passions ruling in the unhappy country; 
of the daily violence exchanged morning and night between the papers ; of the 
towns reduced to ruins; of the thousands of human beings wandering without 
refuge or aim ; of the death, blood and crime crying everywhere for vengeance ; 
of the Te Deums rising from churches whose very possession was disputed 
by rival fanaticisms. 

The Report 

In spite of all, the Commission did not abandon its voluntary task, impeded 
or not. It was not stopped, and one by one accomplished the different steps 
of the journey, from Belgrade to Salonica, to Athens, to Constantinople, to Sofia, 
from Servia to Greece, to Macedonia, to Turkey, to Thrace, to Bulgaria. The 
investigation required five weeks. On September 28, it returned to Paris, 
where it was joined by the other members who had given their authorization, and 
here they planned together the broad lines of the report which has required 
nearly a year to draw up, translate and publish. 

The preparation and publication of the report has cost more time and 
trouble than we expected, but happily what might have been a difficulty, complete 
harmony between all the members of the Commission proved to be a simple 
matter. The plan of the work once set on foot, — the historical chapter taking 
the place of a general introduction, — each of the members who had personally 
taken part in the journey, was entrusted according to his special ability with 
one or two chapters, under the collective responsibility of the Commission. 
This explains why no chapter is signed by its author, the Commission continuing 
up to the end to be animated by the same spirit of unity and the same ambition 
for truth. Each of the authors and the office of the Commission revised the 
proofs sent across continents at the cost of a good many complications. The 


Commission meeting in Paris has acted as a reading committee, and chosen the 
pictures, few in number, to be published, avoiding as much as possible, — though 
it was no easy matter, — a vulgar collection of horrors. It was not desirable, 
however, to eliminate these completely, and they appear in the report as speci- 
mens, often incomplete, of the illustrations published wholesale by the news- 
papers. The report is followed by an appendix which the Commission would 
gladly have made more complete. There we had hoped to publish the official 
communications and protestations of the Greek and Servian governments, as 
well as their statistics giving the numbers of the killed, wounded and lost, and 
the estimate of material losses. It is not our fault, if these documents do not 
terminate our report, but in default of governmental information, veracious and 
verified information has not been wanting, as will be seen. The execution of 
the maps both in the text and apart from it, without which many pages of 
our report would be difficult to read, was carried out under the direction of 
the geographers, Messrs. Schrader and Aitoff. The editing of the index and 
the typographical correction of the proofs were entrusted to the personnel of 
our Paris office. The main divisions of the report forced themselves on our 
plan: first the causes of the two wars; then the theater of operation; the 
actors in the drama ; the medley of nationalities engaged ; the inevitable violation, 
or rather the non-existence of an international law in the anarchy of men and 
of things ; finally the economic and moral consequences of the two wars, and 
the possible prospects for the future. 

Nothing could be more necessary than the first chapter on the causes of 
the two wars. It was the prelude and the indispensable statement of affairs, 
not only for those who do not know but for those who know more or less but 
who forget. If our report contained nothing but this full and serious expose, 
at once scholarly and equitable, its publication would be amply justified. We 
recommend those of our readers who assert that some of our members are 
actuated by pro-Bulgar sympathies, to read the pages in which is unfolded, 
from the conquest of the Turks and their taking of Constantinople, the fatality of 
the acts which led to the two last wars, among these acts, the outburst of 
folly, the unbridled militarism against the popular will. We draw attention 
to the aberration of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgar army, General Savov, 
who became the leader of a military party, and his monstrous outrage which 
calls everything into question, makes a holy war into a butchery, turns the 
heroes into brutes, who in short, by himself and in spite of Europe, precipitates 
the second war and its unknown tomorrows. This chapter seemed to me like a 
mirror faithfully reflecting a mass of complications, sometimes discouraging for 
the historian and still more so for the diplomat, but edifying for whoever 
attempts to protect his country from adventurers. One sees clearly in it the 
fundamental distinction which we never cease making, between the war of 
liberation and the war of conquest, between patriotism and crime. 


The second chapter is both painful and absorbing. Here we shall be re- 
proached for not taking sides. Here we ought to have said to each of the 
belligerents following the example of their press: "All the wrong is on the 
other side. The glory is entirely yours, the shame belongs only to the others." 

There is to be seen what must be thought of these official classifications 
which pretend, in this horrible confusion where "God himself would not recognize 
his own," to assemble all the good under the same flag and all the bad under 
another. There is to be seen how the war kindled by intrigue, begins with 
the generosity of youth, to terminate without distinction of race, in the unloosing 
of the human beast. It is useless to dwell upon these massacres which we 
can not pass over in silence. I do not know whether an ideal war has ever 
existed, but it is time that the world should know what war really means. 
All the poet-laureates, the ephemeral glorifiers of these infamies whose authors 
we are commanded not only to absolve but to admire, and to hold up as 
examples to our children, all the crowd of officious writers are there to counter- 
balance our report, and to praise what we are determined to denounce in the in- 
terests of nations which require to be enlightened in regard to themselves. 

Chapter III is not less lamentable, less harrowing, or less necessary, just 
because it will be more disagreeable to those who do not wish the truth to be 
known. Here the Greeks and the Bulgarians are no longer alone on the scene, 
the Turks and the Servians show what they can do. Here again, the Bulgarians 
are not spared more than the others ; but the others have their share too. They 
will protest, they will reflect, and their reflections will do them more good than 
lying eulogy. 

Chapter IV again holds up the mirror to an inextricable situation which 
must nevertheless be understood. Under the title "The War and the Nation- 
alities," it discloses an excess of horrors that we can scarcely realize in our 
systematized countries, war carried on not only by armies but by mobilized 
gangs, and in reality by the medley of nations ; local populations being "divided 
into as many fragments as there are nations fighting each other and wanting to 
substitute one for another. * * * This is the reason why so much blood 
was spilt in these wars. The worst atrocities were not due to the regular soldiers. 
* * * jj^ populations themselves killed each other." Whoever wishes to 
judge of the evil and to look for more than the appearance of a remedy should 
meditate over this fourth chapter, and study the maps before forming too 
severe a judgment upon these competitions of horrors, and condemning as 
culprits peoples who turn and turn about, for centuries past have been crushed 

Chapter V, "The War and International Law," is not less impartial than 
the preceding. Its conclusion is this : Every clause in international law relative 
to war on land and to the treatment of the wounded, has been violated by all 
the belligerents, including the Roumanian army, which was not properly speak- 



ing belligerent. Public opinion has made great progress on this question of 
late years. I confess that in my ardent participation in the two Hague Confer- 
ences, the conventions fixing the laws and customs of war, interested me infi- 
nitely less than those organizing arbitration, mediation and good will, which 
tended in fact to prevent war, and not to humanize it. To humanize war seemed 
to me then a hypocrisy and a satire, leading to its being too easily accepted, 
but since then I have recognized my error. War is not declared by those who 
carry it on. The armies are only instruments in the hands of the governments ; and 
these armies are recruited among the youth of each country. We at least owe 
it to them to spare them sufferings which they have not brought upon them- 
selves. To refuse to humanize war for fear of making it too frequent, is to let 
the weight of the governments' fault fall upon the soldier. In short, whatever 
amelioration diplomatic conferences can bring about in the horrors of war, it 
could never be enough. The torture of criminals is now suppressed. Should 
it exist — and what torture ! — for soldiers and for hostile populations ? The 
Commission has done its duty in contending that in spite of the Hague Conven- 
tions, the cruelty and ferocity and the worst outrages remained in the Balkans 
as the direct heritage of slavery and war. 

Chapter V suggests as a subject worthy of the deliberations of the Third 
Hague Conference, the constitution of a permanent international commission, 
named in advance, and empowered in case of war to go and observe the appli- 
cation of its resolutions which the belligerents themselves have signed. This 
innovation, precisely because it would have too much reason for existence, will 
run a great risk of being considered indiscreet. It deserves more than to be 
passed over from prejudice. 

We shall make a pause at Chapter VI. In an atmosphere of high and 
serene impartiality, the author contemplates the economic consequences of the 
war, and he concludes that in spite of appearances, it has been, apart from 
evil actions, because he does not desire to injure anyone, a bad and evil thing 
for every one, with the exception of course of the contractors who supplied the 
arms and ammunition, and the makers of wooden legs. Greece herself who 
is said to have made the maximum of possible gains, with the minimum of 
losses, because she was relatively far from the theater of war, even Greece 
has seen her national debt doubled. It is true that she will be able to retrieve 
her sacrifices by the new resources which she will draw from the islands and 
territories that are now part of her domain, but this is just where the question 
arises for her, as well as for all conquerors, even the happiest: Will the re- 
sources of which she assures herself, suffice to meet not only the expenses of 
the land improvement which her statesmen are unquestionably able to undertake, 
but also the military expenditure corresponding to her new ambitions? Here 
is Greece involved more deeply than she expected in the construction of arma- 
ments, competing with Italy, exposed in her turn to the temptation, to the 


fascination of dreadnoughts. For this hundreds of millions of capital will have 
to be borrowed, taxes imposed to pay the contributors, to say nothing of the 
always increasing cost of maintenance and consequent temptations, because a 
young nation whatever the wisdom of its rulers may be, will not easily resign 
itself to let its armaments, on land and sea become, as they do, old fashioned in 
a very few years, without having made use of them; it will not let its men of 
war lie at anchor and its soldiers remain idle in barracks. What will happen 
then? Greece, the beautiful, will in her turn, be torn between the militarists on 
the one side who proclaim their patriotism at every opportunity by means of 
their journals and the voices of their impatient orators, and, on the other side, 
by the party in favor of industry, of progress, seeing itself discredited while the 
sources of national riches are drained, and social revolt is engendered. * * * 
Greece is now going to discover how much it costs to abandon herself to the 
luxury of dreadnoughts. She is as yet only at the beginning. As to the other 
allies, and the Turks, we shall refrain from insisting upon their losses, which were 
very much greater than those of Greece, or upon the dangers that threaten their 
future. These are only too apparent. 

The moral consequences of the Balkan wars are briefly indicated in the 
chapter which completes the report. In it may be found the long reverberation 
of the many crimes as disastrous for their authors as for their victims and 
their respective countries. We are shown millions of human beings systemat- 
ically degraded by their own doing, corrupted by their own violence. It gives 
us a good example of the evil which elsewhere we strive to denounce and to 
combat, by showing us how the generations of tomorrow are corrupted by the 
heritage of their forefathers, and the young men taken from the necessary and 
urgent work of the farm and the workshop to be placed in the comparative 
idleness of barracks, to wait for the next war. All these apprehensions for the 
future are expressed without the slightest trace of animosity against one or 
other of these unhappy and misguided nations, but rather with a feeling of 
profound sympathy for them and for humanity. The conclusion of the chapter 
evolves itself definitely: violence carries its own punishment with it and some- 
thing very different from armed force will be needed to establish order and 
peace in the Balkans. 

The Lesson of the Two Wars 

Never was a lesson clearer and more brutal. United, the peoples of the 
Balkan peninsula, oppressed for so long, worked miracles that a mighty but 
divided Europe could not even conceive. Crete, Salonica, Uskub, even Scutari 
and Adrianople they took, and after a few months they almost entered Constanti- 
nople. It was the end, the Gordian knot was cut. Disunited, they were forced 
to come to a standstill and to exhaust themselves further in their effort to 
begin again, an effort indefinitely prolonged. For, far from being a solution, 


the second war was only the beginning of other wars, or rather of a continuous 
war, the worst of all, a war of religion, of reprisals, of race, a war of one 
people against another, of man against man and brother against brother. It has 
become a competition, as to who can best dispossess and "denationalize" his 
neighbor. The Turks in any case remain in Europe. The hecatombs of the 
siege of Adrianople have been in vain ; Macedonia, no longer a tomb, has become 
a hell. Thrace is torn in pieces. Albania erected into a principality, remains 
the most unhappy and the wildest object of the eager watching of Austria, 
Servia, Montenegro, Greece and Italy. The churches and the Christian schools 
are fighting among themselves, enjoying less liberty than under Ottoman rule. 
Constantinople, more than ever, will be the eternal apple of discord under the 
surveillance of the Russians, who are themselves under the surveillance of 
Germany, Austria Hungary and Roumania, in fact of all the Powers, friends, 
allies and enemies. Greater Greece, Greater Bulgaria, and Greater Servia, the 
children of contemporary megalomania, will in their turn keep a close watch 
over the Bosphorus. The islands bring on a contest between Turkey and Asia 
on one hand, and Italy, Greece, England and all the great European Powers on 
the other. The Mediterranean open to new rivalries, becomes again the battle- 
field which she had ceased to be. 

A dark prospect, which however, might become brighter if Europe and the 
great military Powers so wished. They could, in spite of everything, solve the 
problem if they were not determined to remain blind. 

The real struggle in the Balkans, as in Europe and America, is not between 
oppressors and oppressed. It is between two policies, the policy of armaments 
and that of progress. One day the force of progress triumphs, but the next 
the policy of rousing the passions and jealousies that lead to armaments and to 
war, gets the upper hand. 

With the second Balkan war, the policy of armaments spreads more strongly 
than ever. After having been the resource of European governments, it is 
about to become their punishment. 

A paradoxical situation ! The competition of armaments could not go on 
indefinitely, at this time of open economic competition between all the peoples 
of the Old World and the New. Already by reason of the increase of our 
budgets, and in spite of desperate efforts, it is losing prestige in popular opinion. 
It is being questioned, and consequently condemned. The extravagance of 
armaments appears like the development of a monstrous business, incompatible 
with national work. In spite of all the workmen that it employs, the salaries it 
pays, the auxiliary activities it supports, the war trade only flourishes by uni- 
versal insecurity, lives only upon the increase of public expense, by all of which 
the normal business of all countries suffers. Under this regime of armed peace, 
only the little countries or the new countries are favored, those which have no 
debts, no immense war budgets. 


What finally succeeds in bringing armed peace into disrepute, is that today 
the Great Powers are manifestly unwilling to make war. Each one of them, 
Germany, England, France and the United States, to name a few, has dis- 
covered the obvious truth that the richest country has the most to lose by war, 
and each country wishes for peace above all things. This is so true that these 
two Balkan wars have wrought us a new miracle, — we must not forget it, — 
namely, the active and sincere agreement of the Great Powers who, changing 
their tactics, have done everything to localize the hostilities in the Balkans and 
have become the defenders of the peace that they themselves threatened thirty- 
five years ago, at the time of the Berlin Congress. We might be tempted to 
attribute this evolution of public opinion and that of the governments in part 
to the new education which we are striving to spread, but let us stick to facts: 
The exigencies of the universal competition, the increased means of communi- 
cation, the protest of tax payers, and the dread of socialism and of the un- 
known, have been more efficacious in forcing the governments to think than 
any exhortations. 

If this is so, why not end it? That is the dream, but how to realize it? 
Every one ignores it. A large body of persons, possessing immense capital, 
is engaged in the manufacture of armaments; more still, a formidable plant 
which must be sunk has been created and continues to be created every day. Is 
there anyone who will ignore this accumulation of strength and of riches? 
Who will be able to stop short this impulse? True, the home market is 
overstocked in every country with orders for armaments. Neither the jingo 
papers nor those in the hands of the federation of military contractors, who are 
so admirably organized into national and international syndicates, can urge 
indefinitely for a national consummation. There comes a time when public opinion 
refuses to submit any longer to this so-called patriotic regime ; and the war trade, 
inspired with new ambition, turns its attention towards exportation. As the 
home market is not sufficient, a foreign market is created. The war trade 
believes that the foreign policy of a great nation is first and foremost the policy 
of armaments. The main duty of diplomacy according to it, is the struggle as 
to who shall carry off from a great rival nation, such and such a contract for 
guns, cannon or ironclads, and who shall subordinate political interventions or 
loans of money to army contracts. 

The struggles become Homeric conflicts of influence and intrigue. Ambassa- 
dors can not disregard them without a kind of abdication. Has not even the 
Emperor of a great neighboring country made it a point of honor to militarize 
Turkey? — without any great success it is true. But what of Turkey or the 
colonies or the small states of few resources? An effort has been made to 
militarize North and South America, and Australia as well. Canada, whose 
future lies precisely in her exemption from all military burdens, has been forced 
to order a fleet from England, and to extract from a population still insufficient, 


the elements of a navy which they have done very well without for a hundred 
years ! Australia has not hesitated. Brazil, the Argentine, Chile and the other 
republics of South America did resist, thus giving Europe an example of peace- 
ful cooperation ; but now their former good sense has been overcome by attempts 
of all sorts continually repeated. Commercial travelers in patriotism have 
hurried from every corner of Europe to demonstrate the necessity for ordering 
the biggest battleships possible. We may recall the extraordinary experience 
of Brazil, the first dupe of these campaigns, when her great "Armada" arrived 
from the English ship yards and she saw it make its first attempt to cannonade 
Rio de Janeiro ! It was the beginning of disillusion, the mastodon killed by 
ridicule. Since then, the propaganda of armaments has declined, even in the 
United States, where, however, the yellow press, typical of its kind, has given 
its proofs and is agitating the matter again, thanks to the providential events in 
Mexico. In the last few years, the House of Representatives at Washington 
has refused to vote more than one ironclad against two. In Germany, the 
Krupp case, the Saverne events, and many other incidents, without speaking of 
the Berne Conference, have been the answer to the furious excitement of the pan- 
Germanic press. In Japan itself there has just burst the unprecedented scandal 
of the naval contracts. 

Russia nevertheless, happily for the great war trade, forgets how much 
the disasters of her navy have cost, and once more has allowed herself to be 
imposed upon. Austria has capitulated too, even Spain asks nothing better 
than to be persuaded, inasmuch as she can afford it. But on the whole the 
enthusiasm was cooling when the practice of the new Balkan States came to 
renew it. The acclamations of the jingo press of all countries greeted these 
fortunate countries, new centers for imports. 

Even the battleships with which Brazil and the Argentine are disgusted, are 
being handed over to Turkey and Greece. Constantinople will become a vast 
arsenal and a naval port, worthy of her name and her past. The Greek fleet 
will oblige Italy, whose ardor was declining, to increase her navy as well; 
and following this example, the great countries of Europe and America will not 
remain unaffected. The naval leagues will agitate, the embassies will report 
these imposing manifestations, by sending confidential despatches, communicated 
as soon as received to the leading papers. Patriotic speakers, in print and on the 
platform, will inveigh against the "lie of pacifism," and so the prediction of the 
Americans that "the next war will be declared by the press," will be realized. 

Then the Greeks, the Turks, the Servians, the Bulgarians, the Montenegrins 
and the Albanians, armed to the teeth, provided with all the guns and all the 
dreadnoughts for which we have no further use, can kill each other once more, 
and even drag into their quarrel the European governments, who will be as they 
themselves are, victims of the press and commercial patriotism, or in other 
words, of the policy of armaments. 

Confronted by these follies or these crimes, — the word matters little, — our 


sole resource while waiting for the day when we shall see the rise of an inde- 
pendent press, is our duty of speaking the truth which even the most sensible 
people hesitate to admit, for fear of compromising themselves. 

In one of the speeches that I made in the Senate to free my conscience, 
before an audience sympathetic at heart, but fully determined not to support 
me, I calculated that France has imposed upon herself more than a hundred 
billion francs in unproductive expenditure during the last forty-three years, an 
average of more than two billion francs a year. This is the minimum price of 
armed peace for one country only. Several hundreds of billions in a half cen- 
tury for the Great Powers together ! ! 

Think what United Europe might have done with these millions, had she 
consecrated even half to the service of progress! Imagine Europe herself, 
not to speak of Africa and Asia, penetrated and regenerated by the pure air, in 
its most distant parts, of free intercourse, of education and security. Can we 
picture what might have been the position today of these unfortunate Balkan 
peoples, if their patrons, the Great Powers of Europe, had competed with each 
other in aiding them, in giving them roads, and railways, and waterways, schools, 
laboratories, museums, hospitals and public works ! 

The most suitable title for this report would have been, "Europe Divided 
and her Demoralizing Action in the Balkans," but taking it all round this might 
have been unjust. 

The real culprits in this long list of executions, assassinations, drownings, 
burnings, massacres and atrocities furnished by our report, are not, we repeat, 
the Balkan peoples. Here pity must conquer indignation. Do not let us con- 
demn the victims. Nor are the European governments the real culprits. They 
at least tried to amend things and certainly they wished for peace without 
knowing how to establish it. The true culprits are those who mislead public 
opinion and take advantage of the people's ignorance to raise disquieting rumors 
and sound the alarm bell, inciting their country and consequently other countries 
into enmity. The real culprits are those who by interest or inclination, declaring 
constantly that war is inevitable, end by making it so, asserting that they are 
powerless to prevent it. The real culprits are those who sacrifice the general 
interest to their own personal interest which they so little understand, and who 
hold up to their country a sterile policy of conflict and reprisals. In reality 
there is no salvation, no way out either for small states or for great countries 
except by union and conciliation. 

d'Estournelles de Constant. 


The Origin of the Two Balkan Wars 
1. The Ethnography and National Aspirations of the Balkans 

It is not proposed in this chapter to enter exhaustively into a question on 
which there is a highly abundant literature already in existence, both in the va- 
rious European and Balkan languages. The intention is simply to furnish the 
data indispensable to the reader who is interested in the work done by the Com- 
mission, though unfamiliar with the details of the questions at issue in the Balkan 
peninsula. Every page of the Report handles such a mass of ideas, facts and 
dates, which, though supposed to be generally known, are in fact not so, that it 
seemed impossible to plunge the reader at once in tnedias res. Those more famil- 
iar with things in the East may begin the Report at the next Chapter. 

The actual course of events in the Balkans is a very close reproduction of the 
conditions existing previous to the arrival of the Turks in Europe. Then, as 
now, the Christian States were engaged in constant internecine strife for hege- 
mony in the peninsula. Victory both in the tenth and again in the thirteenth cen- 
tury was with the Bulgarian State, which though still primitive in organization, 
owed its temporary ascendancy to the conquests of a military chief. 

Then in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries came the turn of the conquering 
Servians. Intermittently, the Byzantine Emperors recovered their preponder- 
ance in the peninsula. The various peoples who had occupied the different re- 
gions from the third to the sixth century, A. D. (the indigenous population, Greek, 
Albanian, or Roumanian having been either driven out or assimilated) served only 
to swell the armies or figure in the imposing titles assumed by the autocrats of 
all these, Servians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, conjoined in a sort of Imperial 
organization, a "Great Servia" or "Great Bulgaria." The collapse of these ephem- 
eral "Great" States produced no change in the ethnographic composition of the 
peninsula. Political structures fell and rose again without any attempt being made 
to fuse the populations into any sort of national whole. At that stage indeed 
the national idea was not as now closely connected with the State idea. The 
Bulgar, the Servian, the Wallachian, the Albanian remained Bulgarian, Servian, 
Wallachian or Albanian, throughout all the successive regimes; and thus the 
ancient ethnographic composition remained unaltered until the Turkish conquest 
came, leveling all the nationalities and preserving them all alike in a condition of 
torpor, in a manner comparable to the action of a vast refrigerator. 

Even if the political constructions which followed one another and which 
were actually in conflict with one another at the advent of the Turks, had con- 


tained in them the germs of nationalities, the Turkish regime would have ruth- 
lessly stamped them out. The Turks unconsciously worked for their destruction 
in the most effective possible way. They banished or assimilated the ruling class, 
that is to say the warrior class, in the conquered countries. In the communes 
there remained no one but the village agriculturists, whose only ethical bond was 
that of religion. Here again the Turkish regime did much to reduce the ethnic 
and national significance of the religious element to its lowest terms. The re- 
ligion of all the conquered nationalities being the same, i. e., Oriental orthodoxy, 
the Turks ended by recognizing only one clergy as representative of the rayas 
(creeds), the one chosen being the Greek clergy, the most cultivated and in the 
capital (Constantinople) the most prominent. The Phanar (the Greek quarter 
of Constantinople in which the Greek patriarchate is situated), finally became the 
sole orthodox church in Turkey; the last remains of the national autonomous 
churches which still existed at Okhrida (for the Bulgarians) and at Ipek (for 
the Servians) being abolished by the decrees of the Greek patriarchate of 1765 
and 1767 respectively. Consequently, a common race name was given to the 
orthodox populations in the official language of the Turkish bureaucracy: they 
were all "Roum-mileti," from the name, Romaios, of the Greek people. (This is 
the name the modern Greeks gave themselves down to recent times.) 

Nevertheless, although the people were thus merged and submerged, na- 
tional consciousness was not completely obliterated. There was always a certain 
discontent between the pastors and their flocks. The latter could not forget that 
they had formerly heard mass celebrated in their national language by a priest 
whom they chose themselves and whose interests were not limited to taxes and 
state service. The Greek priest, on his side, was expatriated in the midst of a 
Slav population ; it was humiliating for a lover of the muses to dwell in a barba- 
rian world, in the midst of "wearers of sheep skins." The conditions being so, 
any favorable circumstance, any spark from outside, would be enough to re-light 
the flame of nationality. 

It is impossible in this too brief sketch to follow in detail the course of the 
re-awakening of the national idea in the Balkans. It goes back to the earliest 
days of the Turkish conquest. The Servians and Roumanians, the last to be sub- 
dued by the Turks, were the first to claim their autonomy. What especially 
favored the development of national consciousness among the Servians was the 
large proportion of their race which had remained outside the Ottoman conquest. 
Even apart from the Servians on the Adriatic, who had been open to the influences 
of Italian literature since the sixteenth century, those in Austria Hungary had 
tasted European civilization long before the Servians in Turkey. Ragusa first, 
and afterwards Agram (in Slav "Zagreb") were intellectual centers of the 
Servian nation before Belgrade. 

I n Servi a proper the struggle for independence preceded the intellectual de- 
velopment of the nation. While our Commission was in Belgrade a monument 



was erected, in honor of the first liberator of Servia, the founder of the present 
dynasty, Kara-Georges, who more than a century ago (1804) organized the first 
resistance offered by the people to its Turkish masters. In the year 1813 the first 
insurrection was defeated ; Kara-Georges fled to Austria, and was killed in 1817. 
But a new leader had already appeared in the person of the founder of the sec- 
ond Servian dynasty, — recently extinguished with Alexander and Draga, namely 
Michel Obrenovits, the son of a peasant, like Kara-Georges. The second 
insurrection, with Michel at its head, was more successful than the first. The 
convention of Akkerman (1826) secured Servia a sort of autonomy under Rus- 
sian protectorate, and the Hatticherif of 1829 confirmed and completed the act by 
making Servia a hereditary principality under the Sultan's suzerainty. A year 
later another Hatticherif gave the Servians the right to establish primary schools ; 
and by 1836 there were seventy-two of these in the principality. 

Greece, at the other extremity of the peninsula, had closely followed Servia's 
example. There, too, effort at national revival outside the country went on con- 
temporaneously with the endeavors at revolt on which the wild mountaineers ven- 
tured from time to time. These mountaineers are known by the picturesque 
appellation of "thieves" (Klephtai, patriotic thieves, in distinction to lestai, 
brigands pure and simple). 

The liberty of Greece proclaimed by the national assembly at Epidaurus was 
not recognized until the Act of February 3, 1830. Then the bases of national civ- 
ilization asserted since 1814 by members of the Philiki Heteria were formally 
laid down. We have already seen that thanks to the energy of the Phanar clergy, 
the Greek schools had maintained not existence merely but vitality, despite the 
Turkish rule, and sent out generations of educated Greeks. 

This was not the fate of the countries in the interior — Bulgaria and Mace- 
donia. It_is_true that the first indications of national consciousness appeared 
early, in the course of the eighteenth century. Down to 1840 they went on spread- 
ing in proportion to the increasing influence of foreign civilization (in the present 
case, of Russian civilization). It was not until 1852, however, that the first na- 
tional Bulgarian school appeared, at Tirnovo. At the close of this period a move- 
ment in the direction of religious independence made itself felt. From 1860 on, 
a most bitter conflict broke out between the heads of the Bulgarian community 
at Constantinople and the Greek patriarchate, religion and nationality being iden- 
tified on either side. Since Greek nationalism constituted a political danger for 
Turkey, while the Bulgarians had as yet formulated no political claim, their chiefs 
rather piquing themselves on their loyalty towards the Sultan, the Turkish authori- 
ties began to take sides against the Greeks in this national strife, and finally con- 
ceded to the Bulgarians the establishment of a national church subject to purely 
formal recognition of the patriarchal supremacy. This was the beginning of the 
Bulgarian exarchy, officially recognized by the Firman of 1870. 

The Greeks, however, would not admit their defeat. The patriarch refused 


to accept the firman. The Bulgarians, supported by the Turks, retorted by electing 
their first exarch and making formal proclamation (May 11, 1872) of the inde- 
pendence of their church. Thereupon the patriarch, four months later, excommu- 
nicated the new church and declared it schismatic. This too hasty step served only 
to assist the Bulgarian cause. The Bulgarians having now secured what they 
desired, i. e., a church wholly independent of the Greeks and thoroughly national, 
both in its head and its members, proceeded to fix the dioceses of the new church. 
Some of these dioceses were actually enumerated in the firman: the exarchies 
of Bulgaria today; others, which were also to form part of the national church, 
were in accordance with Article 10 of the firman to be fixed by a vote of the popu- 
lation. 1 Accordingly the exarchate took a plebiscite, as laid down in Article 11, 
beginning with the provinces of Uskub and Okhrida. Since a more than two- 
thirds majority there declared against the Patriarch the Porte gave its berat 
(investiture) to the Bulgarian Bishops of Uskub and Okhrida. 

But Okhrida and Uskub are Macedonian. The question of Macedonia had 
thus definitely arisen. It is true that before 1873 the Greeks had already con- 
tended for this region with the Slavs. But it had not yet occurred to the Slavs 
(Servians and Bulgarians) to dispute about it among themselves. The young 
radicals in Servia and Bulgaria who between 1860 and 1870 disseminated the no- 
tion of a Southern Slav Federation, accepted the proposition that the populations 
of Thrace and Macedonia were as Bulgarian as those of Bulgaria, as a settled fact, 
traditionally established. The Bulgarian publicist, Liouben Karavelov, wrote the 
following in 1869-70: 

The Greeks show no interest in knowing what kind of people live in 
such a country as Macedonia. It is true that they say that the country for- 
merly belonged to the Greeks and therefore ought to belong to them again 
* * * But we are in the nineteenth century and historical and canonical 
rights have lost all significance. Every people, like every individual, ought to 
be free and every nation has the right to live for itself. Thrace and Macedo- 
nia ought then to be Bulgarian since the people who live there are 

And his friend the Servian Vladimir Yovanovits on his side, regarded Bos- 
nia, Herzegovina and Metchia as the only Servian lands in Turkey, that is Old 
Servia in the most limited sense of the term, which shows that he accepted the 
view of Macedonia as Bulgarian. 

Yet there existed in Servia at this epoch a section of nationalist opinion which 
declared that Old Servia included the whole of Macedonia and claimed it as having 

iArticle X of the Firman of March 11, 1870. * * * "If the whole orthodox population 
or at least two-thirds thereof, desire to establish an exarchy for the control of their 
spiritual affairs in localities other than those indicated above, and this desire be clearly 
established, they may be permitted to do as they wish. Such permission, however, may only 
be accorded with the consent or upon the request of the whole population, or at least 
two-thirds thereof. 


formed part of the ''Great" Servia of the time of Douchan the Strong. These 
Servian nationalists did not confine themselves to polemics in the press : they be- 
gan to organize schools in Macedonia, where the Servian masters were instructed 
to teach in literary Servian and employ text books written in Belgrade. Mr. Milo- 
yevits, one of the leaders of this movement, tells us that in 1865 there was only 
one school in Macedonia proper founded by the Servians; in 1866 there were 
already as many as six; in 1867, 32; in 1868, 42. From that time on the Servian 
government became interested in these schools and began subsidizing them. The 
Macedonian population on the other hand received the schools willingly. Were 
not the schoolmasters Slavs who had come to Macedonia to fight the Greek in- 
fluence ? Soon, however, it appeared that the Servian teachers were there to carry 
on propaganda for their nationality. The Bulgarian press was roused, and from 
1869 on a lively dispute followed. 

The partisans of the "Yougo-Slav Federation" consoled themselves with the 
reflection that this Servian nationalist doctrine only represented the views of a 
small group of journalists and dilettante historians and ethnographers. But as we 
have seen, it had already secured the support of the State. Two circumstances, 
contributed to accentuate this tendency : one, the organization o£ the new national 
Bulgarian church,— the exarchy; the other, the diplomatic check to Servia's 
hopes of an outlet on the Adriatic. 

Mention has already been made of an early success of the exarchist church 
in Macedonia — the two berats sanctioning the bishoprics of Okhrida and Uskub. 
Other victories were to follow. The Greeks, who had considered Macedonia as 
their patrimony, naturally viewed them with disfavor. It occurred to them, as a 
means of withdrawing the attention of the Bulgarians from Macedonia, to sug- 
gest the extension of the Bulgarian ecclesiastical organization to the Servian coun- 
tries, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The suggestion pleased the Bulgarians, but al- 
though they accepted the Greek proposition, they did not renounce their Mace- 
donian pretensions. The list of the exarchist dioceses to be created became a 
long one, embracing as it soon did the whole of Macedonia, Old Servia, Bosnia and 

The Servian government could not regard such claims with indifference, 
since it was fully aware of the inseparability of the ideas of nationality and a na- 
tional church. The Servian Ministry therefore pointed out that while the ethno- 
graphic nature of the Macedonian dioceses formed subject of discussion, those of 
Old Servia were indisputably Servian. If the Bulgarian dioceses wished to form 
an exarchist church, the dioceses of the ancient Servian provinces must, in their 
turn, recognize the head of the church of the Servian principality as their spirit- 
ual head. Here was the whole Macedonian conflict in germ. Even the tactics 
employed foreshadow the course of recent events. 

Servia joined Greece against the Bulgarian exarchy. The Servians, fighting 
against the national Bulgarian church, chose to remain subject to the Greek pa- 


triarch. He profited by this to impose Greek bishops upon them and persisted in 
giving a Greek denomination to their religious communities. Thus did the Ser- 
vians in Turkey deprive themselves of their own free will of the most effective 
weapon in the national conflict. From this time on the "exarchist" was exclusively 
Bulgarian and the Macedonian population, called Boulgari from time imme- 
morial, began to feel itself at once Bulgarian and Slav. Outside the national 
Bulgarian church, which thus remained the Slav church in Macedonia, there 
were only "patriarchists" of every kind — Greek, Wallachian or Servian united 
under one Greek ecclesiastical authority, that of Constantinople. 

The second circumstance driving Servia to accentuate its Macedonian pre- 
tensions was the "occupation" of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria Hungary. 
It is now known that at the interview between Emperor Alexander II and Emper- 
or Francis Joseph at Reichstadt on July 8, 1876, it was agreed that in the event 
of Servia or Montenegro winning independence, Austria Hungary should have 
the right to "occupy and administer" these provinces. The same terms were re- 
peated in the Berlin treaty. At the same time Austria Hungary emphasized her 
assertion that she regarded Servia as within her sphere of influence. 

At Reichstadt, Russia agreed not to make war on Servian territory, and 
when General Ignatiev suggested the annexation of Bosnia to the Austrian dip- 
lomats as the condition of recognition of the treaty of San Stefano, Count An- 
drassy replied by a counter proposition, that of leaving Russia full freedom of ac- 
tion in Bulgaria on condition of the proclamation of Macedonia's autonomy under 
Austro-Hungarian protection. 

After the Berlin Congress, Austria Hungary entered into closer relations 
with King Milan of Servia. He signed the secret treaty of 1881, in which (§7) 
Austria Hungary formally declared that she "would not oppose, would even 
support Servia against other powers in the event of the latter's finding a way of 
extending its southern boundary, exception being made in the case of the Sand- 
jak of Novi Bazar." In 1889, when this treaty was renewed, Austria ;Hungary 
promised in even clearer terms "to aid in the extension of Servia in the direction 
of the Vardar valley." Thus at the very moment when Austria Hungary was 
depriving Servia of any possibility of westward extension, by joining the section 
of the Servian population inhabiting Bosnia and Herzegovina to herself, Aus- 
trian diplomacy was holding out by way of compensation, the hope of an exten- 
sion towards the south, in those territories whose population had, up to 1860- 
1870, been universally recognized as Bulgarian, even by the Servians. 

From this time on nationalism distinctly gained ground in Servia. The 
whole of Macedonia was identified with "Old Servia" and "Young Servia," 
in its map, claimed the entire territory occupied under the rule of Stephen 
Douchan, in the fourteenth century. At this period the net work of Servian 
schools spread specially fast, thanks to the aid of the Turks, who here as else- 
where followed their habitual policy of playing off the Servian and Greek 


minorities against the stronger and more dangerous majority of the Bulgarian 
exarchists. In 1889 the Servian school manuals were for the first time pub- 
lished at Constantinople with ministerial sanction and the Servian school soon 
ceased to be secret and persecuted. In 1895-96 according to official Servian sta- 
tistics there were 157 schools with 6,831 scholars and 238 male and female 
teachers. It is, however, noteworthy that eighty of these schools, comprising 
3,958 scholars and 120 male and female teachers were situated in Old Servia 
properly so-called, that is to say, that more than half of them belonged to coun- 
tries which were undoubtedly Servian. 

Here are the statistics for the Bulgarian-exarchist schools for the same 
period: there were in Macedonia 1896-97, 843 such schools (against 77 Servian 
schools), 1,306 teachers (Servian, 118); 31,719 scholars (Servian, 2,873); chil- 
dren in the kindergarten, 14,713. 

These figures show that at the close of the nineteenth century the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the Slav population of Macedonia was sending its children to the 
exarchist Bulgarian school. The school became henceforth an auxiliary of the 
national movement, and independent of the church. The movement changed 
both its character and its object. Side by side with the ecclesiastical movement 
led by priests and assisted by the religious council of the community, there arose 
about 1895 a revolutionary movement, directed against the Turkish regime, 
whose object was political autonomy and whose leaders were recruited from the 
school teachers. On the other hand the resistance of the minorities, supported 
by the Turks, grew more pro»ounced. "Patriarchism" and "exarchism" became 
the rallying cries of the two conflicting nations. From this time on the ethno- 
graphic composition of Macedonia was only to be elucidated by an enumeration of 
"exarchist" and "patriarchist" households — a most uncertain and fluctuating 
method since the strife grew more complicated, so that one and the same family 
would sometimes be divided into "Bulgarians," "Greeks," "Wallachians" and 
"Servians," according to the church attended by this or that member. 

The new generation in Servia therefore now sought a more reliable and 
scientific means of determining nationality, and found it in language. Youthful 
scholars devoted themselves to the study of Macedonian dialects and sought for 
phonetic and morphological traces of Servian influence which might enable 
them to be classified among Servian dialects. Bulgarian linguists, on their side 
did the same, and insisted on an essentially Bulgarian basis in the Macedonian 

The rival claims to Macedonia might be summed up under the following 
main heads : — 

(1) "Historical rights" to the possession of Macedonia, acquired by Simeon 
the Bulgarian or Douchan the Servian. (Tenth or fourteenth century.) 

(2) Resemblance in customs (above all those pertaining to the Fete of 


New Year's Day — the Slava, claimed by the Servians as the sign of their na- 

(3) Religion — exarchist or patriarchist. 

(4) The spoken language. 

Official Turkish statistics admitted only one principle of discrimination be- 
tween the ethnic, groups dwelling in Macedonia, namely religion. Thus all the 
Mahommedans formed a single group although there might be among them 
Turks, Albanians, Bulgarian "pomaks," etc. : all the patriarchists in the same way 
were grouped together as ''Greeks," although there might be among them Ser- 
vians, Wallachians, Bulgarians, etc. Only in the "exarchist" group, did religion 
coincide, more or less, with Bulgarian nationality. The Turkish official registers 
included men only; women were not mentioned, since the registers served only 
for the purposes of military service and taxation. Often nothing was set down 
but the number of "households." This explains the lack of anything approaching 
exact statistics of the Macedonian populations. Owing to the different princi- 
ples and methods of calculation employed, national propagandists arrived at 
wholly discrepant results, generally exaggerated in the interest of their own na- 
tionality. The table subjoined shows how great is this divergence in estimate and 
calculation : 

BULGARIAN STATISTICS (Mr. Kantchev, 1900) 

Turks 499,204 

Bulgarians 1,181,336 

Greeks 228,702 

Albanians 128,711 

Wallachians 80,767 

Jews 67,840 

Gypsies 54,557 

Servians 700 

Miscellaneous 16,407 

Total 2,258,224 



Timok Dialect. 
Prizrend Dialect. 

Bulgarian Territory where Servian is spoken. 

Bulgaro-Macedonian Territory where Servian 

is spoken. 


Serbo-Macedonian Dialect. [ \"\\\\\ Non-Slavic Territory 


SERVIAN STATISTICS (Mr.. Gopcevic, 1889) 1 

Turks 231,400 

Bulgarians 57,600 

Greeks 201,140 

Albanians 165,620 

Wallachians 69,665 

Jews 64,645 

Gypsies 28,730 

Servians 2,048,320 

Miscellaneous 3,500 

Total 2,870,620 

GREEK STATISTICS (Mr. Delyani, 1904) 
(Kosovo vilayet omitted) 

Turks 634,017 

Bulgarians 332,162 

Greeks 652,795 


Wallachians 25,101 

Jews 53,147 

Gypsies 8,911 


Miscellaneous 18,685 

Total 1,724,818 

The Bulgarian statistics alone take into account the national consciousness of 
the people themselves. The Servian calculations are generally based on the re- 
sults of the study of dialect and on the identity of customs: they are therefore 
largely theoretic and abstract in character. The Greek calculations are even more 
artificial, since their ethnic standard is the influence exercised by Greek civiliza- 
tion on the urban populations, and even the recollections and traces of classical 

The same difficulties meet us when we leave population statistics and turn 
to geographical distribution. From an ethnographical point of view the popula- 
tion of Macedonia is extremely mixed. The old maps, from that of Ami Bone 
(1847) down, follow tradition in regarding the Slav population of Macedonia 
as Bulgarian. Later local charts make the whole country either Servian, or Greek. 
Any attempt at more exact delineation, based on topical study, is of recent date. 
There are, for example, Mr. Kantchev's maps, representing Bulgarian opinion, 
and the better known one of Mr. Tsviyits representing Servian. But Mr. Tsviyits' 
ethnographic ideas vary also with the development of Servia's political preten- 
sions. In 1909 he gave "Old Servia" a different outline from that he gave in 
1911 (see his map published in the "Petermann" series) ; and in the hour of 
Servian victory on the eve of the second Balkan war, another professor at Bel- 
grade University, Mr. Belits, published his map, based on a study of dialects, -a 

1 Recent Servian authorities avoid giving general figures or else, like Mr. Guersine, sug- 
gest a total for the Macedonian Slav population which approximates more closely to Mr. 
Kantchev's figures. 


map which satisfied the most recent and immoderate pretensions. The Servo- 
Bulgarian frontier recognized by the treaty of March 13 is plainly inspired by 
the ideas of Mr. Tsviyits, while the line drawn by Mr. Belits reveals and explains 
the causes of the breaking of the treaty and the war between the allies. 

But we are anticipating. We must now return to the close of the nineteenth 
century to see two parallel and rival ideas ripening — the ideas of the autonomy 
and of the partition of Macedonia. 

2. The Struggle for Autonomy 

The part played by Russia in the liberation of Bulgaria is sufficiently well 
known. It is much less well known that this liberation was preceded in 1878 by 
a national movement on the spot. Of this we have spoken already in connec- 
tion with the peaceful struggle carried on by the exarchate against the Phanariot 
Greeks. It was accompanied by a revolutionary movement whose aim was the 
independence of Bulgaria. As in Servia and in Greece at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the movement found allies among the semi-brigand, semi- 
revolutionary mountain chiefs, known as hdidouks. The principal leaders, the 
"apostles" of the movement, however, were revolutionaries of a more modern 
type, intellectuals whose education had frequently been acquired in foreign schools 
and universities. The generation of the "apostles" declared against the older 
methods of conflict, the ecclesiastical methods adopted by the tchobadjis, or na- 
bobs of the Bulgarian colony at Constantinople. The people were with the apos- 
tles, and the era of insurrections began, bringing in its train the Turkish atroci- 
ties which Gladstone revealed to the civilized world. The Macedonian Bulga- 
rians shared in this movement as well as the Bulgarians of Bulgaria proper. It 
was quite natural that the close of the Russo-Turkish war should see arising the 
idea of an "undivided Bulgaria," conceived within the limits of the treaty of San 
Stefano and including all the populations in Turkey regarded by themselves as 
Bulgarian. The protestations of Servian nationalism were stifled by the Servians 
themselves, for they, like Mr. Verkovits, had recognized all the countries enclosed 
within the boundaries of the Bulgaria of the future, imagined by Count Ignatiev, 
as traditionally Bulgarian. 1 

The fate of the treaty of San Stefano is familiar. The principality of Bul- 
garia was dismembered, and Macedonia remained in the hands of the Turks. This 
was the origin and cause of all subsequent conflicts. "Undivided Bulgaria," 
tsielo coupna Boulgaria, becam e in future the goal and the ideal of Bulgarian na- 

*It should be added that the ethnographic boundaries of Bulgaria, including therein 
Macedonia, were, previous to the treaty of San Stefano, indicated in the Minutes of the 
Conference at Constantinople in 1876. (See the debates of December 11/23.) The treaty 
of San Stefano as agreed upon between Russia and Turkey was, as is known, modified in 
essential respects and remade by the Berlin agreement, which divided this ethnographic 
Bulgaria in three parts: (i) The principality of Bulgaria; (ii) The vassal province of 
Eastern Roumelia; (iii) The Turkish province of Macedonia. 



tional policy. Turkey replied by favoring minorities. An internal conflict fol- 
lowed by the use of means of which the late war has given an appalling example. 
From this time on there was no more security in Macedonia. Each of the rival 
nations, — Bulgarian, Greek, Servian, counted its heroes and its victims, its cap- 
tains and its recruits, in this national guerrilla warfare and the result for each 
was a long martyrology. By the beginning of 1904 the number of political as- 
sassinations in Macedonia had, according to the English Blue Book, reached an 
average of one hundred per month. The Bulgarians naturally were the strongest, 
their bands the most numerous, their whole militant organization possessing 
the most extensive roots in the population of the country. The government of 


after the conference of 


After A.d'Avril 

Th >Veinreb del- 

the Bulgarian principality had presided at the origination of the Macedonian 
movement in the time of Stefane Stamboulov (about 1895). There was, how- 
ever, always a divergence between the views of official Bulgaria which sought to 
use the movement as an instrument in its foreign policy, and those of the revolu- 
tionaries proper, most of them young people, enamored of independence and filled 
with a kind of cosmopolitan idealism. 

The revolutionary movement in Macedonia has frequently been represented 
as a product of Bulgarian ambition and the Bulgarian government held directly 
responsible for it. As a matter of fact, however, the hands of the government 
were always forced by the Macedonians, who relied on public opinion, violently 


excited by the press, and the direct propaganda of the leaders. There certainly 
was a "Central Committee" at Sofia, whose president was generally someone who 
enjoyed the confidence of the prince. This committee, however, served chiefly 
as the representative of the movement in the eyes of the foreigner; in the eyes 
of the real leaders it was always suspected of too great eagerness to serve the dy- 
nastic ambitions of King Ferdinand. It was in Macedonia that the real revo- 
lutionary organization, uncompromising and jealous of its independence, was to 
be found. For the origins of this internal organization we must go back to 
1893, when, in the little village of Resna, a small group of young Bulgarian in- 
tellectuals founded a secret society with the clearly expressed intention of "pre- 
paring the Christian population for armed struggle against the Turkish regime 
in order to win personal security and guarantees for order and justice in the ad- 
ministration," which may be translated as the political autonomy of Macedonia. 
The "internal organization" did not aim at the annexation of Macedonia to Bul- 
garia ; it called all nationalities dwelling in the three vilayets to join its ranks. 
Xo confidence was felt in Europe; hope was set on energetic action by the people. 
To procure arms, distribute them to the young people in the villages, and drill the 
latter in musketry and military evolutions — such were the first endeavors of the 
conspirators. All this was not long in coming to the notice of the Turks, who 
came by accident upon a depot of arms and bombs at Vinitsa. This discovery 
gave the signal for Turkish acts of repression and atrocities which counted more 
than two hundred victims. From that time on, there was no further halt in the 
struggle in Macedonia. The people, far from being discouraged by torture and 
massacre, became more and more keenly interested in the organization. In a 
few years the country was ready for the struggle. The whole country had been 
divided into military districts, each with its captain and militia staff. The central 
"organization," gathering force "everywhere and nowhere" had all the regular 
machinery of a revolutionary organization ; an "executive police," a postal service 
and even an espionage service to meet the blows of the enemy and punish "trai- 
tors and spies." Throughout this period of full expansion, the people turned 
voluntarily to the leaders, even in the settlement of their private affairs, instead of 
going before the Ottoman officials and judges, and gladly paid their contributions 
to the revolutionary body. Self-confidence grew to such a point that offensive 
action began to be taken. The agricultural laborers tried striking against their 
Turkish masters for a rise in wages, to bring them up to the minimum laid down 
by the leaders of the "organization." They grew bolder in risking open skirmishes 
with the Turkish troops ; and the official report of the "organization" records that 
as many as 132 conflicts (512 victims) took place in the period 1898-1902. At last 
European diplomacy stirs. The first scheme of reforms appeared, formulated by 
Russia and Austria in virtue of their entente of 1897. The Austro-Russian note 
of February, 1903, formulates demands too modest to be capable of solving the 
problem. The result was as usual ; the Porte hastens to prevent European action 


by promising in January to inaugurate reforms. The Macedonian revolutionaries 
are in despair. A little group of extremists detaches itself from the Committee 
to attempt violent measures such as might stir Europe ; in June bombs were 
thrown at Salonica. On July 20 (old style) the day of St. Elie (I line-den) a. 
formal insurrection breaks out: the rayas see that they are strong enough to 
measure themselves against their old oppressors. 

It is the climax of the "internal organization" and that of its fall. The heroism 
of the rebels breaks itself against the superior force of the regular army. The fight- 
ing ratio is one to thirteen, 26,000 to 351,000; there are a thousand deaths and, 
in the final result, 200 villages ruined by Turkish vengeance, 12,000 houses burned, 
3,000 women outraged, 4,700 inhabitants slain and 71,000 without a roof. [We 
quote throughout from the official report of the "organization."] 

The decadence of the "internal organization" begins here, with the usual 
consequences — demoralization and Jacobinism. Traitors are searched out, and 
to an increasing extent discovered and executed ; funds are extorted and employed 
on private purposes instead of on the national conflict; forced idleness condemns 
men to a life of disorder and coarse pleasure. The first period of the struggle is 
at an end (1897-1904). 

Now, however, the whole of Europe begins „Jto_interes_t_itself in the 
affairs of Macedonia. The second period opens ; it is mark ed by attempts 
to organize European control over the Turkish regime (1905-1907). Mace- 
donian autonomy becomes the distant goal of diplomatic efforts. Gradually 
an understanding begins to be reached, as questions are taken 
one, and the attempt is made to reform Turkish administration, police, 
finance and justice in Macedonia. We need not linger over the details of 
this portion of Balkan history, for it is but too familiar. Generally speaking, it 
is the repetition, on a larger scale, of what had been going on for half a century. 
First, u nreal concessions, then, as soon as they begin to become onerous, general 
reform on paper which sweeps away and slurs over all practical details; and 
finally, the moment of tension once over, and the attention of Europe averted, 
the old order once again — with the single _ difference that the concessions 
agreed upon this time were more important. The loss of a whole province seemed 
threatened. So the reaction was all the greater. Instead of the Hamidian con- 
stitution of 1876, here was a new one, imposed this time on the sovereign by the 
Young Turk Revolution. Reforms were imposed fin the name of the people]. 
The Great Powers had nothing more to do in Macedonia. They departed amid 
the joyous cries of the multitude, while the leaders of the different nationalities, 
only yesterday on terms of irreconcilable hostility, embraced one another. The 
last attempt at the reconstruction of the Ottoman State was about to begin; the 
third and last period of our history (1908-12). 

Its opening was of very happy augury. Proclaimed to the strains of the 
Marseillaise, the -young. Turkish revolution promised, to solve all difficulties 


and pacify all hatreds by substituting justice for arbitrary rule, and freedom for 
despots. First and foremost it proclaimed complete equality as between the di- 
verse nationalities inhabiting Turkey, in reliance on their Ottoman patriotism, 
their attachment to the vatan, to their fatherland one and indivisible. The parti- 
sans of Macedonian autonomy take up once more their hopes of reaching their 
end without alarming the susceptibilities of the dominant race. The revolution- 
aries and comitadjis of yesterday lay down their arms and go down 'from their 
mountains to the big towns ; neither arms nor secret relations with the neighbor- 
ing Balkan governments are any longer needed. Bulgarian Macedonians above all 
dream that they can now become good Ottoman patriots, while still faithful to 
their national ambitions. 

It is a dream of but a moment's duration. The Young Turkish revolution 
proves itself from the very first narrow and nationalist. Far from satisfying the 
tendencies of re-awakening nationalism, it sets itself a task to which the absolu- 
tism of the Sultan had never ventured ; to reconstruct the Turkey of the Caliph- 
ate and transform it into a modern state, beginning by the complete abolition 
of the rights and privileges of the different ethnic groups. These rights and 
privileges, confirmed by firmans and guaranteed by European diplomacy, were 
the sole means by which the Christian nationalities could safeguard their lan- 
guage, their beliefs, their ancient civilizations. These barriers once down, they 
felt themselves threatened by Ottoman assimilation in a way that had never 
been threatened before in the course of the ages since the capture of Constanti- 
nople by Mahomet II. This assimilation, this !!Qttonianiza±ion^ was the avowed 
aim of the victor, the committee of "Union and Progress." 

Worse still: the assimilation of heterogeneous populations could only be 
effected slowly, however violent might be the measures threatening the future 
existence of the separate nationalities. The men of the Committee had not even 
confidence in the action of time. They wished to destroy their enemies forth- 
with, while they were still in power. Since national rivalries in Macedonia 
offered an ever-ready pretext for the intervention of the Powers, they decided 
to make an end of the question with all possible celerity. They were sure — and 
frequently stated their assurance in the Chamber — that the ancien regime was to 
blame for the powerlessness it had shown in Macedonia. They, on the other 
hand, with their new methods, would have made an end of it in a few months, 
or at most a few years. 

Nevertheless it was the old methods that were employed. A beginning was 
made in 1909 by violating the article of the constitution which proclaimed the lib- 
erty of a s sociations . The various ethnic groups, and especially the Bulgarians, 
had taken advantage of this article to found national clubs in Macedonia. As 
the pre-1908 revolutionary organizations had been dissolved by their heads, in their 
capacity of loyal Ottoman citizens, they had been replaced by clubs which had 
served as the nucleus of an open national organization. Their objective was now 


electoral instead of armed conflict ; and while secretly arming there was neverthe- 
less a readiness to trust the Ottoman Parliament, to leave it to time to accomplish 
the task of regeneration and actual realization of constitutional principles. The 
Bulgarian revolutionaries had even concluded a formal agreement with the revolu- 
tionaries of the Committee of Union and Progress, according to which the return 
home of the insurgents was regarded as conditional only, and the internal organi- 
zation only to be disbanded on condition that the constitution was really put in 

The Committee once in power saw the danger of these national political or- 
ganizations and entered on a systematic conflict with its allies of yesterday. From 
the spring of 1909 onwards, the partisans of the Committee caused the assassi- 
nation one after another of all those who had been at the head of revolutionary 
bands or committees under the previous regime. In the autumn of 1909 the final 
blow was aimed at the open organizations. (The Union of Bulgarian constitu- 
tional clubs included at that moment sixty-seven branches in Macedonia.) In 
November, the Chamber passed an Association law which forbade "any organi- 
zation based upon national denomination." An end was thus successfully put to 
the legal existence of the clubs, but not to the clubs themselves. Revolutionary 
activity began again from the moment when open legal conflict became impossible. 

The Christian populations had good reasons for revolting against the new 
Turkish regime. Articles 11 and 16 of the revised constitution infringed the 
rights and privileges of the religious communities and national schools. The 
Ottoman State claimed to extend the limits of its action under the pretext of 
"protecting the exercise of all forms of worship" and "watching over all public 
schools." The principles might appear modern but in practice they were but new 
means for arriving at the same end — the "Ottomanization" of the Empire. This 
policy aimed at both Greeks and Bulgarians. For the Greeks, the violent enemies 
of the Young Turkish Movement from its beginning, it was the economic boycott 
declared by the Committee against all the Greeks of the Empire in retaliation 
for the attempts of the Cretans to reunite themselves with the mother country. 
It was forbidden for months that the good Ottomans should frequent shops or 
cafes kept by Greeks. Greek ships stopped coming into Ottoman ports, unable to 
find any laborers to handle their cargo. 

Even more dangerous was the policy of Turkizing Macedonia by means of 
systematic colonization, carried out by the mohadjirs — emigrants, Moslems from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This measure caused discontent with the new regime 
to penetrate down to the agricultural classes. They were almost universally Bul- 
garian tenant farmers who had cultivated the tchifliks (farms) of the Turkish 
beys from time immemorial. In the course of the last few years they had be£un 
to buy back the lands of their overlords, mainly with the money many of them 
brought home from America. All this was now at an end. Not only had the 
purchase of their holdings become impossible; the Turks began turning the ten- 


ants out of their farms. The government bought up all the land for sale to es- 
tablish mohadjirs (Moslem refugees from Bosnia) upon it. 

This was the final stroke. The leaders of the disarmed bands could now re- 
turn to their mountains where they rejoined old companions in arms. The "in- 
ternal organization" again took up the direction of the revolutionary movement. 
On October 31, 1911, it "declared publicly that it assumed responsibility for all the 
attacks on and encounters with the Turkish army by the insurgents in this and the 
p revious year, and for all other revolutionary manifestations." The Young 
Turkish Government had not waited for this declaration to gain cognizance of 
revolutionary activity and take action upon it. So early as November, 1909, it 
had replied by an iniquitous "band" law, making the regular authorities of the 
villages, all the families where any member disappeared from his home, the whole 
population of any village harboring a comitadji, responsible for all the deeds and 
words of the voluntary, irregular associations. In the summer of 1910 a system- 
atic perquisition was instituted in Macedonia with the object of discovering 
arms hidden in the villagers' houses. The vexations, the tortures to which peace- 
ful populations were thus subjected can not possibly be enumerated here. In 
November, 1910, Mr. Pavlov, Bulgarian deputy, laid the facts before the Ottoman 
Parliament. He had counted as many as 1,853 persons individually subjected 
to assault and ill treatment in the three Macedonian vilayets, leaving out of ac- 
count the cases of persons executed en masse, arrested and assaulted, among whom 
were dozens killed or mutilated. Adding them in, Mr. Pavlov, brought his total 
up to 4,913. To this number were still to be added 4,060 who had taken ref- 
uge in Bulgaria or fled among the mountains to escape from the Turkish 

The year 1910 was decisive in the sense of affording definite proof that the 
regime established in 1908 was not tolerable. The regime had its chance of jus- 
tifying itself in the eyes of Europe and strengthening its position in relation to 
its own subjects and to the neighboring Balkan States; it let the chance go. 
From that time the fate of Turkey in Europe was decided, beyond appeal. 

This was also the end of the attempts at autonomy in Macedonia. To real- 
ize this autonomy two principal conditions were required : the indivisibility of Tur- 
key and a sincere desire on the part of the Turkish government to introduce 
radical reforms based on decentralization. No idea was less acceptable to the 
"Committee of Union and Progress" than this of decentralization, since it was 
the watchword of the rival political organization. Thenceforward any hope of 
improving the condition of the Christian populations within the limits of the 
status quo became illusory. Those limits had to be transcended. Autonomy was 
no longer possible. Dismemberment and partition had to be faced. 



3. The Alliance and the Treaties 

The most natural solution of the Balkan imbroglio appeared to be the crea- 
tion in Macedonia of a new autonomy or independent unity, side by side with the 
other unities realized in Bulgaria, Greece, Servia and Montenegro, all of which 
countries had previously been liberated, thanks to Russian or European inter- 
vention. But this solution had become impossible, owing first to the incapacity 
of the Turkish government, and then to the rival pretensions of the three neigh- 
boring States to this or that part of the Macedonian inheritance. Mr. Dehn has 
tried to show on a map the result of this confusion of rival claims (see his sche- 

After Dehn 

ThWeuireb del. 

matic map). 1 There was hardly any part of the territory of Turkey in Europe 
which was not claimed by at least two competitors. These views on the inherit- 
ance of the "Sick Man" and for the realization of "great national ideas" in the 
shape of a "Great" Servia, a "Great" Greece, or a "Great" Bulgaria, made any 
united action on the part of these little States for their common ends impossible. 
Intheory every one accepted the opinion that they must act together, that the 
JBalkans ought to belong to the Balkan peoples, and that the great neighboring 

1 This schematic map is borrowed from the little book by Mr. Paul Dehn, Die Volker 
Sudeuropas und ihre politischen Probleme. Halle, 1909; in the Angewandte Geographie 


Powers who might weaken or enslave the little Balkan States, must be kept off. 
In practice, however, the opposite course was adopted. Each courted Russia or 
Austria, in turn, sometimes even both at the same time, first one and then the 
other, with a view to opposing his neighbors and securing the prospect of his 
own country's hegemony. 

Russia and Austria for their part naturally pursued their own interests in 
the Balkans, — interests that were by no means identical. Geography and eth- 
nography have divided the Balkans into two spheres of influence, the Eastern 
and the Western, the Servian and the Bulgarian spheres. Diplomatic history 
has made them into the Austrian and the Russian spheres of influence, hence 
two opposing pulls — the "German pull" from North to South, and the "Slav 
pull" from East to West. The plain of the Vardar, which divides Macedonia 
into two parts, was destined to be the arena where the two influences met and 
battled. Russia traced the limits of its zone of influence in the treaty of San 
Stefano in 187.8 — the whole of Macedonia forming part of Bulgaria indivisible — 
the tsielo coupna Boulgaria. Austrian policy has also had its treaties, concluded 
to countervail the Russian pull in the shape of the secret treaties of 1881 and 
1889, made with King Milan — the Servian King — who for his part was promised 
the plain of the Vardar, and the Western half of Macedonia, on condition of 
Servia's renouncing its intentions upon the Adriatic, its "Pan-Servian" tenden- 
cies, that is, of consenting to the annexation of the Sandjak of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and finally all the Servian-speaking countries, as far as Zagreb. 

Looked at from this general point of view, the idea of a Balkan alliance was 
contrary to the idea of partition, since alliance was the instrument of independ- 
ence, the means to the realization of the idea of "the Balkans for the Balkan 
peoples," while partition subserved the ambitions of the great neighboring powers. 
As a matter of fact those who first conceived the idea of alliance were as far as 
possible remote from that of partition. They were the_ idealistic youth of 1870, 
of whom we have spoken above, and in their minds a "Yougo-Slav Federation" 
was a veritable union of the free and independent Slav democracies. Nor was 
the idea of partition clearly present to the mind of the first great politician who 
tried to realize a Yougo-Slav Federation under Servian hegemony, Prince Mi- 
chel Obrenovits. On the eve of his violent death he was in treaty with Greece, 
Roumania, Montenegro and the revolutionary "apostles" of still subject Bulga- 
ria, for the preparation of common strife against Turkey. What was the use of 
partition since there was the absolute property of each to be taken? It is true 
that with the Slav family itself there was by no means complete unanimity in 
the idea of alliance without partition. There were some Bulgarians, and those 
the most far sighted, who protested. Why ally against Turkey when whatever 
was taken from the Ottoman Empire was at the same time taken from the Bul- 
garian people as a whole? But for these latter the reply was taken from Tur- 
key, which was trying the patience of the giaours even when they desired to be 


loyal; second from the young Bulgarian revolutionaries, crying, with the voice 
of their best representative, Liouben Karavelov, the doyen of Bulgarian litera- 
ture — "First of all we must have union, union, union — and when we are free 
each shall have what belongs to him." 

A remarkable light is thrown by recent events upon these disputes at the end 
of the sixties. Neither the idea of alliance nor the conflicting claims which ap- 
peared at the same time disappeared in the fifty years that lie between us and 
Prince Michel's first attempts. He was slain in 1868 by assassins. "Thy 
thought shall not perish" — so it runs on his tombstone. It has, in truth, not per- 
ished; but it has become more complex. Mutual rivalries became more acute as 
the area to be partitioned became more confined while still leaving something to 

"England's responsibility" in these new complications and difficulties has 
been set forth by the Duke of Argyll i 1 we, therefore, need not linger over the 
blow struck at the idea of a federation of the Balkan nationalities when Bulgaria — 
one and indivisible — according to the treaty of San Stefano, — was divided into 
three by the Treaty of Berlin. The whole course of succeeding events was the 
result of this grave error. The most recent events lie there in germ. 

The reunion to free Bulgaria of the still vassal Oriental Roumelia, and as 
the immediate consequence thereof, the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885, the grow- 
ing rivalries between the nationalities in a still subject Macedonia, the new 
propaganda of the secondary nationalities, the isolation of Greece in its 1897 
attempt, the fetishism of the status quo, mitigated and corrected as it was by 
the intrigues of the Powers, the miscarriage of the hypocritical plan of reforms 
in Macedonia in 1907-1908, the intermezzo of the Turkish revolution with its 
failure to solve an insoluble problem, then the greatness and decline of the 
Balkan "alliance" — all were the natural results of the mistake of Berlin, — a mis- 
take which now everybody sees without the power to correct. 

This same series of events has put obstacles in the way of the normal devel- 
opment of the highly national conception of an alliance between the Balkan peo- 
ples, has turned it aside from its true aim, that of preparing the way for feder- 
ation; and by informing it with an alien egoism and mania have delayed its de- 
velopment and brought it prematurely to an end. Any judgment of men and 
events as they are today must take into account all this past, and not lay to the 
charge of the present the results of a negligence which goes back for decades. 

The idea of Balkan alliance has come into life in our time with a signifi- 
cance quite different from that which it possessed thirty or forty years ago. It 
is no longer the young Slav enthusiasts' dream of a free federation of Balkan 
democracies. It is no longer the nationalists and Pan-Slav philosphers' notion of 
a Russian moral hegemony with Constantinople as its political center. The first 

r See his book Our Responsibility for Turkey. 


of these dreams was slain by the rivalry of the Balkan States ; the second by their 
love of independence. The Balkan alliance in its later phase was but a tool em- 
ployed by local policy encouraged by Russia, and directed, under the inspiration 
o f Ru ssian diplomacy, against Germanic pretensions, or in so far as advantage 
was taken of the device by Balkan statesmen against the invasions of Turkish 
"QltQmanism" and Athenian ambition towards autonomy. Alliance in this latest 
phase inevitably implied partition as an essential condition; the means being 
war with Turkey, the final end the conquest of Turkey in Europe. 

The modern history of the alliance might start at the point where Mr. Bour- 
chier 1 begins in his excellent articles on the Balkan League, that is to say, with 
the attempt of the Greek Minister, Mr. Tricoupis, in 1891, who openly proposed 
to Belgrade and Sofia the partition of Turkey in Europe on the basis of a treaty 
in whic h the fut ure frontier s of the jBalkarL^tates_vv£ exactly determined 
Jn adv ance. To speak of such a plan to King Milan and to Stamboulov, was to 
communicate it to the Ballplatz at Vienna and to the Sublime Porte. The pour- 
parlers did not get beyond a mere exchange of amiable courtesies. Austria Hun- 
gary had just renewed the treaty with King Milan which led to the fratricidal 
Serbo-Bulgarian war (1889 to 1895). Some years later she was to sign a secret 
convention with Roumania. In the event of a common war with Bulgaria, Rou- 
mania was to receive a portion of Bulgarian territory. It is the very territory, 
promised by Austria, which Roumania has just been given without war. In 
1897, during the Grseco-Turkish war, Mr. Deliannis renewed the proposals of 
Tricoupis. But his partition formula, repeated so often since, and not even now 
wholly renounced by the Greeks, was not to the Bulgarians' taste. They pre- 
ferred negotiating with the Porte for new concessions for their churches and 
schools in Macedonia, to risking taking part in an ill-prepared and ill-conducted 
war. Soon after (1901) Austria Hungary brought about the Grseco-Roumanian 
rapprochement which, together with the Austro-Servian treaty and the Austro- 
Roumanian convention, finally "enclosed" Bulgaria and threatened to paralyze 
its action in Macedonia. A Balkan alliance seemed as far remote as possible. 

All the same the web spun with such pains was quickly to be broken. The 
revolution of 1904 in Macedonia made the question an international one. Walla- 
chian propagandism and Greek "conversions" in Macedonia led to a diplomatic 
rupture between Greece and Roumania (1903). The murder of King Alexandre 
Obrenovits and the return of the Karageorgevits dynasty to Belgrade (1903) 
emancipated Servia from Austrian influence. The natural alternatives were 
either a rapprochement with Russia or the renaissance of the Yougo-Slav al- 
liance. The young generation in Servia and Bulgaria went further and became 
once more enthusiastic for the federation idea. Writers, artists, students in Bel- 

1 The Balkan League — The London Times, June 4, 5, 6, 11, 13. Use has been made of 
these articles but the brief historical account which follows has been based on the Com- 
mission's own information. 


grade and Sofia exchanged visits. Diplomatists followed suit. By 1904 people 
in Belgrade were discussing a scheme for an offensive and defensive alliance as 
a means of securing the autonomy of Old Servia and of Macedonia as far as 
possible by peaceful means, but in case of extremity, by force of arms. The 
names of those who took part in these pourparlers will reappear in 1911. They 
were Mr. Pachitch, at whose house secret conversations went on ; Milovane Milo- 
vanovits, late minister of Foreign Affairs; Dimitri Risov, a Macedonian revolu- 
tionary who had become a diplomatist without losing his ardent devotion to the 
cause; Mr. Kessaptchiev at that time specially sent to discuss the alliance. But 
difficulties arose as soon as the frontiers began to be spoken of. The Servians 
gave their adhesion in principle only, to propose the very next day a geographical 
interpretation of the term "Old Servia," which extended it to cover the whole of 
the Sandjak. The Bulgarians regarded these claims as exorbitant; and finally 
after vain disputes lasting three days, the idea of an offensive alliance was given 
up. On April 12/25, 1904, a defensive alliance was however concluded. But 
this treaty, far too vague and general in its terms, had no practical result, thanks 
to the indiscretion of a Servian official who was also the correspondent of the 
Neue Freie Press e. The treaty was immediately divulged and seeds of distrust 
consequently implanted in the minds of the allies. The Servians regarded the 
treaty as annulled after the Bulgarian declaration of independence was made in 
1908 without consulting Servia, and greatly to the detriment of Servian national 
policy, which was then passing through a critical phase, owing to the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria Hungary. The Servians accused the Bul- 
garians of profiting by their losses to improve their own international position in- 
stead of coming to their assistance. Old distrust was thus about to revive when 
Russian diplomacy took up the alliance idea again. The Russian diplomatists 
took the promises of a Young Turkish regeneration seriously, and proposed a 
universal Balkan alliance with a free and constitutionally governed Turkey as a 
member. They wanted an alliance facing towards the Danube rather than the 
Bosphorus. Balkan diplomacy knew well enough that the "Sick Man" was in- 
curable ; but the chance was seized. It is true that here again the old difficulties 
about partition rose. In 1909 Mr. Milovanovits vainly proposed the cession of 
Uskub and Koumanovo to Servia. In 1910 conferences were held at St. Peters- 
burg with Mr. Milovanovits and Mr. Malinov, which, however, did not succeed 
in arriving at any result. Bulgaria was by no means disposed to sanction the Ser- 
vian tendencies favored by Russian diplomacy, even in the highly general form 
of a possible extension of Old Servia, properly so-called, towards the south. 

All the same in 1910, as we know, it became clear to all the world that the 
Young Turk policy of "Ottomanizing" the nationalities by assimilation w#s 
going to lead to catastrophe. Growing pressure on Bulgarians and Greeks 
in Turkey finally brought these enemies together. Mr. Venizelos, since 1910 
head of the Athenian cabinet, as early as October pro^oMgL_an..jagreernejit_to 


Sofia. Once more no agreement could be reached on the delimitation of spheres 
of influence. The Bulgarians were unwilling to hand over Kavala, Serres, Vodena, 
Castoria, Fiorina to the Greeks, in accordance with the old "Deliannis formula." 
But the condition of things in Macedonia made an understanding a matter of 
necessity. The only thing to do was to conclude an agreement. The heads of the 
Christian churches in Constantinople had to make similar representations to the 
Ottoman government, without waiting for any understanding. At Sofia discus- 
sions began as to how an understanding was to be arrived at, and a joint system- 
atic protest was made in defence of the religious and educational privileges 
granted in common to the Christian communities by the ancient firmans of the 
sultans and by international treaties. 

At Sofia the pourparlers dragged on throughout the Malinov administration. 
When Mr. Guechov, in March, 1910, succeeded Mr. Malinov as head of the Cabi- 
net, he stopped them. Then Mr. Venizelos proposed to Mr. Guechov, under the 
seal of secrecy, in March, 1911, not merely an agreement to defend the privileges 
of the Christians in Turkey, but a defensive alliance, "envisaging the case of an 
attack" on one of the contracting parties. No reply was made to this proposition, 
which was kept strictly secret, since the Cretan difficulties might provoke a war 
in which Bulgaria had no desire to take part. The event which led Bulgaria to 
consider the necessity of a Balkan alliance in a yet more serious light was the 
beginning of the Turco-Italian war at the end of September, 1911. When the 
Italian ultimatum was issued, Bulgarian statesmen were on holiday; Czar Ferdi- 
nand and his first Minister were at Vichy. Milovanovits was watching at his 
post. B. Risov, Th. Theodorov and he discussed the project of an alliance at 
Belgrade, Vienna and Sofia. Mr. Guechov hastened to return. Mr. Milovanovits 
met him at the station at Belgrade, got into his carriage and between Belgrade and 
the little station of Liapovo, the bases of an alliance were laid down in the course 
of a two hours' conversation. For the first time a Bulgarian minister recog- 
nized the necessity and possibility of territorial concession in Macedonia — Uskub 
and Koumanovo. 

It might have been foreseen that public opinion in Bulgaria would, as inva- 
riably, be against any such transaction. Rather Macedonia autonomous as a whole 
under Turkish suzerainty than independent on condition of partition, — such had 
always been the Bulgarian point of view. Even in 1910, Mr. Malinov, as we have 
pointed out, prepared to wait rather than make concessions. So now Guechov, 
once returned to Sofia, again decided to temporize. In December, Milovanovits 
renewed the alliance proposal ; but after ten days without a reply he had to modify 
his proposition. Then and not until then did the Bulgarian government decide 
to treat. The pourparlers lasted all winter, and the treaty was concluded be- 
tween February 29 and March 13, 1912. 

In this treaty, which was kept secret, and of which the text was published 
later by Le Matin, 1 the fundamental point was the delimitation of the line of par- 

iMonday, November 24, 1913. 


tition "beyond which" Servia agreed "to formulate no territorial claim." A highly 
detailed map of this frontier was annexed to the treaty. 1 Bulgarian diplomatists 
still wished to keep an open door for themselves. That is why they left the re- 
sponsibility for the concessions demanded to the Czar of Russia. "Bulgaria 
agrees to accept this frontier," they added, "if the Emperor of Russia, who shall 
be requested to act as final arbiter in this question, pronounces in favor of the 
line." Their idea was that the Emperor might still adjudge to them the "dis- 
puted zone" they were in the act of ceding, between the frontier marked on the 
map and Old Senna, properly so-called, "to the north and west of Char-Planina." 
"It goes without saying," the treaty added, "that the two contracting parties un- 
dertake to accept as definitive the frontier line which the Emperor of Russia may 
have found, within the limits indicated below, most consonant with the rights and 
interests of the two parties." Evidently "within the limits indicated below" meant 
between Char-Planina and the line marked on the map, "beyond which Servia 
agreed to formulate no territorial claim." That was the straightforward mean- 
ing of the treaty, afterwards contested by the Servians. The line of partition 
of which the treaty spoke corresponded fully with the ethnographic conclusions 
of the learned geographer, Mr. Tsviyits; conclusions which made a profound 
impression on the Czar Ferdinand at the time of his interview with Mr. Tsviyits. 
It was these conclusions probably which made the Czar decide to accept the 
compromise. 2 Mr. Tsviyits was also the first to communicate to the world, in 
his article of November, 1912, in the Review of Reviews, the frontier established 
by the treaty. 3 The reason why Bulgarian diplomatists decided on making a 
concession so little acceptable to public opinion is now clear. They did more. 
After deciding on eventual partition they reverted to the idea of autonomy and 
laid it down that partition was only to take place in case the organization of the 
conquered countries "as a distinct autonomous province," should be found 
"impossible" in the "established conviction" of both parties. Up to the "liquida- 

x It is reproduced here from a reduced and simplified copy published in the Echo de Bul- 
garie of June 7/20, 1913. 

2 See Mr. Tsviyits' ethnographic map, published in his pamphlet The Annexation of 
Bosnia and the Servian Question, 1909. The map annexed to the treaty of Feb. 29 (March 
13), 1912, differs from it to the advantage of Servia in the western region, but corresponds 
generally with it in the eastern part of the frontier agreed upon. 

3 Mr. Tsviyits' article has appeared in a Servian translation, but at that time Servian 
claims had already increased and the pamphlet was banned. In a second edition, adopted 
by the "Information Bureau," the passage describing the frontiers was simply omitted. The 
omitted passage runs as follows : "The Southern frontier of Old Servia, or the line dividing 
the Bulgarian and Servian spheres of interest (starts from the Bulgarian frontier, near 
Kustendil, by the line of partition between the rivers Ptchinia and Kriva-Reka, leaving Kriva- 
Palnika and Kratovo in the Bulgarian sphere and Uskub and Koumanovo in the Servian. 
The frontier then crosses the Ovtche-Pole, by the line of division between Bregalnitsa and 
Ptchinia, and passes the Vardar, to the north of Veles. Thence it goes over the slopes of the 
Yagoupitsa mountains, and along the ulterior line of division, reaches the Baba mountain 
as far as Lake Okhrida, so that Prilepe, Krouchevo and the town of Okhrida are in the 
Bulgarian sphere and Strouga, Debar and Tetovo in the Servian.) Old Servia issues, 
through a narrow belt, on the Adriatic near Scutari, Alessio and (perhaps) Durazzo. [Pas- 
sages within parentheses omitted.] 




according to the map annexed 
Scale of I : 1,500.000 

4-anja f B U L G^A R I A 

Sn^ct?^ M|y|tQ 0iBii 

1 M*Kitka* ('W ^^ 

Pefarti.caf i ~^\ Arivar'ecna- 
a/^W^J^V* Palanka, 


T.Weinrcv del. 


tion," the occupied countries were to be regarded as "falling under common 
dominion — condominium." Finally the treaty was to remain defensive purely, 
until the two parties "find themselves in agreement" on "undertaking common 
military action." This "action" was to "be undertaken solely in the event of 
Russia's not opposing it," and the consent of Russia was to be obligatory. 
Turkey had been expressly designated as the objective of "action" in the cases 
forecast, but included was "any one among the Great Powers which should 
attempt to annex any portion whatsoever of the territories of the peninsula." 
Such were the precautions and provisions designed to guarantee Bulgarian 
diplomatists against abuse. All, however, were to fall away at the first breath 
of reality. 

Sofia has been credited with a secondary interest in the Grseco-Bulgarian 
agreement proffered by Venizelos in April, 1911. Since 1897 the Greek army 
had been considered almost a negligible quantity, and the advance made under 
French instruction was hardly known. But the Greek navy was needed to cut 
Turkey's communication with Anatolia via the ^Egean Sea, and thus prevent the 
transport of troops to Macedonia. Thus as soon as the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance 
had been concluded in February, conferences with Greece were entered upon. 
The Greeks proposed to the Bulgarians to discuss the question of future frontiers. 
Since Greek aid was not rated high at Sofia, the Bulgarians were not inclined to 
make sacrifices, the more because of designs on Salonica. On this point 
previous negotiations had made it abundantly clear that the Greeks, so 
far from yielding would again propose their unacceptable frontier. It was there- 
fore unhappily decided to leave the war to settle the question, with a secret 
intention of being the first to reach the desired spot. As for the alliance, it was 
concluded on a "purely defensive" basis with the promise "of lending the agree- 
ment no kind of aggressive tendency." 1 The principal object appeared to be the 
"peaceful co-existence of the different nationalities in Turkey, on the basis of 
real and actual political equality and respect of rights accruing from treaties or 
otherwise conceded to the Christian nationalities of the Empire." But it was 
foreseen that a "systematic attempt" on these rights on the part of Turkey might 
as readily be the casus foederis as a direct attack on the territories of the con- 
tracting parties. It should be added that the expression "rights accruing from 
treaties" was inserted in the text on the insistence of the Bulgarian diplomats, 
who intended by this reference to treaties, Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, i. e., 
Macedonian autonomy. Clearly in the hour of the conclusion of this treaty, 
May 16/29, 1912, complete vagueness prevailed as to eventual "action." The 
only thing which was clear was that Bulgaria was not going to make war on 
Turkey about Crete. To this end a declaration had been added to the treaty 
which merely bound Bulgaria to "benevolent neutrality" in the event of 
war breaking out "because of the admission of Cretan deputies to the Greek 

iThe text of the Graeco-Bulgarian treaty was published by Le Matin November 26, 1913. 


The Serbo-Bulgarian and Graeco-Bulgarian treaties concluded, the King of 
Montenegro came on the scene in his turn. Nicholas was always ready to take 
part in any combination of the Balkan States against Turkey. He had spoken 
of it to Russia in 1888; he renewed his proposition at the Russian Embassy in 
Constantinople in July, 1911. When the Turco-Italian war began, in September, 
he was the first to propose common military action on the part of Servia, Bul- 
garia, Greece and Montenegro. An agreement was made with Bulgaria in April, 
1912, and with Greece somewhat later. Belgrade remained. It was not on good 
terms with Cettigne, partly because of the patriotic rivalry between the two 
Servian States (each of which aspired to the role of "Piemont") ; partly be- 
cause of anti-dynastic intrigues supposed to be going on on either side and partly 
because of the reactionary regime of Nicholas, which drove all the educated 
youth of the country to emigration and conspiracy abroad. Bulgarian diplomats 
acted as intermediaries. Mr. Danev communicated to the Vienna Zeit an amusing 
account of the way in which the last stone of the Balkan alliance (which Russia 
wanted to build up against Austria Hungary) was placed at the end of May in 
the Hofburg at Vienna. None of these treaties however became effective until 
the end of September, after a series of events in Turkey which ended by seriously 
threatening the very existence of the nationalities in Macedonia. These events 
opened in the spring of 1912 with a revolt in Albania, a revolt which had been 
foreseen and taken into consideration by the enemies of Turkey. In summer the 
revolt bore fruit which exceeded all expectation. The cabinet resigned, the 
chamber was dissolved, the executive committee of the party of "Union and 
Progress," threatened with complete defeat, was compelled to grant the Alba- 
nians all they asked in order to stop the movement in Constantinople, a movement 
which the discontented army refused to prevent. This demonstration of Turkish 
weakness encouraged the new allies, the more so that the promises of Albanian 
autonomy, covering the four vilayets of Macedonia and Old Servia, directly 
threatened the Christian nationalities with extermination. The Servians 
hastened to oppose the plan of a "greater Albania" by their plan for the partition 
of Turkey in Europe among the Balkan States into four spheres of influence. 
Counting on the possibility of European intervention the organization of the 
autonomous provinces based on the ethnographic principle was undertaken with 
a minimum of success. But Europe did not "find itself." 

The proposal made on August 14 by Mr. Berchtold, to assist Turkey in ex- 
tending "decentralization" to the Christian nationalities was no more than a trial 
move, adroitly designed as a means of feeling the ground. Russia replied by an 
exhortation to the allies to abstain from aggressive action of any kind, and the 
endeavor to detach Bulgaria from Servia and Servia from Bulgaria. The reply 
of the allies, prepared with the utmost secrecy, was to conclude a series of mili- 
tary conventions, complementary to the alliances, which did this time anticipate 
and prepare for war. 


The Bulgarian military convention, foreshadowed by the treaty, was signed 
as early as April 29/May 12. Bulgaria undertook in case of war to mobilize 
200,000 men; Servia 150,000 — minimum figures, since there could be no thought 
of conquering Turkey with an army of 350,000 men. Of these 200,000 men, 
Bulgaria was to dispatch half to Macedonia, and half to Thrace. At the same 
time the convention took into account the possibility of Austria Hungary's 
marching upon Servia. In that case Bulgaria undertook to send 200,000 men 
to Servia's assistance. 

The basis of the Grseco-Bulgarian military convention was different; it was 
concluded almost on the eve of general mobilization, September 13/26. Bul- 
garia promised, in case of war, an effective army 300,000 strong ; Greece, 120,000. 
Bulgaria undertook to take the offensive "with an important part of its army" 
in the three Macedonian vilayets ; but in case Servia should take part in the war 
with at least 120,000 men, "Bulgaria might employ the whole of its military 
forces in Thrace." Now that real war was about to begin and the main Turkish 
force was directed hither, it was high time to contemplate war in Thrace which 
had been left, in the hypothetical agreements, to Russia's charge, as Mr. Bourchier 
assumes. This made it necessary to change, define and complete the military 
agreement with Servia of April 29/May 12. The document was now more than 
once remodeled in consonance with new agreements arrived at between the heads 
of the General Staff of the two armies — such agreements having been fore- 
shadowed in Articles 4 and 13. The special arrangement of June 19/ July 2 
provides that the necessary number of troops agreed upon might be transported 
from the Vardar to the Maritza and vice versa, "if the situation demands it." 
On August 23/September 5, the Bulgarians demand to have all their forces for 
disposition in Thrace, the Servians make objections and no agreement is 
reached. At last, three days after the Greek military convention (September 
15/28), an understanding was arrived at. "The whole of the Bulgarian army 
will operate in the valley of the Maritza, leaving one division only in the first 
days on the Kustendil — Doupnitsa line." But if the Servian army repulsed the 
Turks on the Uskub — Veles-Chtipe line — and advanced southward, the Bulgarians 
might recall their division to the theater of the Maritza to reinforce their armies, 
leaving only the battalions of the territorial army in Macedonia." Later, as 
is known, it was the Servians who sent two divisions with siege artillery to 
Adrianople. The Servians were later to declare the arrangements made by the 
two General Staffs forced and not binding, and to use this as an argument for 
treaty revision. 

While making their final dispositions, the allies still awaited European in- 
tervention in Turkey. In vain. Friends only gave them counsels of prudence. 
Enemies were not sorry to see the allies given a drubbing by the Turks, whom 
everybody in Europe regarded as infinitely their superiors. During the two 
weeks in which final decisions were being made in Bulgaria, Mr. Sazonov traveled 


about in England and talked about Persia. When it appeared at the last moment 
that the Balkan States were going to act, thanks to Mr. Poincare and with the 
conditional assent of Mr. Berchtold, it was thought advisable to issue, September 
25 /O ctober 8, an Austro-Russian proclamation to the effect that if the Powers 
disapproved energetically ... of measures contrary to peace, they would take 
the execution of reforms in hand, subject to the suzerainty of the Sultan and 
the territorial integrity of Turkey; if war broke out, whatever were the issue, 
they would not permit any change in the territorial status quo of Turkey in 
Europe. Alas! while the reply to be sent to this note was under discussion, 
King Nicholas of Montenegro declared war on Turkey (October 9) ; on Sep- 
tember 30/October 13 the allies formally demanded Turkey's consent to the 
autonomy of the European vilayets, redivided according to nationality. On 
October 4/17, Turkey declared war. 

If it be now asked what were the causes of the first Balkan war, three 
principal ones may be found. .First, the weakness and want of foresight of 
Turkey, on the verge of dissolution; second, the powerlessness of Europe to im- 
pose on a constitutional Turkey the reforms which she had succeeded in intro- 
ducing into an absolute Turkey, and third, the consciousness of increased strength 
which alliance gave to the Balkan States, each with a national mission before it, 
namely, the protection of the men of its race and religion dwelling in Turkey, 
against the Ottomanization policy which threatened national existence. The 
first two reasons made the war possible and inevitable; the third guaranteed its 
success. In a few weeks the territories of Turkey in Europe were invaded by 
the allied armies and the whole country from the west of the fortified lines of 
Tchataldja and the Gallipoli peninsula, with the exception of Albania, in their 
hands as condominium. This was, at least, the principle acknowledged by the 
Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. This principle of the condominium had to be reconciled 
with the fact of the occupation and the new demands that rose up, the conse- 
quences of unexpected success. As might have been expected, partition was 
more difficult than conquest. Another war, the conflict for the "equilibrium," 
was to follow on the first, the conflict for freedom. 

4. The Conflict Between the Allies 

There had long existed germs of discord among the Balkan nationalities 
which could not be stifled by the treaties of alliance of which we know. Rather 
the te xts o f tnese treaties created fresh misunderstandings and afforded formal 
pretexts to cover the real reasons of conflict. There was but one means which 
could have effectually prevented the development of the germs — to maintain the 
territoriar status quo of Turkey and grant autonomy to the nationalities without 
a change of sovereignty. This could not have been, it is true, a definitive solu- 
tion ; it could only be a delay, a stage, but a stage that would have bridged the 
transition. In default of an issue which Turkey rendered impossible by its 


errors, Europe by its too protracted patience and the allies by their success, the 
change was too abrupt. It produced the deplorable results we are to study 
under the aspect of the "excesses" committed by the different nationalities when 
reduced to an elementary struggle for existence carried out by the most primitive 

We find this struggle in Macedonia from the first days of the Servian and 
Greek occupation onwards. At first there was general rejoicing and an outburst 
of popular gratitude towards the liberators. The Macedonian revolutionaries 
themselves had foreseen and encouraged this feeling. They said in their "proc- 
lamation to our brothers," published by the delegates of the twenty-five Mace- 
donian confederacies on October 5/18, i. c, at the very beginning of the war: 
"Brothers: — your sufferings and your pains have touched the heart of your 
kindred. Moved by the sacred duty of fraternal compassion, they come to your 
aid to free you from the Turkish yoke. In return for their sacrifice they desire 
nothing but to reestablish peace and order in the land of our birth. Come to 
meet these brave knights of freedom therefore with triumphal crowns. Cover 
the way before their feet with flowers and glory. And be magnanimous to those 
who yesterday were your masters. As true Christians, give them not evil for 
evil. Long live liberty ! Long live the brave army of liberation !" In fact the 
Servian army entered the north and the Greek army the south of Macedonia, 
amid cries of joy from the population. But this enthusiasm for the liberators 
soon gave place to doubts, then to disenchantment, and finally was converted to 
hatred and despair. The Bulgarian journal published at Salonica, Bulgarine, 
first records some discouraging cases whose number was swollen by the presence 
of certain individuals, chauvinists of a peculiar turn, who gave offence to the 
national sentiment of the country by the risks they ran. "It is the imperative 
duty of the powers in occupation," said the journal, "to keep attentive watch over 
the behavior of irresponsible persons." Alas! five days later (November 20) 
the journal had to lay it down, as a general condition of the stability of the 
alliance, that the powers in occupation should show toleration to all nationalities 
and refrain from treating some of them as enemies. Four days later the journal, 
instead of attacking the persons responsible, was denouncing the powers who 
"in their blind chauvinism take no account of the national sentiments of the 
people temporarily subject to them." They still, however, cherished the hope 
that the local authorities were acting without the knowledge of Belgrade. The 
next day the editor wrote his leader under a question addressed to the Allied 
Governments : "Is this a zvar of liberation or a war of conquest?" He knew the 
reply well enough ; the Greek authorities forbade the existence of this Bulgarian 
paper in their town of Salonica. 

The illusion of the inhabitants likewise disappeared before the touch of 
reality. The Servian soldier, like the Greek, was firmly persuaded that in 
Macedonia he would find compatriots, men who could speak his language and 
address him with jivio or zito. He found men speaking a language different 


from his, who cried hourrah! He misunderstood or did not understand at all. 
The theory he had learned from youth of the existence of a Servian Macedonia 
and a Greek Macedonia naturally suffered; but his patriotic conviction that 
Macedonia must become Greek or Servian, if not so already, remained unaf- 
fected. Doubtless Macedonia had been what he wanted it to become in those 
times of Douchan the Strong or the Byzantine Emperors. It was only agita- 
tors and propagandist Bulgarians who instilled into the population the idea of 
being Bulgarian. The agitators must be driven out of the country, and it would 
again become what it had always been, Servian or Greek. Accordingly they 
acted on this basis. 

Who were these agitators who had made the people forget the Greek and 
Servian tongues? First, they were the priests; then the schoolmasters; lastly 
the revolutionary elements who, under the ancient regime, had formed an "or- 
ganization" ; heads of bands and their members, peasants who had supplied them 
with money or food, — in a word the whole of the male population, in so far 
as it was educated and informed. It was much easier for a Servian or a Greek 
to discover all these criminal patriots than it had been for the Turkish authori- 
ties, under the absolutist regime, to do so. The means of awakening the national 
conscience were much better known to Greeks and Servians, for one thing, 
since they were accustomed to use them for their own cause. Priests, school- 
masters, bands existed among the Greeks and Servians, as well as among the 
Bulgarians. In Macedonia the difference, as we know, lay in the fact that the 
schoolmaster or priest, the Servian voyevoda or Greek andarte, addressed him- 
self to the minority, and had to recruit his own following instead of finding 
them ready made. Isolated in the midst of a Bulgarian population, he made 
terms with Turkish power while the national Bulgarian "organizations" fought 
against it. Since the representative of the national minority lived side by side 
with his Bulgarian neighbors, and knew them far better than did the Turkish 
official or policeman, he could supply the latter with the exact information. He 
learned still more during the last few years of general truce between the Chris- 
tian nationalities and growing alliance against the Turk. Almost admitted to the 
plot, many secrets were known to him. It was but natural he should use this 
knowledge for the advantage of the compatriots who had appeared in the guise 
of liberators. On the arrival of his army, he was no longer solitary, isolated and 
despised ; he became useful and necessary, and was proud of serving the national 
cause. With his aid, denunciation became an all powerful weapon; it penetrated 
to the recesses of local life and revived events of the past unknown to the Turkish 
authorities. These men, regarded by the population as leaders and venerated 
as heroes, were arrested and punished like mere vagabonds and brigands, while 
the dregs were raised to greatness. 

This progressive disintegration of social and national life began in Mace- 
donia with the entry of the armies of occupation, and did not cease during the 
eight months which lie between the beginning of the first war and the beginning 


of the second. It could not fail to produce the most profound changes. The 
Bulgarian nation was decapitated. A beginning was made when it was easiest. 
The openly revolutionary elements were gotten rid of, — the comitadjis and all 
those who had been connected with the movement of insurrection against the 
Turkish rule or the conflict with the national minorities. This was the easier 
because in the chaos of Macedonian law there was^no clearly drawn line of 
demarcation between political and ordinary crime. 

To combat the Bulgarian schools was more difficult. The time was already 
long past when the schoolmaster was necessarily a member of the "interior or- 
ganization." The purely professional element had steadily displaced the apostles 
and martyrs of preceding generations. But the conquerors saw things as they 
had been decades ago. For them the schoolmaster was always the conspirator, 
the dangerous man who must be gotten rid of, and the school, however strictly 
"professional," was a center from which Bulgarian civilization emanated. This 
is why the school became the object of systematic attack on the part of Servians 
and Greeks. Their first act on arriving in any place whatsoever was to close 
the schools and use them as quarters for the soldiery. Then the teachers of the 
village were collected together and told that their services were no longer re- 
quired if they refused to teach in Greek or Servian. Those who continued to 
declare themselves Bulgarians were exposed to a persecution whose severity 
varied with the length of their resistance. Even the most intransigeant had to 
avow themselves beaten in the end ; if not, they were sometimes allowed to depart 
for Bulgaria, but more usually sent to prison in Salonica or Uskub. 

The most difficult people to subdue were the priests, and above all the 
bishops. They were first asked to change the language of divine service. En- 
deavors were made to subject them to the Servian or Greek ecclesiastical authori- 
ties, and they were compelled to mention their names in the liturgy. If the priest 
showed the smallest inclination to resist, his exarchist church was taken from 
him and handed over to the patriarchists ; he was forbidden to hold any com- 
munication with his flock, and on the smallest disobedience was accused of 
political propagandism and treason. At first an open attack on the bishops was 
not ventured on. When Neophite, bishop of Veles, refused to separate the 
name of King Peter from the names of the other kings of the allies in his 
prayers, and used colors in his services which were suspected of being the 
Bulgarian national colors, Mr. Pachitch advised the military powers at Uskub 
(January 4/17) to treat him as equal to the Servian bishop and with correcti- 
tude. This ministerial order, however, did not prevent the local administrator 
of Veles, some weeks later (January 24/February 6 and February 4/17), from 
forbidding Neophite to hold services and assemblies in his bishopric, to see priests 
outside of the church or to hold communication with the villages. As the bishop 
refused to take the veiled hints given to him to depart for Bulgaria, an officer was 
finally sent to his house accompanied by soldiers, who took his abode for the army, 
after having beaten his secretary. In the same way Cosmas, bishop of Debra, 


was forced to abandon his seat and leave his town. It was even worse at Uskub, 
where the holder of the bishopric, the Archimandrite Methodius, was first driven 
out of his house, taken by force, shut up in a room and belabored by four sol- 
diers until he lost consciousness (April 8/21). Cast out into the street, Method- 
ius escaped into a neighboring house, in which a Frenchman dwelt who told the 
story to Mr. Carlier, French consul at Uskub. Under his protection, Methodius 
left for Salonica on April 13/26, whence he was sent to Sofia. The Commission 
has in its possession a deposition signed by the foreign doctors of Salonica 
who saw and examined Methodius on April 15/28, and found his story "entirely 
probable." 1 

The leaders, intellectual and religious, of the revolutionary movement, 
having been removed, the population of the villages were directly approached 
and urged to change their nationality and proclaim themselves Servian or Greek. 
The ecclesiastic Bulgarian reports written from every part of Macedonia are 
unanimous on this head. "You know," Bishop Neophite of Veles said to his 
persecutor, "in your capacity as sub-prefect, what the Servian priests and school- 
masters are doing in the villages. They are visiting the Bulgarian villages with 
soldiers and forcing the people to write themselves down as Servians, drive out 
their Bulgarian priest and ask to have a Servian priest given them. Those who 
refuse to proclaim themselves Servians are beaten and tortured." We are in 
possession of the Servian formula of renunciation of Bulgarian nationality. 
This is the formula which the priests of these villages and their flocks had to 
address to Mr. Vincentius, the Servian metropolitan at Uskub: 

I and the flock confided to my charge by God were formerly Servian, 
but the terrors with which the Bulgarian comitadjis representing the revolu- 
tionary organization inspired us, and the violence they used towards us, 
compelled us and our fathers before us to turn from the patriarchate to the 
exarchate, thus making Bulgarians of the pure Servians we were. Thus 
we called ourselves Bulgars under fear of death until the arrival of our 
Servian army, until the moment of our liberation from the Turks. Now 
that we are no longer in fear of bombs, stones, and bullets, we beg your 
Holiness, on our own behalf and on behalf of our flocks, to deign to restore 
us to our Holy Church of Uskub, to restore us to the faith which we have 
for a time betrayed through fear of death. Kissing your holy right hand, 
we ask you to pray to God to pardon our sin. Signed at Sopot, March 28, 

This formula was sent, in Servia, by a Servian official, Daniel Tsakits, sec- 
retary to the Malinska community at Koumanovo, to the Bulgarian priest, 
Nicolas Ivanov, with the following letter : 

Father Nicolas, thou shalt sign this letter that I send thee, and after 
thee all the villagers of Sopot are to sign likewise the Trstenitchani, the 

1 See the Appendix. 


Piestchani, the Stanevchani, and the Alakintchani, who are thy parishioners. 
The whole to be ready by Saturday. Greeting from Daniel Tsakits, 27, III, 
1913, Malino. 

On the margin, Mr. Tsakits added that there must be twenty signatures per 
village and, to be the more sure of his man, gave him on the other side indica- 
tions ad oculos: e. g.: 

Priest Nicolas Yane Troyine 

Petroche Kralo Troyan Spasi 

Ghele Sparits Petrouche Yane 

Danil Naoumov 




"Take care that those who have signed do not make off." 

The precaution was not superfluous, for priest Nicolas replied to this invi- 
tation by himself making off to Chtipe, to the protection of the Bulgarian authori- 
ties. This is what he wrote to the sub-prefect at Chtipe : 

I did not desire to lead my parishioners to the Servian church. Since 
I could not renounce my Bulgarian nationality, I have emigrated. I should 
add that my family is exposed to the revenge of the Servian authorities and 
that my children, remaining in their birthplace, will be condemned to im- 
prisonment at Belgrade if I do not immediately return. 



The Servians have attempted to deny the authenticity of the secret Bulgarian 
documents cited above, and a small collection of secret Servian documents, 
likewise authentic, has actually been published to refute them. We shall return 
thereto; but upon the point that interests us it must be said that these docu- 
ments only confirm what we have already said. "Anyone calling himself Bul- 
garian," writes a certain Peter Kotsov, a Macedonian Bulgar, in a letter of 
January 11/24, 1913, "risks being killed. The Servians have introduced their 
communal administration throughout the villages, and installed a Servian school- 
master for every ten villages. We can not act and we are in a difficult position 
because the Servians have taken all the Bulgarians' arms. We do what we can, 
we call to the people ; but we are all waiting for the Bulgarian army. Make it 
come as soon as possible, or we shall all be subjected by the Servians. Even the 
staunchest Bulgarians are ready to become Servians. The secret police has 




ljj Occupation- serbe 
K'-'v.-l « montenegrine 
,/ bu/gare 

" 3 rec 9 ue 
. Front/ere d'Albanie 
d'apres la confdeLondres 
♦++++ Front /ere d'apres 
le traite serbo-bulgare 
du 13 Mars 1912 
Echellede 1:5.000.000 

D'apres Balkan reus 


numerous agents. Anyone who ventures to speak ill of the Servians exposes 
himself to much suffering. 1 In the South of Macedonia, in the Greek, occupation 
zone 2 the same endeavors are being made to make the population Greek/' 

Here are some examples, from among thousands, A letter from the village 
of Dembesi (Castoria) on December 11/24, 1912, runs: 

The first care of the Greek officers and soldiers arriving here is to 
discover if the population of the said village and its environs is Bulgarian 
or Greek. If the population is pure Bulgarian, the officers order the peasants 
to "become Greeks again, that being the condition of a peaceful life." 

Evidently here again the underlying assumption made is that the whole 
population was Greek in the past. "How long have you been Bulgarian?" the 
Greek officer asked at Khroupichta, for example. "For years," was the reply. 
"Return to old times then; become Greeks again," was the order thereupon. 
And he showed remarkable clemency. In the village of Gorno-Nestrame, 
when the population replied in Bulgarian to questions put in Greek, the Greek 
officer cried out angrily: "Mi fonasete vourgarika" — [Don't speak Bulgarian] : 
we are in Greece and anyone who speaks Bulgarian shall be off to Bulgaria. In 
some villages the question was put in this form: "Are you Christians or Bul- 
garians?" In several villages the inhabitants were made to sign petitions whose 
contents, unknown to them, were a demand for reunion with Greece. "What 
a shame," said the Greek gendarmes at Gorno-Koufalovo (March 12/25). 
"We have freed you. The voice of Alexander the Great calls to you from the 
tomb; do you not hear it? You sleep on and go on calling yourselves 
Bulgarians !" 

Where then was the Bulgarian army for which people were crying in Mace- 
donia and begging it to come soon, if Bulgarian Macedonia were to be saved? 
On the eve of the war, as we have seen, the Bulgarian General Staff insisted 
on having 100,000 men left free, according to the terms of the treaty, to fight 
back to back with the Servians in Macedonia, and thus effect a real condominium 
after the conquest. To defeat the Turks in the principal theater of war was 
first and foremost a matter of imperious strategic necessity. After the first 

1 The documents are published in an appendix to Balcanicus' book, The Servians and 
Bulgarians in the Balkan War. Our quotation is taken from the German translation 
"Serbien und Bulgarien im Balkankriege, 1912-13, ins Deutsche ubertragen von Dr. jur. L. 
Markowitsch, Wigand, Leipzig, 1913." The French translation of the original perverts the 
meaning of the published documents. For example, in our quotation the first phrase (Ger- 
man "Wer sich als Bulgare bekennt, dem droht die Lebensgefahr") is translated as "It is 
impossible for us to raise the people." The last phrase "Wer was Schlechtes hier von Serben 
sagt, dem wird es nicht wohlergehen," is simply omitted. 

2 See the zones of occupation on the map (page 55) taken without alteration from 
Balcanicus' book to show the Servian point of view the more clearly. We have merely 
made the stippling rather more distinct and completed the Albanian frontier to the South, 
as projected at the London Conference (Balcanicus shows an Albania of which more than 
half is in Servian occupation), adding the line of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier as agreed 
by the treaty of February 29/ March 13, 1912. Balcanicus is the pseudonym of a well-known 
Servian statesman. 


victories, however, and the repulsion of the Turks at Kirk Kilisse, Lule Bourgas, 
Tchorlou, and Tchataldja, a new reason for continuing the war appeared. After 
the end of November the question might be put, as by the editor of the Bul- 
garian paper at Salonica, whether this was a war of liberation or of conquest. 
The war of liberation has in fact gained its end at Lule Bourgas (October 31), 
Salonica (October 27), Monastir (October 28). Why go on pouring out the 
blood of hundreds of thousands of men and expending great sums of money 
down to the capture of Adrianople (March 13), of Yanina (February 24), 
Durazzo and Scutari (April 9) ? The question was debated at length in all its 
details at Belgrade during the debates on the address at the beginning of 
November (new style), and at Sofia above all, in the three weeks of the election 
campaign (November 17-December 7). For divers reasons the two par- 
ties agreed to end the war in November, 1912, and the Servian opposition, as 
well as the Bulgarian opposition, tried to prove that statesmen and parties had 
committed a grave error in letting it drag on longer (down to May, 1913). In 
the first place, what had the Servians to gain by it? A discussion between the 
opposition orator, Mr. Drachkovits, and the deputies composing the majority in 
the Skupshtina (October 23/Nov. 5, 1913) will show: 

Mr. Milorad Drachkovits: For Bulgaria the breaking of the armistice 
and the new war spelt Adrianople, the most important fortress in the Balkans 
after Constantinople. For Bulgaria that meant the addition to the one sea 
she possessed of two others, and the permanent isolation of Constantinople. 
But what does that mean for us ? What are we going to gain in compensa- 
tion for the acquisition of Adrianople, of Thrace and of three seas, the 
desires of the Bulgarians? 

A Voice from the Right: We buy back Macedonia. 

Mr. Drachkovits: But gentlemen of the majority, we have already 
bought it back. We have acquired it. 

Anastasius Petrovits: And the treaty? 

Mr. Drachkovits: If you want Servia to put the treaty in force, first 
make Bulgaria do so. But you are freeing Bulgaria from an engagement 
which it contracted while making Servia responsible for an engagement into 
which it never entered. 

Anastasius Petrovits: It is that fact which, as the world recognizes, has 
given the government its most real rights over Macedonia. 

Mr. Drachkovits: We have not assisted all those who have recognized 
the fact; but we have assisted Bulgaria, which does not recognize it. 

We shall see that it is in truth the eight months' delay which allows 
Servia to annul the treaty and keep the whole of Macedonia. But how do the 
Bulgarians come to allow the war to be thus prolonged? How did they, or 
rather how did their government fail to see that the occupation of Macedonia 
for eight months by the Servians and Greeks was going to prevent the attain- 
ment of the real end of the war, — the unification of Bulgarian nationality? 

Here the case is more complex. The replies made to the attacks of Mr. 


Ghenadiev by his predecessors, and especially by Mr. Theodore Theodorov, 
were plausible enough. Yet, it is true that Grand Vizier Kiamil asked for 
peace on October 29/Nov. 11, 1902. But the General Staff, among them General 
Savov, insisted that war should be recommenced without dragging on the 
pourparlers. You say that Turkey was ready at that time to hand over 
Adrianople? The case never arose. You cite as proof the mysterious mission 
to Constantinople of the Bulgarian banker, Mr. Kaltchev (December 10-13/ 
23-26) ? Without insisting on the fact that the government had no information 
about a mission that was entirely confidential (Mr. Guechov's first act when 
hearing of it was to offer his resignation), Mr. Kaltchev himself and his inter- 
locutor, Mr. Noradounghian, Foreign Minister in the Kiamil cabinet, made it 
known through the press that the questions at issue were the autonomy of 
Macedonia and Thrace and the condominium at Dede-Agatch, and that there 
was no question of the cession of Adrianople. 1 Mr. Ghenadiev continued to talk 
of a third opportunity for negotiations: the interview between General Savov 
and Nazim Pasha and Noradounghian, at Tchataldja on December 26/ January 8, 
at which the Turkish ministry resigned themselves to the abandonment of the 
beleaguered fortress in return for certain concessions in favor of Moslem religious 
establishments and subject to the undertaking that Greek pretensions to the islands 
were not upheld — but, Mr. Theodorov asserts, all that is false; if it were true 
the acceptance of conditions so equivocal would have been tantamount to a 
breach of alliance and would have stopped the regular negotiations going on in 

In all these questions of fact, the last word has probably not yet been said. 
What is clear so far, is that in so far as Mr. Theodorov succeeded in exonerating 
himself, and the Danev Cabinet found excuses for missing all these happy oppor- 
tunities for negotiations, it was only by means of casting the responsibility on 
others in higher places. 

It will be seen from the preceding that by the end of 1912 there were two 
policies in Bulgaria : the policy of the cabinet and that of those in direct contact 
with the army. Ministers might be anxious to be faithful to the terms of the 
alliance; that consideration hardly troubled General Savov's entourage. The 
press has said a great deal about the romanticism of the latter, of Czar Ferdi- 
nand's desire to make a triumphal entry into Constantinople, of the white horses 
and precious Venetian saddle kept ready for the attack on Tchataldja. This 
followed immediately upon Kiamil's peace proposal of October 29/November 
11, the prospects of which were notoriously weakened by its failure. After 
demanding Adrianople. a new frontier was proposed, Rodosto-Malatra, instead 
of Midia-Enos already adopted by international diplomacy. Such an extension 
of ambitions could not but hide from sight the principal object of the war. To 
desire to take Adrianople at whatever cost was to risk the loss of Macedonia. 

iKiamil asked that the garrison in Adrianople might be allowed to depart and passage 
be left free as far as Tchataldja. 


To demand an outlet on the sea of Marmora was to have lost all feeling of 
the international position. Was it a pure chance that Macedonia was forgotten 
amid the secretive but remote ambitions which appeared thus unexpectedly on 
the horizon? A recollection of what was said in the second part of this chapter 
on the relations between the Bulgarian government and the revolutionary move- 
ment in Macedonia, will show that there was nothing accidental in this neglect. 
Distrust was ever active between the Bulgarian government and the Macedonian 
movement. The former was perpetually apprehensive that the comitadjis would 
involve them in internal or international complications. Now that Macedonia 
was on the point of being freed, everything was done to prevent the Macedonians 
themselves from having any direct share in the work of liberation. The reason 
may have lain partly in that notion of partition in Macedonia, admitted in the 
treaties, but unknown to the public at large, which had yet to become accustomed 
to it. In any case the 15,000 Macedonian volunteers who might have been left 
to fight in Macedonia itself, near their homes, were compelled to dwell through- 
out the war, far away from their villages, at Tchataldja and Boulair. The 
number of inconvenient witnesses of the work of denationalization in Macedonia 
was as far as possible reduced, and the taking possession of the conquered 
country by the Servian and Greek armies as far as possible facilitated. If the 
aim of these tactics was to facilitate partition, the result went beyond it. What 
was precipitated was the loss of Macedonia to the profit of the allies. Fear of 
a real liberation of the Macedonian nation brought about its conquest by the 
competitors. In January, the Macedonian legionaries of General Ghenev began 
accusing the Bulgarian government of having deceived the people in order to 
"sell Macedonia." In fact the government deceived only itself. 

True, the Bulgarian government had no notion of making any sacrifice in 
turning its attention from Veles, Monastir, Okhrida, Castoria and Fiorina, to 
which it should have been directed, to Salonica and Rodosto. They thought 
they could chew all they had bitten off. The members of the Russophil Guechov- 
Danev cabinet believed it because they were sure of the sacredness of treaty 
obligations and believed that the existence of the arbitration was a sort of guar- 
antee. The military party and public opinion were sure of the excellence of 
natural rights which they are ready to defend with the sword. 

Were there not, nevertheless, certain premonitory signs which should have 
proved to the blindest the lack of prudence in combining such complete mistrust 
of others with such entire self confidence? 

First there was the state of things in Macedonia above described. The 
denationalization process had gone much further there than diplomatists were 
willing to admit. The partition treaty had long been violated when Mr. Pachitch 
was still talking of introducing modifications into the treaty to save it from 
complete annihilation. 

On September 15, 1912, that is to say, six and a half months after the 
conclusion of the treaty, and twenty days before the beginning of the war abroad, 


Servia's representative received a secret circular demanding the incorporation in 
"Old Servia," beyond the agreed frontier, of the towns of Prilepe, Kritchevo and 
Okhrida. With the victories of the Servian army, the list of concessions de- 
manded rapidly lengthened. Mr. Pachitch was still only talking of Prilepe, the 
town of the legendary hero, Marko Kralivits, when the army was asking for 
Monastir. When he asked for Monastir, the army insisted on a frontier co- 
terminous with Greece. The government ended by accepting all the conditions 
laid down by the country, conditions that grew more and more exacting. The 
military party was powerful; it was led by the hereditary prince; and it in- 
variably succeeded in overriding the first minister, always undecided, always 
temporizing and anxious to arrange everything pleasantly. The demands pre- 
sented to the Bulgarians by Mr. Pachitch were as vague and indecisive as his 
home policy. He began in the autumn of 1912, by offering a revision of the 
treaty in the official organ. Then in December, in a private letter to his ambassa- 
dor at Sofia, he informed Mr. Guechov, the head of the Bulgarian cabinet, that 
revision was necessary. In January his ideas as to the limits within which the 
said revision should take place, were still undecided. In February he submitted 
written proposals to the Bulgarian government, and suggested that revision 
might be undertaken "without rousing public opinion or allowing the Great 
Powers to mix themselves up with the question of partition." At this moment 
Mr. Pachitch could still fancy that he had the solution of the conflict in his 
hand. He was to lose this illusion. His colleague was already writing his 
"Balcanicus" pamphlet in which he took his stand on the clause pacta servanda 
sunt, with the reservation rebus sic stantibus, and pointing to the changes in the 
disposition of the allied armies between the two theaters of war (see above), as 
infractions of the treaty which must lead to revision. In his speech of May 
29, Mr. Pachitch ended by accepting this reasoning. At the same time the 
military authorities in Macedonia had decided to hold on. On February 27/ 
March 12, they told the population of Veles that the town would remain in 
Servia. On April 3/16, Major Razsoukanov, Bulgarian attache with the General 
Staff of the Servian army at Uskub, told his government that his demands were 
not even answered with conditional phrases. "This is provisional, until it has 
been decided to whom such and such a village belongs" (in the Chtip or Doiran 
areas). Major Razsoukanov learned that at the instance of the General Staff 
the Belgrade government had decided on the rivers Zletovska, Bregalnitsa and 
Lakavitsa, as the definite eastern limit of the occupation territory. The inter- 
esting correspondence published by Balcanicus in his pamphlet (see above) re- 
fers to the forced execution of this resolution in the disputed territories during 
the month of March. We have here, on the one hand, the Bulgarian comitadjis 
begging, according to the advice of the above letter, for the arrival of the Bul- 
garian force and trying, in its absence, to do its work, well or ill; on the 
other, the Servian army, setting up Servian administration in the villages, closing 
the Bulgarian schools, driving out the comitadjis and "reestablishing order." 


Between the two parties, contending in a time of peace, stood the population, 
forced to side with one or the other and naturally inclining to the stronger. 
Mr. Razsoukanov (who gives us confirmation of the methods employed by the 
Servian administration to ''round off" the frontiers of the occupied territory) 
notes also the predominant state of mind of the army of occupation. According 
to him "the military party in Servia, with the heir apparent as its head," did 
not stop here. It "dreams of and works for a 'Great Servia' with the river 
Strouma at least as its frontier." "To insure possession of the occupied terri- 
tories the Servians had to discover some compromise with the Greeks, and one 
was found." Mr. Razsoukanov was the first to make us acquainted with facts 
now confirmed by the Roumanian "Green Book." He states that — "I am in- 
clined to believe that there was, over and above the treaty concluded between the 
'military leagues' of the two countries, a similar agreement between the govern- 
ments and the armies. That was why General Poutnik went, on March 9/22, 
to 'inspect' the garrison at Monastir, where there was barely a regiment, and 
the heir apparent had also gone on two occasions, likewise for 'inspection.' I 
rather think that in the special train, with which General Poutnik was provided 
by the Greeks, 'something' was decided between the two allies, to the disadvan- 
tage of the absent third : and that it was this special train, Salonica to Monastir, 
which the General went to 'inspect.' It is a fact that the Servian ambassador 
at Bucharest did on March 24/April 6, propose to Roumania a treaty of alliance 
against Bulgaria, and that on April 19/May 2, the Greek ambassador made the 
same proposition. Mr. Venizelos, on his part, confessed to the Chamber that 
Prince Nicholas — one of the interlocutors on board the 'special trains,' — as 
military governor of Salonica, largely contributed in the preparations of the 
Greek-Servian convention. This convention was concluded on May 16/29." 

Evidently war was preparing. The Servian General Staff employed the 
time in fortifying the central position at Ovtche-Pole. The Greeks, after increas- 
ing their Macedonian army by the addition of the regiments released by the 
capture of Yanina, also tried to take up advanced positions in the area of Bulgarian 
occupation, at Pravishta and Nigrita. The pourparlers with Turkey, which had 
been resumed in London, were dragged on to give time to complete these prepa- 
rations. On May 6, the Servian General Staff laid down the preliminary dis- 
positions for concentrating to the east of Uskub. From May 15, a military 
convention and plan of concerted operations with Greece were under discussion. 
The Bulgarians, on the other hand, hastened to make peace with the Turks ; this 
agreed, they diverted their armies from Adrianople and Tchataldja towards 
Macedonia and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. On either side preparations were 
made when a final diplomatic duel took place. Throughout, the opening of 
hostilities was never lost to sight. On May 12/25, Mr. Pachitch finally despatched 
to Sofia propositions relative to the revision of the treaty. He justified the new 
Servian demands by two classes of reasons. First, the clauses of the treaty had 
been modified in application ; secondly, external circumstances not foreseen by the 


treaty had profoundly changed its tenor. The clauses of the treaty had been 
violated by the fact that the Bulgarians had not given the Servians military 
assistance, while the Servians for their part had aided the Bulgarians. The 
refusal to leave the Adriatic on the part of the Servians, and the occupations of 
Adrianople and Thrace by the Bulgarians, constituted two new violations of the 
treaty. Servia then was entitled to territorial compensation; first, because the 
Bulgarians had not rendered the promised aid; second, because Servia had 
assisted the Bulgarians ; third, because Servia had lost the Adriatic littoral while 
Bulgaria had acquired Thrace. This time Mr. Pachitch was in accord with public 
opinion. This same public opinion had its influence on the Bulgarian govern- 
ment. Since the treaty of February 29/March 13 remained secret, the public 
could not follow the juridical casuistry based on a commentary on this or that 
ambiguous phrase in the text. The public renounced the treaty en bloc and 
would have nothing to do with the "contested zone."' If the Servians trans- 
gressed the terms of the treaty in their demands Bulgarian diplomatists greatly 
inclined to act in the same way. If the Servians demanded an outlet on the 
yEgean as a necessary condition of existence after the loss of their outlet on the 
Adriatic, and insisted on a coterminous frontier with Greece to secure it, Mr. 
Danev left the allies and contravened the terms of the treaty when he laid before 
the Powers in London a demand for a frontier coterminous with Albania in the 
Debra region. At the same time Mr. Danev went against his ministerial col- 
leagues and followed the military authorities in refusing to hand over Salonica. 
Austria appeared to have promised it him, after promising the Vardar plain to 
Servia. Thus on the one hand complications and broils were being introduced 
by the perversion to megalomania of the National Ideal: on the other (this was 
the standpoint of Guechov and Theodorov), there was the endeavor to safeguard 
the alliance. With Servia drawing near to Greece, Bulgaria had to join hands 
with Roumania if it were not to find itself isolated in the peninsula. This was 
what Austria Hungary wanted, and it favored the policy. Roumania accepted, 
but on condition of receiving the recompense assured it by a secret convention 
with Austria in the event of war with Bulgaria: annexation of the Tourtoukai- 
Baltchik line. On these conditions Roumania would remain neutral; it even 
promised military assistance against Turkey ! But Turkey was defeated and the 
Ministry pretended not to want to war with the allies. Why then sacrifice the 
richest bit of Bulgarian territory? Austria's effort broke against these hypo- 
critical and formal — or too simple — arguments. At bottom war was believed to 
be inevitable and Russia, it was thought, would do the rest. Russia threatened 
Bulgaria with Roumanian invasion, if it came to war. By the end of May, 
Russian diplomacy made a final effort to avoid conflict. While agreeing to play 
the part of arbiter within the limits of the alliance, Russia gave counsels of 
prudence. Go beyond the Servian demands for compensation, they said: despite 
the implicit promise the Servians made you of demanding nothing beyond what 


the treaty gave them, agree to cede some towns outside the ''contested zone," 
"beyond" the frontier which they had promised not to "violate." 

This Russian solution, which could not satisfy the Servians, had not much 
chance of being accepted by the Bulgarians. The attitude taken by Russia filled 
the opposing parties with some doubts as to the impartiality of its arbitration. 
The Servians were sure that Russia had not forgotten the Bulgaria of San Stefano 
and the Bulgarians could not use Macedonia as a medium of exchange on the 
international market. On both sides the conviction was reached that the issue 
must be sought in armed conflict. 

There was. however, one last attempt at avoiding open strife : the two initia- 
tors of the treaty of alliance, Pachitch and Guechov, arranged a meeting at 
_TsarjJbrod on the frontier. They_j&anied to try to _j:£a£h_a Jriendly, solution of 
the difficulties, without any "public" or "Powers." Alas, what was possible in 
the month of February was no longer so in May. In the first place the "public" 
of the political parties was there, in Belgrade, and they did not want to leave 
Pachitch tete-a-tete with the Bulgarian Premier. Before starting for Tsaribrod 
he had to read to the Skupshtina a summary of his reasons for a revision of the 
treaty; they were the same he had addressed to Sofia three days earlier (see 
above). But thus to divulge the secrets of diplomatic correspondence was to cut 
off the retreat. In such circumstances the speech of May 15/28 was the death- 
blow to the pacifist hopes of Mr. Guechov on the eve of departure for Tsaribrod. 
The words attributed to Mr. Pachitch in an interview in an Agram paper are not 
at all improbable. "I was certain," he is reported to have said, "that the Bulga- 
rians would reply by a declaration of war." Mr. Guechov's situation was hardly 
more brilliant. He, too, had to fight at Sofia against a war party; but he was 
not going to make concessions. When he learned on May 17/30 that the Czar 
Ferdinand had received the leaders of the opposition on the previous evening 
and received their counsels of war with approval, Mr. Guechov handed in his 
resignation. Mr. Pachitch did not know that on May 20/June 2, at Tsaribrod, 
he was speaking to an ex-Minister. Yet another issue or rather a means of 
delaying events was discovered: to hold a conference of the prime ministers of 
the allied States. On May 22/June 4, Mr. Guechov's resignation was known 
to all. With him the last hope of escaping war disappeared. 

At this moment the Czar of Russia made a final effort. On May 26/June 8, 
he sent a telegram to the Kings of Servia and Bulgaria in which, while noting 
the suggested meeting at Salonica and its eventual continuation at St. Petersburg, 
he reminded them that they were bound to submit their findings to his arbitra- 
ment. He stated solemnly that "the State which begins the war will answer for 
its conduct to Slavdom." He reserved to himself entire freedom to decide what 
attitude Russia would take up in view of the "possible consequences of this 
criminal strife." The secret diplomatic correspondence explains this threat. 
If Servia will not submit to Russian arbitration "it will risk its existence." If 


it is Bulgaria that resists, "it will be attacked, in the war with the allies, by 
Roumania and Turkey." 

The threat was understood at Belgrade but merely created irritation. "Russia 
holds over us," it was said there, "the ever threatening danger of Austria's 
neighborhood, and because she knows that if she abandons us, our enemies 
across the Danube will hasten to exercise the severest pressure upon us, she 
thinks she can neglect us. * * * All favors go to the Bulgarians. We can 
not go any further in this direction. We have given way on the Albanian ques- 
tion, we can not give way in Macedonia. We can not condemn ourselves to 
national suicide because at St. Petersburg or at Tsarskoie-Selo it has been so 
decided." 1 

In view of the tendencies of the militarist party, Mr. Pachitch sent in his 
resignation in his turn, on June 2/15. But the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Hartwig, 
was there to show the gravity of the situation and persuade the King, the mem- 
bers of the cabinet, the deputies, to yield to Russia's demands and unreservedly 
accept arbitration. Mr. Pachitch remained, and on June 8/21, Belgrade declared 
its willingness to accept arbitration ; "without inwardly believing in it," as the 
Agram interviewer adds. And Mr. de Penennrun said "Mr. Pachitch had no more 
desire than Mr. Danev to betake himself to St. Petersburg. As a matter of fact 
although he endeavored to put himself in agreement with the critics and oppo- 
nents in the Skupshtina, at the close of the eventful session of June 17/30, 
Mr. Pachitch declared that he in no way abandoned the point of view set out in 
his summary of May 15/28, and had accepted arbitration only because he had 
become convinced first, that it would proceed on an extended basis rather than 
within the limits laid down in Art. 4 of the secret annex to the treaty; and 
second, on condition that the "spheres of direction in Russia" agreed to consider 
the Greek-Bulgarian conflict at the same time as the Serbo-Bulgarian. 

On this point the new allies had agreed ; and Mr. Venizelos confirmed it in a 
paragraph communicated on the same day to the Temps. After Mr. Pachitch's 
explanations and the subsequent discussion in which the demand voiced was for 
the annexation of Macedonia rather than for arbitration (Mr. Ribaratz) ; and 
after it had been stated (Mr. Paul Marinkovits) that "the Servian people would 
rather trust to its victorious army than to the well known tactlessness of Mr. 
Pachitch," the Skupshtina reverted to the order of the day of a month previous. 
It renewed its decision "not to allow the vital interests of Servia to be abused." 
Mr. Drachkovits explained this condition which he laid down as follows: 
"The valley of the Vardar is a vital interest for Servia, and any arbitrament 
which leaves this vital need out of account could not be accepted." Some min- 
utes before. Pachitch received in the chamber the telegram informing him of the 

1 These characteristic terms were recorded, some weeks later, at Belgrade by Mr. de 
Penennrun. See his book, Quarante jours de guerre dans les Balkans. Chapelot, Paris, 


outbreak of hostilities. Turning pale, he withdrew. Arbitration then would not 
take place, and it would not be Servia's fault. 

At Sofia, in fact, for military reasons to be explained, the final agony had 
been reached more quickly than at Belgrade. Here events were precipitated by 
conflict between the cabinet and the military party. As to the aim to be attained 
there was unanimity. The Servians must be forced to carry out the treaty and 
evacuate Macedonia to the south of the frontier agreed upon. But no agree- 
ment could be reached as to the means. Mr. Guechov's favorite tactics were to 
temporize. We have seen how under the circumstances of debate precious time 
had been lost both by Guechov and Pachitch. If concessions to Servia were to 
be made, they ought to have been made in January or at latest in February, when 
Mr. Pachitch proposed to act apart from the '"public and the Powers," and while 
negotiations would still be undertaken under the most favorable conditions. If 
no concession was to be made, means should have been devised for resolving 
by force what it had been determined to regard as a question of force — "eine 
Macht-frage" It was then time to think of alliances and neutralities and pay 
for them with temporary concessions. It was necessary to know how not to 
yield to certain ambitions. Neither one nor the other was done. When Mr. 
Danev became Prime Minister, he took up with his portfolio an ambiguous 
position which Mr. Guechov had rightly refused: that of working for war while 
remaining a partisan of peace. This internal contradiction was bound to act 
fatally and to paralyze those who believed in action and those who opposed it 
alike. Mr. Danev, and, to an even greater extent, his colleague, Mr. Theodorov, 
continued to the end convinced that they could keep all they had acquired. 
Mr. Danev even wanted to get more — without risking war. The militarists 
knew better. 

A telegram of June 8/21 from General Savov to the commander of the 
fourth army, describes the state of things as follows : 

I. There is an alliance between the Servians and the Greeks whose 
object is to hold and divide the whole territory of Macedonia on the right 
bank of the Vardar with the addition of Uskub, Koumanova, Kratovo and 
Kriva Palonka for the Servians ; Salonica and the regions of Pravishta 
and Nigrita for the Greeks. II. The Servians do not recognize the treaty 
and do not admit arbitration within the limits of the treaty. III. We insist 
that the arbitrators start from the basis laid down in the treaty, i. e., con- 
cern themselves solely with the contested zone. Since the non-contested 
territory belongs to us according to the treaty, we desire that it should 
be evacuated by the Servians or, at least, occupied by mixed armies for 
such time as the pourparlers are going on. We make the same proposition 
to the Greeks. IV. These questions must be settled within ten days and in 
our sense, or war is inevitable. Thus within ten days we shall have either 
war or demobilization, according as the government's demands are accepted 
or refused. V. If we demobilize now the territories mentioned will remain 
in the hands of the Greeks and the Servians, since it is difficult to suppose 


that they will be peacefully handed over to us. VI. The discontent which 
has recently manifested itself in certain parts of the army gives ground for 
supposing that there is a serious agitation against war. The attention of 
intelligent soldiers must be directed to the fact that should the army become 
disorganized and incapable of action, the result will be as described in 
paragraph v. Reply with the least possible delay whether the state of the 
army is such that it can be counted on for successful operations. 

The point of particular interest in this document is the indication afforded 
of the state of mind of the Bulgarian army, which explains why the commander 
was particularly anxious to have the question settled. Harvest time approached 
and the Bulgarian soldier who, after what he had suffered and endured during 
the long months of winter and spring at Tchataldja and Boulair, had then, instead 
of returning home, been compelled to join the army on the western frontier, 
had had enough. One thing or the other: it was war or demobilization: but in 
any case there must be an immediate decision, for uncertainty had become in- 
tolerable. This state of mind was general and several officers told Mr. Bour- 
chier what he repeated in the Times, "If the question is not decided in a week, 
General Savov will no longer have an army." 

It was under these circumstances that Mr. Danev summoned the Council of 
Ministers on the morning of June 9/22. He told his colleagues that after a 
sleepless night he had come to the conclusion that since, even after arbitration, 
it was more than likely that Servia would make war on them, it was better to 
carry it on now. Were the army once demobilized it would be difficult to bring 
it together again in the autumn. In such conditions whatever was done must 
be done at once. Clearly Mr. Danev was expressing the ideas of Savov. Mr. 
Theodorov's reply was to the point. War between Christians would be shame- 
ful after the war of liberation. They ought to go to St. Petersburg : they would 
get all they wanted there. If, afterwards, the Servians refused to conform to the 
decision of the arbiter, all Europe would be on Bulgaria's side. All the other 
ministers plead for peace with one exception, — Mr. Khritov, who represented 
the war party in the Council and who was not allowed to speak by Mr. Danev, 
who knew him. Mr. Danev then betook himself to the Czar's summer palace 
at Vrana, near Sofia, to make his report. General Savov was also present. At 
three o'clock in the afternoon Mr. Theodorov was summoned to explain the 
reasons of the "populist" party against war. Mr. Theodorov emphasized the 
reasons for going to St. Petersburg. Mr. Danev and General Savov gave their 
consent thereto. They returned to Sofia; the Council was resumed; the Russian 
Ambassador was summoned and the Council's decision communicated to him. 
A demand was added, the significance of which is comprehensible enough after 
what had been said, but which appeared to St. Petersburg in the guise of an 
ultimatum. The demand was that the arbiter should publish his opinion within 
eight days. It was added that Mr. Danev would start in three days. This was 
nearly the "ten days" of Mr. Savov's telegram. Mr. Necloudov then communi- 


cated the agreeable news that Servia accepted arbitration unreservedly. The 
Russian government gave the Servian and Bulgarian governments four days in 
which to prepare their memoranda for the arbiter. On June 11/24, Mr. Theo- 
dorov received a fresh letter from the Bulgarian Embassy at St. Petersburg 
which strengthened his view and which he read to the Council of Ministers on 
the same day. It was stated there: ''War will be our loss." "The Emperor 
and the Russian government have decided to arbitrate in conformity with and 
within the limits of the treaty. It was desirable to come at once since 'the 
absent are always in the wrong.' Otherwise Russia will not protect you in any 
way, France will give you no money, England and Germany will abandon 
you to your own resources. Since in this case Germany stands with the Triple 
Alliance no one can checkmate Russia's policy ; Austria Hungary will not go 
beyond Platonic promises and Roumania finally will certainly occupy your ter- 
ritories while Russia can not defend you." (This letter referred to a report ad- 
dressed to Mr. Danev a week previous.) 

All this was opportunely said. These prognostics were later confirmed by 
facts. But those at Sofia who desired war drew one conclusion only, — Russia 
did not desire a strong Bulgaria ; Bulgaria fara da se. The peace party was ter- 
rorized by the Macedonian patriots, who threatened to kill Danev at the station 
when he started for St. Petersburg, and to march the army on Sofia. Public 
opinion with few exceptions was for war. Under these circumstances the heads 
of the war party were ready for any risk. The timid and half initiated were 
told that half measures only were in contemplation, which would lead to skir- 
mishings such as had frequently occurred with Servians and Greeks on the dis- 
puted frontiers. If anyone thought thus, he reckoned without his host. 

On June 15/28, General Savov sent the following telegram to the commander 
of the fourth army: 

In order that our silence under Servian attacks may not produce a bad 
effect on the state of mind of the army, and on the other hand to avoid en- 
couraging the enemy, I order you to attack the enemy all along the line as 
energetically as possible, without deploying all your forces or producing a 
prolonged engagement. Try to establish a firm footing on Krivolak on the 
right bank of the Bregalnitsa. It is preferable that you undertake a fusillade 
in the evening and make an impetuous attack on the whole line during the 
night and at daybreak. The operation to be undertaken tomorrow, 16th, in 
the evening. 

The order to the second army is mentioned by General Savov in another 
telegram sent on the following day, the 16th, and even more interesting as it 
displays the motives which led the war party to risk action or supplied them 
with justifications. "In direction 24, I ordered the fourth army to pursue offensive 
operations and the second army as soon as it had completed its operations on 
Tchayasa, to begin immediately concentrating on the line marked out in order 
to attack Salonica. Messieurs the Generals are to bear in mind that our opera- 


tions against the Servians and Greeks are undertaken without a formal declara- 
tion of war, mainly for the following reasons: (I) to bring the state of mind of 
the army up to a certain point and put them in a position (literal translation) to 
regard our allies up to today as enemies; (II) to accelerate the decisions of 
Russian policy by the fear of war between the allies; (III) to inflict heavy 
blows upon our adversaries in order to compel them to treat the more readily 
and make concessions; (IV) since our enemies are in occupation of territories 
which belong to us let us try by our arms to seize new territory until the 
European powers intervene to stop our military action. Since early intervention 
can be foreseen, it is necessary to act quickly and energetically. The fourth 
army must do all in its power to take Veles at any cost, because of the great 
political significance of such a conquest. If the operations of the fourth army 
permit the second will receive the order to attack Salonica." 

Re-reading this, the confused and childish reasoning of a general wishing 
to play the politician, it is now difficult to believe that the questions of war and 
peace were thus decided. General Savov said later that he merely followed an 
order — then he was silent. A story was told in his name that the order was 
given by King Ferdinand, and that he was threatened with a court-martial if 
he disobeyed it. During the election campaign at the end of 1913 public atten- 
tion was almost exclusively occupied with the question of responsibility for 
June 16/29 and people were at great pains to discover the culprit. The inves- 
tigation is not yet complete, and we need not linger over the more or less 
probable rumors current. To seek for a single culprit, however, is a mistaken 
method, inadequate to throw light on the deeper causes of the Bulgarian national 
catastrophe. Not one day in June alone, but the whole course of the two wars 
must be surveyed in the search for the culprit. As has been said a war of libera- 
tion became a war of conquest for the satisfaction of personal ambition: but 
its causes, too, lay in strategic necessities ; in legitimate tendencies implicit in 
the traditional national policy; in the auto-hypnosis of a people which had never 
experienced a reverse and was intoxicated by successes, justly recognized by all 
the world for their military glory ; in a misjudgment of their opponents based on 
well known facts in the past and ignorance of the present; in a word in that 
profound belief in their cause and their star which is a part of the national 

The events which followed on the fatal 16 and 17/29 and 30 June, may be 
recalled in a few words. On the evening of the 17th the pacificist ministers 
learned with astonishment that while Mr. Danev was preparing to start for St. 
Petersburg and a Russian gunboat was waiting at Varna to convey him to 
Odessa, war had broken out on the frontier. On the morning of the 18th, the 
Council of Ministers met and after a very lively discussion in the course of 
which the cabinet threatened to resign, General Savov was forced to give an 
order stopping the offensive. The General himself was retired for having given 
the order. At the same time the Russian government tried to stop the move- 


ments of the Greek and Servian armies by the exercise of diplomatic pressure 
at Athens and Belgrade. There being no sanction behind the action, it was 
ineffectual. Two days before the outbreak of hostilities, Roumania, encouraged 
by Russia, declared to Bulgaria that she reserved for herself entire liberty 
of action in the event of war. Full advantage was taken of this, and it 
soon proved much more difficult to stop Roumania once in action, 
than to induce her to act. Next, Turkey showed itself more and more 
aggressive and intransigeant. A veritable avalanche of misfortunes indeed 
descended upon Bulgaria. A few more dates must be added. On July 1 the 
Greeks fell upon the Bulgarian garrison at Salonica, massacred several soldiers 
and took the rest prisoner. The Bulgarians could not hold the positions behind 
the rivers Zletovska, Bregalnitsa, Kriva Lakavitsa ; they were stopped and driven 
back after several days' assault. On July 7 and 8, the Servian army took the 
offensive. On July 9, the Servians took Radovitch, the Greeks Strumnitsa. On 
July 11, the Roumanian army completed its mobilization and crossed the Bul- 
garian frontier without encountering any opposition. On July 12, the Turkish 
army of Tchataldja began re-conquering Thrace. On July 21, it was at Lule 
Bourgas and Kirk Kilisse; on the 22d, it recaptured Adrianople, which had been 
hastily evacuated by the Bulgarians. On July 14, the Servians took Kriva 
Pahanka. On July 11, Bulgaria made its first appeal for help to Europe. On the 
23d of July, Ferdinand appealed to the Czar to mediate. Without waiting for 
the results of this last proposal Mr. Danev resigned in despair. On the 15th 
during the five days of the crisis the enemies' armies continued their march and 
the Roumanians advanced on Sofia. A telegram from King Ferdinand to 
Francis Joseph demanded mediation for Roumania: on his advice, Ferdinand 
sent a telegram directly to King Carol. He demanded the cession of the triangle 
Danube-Tourtoukai-Baltchik as the condition of peace. His proposition was 
accepted on July 21, but the Bulgarians had still to fight the Greeks who had 
reached the frontiers of the Kingdom at Djouma-ya (25-30), while the 
Servians were besieging Vidine. Negotiations were at last opened at Bucharest 
on July 30, and a five days' armistice signed at mid-day on July 31. On 
August 4 it was extended for four days. The Peace of Bucharest was signed 
on August 10 ; and peace with Turkey concluded September 29, 1913. The 
reader may compare the boundaries established by these treaties (see the map) 
with the areas of occupation three months before the war. The extent of Bul- 
garia's losses is clear. Those who won claimed that "balance in the Balkans" 
had been secured, an end made of pretensions to hegemony, and peace thus 
secured for the future. Unhappily a nearer examination leads rather to the 
conclusion that the treaty of Bucharest has created a condition of things that is 
far from being durable. If the Bulgarian "conquest" is almost annulled by it, 
the Greek and Servian "conquests" are not well established. A later chapter 
(The War and the Nationalities) will afford abundant proof of this, and to it we 
refer the reader for conclusions. 





ihnmh Boundaries 

according to the 

treaty ofBukarest 


The War and the Noncombatant Population 
1. The Plight of the Macedonian Moslems During the First War 

The first of the Balkan campaigns was accepted by European opinion as a 
War of Liberation. It meant the downfall on one continent of the Turkish 
Empire; it was easy, as victory succeeded victory, to believe that it meant also 
the end of all the oppressions of race by race which for five centuries had made 
the history of the Balkans a record of rebellion, repression, and massacre. On a 
close view of what happened in Macedonia, as the Balkan armies marched 
southward, this War of Liberation assumes a more sordid and familiar aspect. 
It unleashed the accumulated hatreds, the inherited revenges of centuries. It 
made the oppressed Christians for several months the masters and judges of 
their Moslem overlords. It gave the opportunity of vengeance to every peasant 
who cherished a grudge against a harsh landlord or a brutal neighbor. Every 
Bulgarian village in northern Macedonia had its memory of sufferings and 
wrongs. For a generation the insurgent organization had been busy, and the 
normal condition of these villages had been one of intermittent revolt. The 
inevitable Turkish reprisals had fallen now on one village and now on another. 
Searches for arms, beatings, tortures, wholesale arrests, and occasional massacres, 
were the price which these peasants paid for their incessant struggle toward 
self-government. In all these incidents Of repression, the local Moslems had 
played their part, marching behind the Turkish troops as bashi-bazouks and 
joining in the work of pillage and slaughter. Their record was not forgotten 
when the Bulgarian victories brought the chance of revenge. To the hatred 
of races there was added the resentment of the peasantry against the landlords 
(beys), who for generations had levied a heavy tribute on their labor and their 
harvests. The defeat of the Turkish armies meant something more than a 
political change. It reversed the relations of conqueror and serf; it promised 
a social revolution. 

Only the utmost vigilance exercised by a disciplined army and a resolute 
police could have checked the natural impulse toward vengeance among the 
liberated Macedonians. In point of fact, the measures adopted by the Bulgarian 
government to protect the local Moslem population in northern and central 
Macedonia were inadequate and belated. The regular army was not numerous, 
and it marched rapidly southwards toward Salonica, leaving no sufficient garri- 
sons behind it. No attempt had been made to embody the insurgent bands in 


regular corps, and they were left free over a broad and populous area to deal 
with the local Turks as their own instincts dictated. Civil officials arrived to 
organize a regular administration in some cases a full six weeks after the 
Turkish authority had disappeared. It is not surprising in these conditions, that 
the Moslem population endured during the early weeks of the war a period of 
lawless vengeance and unmeasured suffering. In many districts the Moslem 
villages were systematically burned by their Christian neighbors. Nor was it 
only the regions occupied by the Bulgarians which suffered. In the province of 
Monastir. occupied by the Serbs and Greeks, the agents of the (British) Macedo- 
nian Relief Fund calculated that eighty per cent of Moslem villages were burned. 
Salonica, Monastir, and Uskub were thronged with thousands of homeless and 
starving Moslem refugees, many of whom emigrated to Asia. The Moslem 
quarter of the town of Jenidje Vardar was almost totally burned down, in 
spite of the fact that this town was occupied by the main Greek army. Even 
in the immediate neighborhood of Salonica, Moslem villages were burned by 
the Greek troops. (See Appendix A, No. 12.) The Greek population of the 
Drama district indulged in robbery, murder and violation at the expense of the 
Moslem inhabitants, until order was restored by an energetic Bulgarian prefect. 
(See Appendix B, No. 16.) 

A curious document (Appendix A, No. 13a) drawn up by the officials of the 
Moslem community of Pravishta and sealed with its seal, gives a vivid impression 
of a kind of persecution which we believe to have been normal in the early 
months of the first war. The district of Pravishta lies along the coast to the west 
of Kavala and is inhabited by about 20,000 Moslems and about 7,000 Greeks. 
It was occupied at first by Bulgarian bands under a voyevoda (chief) named 
Baptchev, and afterwards in part by Bulgarian and in part by Greek troops. 
Such civil administration as there was in the early stages of the conquest was 
conducted by the Greek Bishop, whom Baptchev obeyed, though with some 
measure of independence. This document gives particulars, village by village, 
of the Moslems who were killed and robbed. The lists are detailed, and give 
the names not only of the victims but of the assassins. Some of the partic- 
ulars of the robberies are also given in great detail, and in one village even the 
color of the stolen cows is stated. Our experience shows that lists of this kind 
in the Balkans are usually accurate. Exaggeration begins only when peasants 
attempt to give estimates in round numbers. The number of Moslems killed 
in each village varied from one to twenty-five, and the damage done by robbery 
and looting from hundreds to thousands of pounds. 

In the villages all these excesses seem to have been the work of local Greek 
bands. The most active of these bands was led by a priest and a War- 
like grocer who was a member of the Bishop's council. The Turks indeed 
accuse the Bishop of directing all these atrocities. The total number of Moslems 
killed is 195. Baptchev, in contrast to some other Bulgarian leaders of bands, 


appears to have behaved relatively well. His exactions or robberies amounted to 
about £T6,000, but he killed only in ten cases after the Bishop and his Council 
had passed sentence, and it is said of him and his men that they did no violence to 
women, and even rescued two from the Greeks. It is also said that Moslem 
women fled to escape violation from villages held by Greek troops to villages 
held by Bulgarian soldiers. While we think it probable that this document is 
accurate and truthful, it must be remembered that it is an ex parte statement. 
The Turks imply that the motive for the slaughter was simply a desire to intimi- 
date their community by striking at its heads. But it is likely that the local 
Greeks had long standing grievances against many of these Turks. Vengeance 
and cupidity had probably as much to do with these excesses as policy. No 
villages appear to have been burned in this district, but enough was done to 
make the local Moslems feel that their lot was unendurable. 

The burning of villages and the exodus of the defeated population is a 
normal and traditional incident of all Balkan wars and insurrections. It is the 
habit of all these peoples. What they have suffered themselves, they inflict in turn 
upon others. It could have been avoided only by imperative orders from Athens, 
Belgrade, and Sofia, and only then if the church and the insurgent organization 
had seconded the resolve of the governments. A general appeal for humanity 
was in fact published by the Macedonian insurgent "Internal Organization," 
but it appears to have produced little effect. 

Devastation, unfortunately, was not the worst of the incidents which stained 
the War of Liberation. More particularly in northeastern Macedonia the vic- 
torious population undertook a systematic proscription of the Moslems. The 
Commission has before it full evidence of one of these campaigns of murder 
at Strumnitsa. It was probably the worst incident of its kind, but it is typical 
of much that happened elsewhere on a smaller scale. Our information comes 
(1) from the surviving Moslem notables of the town, who gave us their evidence 
personally (see Appendix A, Nos. 1 and 2) ; (2) from an American gentleman 
who visited the town shortly afterwards; and (3) from a Bulgarian official. 
Strumnitsa in the autumn of 1912 was under a mixed control; the garrison was 
Servian; there was a junior Bulgarian civil official ; and Bulgarian insurgents were 
present in large numbers. A commission was formed under the presidency of the 
Servian commander, Major Grbits, and with him there sat two junior Servian 
officers, the Bulgarian sub-prefect Lieutenant Nicholas Voultchev, the leader of 
the Bulgarian bands, voyevoda Tchekov (or Jekov), and some of the leading 
inhabitants. The local Moslems of the town were disarmed by a house to house 
search. Some indiscriminate killing of Moslems took place in the streets, and 
thereafter an order was issued forbidding any Moslem to leave his house, under 
pain of death. A local gendarmerie was meanwhile organized, and while the 
Moslems passively awaited their fate, a gendarme and a Servian soldier went 
from house to house summoning them one by one before the commis- 


sion. As each victim came before the judges, Major Grbits inquired, "Is 
he good, or is he bad?" There was no discussion and no defense. 
Each member had his personal enemies, and no one ventured to inter- 
fere with his neighbor's resentments. One voice sufficed to condemn. Hardly 
one in ten of those who were summoned escaped the death sentence. The 
victims were roughly stripped of their outer clothing and bound in the presence 
of the commission, while the money found on them was taken by Major Grbits. 
The condemned Moslems were bound in threes, taken to the slaughter house 
and there killed, in some cases after torture and mutilation. The fortunate 
minority received a certificate which permitted them to live, and in many cases 
there is reason to believe that as much as £T100 was paid for it. The motive 
behind these atrocities was clearly as much cupidity as race hatred. The vic- 
tims included not only the citizens of Strumnitsa, but also a large number of 
fugitives and prisoners from the surrounding villages. Our Turkish witnesses 
place the total of killed at the improbable figure of 3,000 to 4,000 — a guesswork 
estimate. Our American and Bulgarian informants, who were both in a posi- 
tion to make a careful calculation, placed the total of those killed in this proscrip- 
tion at from seven to eight hundred. It is fair to add that steps were 
afterwards taken by the Bulgarian courts-martial to prosecute the guilty Bulga- 
rian official, Voultchev, and the Bulgarian chief of bands, Tchekov, and a third 
person named Manov. All three have been sentenced to fifteen years' hard 
labor. The Servian government, on the other hand, has inflicted no punish- 
ment on Major Grbits, who was the senior officer and the person ultimately 
responsible for these atrocities. 

The result of leaving Bulgarian bands at large with no adequate control 
was, if possible, still worse in the Kukush (Kilkish) region. Only a few Bul- 
garian regulars were left to garrison the town during the early weeks of the 
war, and the only authority which could make itself obeyed was that which 
the chief of bands, Toma of Istip, exercised with the aid of a commission of 
local Bulgarian notables. It drew up lists for the whole district, in which each 
of the Moslem inhabitants was rated at a certain figure, which might be repre- 
sented as a poll-tax, but was in effect a ransom. To pay this ransom the Turks 
were often obliged to sell everything they possessed. Later, a band arrived 
under a certain Donchev, a notoriously cruel guerrilla chief, who acted on his 
own responsibility and has been disavowed and sentenced to death by the 
Macedonian revolutionary "internal organization." He is said to have burned 
345 Turkish houses in one day in the villages of Raionovo, Planitsa, and Kukur- 
tevo, shut up the men in the mosques and burned them alive or shot them down 
as they attempted to escape. It is said that Donchev's band massacred women and 
children ; and this statement also is credited by Europeans who have ample local 
sources of information. An account of these events by Pere Michel, the head of 
the French Catholic mission at Kukush, has been published. (See Appendix A, 
No. 6.) It was misused and distorted in some Greek and French newspapers, 


as though it referred to the doings of the Bulgarian regular army shortly before 
the second war. It was undoubtedly a truthful account of the excesses of the 
Bulgarian bands during the autumn of 1912. 

A statement from a local Turk, who was recommended to us as an honest 
witness by a European resident, will be found in Appendix A (No. 7). Pere 
Michel's statements, it should be added, were generally corroborated by the 
Protestant missionaries who worked in the same district. The Bulgarian bands 
in the Kukush region were left for some weeks unmolested in this work of ex- 
tortion and extermination. There is ample proof that they slaughtered many 
hundreds of disarmed and disbanded Turkish soldiers, who had surrendered to 
the Greeks at Salonica, and were traveling through Kukush on their way to 
their homes in northern Macedonia. 

The responsibility of the regular Bulgarian authorities is more directly in- 
dicated in the massacre of Turks which took place in the town of Serres shortly 
after its capture. Here there was an adequate Bulgarian garrison, and a regu- 
lar administration. We have before us a full statement from the President of 
the Turkish community of Serres, which is confirmed by the Austrian vice- 
consul (a Greek), and other Greek residents. Their evidence is inevitably biased 
and exaggerated, but it was unfortunately confirmed in its main outlines by a 
confidential statement made to us by an American gentleman, who was active 
after the massacre in relieving the distress among the Moslems. The events 
which preceded the massacre are very obscure. Mysterious shots were fired, 
and a large number of Turkish soldiers were supposed (we do not know with 
what truth) to be in hiding in the town. On a charitable reading of the facts 
it is fair to suppose that the Bulgarian authorities feared a revolt. This may 
explain but can not excuse the slaughter which followed. The Turkish version 
of this affair will be found in Appendix A (No. 8). The estimates given by 
Turks and Greeks, which range from 600 to 5,000 killed, are certainly exagger- 
ated. Our American informant, a cautious and fair-minded man, with a long 
and intimate experience of Macedonia, believed that the number of killed in 
the town was, at most two hundred. He insisted, however, that the massacre 
was deliberate and unprovoked, and that it was accompanied by pillage on a large 
scale and by the violation of many Turkish women and children. Similar ex- 
cesses were perpetrated in the villages. The instruments of this atrocity were 
chiefly Macedonian insurgents (comitadjis) , but they acted under the eyes of 
the Bulgarian military authorities, who had in Serres a regular force sufficient 
to control them. 

These instances should suffice to give some idea of the sufferings of the 
Moslem population during the early weeks of the occupation. It would un- 
fortunately be easy to multiply them. Details will be found in the Appendices 
of a minor massacre, much exaggerated in the press, carried out at Dedeagatch 
by the dregs of the local Christian population (Greeks and Armenians) with 


the aid of some Bulgarian privates of the Macedonian legion, who were acci- 
dentally left in the town without an officer (Appendix A, Nos. 9 and 10). A 
Bulgarian eye witness described to us the killing of a large number of local Turks 
at Uskub by Servians in the early days of the occupation (Appendix A, No. 11). 

Incidents also occurred while Bulgarian regiments were on the march which 
led to savage reprisals. A volunteer of the Macedonian legion (Opolchenie), who 
was previously known to a member of the Commission as an honorable and 
truthful man, recounted the following incident as the one example of brutality 
which had come within his own experience. While marching through Gumur- 
jina, the legion saw the dead bodies of about fifty murdered Bulgarian peasants. 
The dead body of a woman was hanging from a tree, and another with a young 
baby lay dead on the ground with their eyes gouged out. The men of the 
legion retaliated by shooting all the Turkish villagers or disbanded soldiers 
whom they met next day on their march, and killed in this way probably some 
fifty men and two or three women. The officers of the legion endeavored after- 
wards to discover the culprits, but were baffled by the solidarity of the men, who 
considered this butchery a legitimate reprisal. The Turks with whom we talked 
were on the whole agreed that the period of extreme brutality was confined 
to the early weeks of the first war. Many of them praised the justice of the 
regular Bulgarian administration which was afterwards established. From sev- 
eral of the Bulgarian officials who had to govern turbulent districts (e. g., Istip 
and Drama) infested by bands with an inadequate military force to back them, 
we have heard in detail of the steps which they took to regain the confidence 
of the Moslems. Many of them were successful. 

A real effort was undoubtedly made to check the lawlessness of the bands 
and to deal with marauding on the part of the troops. The records of the 
courts-martial which we have before us, show that it was in January, 1913, that 
the Bulgarian headquarters became alarmed at the frequency and gravity of the 
excesses reported from the occupied territories. A circular telegram (see Appen- 
dix A, No. 13) sent to commanders and governors in Macedonia and Thrace en- 
joined them to institute inquiries into all excesses committed against the inhabit- 
ants of the occupied territories, and reminded them that the honor of the army was 
at stake, and that an attitude of indifference on their part toward the crimes of in- 
dividuals would lead the world to suppose that Bulgarian civilization was not 
superior to that of the enemy. In two later telegrams the courts-martial were 
instructed to deal promptly with such charges and to give precedence to such 
cases over all others, more especially where the complaints came from Turks. 
The tone of these instructions is all that could be desired. It is disappointing to 
learn that up to February 15, 1913, the courts-martial in Macedonia had passed 
sentence on only ten persons for murder, eight for robbery or pillage, and two 
for rape. A large number of cases was in the stage of inquiry ("instruction"), 
and these included seventy-eight cases of murder, sixty-nine of pillage, seven of 


rape, seven of robbery, disguised as taxation, fourteen of arson, and eighty-one 
of various kinds of robbery and dishonesty. Of the culprits thirty-seven were 
Macedonian insurgents, including six chiefs of bands (voyevodas). How many 
of these cases were completed and how many of the culprits were actually sen- 
tenced we do not precisely know, since the archives of the chief Macedonian 
court-martial were lost at the evacuation of Serres. But we are informed that 
more than 200 prisoners belonging to the Bulgarian army and to the irregular 
bands were in Serres gaol under sentence when the town was evacuated. There is 
reason to believe that they were then released, an unfortunate irregularity which 
may possibly have been unavoidable. These facts show that an effort was 
made upon a considerable scale in Macedonia to deal with the excesses com- 
mitted against the Turkish population. It was somewhat tardy, and manifestly 
the prompt execution in the early weeks of the war of some of the more notable 
criminals would have produced a more salutary effect. Public opinion in the 
Balkans does not condemn excesses committed by Christians against Moslems 
as severely as neutral onlookers do. That is inevitable, given the historical 
conditions. But undoubtedly the chiefs of the Bulgarian army did make an 
attempt to clear its honor, and the attempt was successful in bringing about a 
great improvement in the conduct of the troops and their irregular allies. It is, 
moreover, creditable to the Bulgarian government that in order to check the 
spoliation of the Moslems, an edict was issued which made all transfers of land 
during the period of the war illegal and invalid. 

It remains to mention the practice followed by the Bulgarians, over a wide 
area, of reconverting the pomaks by force to Christianity. The pomaks are 
Bulgarians by race and language, who at some period of the Turkish conquest 
were converted by force to Islam. They speak no Turkish, and retain some 
traditional memory of their Christian past; but circumstances have usually made 
them fanatical Mohammedans. They number in the newly conquered territo- 
ries at least 80,000 persons, and are chiefly concentrated to the north and east 
of Nevrocop. The Bulgarian Holy Synod conceived the design of converting 
them en masse, and it was frequently able to reckon on the support of the mili- 
tary and civil authorities, not to mention the insurgent bands. It was not 
usually necessary to employ actual violence; threats, backed by the manifest 
power to enforce them, commonly sufficed to induce whole villages to submit to 
the ceremony of baptism. The policy was carried out systematically, and long 
before the outbreak of the second war, the pomaks in most districts conformed 
outwardly to the Bulgarian church, and listened with a show of docility to the 
ministrations of the priests and nuns sent by the Holy Synod to instruct them in 
the tenets of Christianity. This aberration, in sharp contrast to the toleration 
which the Bulgarian Kingdom has usually shown to the Moslems within its 
frontiers, must rank among the least excusable brutalities of the war. The 
Holy Synod argued that since force had been used to convert the pomaks to 


Islam, force might fairly be used to reverse the process. The argument is one 
proof the more that races whose minds have been molded for centuries by the 
law of reprisal and the practice of vengeance, tend to a common level of 

2. The Conduct of the Bulgarians in the Second War 

The charges brought by the Greeks against the Bulgarians are already pain- 
fully familiar to every newspaper reader. Unlike the Bulgarians, the Greeks 
welcomed war correspondents, and every resource of publicity was at their dis- 
posal, while Bulgaria itself was isolated and its telegraphic communications cut. 
That some of these accusations were grossly exaggerated is now apparent. Le 
Temps, for example, reported the murder of the Greek Bishop of Doiran. We 
saw him vigorous and apparently alive two months afterwards. A requiem 
mass was sung for the Bishop of Kavala; his flock welcomed him back to 
them while we were in Salonica. The correspondent of the same news- 
paper stated that he personally assisted at the burial of the Archbishop of 
Serres, who was savagely mutilated before he was killed. (Letter, dated Livo- 
novo, July 23.) This distressing experience in no way caused this prelate to in- 
terrupt his duties, which he still performs. 

There none the less remains, when these manifest travesties of fact are 
brushed aside, a heavy indictment which rests upon uncontrovertible evidence. 
It is true that the little town of Doxato was burned and a massacre carried out 
there during and after a Bulgarian attack. It is true that the town of Serres 
was burned during a Bulgarian attack. It is also true that a large number of 
civilians, including the Bishop of Melnik and Demir-Hissar, were slaughtered 
or executed by the Bulgarians in the latter town. The task of the Commission 
has been to compare the evidence from both sides regarding these events, and 
to form a judgment on the circumstances which in some degree explain them. 
The Greek charges are in each case substantially true, but in no case do they 
state the whole truth. 

In forming an opinion upon the series of excesses which marked the Bulga- 
rian withdrawal from southeastern Macedonia, it is necessary to recall the fact 
that the Bulgarians were here occupying a country whose population is mainly 
Greek and Turkish. The Bulgarian garrisons were small, and they found them- 
selves on the outbreak of the second war in a hostile country. The Greek pop- 
ulation of these regions is wealthy and intensely patriotic. In several Greek 
centers insurgent organizations (andartes) existed. Arms had been collected, 
and some experienced guerrilla chiefs were believed to be in hiding, and ready 
to lead the local population. All of this in existing conditions was creditable to 
Greek patriotism; their race was at war with Bulgarians, and the more enter- 
prising and courageous among them intended to take their share as auxiliaries 
of the Greek army in driving the Bulgarians from their country. From a nation- 



alist standpoint, this was morally their right and seme might even say their duty. 
But it is equally clear that the Bulgarians, wherever they found themselves op- 
posed by the armed civil population, had also a right to take steps to protect 
themselves. The steps which they elected to take in some places grossly ex- 
ceeded the limits of legitimate defense or allowable reprisal. 


Doxato was a thriving country town, situated between Drama and Kavala 
in the center of a rich tobacco growing district. It had a large school, and 
counted several wealthy and educated families among its 2,700 Greek inhabit- 
ants. It was proud of its Hellenic character, and formed with two neighboring 
villages a compact Greek island in a rural population which was almost exclu- 
sively Turkish. A member of the Commission has visited its ruins. Only thirty 
homes are left intact among its 270 Greek houses. Enough remains of the walls 
to show that the little town was well built and prosperous, and to suggest that 
the conflagration must have caused grievous material loss to the inhabitants. 
The estimate of killed (at first said to number over 2,000) which is now gen- 
erally accepted by the Greeks, is 600. We have had communicated to us an ex- 
tract from an official Greek report in which 500 is given as an outside figure. 

A large proportion, probably one-half, of this total consisted of civilians who 
had taken up arms. Women and children to the number of over a hundred 
were massacred in a single house, and the slaughter was carried out with every 

Fig. 1. — Ruins of Doxato 



Fig. 2. — Finding the Bodies of Victims at Doxato 

conceivable circumstance of barbarity. We print in Appendix B (No. 14) a 
letter in which Commander Cardale, a British naval officer in the Greek service, 
describes the condition of the village when he visited it shortly after the massacre. 
We print in Appendix B, Bulgarian accounts of the Doxato affair. Mr. 
Dobrev, who was the prefect of Drama and earned the good opinion of the Greeks 
by his conduct there (see the Greek pamphlet Atrccites Bulgares, p. 49), has told 
the whole story with evident frankness. (Appendix B, No. 16.) Captain So- 
froniev of the Royal Guard, who commanded the two squadrons of cavalry 
which operated against Doxato, relates his own part in the affair clearly, and 
has shown us the reports of his scouts penciled on official paper. (See Appendix 
B, No. 15.) Lieutenant Milev in a communicated deposition describes his expe- 
riences with the infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel Barnev explains his military 
dispositions. (See Appendix B, Nos. 16a and 16b.) These four depositions 
leave no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the Greeks had organized a 
formidable military movement among the local population; that Doxato was one 
of its centers ; and that several hundreds of armed men were concentrated there. 
Provocation had been given not only by the wanton and barbarous slaughter by 
Greeks of Moslem noncombatants, but also by a successful attack at Doxato upon 
a Bulgarian convoy. There was, therefore, justification for the order given 
from the Bulgarian headquarters to attack the Greek insurgents concentrated 
in Doxato. 



It appears from Captain Sofroniev's report that his men met with an ob- 
stinate resistance from these Greek andartes and that one of his two squadrons 
lost seventeen killed and twenty-four wounded in the attack. In the charge by 
which he finally dispersed them, he believes that his men killed at least 150 
Greeks, and perhaps double this number. These were, he assures us, all armed 
men and combatants. 

We find it hard to believe that an irregular and inexperienced force can 
have resisted cavalry with an obstinacy that would justify so large a slaughter 
as this. A woman, moreover, was wounded in this charge. (See Appendix B, 
No. 16.) Captain Sofroniev states that his men took prisoners. He consigned 
these prisoners to the charge of the Turkish peasants who had come up from 
neighboring villages, full of resentment for Greek excesses against their neighbors. 
He allowed these Turks to arm themselves with the weapons of the defeated Greek 
insurgents. He might as well have ordered the massacre of his prisoners. These 
Turks had recent grievances against the Greeks, and they had come to Doxato 
in the rear of the Bulgarian force for pillage and revenge. 

The cavalry operated outside the village. The force which entered it was 
an infantry detachment comprised in great part of Bulgarian Moslems (po- 
maks). According to Mr. Dobrev, who is clearly the franker witness, it became 
excited when a magazine of cartridges exploded in the village, and began to 
kill indiscriminately all the inhabitants whom it met in the streets, including 
some children. It remained, however, only a short while in Doxato. 

Fig. 3. — Gathering the Bodies of Victims 



Fig. 4. — Bodies of Slain Peasants 

Lieutenant Milev's account attributes this slaughter to the local Turks, and 
states that two of them were executed for their crimes. He represents the in- 
habitants whom his men killed as insurgents. 

We can not explain this discrepancy. It is, however, clear that the 
systematic massacre was carried out by the local Turks who were left 
in possession of the place for the better part of two days. They pil- 
laged, burned, and slaughtered at their leisure, nor did they spare even the 
women who had taken refuge in the houses of friendly Turks. So far there is 
little difference between Commander Cardale's version of events, based on local 
Greek sources, and the statements of our Bulgarian witnesses. What we heard 
ourselves in the village some weeks later agreed with what Commander Car- 
dale has reported. The Bulgarian troops, after a sharp engagement, began the 
killing of the inhabitants, but presently desisted. "The greater part of the 
massacre," as Commander Cardale puts it, "was done by the Turks." He quotes, 
without endorsing it, the statement of the survivors that the Turks acted under 
the "direction" or "incitement" of Bulgarian officers. We gather that he heard 
no convincing evidence on this head, nor did we meet with anyone who had 
personally heard or seen Bulgarian officers giving directions to massacre. That 
charge may be dismissed as baseless. But some part of the responsibility for 
the slaughter falls, none the less, upon the Bulgarian officers. They armed the 
Turks and left them in control of the village. They must have known what 
would follow. The employment of Turkish bashi-bazouks as allies against de- 


fenseless Christian villagers was an offense of which Greeks, Servians, and Bul- 
garians were all guilty upon occasion. No officer in the Balkans could take this 
step without foreseeing that massacre must result from it. 

It is fair none the less to note that the Bulgarians were in a difficult posi- 
tion. They could not occupy the village permanently, for they were threatened 
by Greek columns marching from several quarters. To leave the Turks un- 
armed was to expose them to Greek excesses. To arm the Turks was, on the 
other hand, to condemn the Greek inhabitants to massacre. A culpable error 
of judgment was committed in circumstances which admitted only of a choice 
of evils. While emphasizing the heavy responsibility which falls on the Bulga- 
rian officers for this catastrophe, we do not hesitate to conclude that the massa- 
cre at Doxato was a Turkish and not a Bulgarian atrocity. 


Serres is the largest town of the interior of eastern Macedonia. The to- 
bacco trade had brought considerable wealth to its 30,000 inhabitants ; and it 
possessed in its churches, schools and hospitals the outward signs of the public 
spirit of its Greek community. The villages around it are Bulgarian to 
the north and west, but a rural Greek population approaches it from the south 
and east. The town itself is predominantly Greek, with the usual Jewish and 
Turkish admixture. The Bulgarians formed but a small minority. From Octo- 
ber to June the town was under a Bulgarian occupation, and as the second 
war drew near, the relations of the garrison and the citizens became increasingly 
hostile. The Bulgarian authorities believed that the Greeks were arming 
secretly, that andartes (Greek insurgents) were concealed in the town, and that 
a revolt was in preparation. Five notables of the town were arrested on July 
1 with the idea of intimidating the population. On Friday, July 4, the defeat of 
the Bulgarian forces to the south of Serres rendered the position untenable, and 
arrangements were made for the evacuation of the town. General Voulkov, the 
Governor of Macedonia, and his staff left on the evening of Saturday, July 5. 
The retirement was hastily planned and ill executed. There is evidence from 
Greeks and Turks, and from one of the American residents, Mr. Moore, that some 
of the troops found time to pillage before withdrawing. On the other hand, 
stores of Bulgarian munitions, including rifles, were abandoned in the town, 
and some of the archives were also left behind. We gather that there was some 
conflict of authority among the superior Bulgarian officers. (See evidence of 
Commandant Moustakov, Appendix B, No. 26.) 

The plain fact is that at this central point the organization and discipline of 
the Bulgarian troops broke down. Some excesses, as one would expect, undoubt- 
edly occurred, but the Greek evidence on this matter is untrustworthy. Com- 
mandant Moustakov believes that the notables who had been arrested were re- 
leased. We find, on the other hand, in the semiofficial Greek pamphlet Atro cites 



Fig. 5. — Victims Who Escaped the Serres Slaughter 



Fig. 6. — Ruins of Serres 

Bulgares, the statement (p. 25) that the bodies of four Greek notables were 
found outside the town killed by bayonet thrusts ; among them was the corpse 
of the director of the Orient bank. For this assertion the authority of the Ital- 
ian and Austrian consuls general of Salonica is claimed. (See Appendix B, No. 
17.) The member of our Commission who visited Serres had the pleasure of 
meeting this gentleman, Mr. Ghine, alive, well, and unharmed, and enjoyed his 
hospitality. Such discoveries as this are a warning that even official statements 
regarding these events must be subjected to careful scrutiny. On the other hand, 
there is no doubt that some of the prisoners who were in gaol when the Bulgarians 
left the town, were slaughtered. This was done presumably by their gaolers with- 
out orders. The imprisoned Bulgarians, including many comitadjis, were prob- 
ably released ; it is conceivable that they had a hand in these excesses. The 
fact of a butchery in the prison is placed beyond doubt by the evidence of Mr. 
Arrington, the manager of the American Tobacco Company's branch. His por- 
ter {cavass). a Greek, had been arrested some days before, apparently because 
a rumor had got abroad that the famous Greek guerrilla chief, Captain Doukas, 
was in the town disguised as the cavass of a tobacco warehouse. Mr. Arring- 
ton demanded the release of his employe without result. After the departure 
of the last of the Bulgarian troops, Mr. Arrington visited the prison and found 
there a heap of thirteen corpses, among which was his man, severely wounded. 
He died shortly afterwards in hospital, but was able to tell his story. His Bul- 
garian gaoler had demanded a ransom of £10 for his release and would allow him 






no facilities to procure it from outside. "We do things methodically here," 
said the gaoler. "You have four hours to live. Every half hour you will be 
beaten, and at the end you will be killed." He was in fact made to lie on his 
back and was pinned to the floor with a bayonet. Mr. Arrington stated that his 
arms and back, where he had been beaten, were "as black as his boots." The 
other twelve prisoners had evidently been treated with equal barbarity. 

The main body of the Bulgarian garrison, with the headquarters, withdrew 
from Serres on Saturday, July 5. A panic followed, and a squadron of dis- 
mounted Bulgarian cavalry paraded the town to maintain order. The Greek 
irregulars and armed citizens were already under arms, and fired from some 

Fig. 9.— Ruins of Serres 

of the houses at this squadron. It camped that night outside the town, and en- 
tered it again on Sunday, but apparently without attempting to maintain com- 
plete control. On Monday, July 7 (if not on Sunday), the effective authority 
passed into the hands of the local Greeks. The Archbishop was recognized 
as governor of the town, and at his palace there sat in permanence a commis- 
sion of the local inhabitants. Thirty armed Greeks wearing the evzone (high- 
lander) uniform, who were, however, probably irregulars (andartes), had ar- 
rived in Serres, and one witness states that they were under the command of 
Captain Doukas. A Russian doctor in the Bulgarian sanitary service (Dr. 
Klugmann, see Appendix B, No. 22), who was left in the town, heard on Monday 
a Greek priest summoning the inhabitants to the Bishop's palace, where arms were 



m^ w^i i 

1 «- 

1 • ; &» 

: ri«l|H| 

Fig. 10. — Ruins of Serres 

distributed, first to the Greeks, and later to the Turks. From Monday morning 
to Thursday evening these Greek irregulars and the citizen militia which they 
organized were in possession of the town. Thrice they were threatened by small 
Bulgarian detachments, which returned and skirmished on the hills outside the 
town and at the distant railway station. But these Bulgarian scouts were not 
in sufficient force to enter the town. A telegram dispatched on Thursday by 
the Archbishop to King Constantine (see Le Temps, July 13), begs him to hasten 
to occupy the town, which is, he says, defending itself successfully against the 

Fig. 11. — Ruins of Serres 


attacks of the Bulgarians. He mentions that he is governing the town, and 
states that it has been abandoned for a week by the Bulgarian authorities. He 
fears, however, that the citizens' power of resistance may soon be exhausted. 
These rather aimless Bulgarian attacks must have contributed to excite the local 
Greeks, and to inflame a spirit of vengeance. 

The main concern of the Archbishop's Greek militia during this week was 
apparently to hunt down the Bulgarian population within the town and in some 
of the neighboring villages. It is conceivable that this measure may have been 
dictated in the first instance by the fear that the small Bulgarian minority inside 
Serres would cooperate with the enemy who attacked it from without. An 
armed Greek mob followed a few uniformed men from house to house, threat- 
ening the Bulgarians and all who should assist them to hide, Their houses 
were pillaged and their wives ill treated, while the men were arrested and taken 
singly or in batches to the Bishop's palace ; there they were brought before 
a commission of laymen over whom a priest presided. Whatever money they 
possessed was taken from them by this priest, and the only question asked about 
them was, whether they were or were not Bulgarians. This process was wit- 
nessed by Dr. Klugmann, and the testimony of this Russian doctor entirely con- 
firms that of our Bulgarian peasant witnesses. From the bishopric the pris- 
oners were taken to the neighboring Greek girls' high school. In the school they 
were closely confined in several rooms by fifties and sixties. Fresh batches ar- 
rived continuously from the town and from the villages, until the total number 
of imprisoned Bulgarians reached 200 or 250. The gaolers were in part citizens 
of Serres, some of whom can be named, and in part uniformed irregulars. From 
the first they behaved with gross cruelty. The prisoners were tightly bound and 
beaten with the butt ends of rifles. The plan of the gaolers was apparently 
to slaughter their prisoners in batches, and they were led two by two to an upper 
room, where they were killed, usually by repeated wounds in the head and neck 
inflicted with a butcher's knife or a Martini bayonet. Each of the butchers 
aimed at accounting for fourteen men, which was apparently the number which 
each could bury during the night. The massacre went on in this leisurely way 
until Friday, the 11th. The prisoners included a few captured Bulgarian sol- 
diers, a few peasants taken with arms in their hands (see evidence of the vil- 
lager Lazarov, Appendix B, No. 20), and at least one local Bulgarian, Christo 
Dimitrov (Appendix B, No. 19), who was known to be an active associate of the 
Bulgarian bands. The immense majority were, however, inoffensive tradesmen or 
peasants whose only offense was that they were Bulgarians. Among them were 
four women, who were killed with the rest. The only mitigating circumstance 
is that five lads were released in pity for their youth, after seeing their fathers 
killed before their eyes. (See Blagoi Petrov, Appendix B, No. 21.) We are 
unwilling to dwell on the detailed barbarities of this butchery, of which more than 
enough is recorded in the appendices. 


We must here anticipate a part of the narrative to explain that in the early 
morning of Friday, July 11, a Bulgarian regular force with cavalry and light 
artillery reached Serres, engaged the militia outside the town, defeated it, and 
began toward noon to penetrate into the town itself. There were still sixty or 
seventy of the Bulgarian prisoners alive, and their gaolers, alarmed by the sound 
of cannon in the distance, resolved to finish their work rapidly. Two at least 
of the prisoners (Angelov and Limonov) contrived to overpower the sentinels 
and escaped. Some of them, however, were bound and others were too en- 
feebled or too terrified to save themselves. They were led to the slaughter by 
fours and fives, but the killing this day was inefficient, and at least ten of the 
prisoners fell among the heaps of corpses, severely wounded indeed, but still 
alive. They recovered consciousness in the early afternoon, to realize that their 
gaolers had fled, that the town was on fire, and that the Bulgarian troops were 
not far distant. Ten of them struggled out of the school, and eight had strength 
enough to reach safety and their countrymen. 

The Commission saw three of these fugitives from the Serres massacre, 
(Karanfilov, Dimitrov, and Lazarov, Appendix B, Nos. 18, 19, 20), who all bore 
the fresh scars of their wounds. These wounds, chiefly in the head and neck, 
could have been received only at close quarters. They were such wounds as a 
butcher would inflict, who was attempting to slaughter men as he would slaughter 
sheep. The evidence of these three, given separately, was mutually consistent. 
We questioned a fourth witness, the lad Blagoi Petrov, who was released. We 
were also supplied with the written depositions, backed by photographs showing 
their injuries, of three other wounded survivors of the massacre, who had found 
refuge in distant parts of Bulgaria which we were unable to visit. (See Appen- 
dix D, Nos. 56, 57, 58.) Among these was George Belev, a Protestant, to whose 
honesty and high character the American missionaries of Samakov paid a high 
tribute. The written depositions of the two men who escaped by rushing the sen- 
tinels, afforded another element of confirmation. Dr. Klugmann's evidence, given 
to us in person, is valuable as a description of the way in which the Bulgarian ci- 
vilians of Serres were hunted down and arrested. The Commission finds this evi- 
dence irresistible, and is forced to conclude that a massacre of Bulgarians to the 
number of about two hundred, most of them inoffensive and noncombatant civil- 
ians, was carried out in Serres by the Greek militia with revolting cruelty. The 
victims were arrested and imprisoned under the authority of the Archbishop. 
It is possible that he may have been misled by his subordinates, and that they 
may have disobeyed his orders. But the fact that when he visited the prison 
on Thursday, he assured the survivors that their lives would be spared, sug- 
gests that he knew that they were in danger. 

The last stage of the episode of Serres began on Friday, the 11th. Partly 
because they had left large stores of munitions in the town, partly because ru- 
mors of the schoolhouse massacre had reached them, the Bulgarians were anx- 


ious to reoccupy the town. Their small detachments had been repulsed, and 
it was with a battalion and a half of infantry, a squadron of horse and four 
guns, that Commandant Kirpikov marched against Serres from Zernovo, and 
at dawn approached the hills which command it. His clear account of his mili- 
tary dispositions will be found in Appendix B (No. 23). He overcame the re- 
sistance of the Greek militia posted to the number of about 1,000 men on 
the hills, without much difficulty. In attempting toward noon to penetrate into the 
town, his troops met with a heavy fire from several large houses held by the 
Greeks. Against these he finally used his guns. From noon onward the town 
was in flames at several points. The commandant does not admit that his 
shells caused the conflagration, but in this matter probability is against him. 
One witness, George Belev, states that the schoolhouse was set on fire by a shell. 
The commandant states further that the Greeks themselves, who were as reck- 
less as the Bulgarians, fired certain houses which contained their own stores of 
munitions. It is probable that the Bulgarians also set on fire the buildings in 
which their own stores were housed. Both Greeks and Bulgarians state that a 
high wind was blowing during the afternoon. Serres was a crowded town, 
closely built in the oriental fashion, with houses constructed mainly of wood. The 
summer had been hot and dry. It is not surprising that the town blazed. We 
must give due weight to the belief universally held by the Greek inhabitants that 
the town was deliberately set on fire by the Bulgarian troops. The inhabitants for 
the most part had fled, and few of them saw what happened; but one eye 
witness states that the soldiers used petroleum and acted on a systematic plan. 
This witness (quoted in Appendix B, No. 17) is a local Turk who had taken 
service under the Bulgarians as a police officer while they were still at war with 
his country. That. is not a record which inspires confidence. On the other hand, 
Dr. Yankov, a legal official who accompanied the Bulgarian troops, states that he 
personally made efforts to check the flames. 

The general impression conveyed by all the evidence before us, and especially 
that of the Russian Dr. Laznev (see Appendix D, No. 57), is that the Bulgarian 
troops were hotly engaged throughout the afternoon, first with the Greek militia 
and then with the main Greek army. The Greek forces advanced in large numbers 
and with artillery from two directions to relieve the town, and compelled the 
Bulgarians to retreat before sundown. Their shells also fell in the town. The 
Bulgarians were not in undisturbed possession for so much as an hour, and it 
is difficult to believe that they can have had leisure for much systematic incen- 
diarism. On the other hand, it is indisputable that some Bulgarian villagers who 
followed the troops did deliberately burn houses (see evidence of Lazar Tomov, 
Appendix B, No. 25), and that a mob comprised partly of Bulgarians and partly 
of Turks pillaged and burned while the troops were fighting. It is probable that 
some of the Bulgarian troops, who seem to have been, as at Doxato, a very 
mixed force which included some pomak (Moslem) levies, joined in this work. 


The Bulgarians knew that the Greeks were burning their villages, and some of 
them had heard of the schoolhouse massacre. Any soldiers in the world would 
think of vengeance under these conditions. In two notorious instances leading 
residents were blackmailed. The experiences of Mr. Zlatkos, the Greek gentle- 
man who acts as Austro-Hungarian consul, are related in Appendix B (No. 
17a). His own account must be compared with the Bulgarian version, which 
suggests that some of his fears were baseless. The action of the Bulgarian 
commander in shelling the masses of armed peasants outside the town appears 
to us to have been questionable. Among them there must have been many non- 
combatant fugitives. His use of artillery against an unfortified town was a 
still graver abuse of the laws of civilized warfare. 

To sum up, we must conclude that the Greek quarter of Serres was burned 
by the Bulgarians in the course of their attack on the town, but the evidence be- 
fore us does not suffice to establish the Greek accusation, that the burning was 
a part of the plan conceived by the Bulgarian headquarters. But unquestion- 
ably the whole conduct both of the attack and of the defense contributed to 
bring about the conflagration, and some of the attacking force did undoubtedly 
burn houses. There is, in short, no trustworthy evidence of premeditated or of- 
ficial incendiarism, but the responsibility for the burning of Serres none the 
less falls mainly upon the Bulgarian army. The result was the destruction of 
4,000 out of 6,000 houses, the impoverishment of a large population, and in all 
likelihood the painful death of many of the aged and infirm, who could not make 
good their escape. The episode of Serres is deeply discreditable alike to Greeks 
and Bulgarians. 


The events which took place at Demir-Hissar between the 5th and 10th of 
July possess a certain importance, because they were used as a pretext for the 
"reprisals" of the Greek army at the expense of the Bulgarian population. (See 
King Constantine's telegram. Appendix C, No. 29.) We shall have occasion to 
point out that the Greek excesses began in and around Kukush some days before 
the Bulgarian provocation at Demir-Hissar. 

That Demir-Hissar was the center of excesses committed on both sides is 
indisputable. The facts are confused, and the evidence before us more than 
usually contradictory. This is not surprising in the circumstances. The Bulga- 
rian army, beaten in the south, was fleeing in some disorder through Demir- 
Hissar to the narrow defile of the Struma above this little town. The Greeks 
of the town, seeing their confusion, determined to profit by it, took up arms and 
fell upon the Bulgarian wounded, the baggage trains, and the" fugitive peasants. 
They rose too soon and exposed themselves to Bulgarian reprisals. When the 
Greek army at length marched in, it found a scene of carnage and horror. The 
Greek inhabitants had slaughtered defenseless Bulgarians, and the Bulgarian 
rear guard had exacted vengeance. 


We print in Appendix B ( Nos. 27, 27a, 28, 28a) both the Greek and the Bul- 
garian narratives of this affair. The Greeks as usual suppress all mention of the 
provocation which the inhabitants had given. The Bulgarian account is silent as to 
the manner in which their reprisals were carried out. Both narratives contain in- 
accuracies, and neither of them tells more than a part of the truth. Nor are we 
satisfied that the whole truth can be reached by the simple method of completing 
one story by means of the other. The Greek account is the more detailed and defi- 
nite of the two for the simple reason that the Greeks remained in possession of the 
town, and were able to count and identify their dead. The Bulgarians believe 
that about 250 of their countrymen, wounded soldiers, military bakers, and 
peasant fugitives, were slaughtered there. It may be so, but the total is conjec- 
tural, and no list can possibly be furnished. The Greeks, on the other hand, have 
compiled a list of seventy-one inhabitants of Demir-Hissar who were killed by the 
Bulgarians. We do not question the accuracy of this list. But there is no means 
of ascertaining how many of these dead Greeks were killed during the fighting 
in the streets ; how many were taken with arms in their hands and shot ; and 
how many were summarily executed on suspicion of being the instigators of the 
rising. Two women and two babies are among the dead. If they were killed 
in cold blood an "atrocity" was perpetrated, but during a confused day of street 
fighting they may possibly have been killed by accident. 

The case of the Bishop has naturally attracted attention. Of the four Greek 
Bishops who were said to have been killed in Macedonia, he alone was in fact 
killed. There is nothing improbable in the Bulgarian statement that he was the 
leader of the Greek insurgents, nor even in the further allegation -that he fired 
the first shot. The Bishops of Macedonia, whether Greeks or Bulgarians, are 
always the recognized political heads of their community ; they are often in close 
touch with the rebel bands, and a young and energetic man will sometimes place 
himself openly at their head. The Bulgarians allege that the Bishop, a man of 
forty years of age, fired from his window at their troops. The Greeks admit that 
he "resisted" arrest. If it is true that he was found with a revolver, from which 
some cartridges had been fired, there was technical justification for regarding 
him as a combatant. The hard law of war sanctions the execution of civilians 
taken with arms in their hands. There is no reason to reject the Greek state- 
ment that his body was mutilated, dead or alive. But the Greek assertion that 
this was done by a certain Captain Bostanov is adequately met by the Bulgarian 
denial that any such officer exists. 

Some of the men in the Greek list of dead were presumably armed inhab- 
itants who engaged in the street fighting. Nine are young men of twenty and 
thereabouts and some are manual laborers. Clearly these are not "notables" 
collected for a deliberate massacre. On the other hand, six are men of sixty years 
and upwards, who are not likely to have been combatants. These leaders of the 
Greek community were evidently arrested on suspicion of fomenting the out- 


break and summarily "executed." It was a lawless proceeding without form of 
trial, and the killing was evidently done in the most brutal way. We are far 
from feeling any certainty regarding the course of events at Demir-Hissar. 
There was clearly not an unprovoked massacre as the Greeks allege. But there 
did follow on the cowardly excesses of the Greek inhabitants against the Bul- 
garian wounded and fugitives, indefensible acts of reprisal, and a lawless and 
brutal slaughter of men who may have deserved some more regular punishment. 

The events at Doxato and Demir-Hissar, with the burning of Serres, form 
the chief counts in the Greek indictment of the Bulgarians. The other items 
refer mainly to single acts of violence charged against individuals in many places 
over a great range of territory. These minor charges we have not investigated, 
since they rarely involved an accusation against the army as a whole or its su- 
perior officers. We regret that we were unable to visit Nigrita, a large village, 
which was burned during the fighting which raged around it. Many of the 
inhabitants are said to have perished in the flames. We think it proper to place 
on record, without any expression of opinion, the Greek belief that this place 
was deliberately burned by the Bulgarians. We note also the statement made 
by a Greek soldier in a captured letter (see Appendix C, No. 51) that more than 
a thousand Bulgarian prisoners were slaughtered there by the Greek army. 
We have also before us the signed statement of a leading Moslem of the Nigrita 
district to the effect that after the second war the Greeks drove the Moslems 
from the surrounding villages with gross violence, because they had been neu- 
tral in the conflict, and took possession of their lands and houses. 

It remains to mention the charge repeatedly made by some of the diplomatic 
representatives of Greece in European capitals, that the fingers and ears of 
women were found in the pockets of captured Bulgarian soldiers. We need 
hardly insist on the inherent improbability of this vague story. Such relics 
would soon become a nauseous possession, and a soldier about to surrender 
would, one supposes, endeavor to throw away such damning evidence of his 
guilt. The only authority quoted for this accusation is a correspondent of the 
Times. We saw the gentleman in question at Salonica, a Greek journalist, who 
was acting as deputy for the Times correspondent. He had the story from 
Greek soldiers, and did not himself see the fingers and ears. The headquarters 
of the Greek army, which lost no opportunity of publishing facts likely to dam- 
age the Bulgarians, would presumably have published this accusation also, with 
the necessary details, had it been capable of verification. Until it is backed 
by further evidence, the story is unworthy of belief. 

The case against the Bulgarians which remains after a critical examination 
of the evidence relating to Doxato, Serres, and Demir-Hissar is sufficiently 
grave. In each case the Bulgarians acted under provocation, and in each case 
the accusation is grossly exaggerated, but their reprisals were none the less 
lawless and unmeasured. It is fair, however, to point out that these three cases, 


even on the worst view which may be taken of them, are far from supporting the 
general statements of some Greek writers, that the Bulgarians in their withdrawal 
from southern Macedonia and western Thrace, followed a general policy of 
devastation and massacre. They held five considerable Grseco-Turkish towns 
in this area and many smaller places — Drama, Kavala, Xanthi, Gumurjina, and 
Dedeagatch. In none of these did the Bulgarians burn and massacre, though 
some acts of violence occurred. The wrong they did leaves a sinister blot upon 
their record, but it must be viewed in its just proportions. 

3. The Bulgarian Peasant and the Greek Army 

It required no artificial incitement to produce the race hatred which explains 
the excesses of the Christian Allies, and more especially of the Bulgarians 
toward the Turks. Race, language, history, and religion have made a barrier 
which only the more tolerant minds of either creed are able wholly to surmount. 
It is less easy to explain the excesses of which Greeks and Bulgarians were 
guilty toward each other. The two races are sharply distinguished by tem- 
perament. A traditional enmity has divided them from the dawn of history, 
and this is aggravated in Macedonia by a certain social cleavage. But for a 
year the two races had been allies, united against a common enemy. When 
policy dictated a breach, it was necessary to prepare public opinion; and the 
Greek press, as if by a common impulse, devoted itself to this work. To 
the rank and file of all three Balkan armies, the idea of a fratricidal war 
was at first repugnant and inexplicable. The passions of the Greek army 
were roused by a daily diet of violent articles. The Greek press had had 
little to say regarding the Bulgarian excesses against the Turks while the facts 
were still fresh, and indeed none of the allies had the right to be censorious, for 
none of their records were clean. Now everything was dragged into the light, 
and the record of the Bulgarian bands, deplorable in itself, lost nothing in the 
telling. Day after day the Bulgarians were represented as a race of monsters, 
and public feeling was roused to a pitch of chauvinism which made it inevitable 
that war, when it came, should be ruthless. In talk and in print one phrase 
summed up the general feeling of the Greeks toward' the Bulgarians, "Dhen 
einai anthropoi!" (They are not human beings). In their excitement and in- 
dignation the Greeks came to think of themselves as the appointed avengers of 
civilization against a race which stood outside the pale of humanity. 

When an excitable southern race, which has been schooled in Balkan con- 
ceptions of vengeance, begins to reason in this way, it is easy to predict the con- 
sequences. Deny that your enemies are men, and presently you will treat them 
as vermin. Only half realizing the full meaning of what he said, a Greek officer 
remarked to the writer, "When you have to deal with barbarians, you must be- 
have like a barbarian yourself. It is the only thing they understand." The 
Greek army went into the war, its mind inflamed with anger and contempt. A 



o BoYArAPoa^Aroz 

Fig. 12. — A Popular Greek Poster 


gaudily colored print, which we saw in the streets of Salonica and the Pireaus, 
eagerly bought by the Greek soldiers returning to their homes, reveals the depth 
of the brutaHty to which this race hatred had sunk them. It shows a Greek 
ev.zonc (highlander) holding a living Bulgarian soldier with both hands, while 
he gnaws the face of his victim with his teeth, like some beast of prey. It is enti- 
tled the Bulgarophagos (Bulgar-eater), and is adorned with the following verses: 

The sea of fire which boils in my breast 
And calls for vengeance with the savage waves of my soul, 
Will be quenched when the monsters of Sofia are still, 
And thy life blood extinguishes my hate. 

Another popular battle picture shows a Greek soldier gouging out the eyes of 
a living Bulgarian. A third shows as an episode of a battle scene the exploit 
of the Bulgar-eater. 

As an evidence of the feeling which animated the Greek army these things 
have their importance. They mean, in plain words, that Greek soldiers wished 
to believe that they and their comrades perpetrated bestial cruelties. A print 
seller who issued such pictures in a western country would be held guilty of a 
gross libel on its army. 

The excesses of the Greek army began on July 4 with the first conflict at 
Kukush (Kilkish). A few days later the excesses of the Bulgarians at Doxato 
(July 13), Serres (July 11), and Demir-Hissar (July 7) were known and still 
further inflamed the anger of the Greeks. On July 12 King Constantine an- 
nounced in a dispatch which reported the slaughter at Demir-Hissar that he 
"found himself obliged with profound regret to proceed to reprisals.'*' A com- 
parison of dates will show that the Greek "reprisals" had begun some days before 
the Bulgarian "provocation." 

It was with the defeat of the little Bulgarian army at Kukush (Kilkish) after 
a stubborn three days' defense against a superior Greek force, that the Greek 
campaign assumed the character of a war of devastation. The Greek army 
entered the town of Kukush on July 4. We do not propose to lay stress on the 
evidence of Bulgarian witnesses regarding certain events which preceded their 
entry. Shells fell outside the town among groups of fugitive peasants from the 
villages, while within the town shells fell in the orphanage and hospital con- 
ducted by the French Catholic sisters under the protection of the French flag. 
(See Appendix C, Nos. 30 and 31.) It is possible and charitable to explain such 
incidents as the effect of an unlucky chance. The evidence of European eye wit- 
nesses confirms the statements of the Bulgarian refugees on one crucial point. 
These shells caused no general conflagration, and it is doubtful whether more than 
three or four houses were set on fire by them. When the Greek army entered 
Kukush it was still intact. It is today a heap of ruins — as a member of the 
Commission reports, after a visit to which the Greek authorities opposed several 





,^ -• '"> 

.. **^^Pj 



' * *^ 5*. .^ ^ "'*w^'-^i 


*?j^ ^ 


v m^*^ 

^ W4 Ik * / 

?#V \„ s ^P ' 


% ^l^v ^ \ w 

\ ■■,^-* & "'- 

R, ^ 


.. ~~X' 

^' $JN*W^*i^BF ii*- 

■■- - # 

y ! 

4^'wm 1 

*%. Iti^w* k^— ■«► 

/ I 

j^k^^ftk HI|S| j jdjf^gp^ *y v*^*"^ 

Ka&flB^^gaSJ Wr W^SEZJKr 

' i 

^Ri'^ ■* NT 

fe " XTTT?m 

^r m 

•• •'■ WwgF'^m 

r. - ^ 

, / ST .f . * i 


%■ WSF'^^rmm ^\i5ul 

p \MKr ,. ' /■ . ^tH^B |hK ' 

\ : v.^f! 

Hr^»" > * ■ 


v^-- ;: 

f ^ 

JKi , i^S* . .JtjfjM 


:i ^^^^^m. ^HH 

SL ^B Nfe 

Sy ';;>..,-,,. ^ _£ 



Fig. 13. — A Popular Greek Poster 


obstacles. It was a prosperous town of 13,000 inhabitants, the center of a purely 
Bulgarian district and the seat of several flourishing schools. The bent stand- 
ards of its electric lamps still testify to the efforts which it had made to attain a 
level of material progress unusual in Turkey. That its destruction was deliber- 
ate admits of no doubt. The great majority of the inhabitants fled before the 
arrival of the Greeks. About four hundred, chiefly old people and children, had 
found shelter in the Catholic orphanage, and were not molested. European eye 
witnesses describe the systematic entry of the Greek soldiers into house after 
house. Any of the inhabitants who were found inside were first evicted, pillage 
followed, and then, usually after a slight explosion, the house burst into flames. 
Fugitives continued to arrive in the orphanage while the town was burning, and 
several women stated that they had been violated by Greek soldiers. In one 
case a soldier, more chivalrous than his comrades, brought a woman to the or- 
phanage whom he had saved from violation. Some civilians were killed by the 
Greek cavalry as they rode in, and many lives were lost in the course of the 
sacking and burning of Kukush. We have received a detailed list from a Bul- 
garian source of seventy-four inhabitants who are believed to have been killed. 
Most of them are old women, and eleven are babies. 

The main fact on which we must insist is that the Greek army inaugurated 
the second war by the deliberate burning of a Bulgarian town. A singular fact 
which has some bearing on Greek policy is that the refugees who took shelter 
in the French orphanage were still, on September 6, long after the conclusion of 
peace, closely confined as prisoners within it, though hardly a man among them 
is capable of bearing arms. A notice in Greek on its outer door states that they 
are forbidden to leave its precincts. Meanwhile, Greek (or rather "Grecoman") 
refugees from Strumnitsa were being installed on the sites of the houses which 
once belonged to Bulgarians, and in the few buildings (perhaps a dozen in num- 
ber) which escaped the flames. The inference is irresistible. In conquering the 
Kukush district, the Greeks were resolved to have no Bulgarian subjects. 

The precedent of Kukush was only too faithfully followed in the villages. 
In the Caza (county) of Kukush alone no less than forty Bulgarian villages were 
burned by the Greek army in its northward march. (See Appendix C, No. 52.) 
Detachments of cavalry went from village to village, and the work of the regulars 
was completed by bashi-bazouks. It was a part of the Greek plan of campaign 
to use the local Turkish population as an instrument in the work of devastation. 
In some cases they were armed and even provided with uniforms. (See Appen- 
dix C, No. 43.) In no instance, however, of which we have a record were the 
Turks solely responsible for the burning of a village. They followed the Greek 
troops and acted under their protection. We have no means of ascertaining 
whether any general order was given which regulated the burning of the Bulga- 
rian villages. A Greek sergeant among the prisoners of war in Sofia, stated in 
reply to a question which a member of the Commission put to him, that he and 
his comrades burned the villages around Kukush because the inhabitants had fled. 


It is a fact that one mainly Catholic village (Todoraki) in which most of the 
inhabitants remained, was not burned, though it was thoroughly pillaged. (See 
Appendix C, No. 32.) But the fate of other villages, notably Akangeli, in which 
the inhabitants not only remained, but even welcomed the Greek troops, disposes 
of this explanation. Whatever may have been the terms of the orders under 
which the Greek troops acted, the effect was that the Bulgarian villages were 
burned with few exceptions. 

Refugees have described how, on the night of the fall of Kukush, the whole 
sky seemed to be aflame. It was a signal which the peasants understood. Few 
of them hesitated, and the general flight began which ended in massing the Bul- 
garian population of the districts through which the Greeks marched within the 
former frontiers of Bulgaria. We need not insist on the hardships of the flight. 
Old and young, women and children, walked sometimes for two consecutive weeks 
by devious mountain paths. The weak fell by the wayside from hunger and 
exhaustion. Families were divided, and among the hundred thousand refugees 
scattered throughout Bulgaria, husbands are still looking for wives, and parents 
for children. Sometimes the stream of refugees crossed the path of the contend- 
ing armies, and the clatter of cavalry behind them would produce a panic, and 
a sanve qui pent in which mothers lost their children, and even abandoned one 
in the hope of saving another. (See Appendix C, Nos. 33, 34, 35.) They 
arrived at the end of their flight with the knowledge that their flocks had been 
siezed, their crops abandoned, and their homes destroyed. In all this misery and 
loss there is more than the normal and inevitable wastage of war. The peasants 
abandoned everything and fled, because they would not trust the Greek army 
with their lives. It remains to inquire whether this was an unreasonable fear. 

The immense majority of the Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria were never 
in contact with the Greek army and know nothing of it at first hand. They heard 
rumors of excesses in other villages ; they knew that other villages had been 
burned: they fled because everyone was fleeing; at the worst they can say that 
from a distance they saw their own village in flames. It would be easy to 
ascribe their fears to prejudice or panic, were it not for the testimony of the 
few who were in direct touch with the Greek troops. In the appendices will be 
found a number of depositions which the Commission took from refugees. It 
was impossible to doubt that these peasants were telling the truth. Most of them 
were villagers, simple, uneducated, and stunned by their sufferings, and quite in- 
capable of invention. They told their tales with a dull, literal directness. In 
two of the more striking stories, we obtained ample corroboration in circum- 
stances which admitted of no collusion. Thus a refugee from Akangeli, who had 
fled to Salonica, told us there a story of butchery and outrage (see Appendix 'C, 
No. 39) which tallied in almost every detail with the story afterwards told by 
another fugitive from the same village who had fled to Sofia (Appendix C, 
No. 41). While passing through Dubnitsa we inquired from a group of refugees 


whether any one present came from Akangeli. A youth stepped forward, who 
once more told a story which agreed with the two others (Appendix C, No. 42). 
The story of the boy Mito Kolev (Appendix C, No. 36) told in Sofia, was 
similarly corroborated in an equally accidental way by two witnesses at Samakov 
(Appendix C, Nos. 37 and 38), who stepped out of a crowd of refugees in 
response to our inquiry whether anyone present came from the village in 
question (Gavaliantsi). We can feel no doubt about the truth of a story which 
reached us in this way from wholly independent eye witnesses. These two inci- 
dents are typical, and must be briefly summarized here. 

Mito Kolev is an intelligent boy of fourteen, who comes from the Bulgarian 
village Gavaliantsi, in the Kukush district. He fled with most of his neighbors 
in the first alarm after the Bulgarian defeat at Kukush, but returned next day 
to fetch his mother, who had remained behind. Outside the village a Greek 
trooper fired at him but missed him. The lad had the wit to feign death. As 
he lay on the ground, his mother was shot and killed by the same cavalryman. 
He saw another lad killed, and the same trooper then went in pursuit of a crippled 
girl. Of her fate Mito, who clearly distinguished between what he saw and 
what he suspected, knew nothing, but another witness (Lazar Tomov) chanced 
to see the corpse of this girl (Appendix B, No. 25). Mito's subsequent adven- 
tures were told very clearly and in great detail. The essential points are (1) that 
he saw his village burned, and (2) that another Greek cavalryman whom he met 
later in the day all but killed him with a revolver shot and a saber cut at close 
quarters, while he spared a by-stander who was able by his command of the lan- 
guage to pass himself off as a Greek. The material corroboration of this story is, 
that Mito still bore the marks of his wounds. A shot wound may be accidental, 
but a saber wound can only be given deliberately and at close quarters. A trooper 
who wounds a boy with his sword can not plead error. He must have been en- 
gaged in indiscriminate butchery. Of this particular squad of Greek cavalry, it is 
not too much to say that they were slaughtering Bulgarian peasants at sight, and 
that they spared neither women nor children. 

The evidence regarding Akangeli (Appendix C, Nos. 39-42, and Appendix 
D, No. 63, paragraph b) points to the same conclusion. In this Bulgarian 
village near the Lake of Doiran, refugees from many of the neighboring 
villages, who are said to have numbered 4,000 persons, had halted in their 
flight. A squadron of Greek cavalry, numbering about 300 men, with officers 
at its head, arrived between 3 and 4 p.m. on Sunday, July 6. The villagers 
with their priest went out to meet them with a white flag and the Greek 
colors. The officer, in conversation with the mayor, accepted their surrender 
and ordered them to give up any arms they possessed. The peasants brought 
bread and cheese, and thirty sheep were requisitioned and roasted for the 
troops. Some sixty of the men of the place were separated from the others 
and sent away to a wood. Of their fate nothing is known. The villagers be- 


lieve that they were slaughtered, but we have reason to hope that they may have 
been sent as prisoners to Salonica. While the rifles were being collected the 
troopers began to demand money from both men and women. The women were 
searched with every circumstance of indignity and indecency. One witness, a 
well to do inhabitant of Kukush, was bound together with a refugee whose name 
he did not know. He gave up his watch and five piastres and his life was spared. 
His companion, who had no money, was killed at his side. While the arms were 
being collected, one which was loaded went off accidentally and wounded an 
officer, who was engaged in breaking the rifles. Two youths who were standing 
near were then killed by the soldiers, presumably to avenge the officer's mishap. 
Toward evening the soldiers forced their way into the houses and began to vio- 
late the women. 

Another witness, the butcher who roasted the sheep for the troops, saw two 
young women, whom he named, violated by three soldiers beside his oven. In- 
fantry arrived on Monday, and shortly afterwards the village was set on fire. 
During Sunday night and on Monday morning many of the villagers were 
slaughtered. It is impossible to form an estimate of the number, for our wit- 
nesses were in hiding and each saw only a small part of what occurred. One of 
them estimated the number at fifty, but this was clearly only a guess. We have 
before us a list from a Bulgarian source of 356 persons from seven villages who 
have disappeared and are believed to have been killed at Akangeli. Turks from 
neighboring villages joined in the pillage under the eyes of the Greek soldiers 
and their officers. The facts which emerge clearly from our depositions are (1) 
that the village submitted from the first; (2) that it was sacked and burned; 
(3) that the Greek troops gave themselves up openly and generally to a debauch 
of lust; (4) that many of the peasants were killed wantonly and without provo- 

It would serve no purpose to encumber this account of the Greek march 
with further narratives. Many further depositions will be found in the appen- 
dices. They all convey the same impression. Wherever the peasants ventured 
to await the arrival of the Greek troops in their villages, they had the same ex- 
perience. The village was sacked and the women were violated before it was 
burned, and noncombatants were wantonly butchered, sometimes in twos or 
threes, sometimes in larger numbers. We would call attention particularly to 
two of these narratives — that of Anastasia Pavlova, an elderly women of the 
middle class, who told her painful and dramatic story with more intelligence 
and feeling than most of the peasant witnesses. (Appendix C, No. 43.) Like 
them, she suffered violation ; she was robbed, and beaten, and witnessed the dis- 
honor of other women and the slaughter of noncombatant men. Her evidende 
relates in part to the taking of the town of Ghevgheli. Ghevgheli, which is a mixed 
town, was not burned, but a reliable European, well acquainted with the town, 
and known to one member of the Commission as a man of honor and ability, 


stated that fully two hundred Bulgarian civilians were killed there on the entry 
of the Greek army. 

Another deposition to which we would particularly call attention is that of 
Athanas Ivanov, who was an eye witness of the violation of six women and the 
murder of nine men in the village of Kirtchevo. (Appendix C, No. 44.) His 
story is interesting because he states that one Greek soldier who protested against 
the brutality of his comrades was overruled by his sergeant, and further that the 
order to kill the men was given by officers. It is probable that some hundreds of 
peasants were killed at Kirtchevo and German in a deliberate massacre, carried 
out with gross treachery and cruelty. (See also Appendix D, Nos. 59-62.) For 
these depositions the Commission assumes responsibility, in the sense that it be- 
lieves that the witnesses told the truth ; and, further, that it took every care to 
ascertain by questioning them whether any obvious excuse, such as a disorderly 
resistance by irregulars in the neighborhood, could be adduced. These depositions 
relate to the conduct of the Greek troops in ten villages. We should hesitate to 
generalize from this basis (save as to the fact that villages were almost every- 
where burned), but we are able to add in the appendix a summary of a large 
number of depositions taken from refugees by Professor Miletits of Sofia Uni- 
versity. (See Appendix D, No. 63.) While it can not assume personal respon- 
sibility for this evidence, the Commission has every confidence in the thorough- 
ness with which Professor Miletits performed his task. 

This great mass of evidence goes to show that there was nothing singular 
in the cases which the Commission itself investigated. In one instance a number 
of Europeans witnessed the brutal conduct of a detachment of Greek regulars 
under three officers. Fifteen wounded Bulgarian soldiers took refuge in the 
Catholic convent of Paliortsi, near Ghevgheli, and were nursed by the sisters. 
Father Alloati reported this fact to the Greek commandant, whereupon a de- 
tachment was sent to search the convent for a certain Bulgarian voyevoda (chief 
of bands) named Arghyr, who was not there. In the course of the search a 
Bulgarian Catholic priest, Father Treptche, and the Armenian doctor of the con- 
vent were severely flogged in the presence of the Greek officers. A Greek soldier 
attempted to violate a nun, and during the search a sum of iT300 was stolen. 
Five Bulgarian women and a young girl were put to the torture, and a large num- 
ber of peasants carried off to prison for no good reason. The officer in com- 
mand threatened to kill Father Alloati on the spot and to burn down the con- 
vent. If such things could be done to Europeans in a building under the pro- 
tection of the French flag, it is not difficult to believe that Bulgarian peasants 
fared incomparably worse. 

The Commission regrets that the attitude of the Greek government toward 
its work has prevented it from obtaining any official answer to the charges which 
emerge from this evidence. The broad fact that the whole of this Bulgarian 
region, for a distance of about one hundred miles, was devastated and nearly 


every village burned, admits of no denial. Nor do we think that military neces- 
sity could be pleaded with any plausibility. The Greeks were numerically greatly 
superior to their enemy, and so far as we are aware, their flanks were not har- 
assed, nor their communications threatened by guerrillas, who might have found 
shelter in the viHages. The Greeks did not wait for any provocation of this 
kind, but everywhere burned the villages, step by step with their advance. 
The slaughter of peasant men could be defended only if they had been taken 
in the act of resistance with arms in their hands. No such explanation will 
fit the cases on which we have particularly laid stress, nor have any of the war 
correspondents who followed the Greek army reported conflicts along the main 
line of the Greek march with armed villagers. The violation of women admits of 
no excuse; it can only be denied. 

Denial unfortunately is impossible. No verdict which could be based on the 
evidence collected by the Commission could be more severe than that which Greek 
soldiers have pronounced upon themselves. It happened that on the eve of the 
armistice (July 27) the Bulgarians captured the baggage of the Nineteenth 
Greek infantry regiment at Dobrinichte (Razlog). It included its post-bags, to- 
gether with the file of its telegraphic orders, and some of its accounts. We 
were permitted to examine these documents at our leisure in the Foreign Office 
at Sofia. The file of telegrams and accounts presented no feature of interest. 
The soldiers' letters were written often in pencil on scraps of paper of every sort 
and size. Some were neatly folded without envelopes. Some were written on 
souvenir paper commemorating the war, and others on official sheets. Most of 
them bore the regimental postal stamp. Four or five were on stamped business 
paper belonging to a Turkish firm in Serres, which some Greek soldier had pre- 
sumably taken while looting the shop. The greater number of the letters were 
of no public interest, and simply informed the family at home that the writer 
was well, and that his friends were well or ill or wounded as the case might be. 
Many of these letters still await examination. We studied with particular care a 
series of twenty-five letters, which contained definite avowals by these Greek 
soldiers of the brutalities which they had practiced. Two members of the Com- 
mission have some knowledge of modern Greek. We satisfied ourselves (1) 
that the letters (mostly illiterate and ill written) had been carefully deciphered 
and honestly translated; (2) that the interesting portions of the letters were in 
the same handwriting as the addresses on the envelopes (which bore the official 
stamp) and the portions which related only personal news; (3) that no tamper- 
ing with the manuscripts had been practiced. Some minor errors and inac- 
curacies are interesting, as an evidence of authenticity. Another letter is dated by 
error July 15 (old style), though the post-bags were captured on the 14th (27th). 
We noted, moreover, that more than one slip (including an error of grammar) 
had been made by the Bulgarian secretary in transcribing the addresses of the 
letters from Greek into Latin script — a proof that he did not know enough 


Greek to invent them. But it is unnecessary to dwell on these minor evidences of 
authenticity. The letters have been published in fac simile. The addresses and 
the signatures are those of real people. If they had been wronged by some in- 
credibly ingenious forger, the Greek government would long ago have brought 
these soldiers before some impartial tribunal to prove by specimens of their genu- 
ine handwriting that they did not write these letters. The Commission, in short, 
is satisfied that the letters are genuine. 

The letters require no commentary. Some of the writers boast of the 
cruelties practiced by the Greek army. Others deplore them. The statements 
of fact (see Appendix C, No. 51) are simple, brutal, and direct, and always to the 
same effect. These soldiers all state that they everywhere burned the Bulgarian 
villages. Two boast of the massacre of prisoners of war. One remarks that 
all the girls they met with were violated. Most of the letters dwell on the 
slaughter of noncombatants, including women and children. These few ex- 
tracts, each from a separate letter, may suffice to convey their general tenor : 

By order of the King we are setting fire to all the Bulgarian villages, 
because the Bulgarians burned the beautiful town of Serres, Nigrita, and 
several Greek villages. We have shown ourselves far more cruel than the 
Bulgarians. * * * 

Here we are burning the villages and killing the Bulgarians, both 
women and children. * * * 

We took only a few [prisoners], and these we killed, for such are the 
orders we have received. 

We have to burn the villages — such is the order — slaughter the young 
people and spare only the old people and the children. * * * 

What is done to the Bulgarians is indescribable; also to the Bulgarian 
peasants. It was a butchery. There is not a Bulgarian town or village but 
is burned. 

We massacre all the Bulgarians who fall into our hands and burn the 

Of the 1,200 prisoners we took at Nigrita, only forty-one remain in 
the prisons, and everywhere we have been we have not left a single root of 
this race. 

We picked out their eyes [five Bulgarian prisoners] while they were 
still alive. 

The Greek army sets fire to all the villages where there are Bulgarians 
and massacres all it meets. * * * God knows where this will end. 

These letters relieve us of the task of summing up the evidence. From 
Kukush to the Bulgarian frontier the Greek army devastated the villages, vio- 
lated the women, and slaughtered the noncombatant men. The order to carry 
out reprisals was evidently obeyed. We repeat, however, that these reprisals 
began before the Bulgarian provocation. A list of Bulgarian villages burned by 
the Greek army which will be found in Appendix C (No. 52) conveys some 
measure of this ruthless devastation. At Serres the Bulgarians destroyed 4,000 


houses in the conflagration which followed the fighting in the streets. The 
ruin of this considerable town has impressed the imagination of the civilized 
world. Systematically and in cold blood the Greeks burned one hundred and 
sixty Bulgarian villages and destroyed at least 16,000 Bulgarian homes. The 
figures need no commentary. 


No account of the sufferings of the noncombatant population in Macedo- 
nia would be complete which failed to describe the final exodus of Moslems and 
Greeks from the territory assigned to Bulgaria. Vast numbers of Moslems ar- 
rived on the outskirts of Salonica during our stay there. We saw them camped 
to the number, it is said, of 8,000, in the fields and by the roadside. They had 
come with their bullock carts, and whole families found their only shelter in 
these primitive vehicles. They had left their villages and their fields, and to all 
of them the future was a blank. They did not wish to go to Asia, nor did they 
wish to settle, they knew not how nor where, in Greek territory. They regretted 
their homes, and spoke with a certain passive fatalism of the events which had 
made them wanderers. They were, when we visited them, without rations, but 
we heard that the Greek authorities afterwards made some effort to supply them 
with bread. 

The history of this exodus is somewhat complicated. It was part of the 
Greek case to assert that no minority, whether Greek or Moslem, can safely live 
under Bulgarian rule. The fact is, that of all the Balkan countries, Bulgaria alone 
has retained a large proportion of the original Moslem inhabitants. Official 
Greek statements predicted, before peace was concluded, that the Moslem and 
Greek minorities would emigrate from the new Bulgarian territories in a body. 
The popular press went further, and announced that with their own hands they 
would burn down their own houses. When the time arrived, steps were taken to 
realize these prophecies, more particularly at Strumnitsa and in the neighboring 

We questioned several groups of these Moslem peasants on the roadside near 
Salonica. (Appendix A, No. 4.) We took the deposition of a leading Tur- 
kish notable of Strumnitsa, Hadji Suleiman Effendi. (See Appendix A, 
No. 3.) We questioned the Greek refugees from the same town who were 
at Kukush. We obtained Bulgarian evidence at Sofia. (See Appen- 
dix D, No. 65.) Finally, we have before us the confidential evidence 
of an authoritative witness, a subject of a neutral power, who visited the 
town before the exodus was complete. From all these sources we heard the 
same story. The Greek military authorities in Strumnitsa gave the explicit 
order that all the Moslem and Greek inhabitants of the town and villages must 
abandon their homes and emigrate to Greek territory. The order was backed by 
the warning that their houses would be burned. Persuasion was used and was, 


in the case of the Greeks, partially successful. They were told that the Bulga- 
rians would massacre them if they remained. They were also assured that a 
new Strumnitsa would be built for them at Kukush on a splendid scale, and 
they were promised houses and lands. Some of the leaders of the Greek com- 
munity eagerly embraced this policy and used their influence to enforce it. The 
Greek exodus was far from being spontaneous, but it was on the whole volun- 
tary. Our conviction is that the Moslems yielded to force. It is true that they 
had had a terrible experience under the mixed Serbo-Bulgarian rule in the early 
weeks of the first war. But this they had survived, and most of them stated 
that Bulgarian rule, after this first excess, had been at least tolerable. Most of 
them departed in obedience to the order. Some vainly attempted to bribe the 
Greek soldiers. A few obstinately remained and were evicted by force. The 
same procedure was followed in the villages. 

The emigration began about August 10. On the evening of Wednesday, 
August 21, parties of Greek soldiers began to burn the empty houses of the 
Moslem and Greek quarters on a systematic plan, and continued their work on 
the following nights up to August 23. The Greeks evacuated what was left 
of the town on August 27, and handed it over to the Bulgarian troops. The 
Bulgarian quarter was not burned, since the object of the Greeks was to circu- 
late the legend that the non-Bulgarian inhabitants had themselves burned their 
own houses. To estimate the full significance of this extraordinary outrage, 
it must be remembered that it was perpetrated in time of peace, after the sig- 
nature of the Peace of Bucharest. 

A similar emigration of the Greek inhabitants of Melnik also took place 
under pressure. Their houses, however, were not burned, and there are indi- 
cations that some of them will endeavor to return when the pressure is relaxed. 

We found some hundreds of the Greek fugitives from Strumnitsa at Ku- 
kush. They are not, in point of fact, Greeks at all, but Slavs, bi-lingual for the 
most part, who belong to the Greek party and the Patriarchist Church. One 
woman had a husband still serving in the Bulgarian army ; she at least was not a 
voluntary fugitive from Bulgarian rule. These people were camped amid the ruins 
of Kukush, some in the few houses which escaped the conflagration, and others 
in improvised shelters. They received rations, and hoped to see the "New 
Strumnitsa" arise on the ashes of what was once a Bulgarian town. From the 
windows of the Catholic orphanage the remnant of the genuine population of 
Kukush, closely imprisoned, watched the newcomers establishing themselves on 
sites which were once their own. The Greek authorities are apparently deter- 
mined to dispose of the lands of the fugitive Bulgarian villagers as though con- 
quest had wiped out all private rights of property. The fugitives from Strum- 
nitsa are simple people. One man spoke rather naively of his first horror at 
the idea of leaving his native place. Later, he said, he had acquiesced; he 
supposed the authorities knew best. Another fugitive, a village priest, regretted 


his home, which had, he said, the best water in all Macedonia. But he was 
sure that flight was wise. He had reason to fear the Bulgarians. A comitadji, 
early in the first war, pointed a rifle at his breast, and said: "Become a Bulga- 
rian, or I'll kill you." He forthwith became a Bulgarian for several months and 
conformed to the exarchist church. These "Greeks" will probably be well cared 
for, and may have a prosperous future. The Moslem fugitives furnish the tragic 
element of this enforced exodus. It creates three problems: What will become 
of these uprooted Turkish families? Who will acquire the lands they have left 
behind? By what right can the Greeks dispose of the Bulgarian lands in the Ku- 
kush region? The problem may solve itself by some rough exchange, but not 
without endless private misery and immense injustice. 

In bringing this painful chapter to a conclusion, we desire to remind the 
reader that it presents only a partial and abstract picture of the war. It brings 
together in a continuous perspective the sufferings of the noncombatant popula- 
tions of Macedonia and Thrace at the hands of armies flushed with victory or 
embittered by defeat. To base upon it any moral judgment would be to show 
an uncritical and unhistorical spirit. An estimate of the moral qualities of the 
Balkan peoples under the strain of war must also take account of their courage, 
endurance, and devotion. If a heightened national sentiment helps to explain 
these excesses, it also inspired the bravery that won victory and the steadiness 
that sustained defeat. The moralist who seeks to understand the brutality to 
which these pages bear witness, must reflect that all the Balkan races have grown 
up amid Turkish models of warfare. Folk-songs, history and oral tradition 
in the Balkans uniformly speak of war as a process which includes rape and 
pillage, devastation and massacre. In Macedonia all this was not a distant 
memory but a recent experience. The new and modern feature of these wars 
was that for the first time in Balkan annals an effort, however imperfect, was 
made by some of the combatants and by some of the civil officials, to respect an 
European ideal of humanity. The only moral which we should care to draw 
from these events is that war under exceptional conditions produced something 
worse than its normal results. The extreme barbarity of some episodes was a 
local circumstance which has its root in Balkan history. But the main fact is 
that war suspended the restraints of civil life, inflamed the passions that slumber 
in time of peace, destroyed the natural kindliness between neighbors, and set in 
its place the will to injure. That is everywhere the essence of war. 


Bulgarians, Turks and Servians 
1. Adrianople 

The Commission was afforded a perfectly natural opportunity of investi- 
gating the atrocities attributed to the Bulgarians after they had taken Adria- 
nople. On August 20, 1913, the Daily Telegraph published a very solid body 
of material sent to the paper by Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, and printed under the 
suggestive heading "Terrible Reports by a Russian Official." On August 26 
and 27, this same report appeared in Constantinople in the official organ of the 
Committee of Union and Progress, Le Jeune Turc. Since, however, the latter 
contained details omitted by the Daily Telegraph, the information published in 
Le Jeune Turc was evidently first hand. On August 28 Le Jeune Turc revealed 
the source of its information as the result of an unofficial Russian contradiction 
inserted in La Turquie of August 27. "We are authorized," declared the un- 
official organ of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, "to give a categorical 
denial of the information of the Daily Telegraph reproduced in Le Jeune Turc, 
and attributed to a Russian official. No Russian official has been commissioned 
to make inquiries in Thrace and at Adrianople, or to obtain any kind of in- 
formation : none is therefore in a position to supply such a report. Nor have the 
Russian consuls recorded the facts mentioned in the Telegraph." Replying to 
this denial, which certainly emanated from the Russian Embassy, Le Jeune Turc 
stated that "the document in question was not the work of a Russian official 
in active service, but of an ex-official, the Consul-General Machkov, who was 
in fact the correspondent of the Novoie Vremya." It should be added that Mr. 
Machkov's telegraphic "report" was rejected by his paper, and that, according 
to the statement of Mr. Machkov's colleagues of the Constantinople press, the 
expense of his telegram amounting to £T150, was repaid him by the Com- 
mittee. Le Jeune Turc itself said: "Fearing, no doubt, lest the paper (the 
Novoie Vremya) being excessively Bulgarophil 1 might not publish the results 
of his eight days' inquiry in Adrianople, Mr. Machkov sent copies of it to the 
President of the Council of Ministers and the Foreign Minister." 

The veracity of the document, which made a profound impression in 
Europe, is naturally in no way prejudiced by its origin and history, which do 
however assist an understanding of the spirit in which it is conceived. One of 
the members of the Balkan Commission came to Adrianople to follow up Mr. 
Machkov's information. He succeeded in getting in touch with the sources from 

x This is not at all the case. 


which it was largely derived, and had repeated to him verbally practically the 
whole of the facts and sayings contained in Mr. Machkov's account. The truth 
seems to be that while Mr. Machkov invented nothing and added practically 
nothing to the information he was able to collect in Adrianople, he did rely upon 
distinctly partisan sources, in so far as the medium through which his informa- 
tion came was Greek. The member of the Commission was at pains not to con- 
fine his inquiry to this medium. In addition to obtaining from the persons 
responsible for the administration of the city in occupation, a long series of 
official Bulgarian depositions (see Appendix G, 3), he succeeded in pushing his 
inquiries in Adrianople itself, in other than purely Greek areas, and in utilizing 
the depositions of Turkish prisoners at Sofia, collected by another member of 
the Commission (see Appendix G, 2). Thus without any intention of rehabili- 
tating the Bulgarians, he succeeded in establishing the facts in a more impartial 
manner than could be done by Mr. Machkov, who had been known as a very pro- 
nounced Bulgarphobe since his tenure of the Russian consulate at Uskub, fifteen 
years previously. 

The account of affairs in Adrianople falls into three sections: first, the 
capture of the town and the days immediately following, — March 26-30, 1913 ; 
secondly, the Bulgarian administration of the town during the occupation, and 
thirdly, the last days and the evacuation, — July 19-22, 1913. 


The particular charge made against the Bulgarians during this short period 
is that they were guilty of acts of cruelty against the Turkish prisoners and of 
pillaging the inhabitants of the town. Any clear establishment of their respon- 
sibility depends on a knowledge of the situation existing prior to the occupa- 
tion. To throw light on this point we will refer to a document entitled Journal 
of the Siege of Adrianople, published in Adrianople itself over the initials 
"P. C," belonging to a person well known in the locality and worthy of every 
confidence. So early as January 31 (new style), P. C. remarks that ''the famine 
has become more atrocious: there is nothing to be heard in some of the poor 
quarters of the town but the cries of the little children asking for bread and 
the wailing of the mothers who have none to give them. From the Hildyrym 
quarter it is reported that a man has committed suicide after killing his wife 
and three children. A Turkish woman, a widow, is said to have cast her little 
ones into the Toundja. * * *" And so on. On February 12, P. C. speaks 
of the "famished soldiers," forbidden to receive alms, and who "beg you to cast 
your money on the ground, whence they may pick it up an instant after." On 
March 2, revolt broke out among the Hildyrym populace and the writer fore- 
casts what was to follow in these words: "A day of vengeance and reprisals 
will come when the besiegers enter." The soldiery stole bread in broad day- 
light and refused to give it up when taken in the act. P. C. describes, two days 


after, how "groups of people pass you who can hardly hold each other up ; most 
of their faces are emaciated, their skin looks earthy and corpse-like; others with 
swollen limbs and puffy countenances seem hardly able to stumble along. You 
see them chewing at lumps of snow to cheat their hunger." And nearly two 
weeks were still to pass before the surrender! On March 12 the following scene 
took place : "A soldier crossing the Maritza bridge suddenly stopped, beat the air 
two or three times with his hands and fell down dead." He was thought to be 
wounded but "it was only starvation." "Stretchers bearing dead or diseased 
persons pass in constant succession ; the doctors predict an appalling mortality 
as soon as the mild weather comes." On March 19, "In the hospitals one death 
follows another; yesterday two new cases of cholera were reported." * * * 
"This morning a poor trooper was brought in, poisoned from browsing on grass. 
Since the spring the cases have been multiplied." On March 22, "We have had 
five deaths last night; at the moment the mortality is from 50 to 60 a day, the 
result not of any epidemic, but of pneumonia affections and physiological star- 
vation. Many have eaten unwholesome or poisonous bodies." Finally, there is 
the extract referring to the "last day of Adrianople," i. e., Wednesday, March 26, 
the day on which the town fell. It runs as follows : 

The streets and squares are gradually filling with emaciated and ragged 
soldiers, who march gloomily to the rendezvous or sit down with an air of 
resignation at the corners and along the walls. There is no disorder among 
them: on the contrary they present a picture of utter prostration and 
sadness. * * * In contrast to the calm dignity of the Turks, the Greek 
mob showed an ever increasing meanness. They did not yet dare to insult 
their disarmed masters, but began to pillage like madmen, to an accompani- 
ment of yells., blows and blasphemies. The Turks let them carry off every- 
thing without saying a word. 1 

It only remains now to place the picture thus given in juxtaposition with 
Mr. Machkov's report and the commentary by the Bulgarian authorities on 
the events at the moment of the entry of their troops, to see how the different 
accounts complete and confirm one another. 

Take, to begin with, the truly awful fate of the prisoners incarcerated in 
the island of Toundja, Sarai Eski. A member of the Commission visited the 
island. He saw how the bark had been torn off the trees, as high as a man 
could reach, by the starving prisoners. He even met on the spot an aged Turk 
who had spent a week there, and said he had himself eaten the bark. A little 
Turkish boy who looked after the cattle on the island, said that from across 
the river he had seen the prisoners eating the grass and made a gesture to show 
the inquirer how they did it. General Vasov stated in his deposition (see Ap- 

x These somewhat long quotations from P. C.'s book have been made because it is now 
a bibliographical rarity. P. C.'s impressions are confirmed by another Journal of the 
Siege of Adrianople, by Gustave Cirilli (Paris: Chapelot, 1913). see pp. 129-151, etc. 




Fig. 14. — Isle of Toundja 
Trees Stripped of Bark Which the Prisoners Ate 

pendix G, 3) that he gave the prisoners permission to strip the bark off the trees 
for fuel, a fact confirmed by other trustworthy witnesses. The same general, from 
the second day on, ordered a quarter loaf to be distributed to the prisoners, 
which he took from the rations of the Bulgarian soldiery. This was confirmed 
by Major Mitov, who was entrusted with carrying out the order, which is more- 
over inscribed in the War Minister's archives (see Appendix G, 5). On the first 
day the victorious soldiery shared their bread with the prisoners and the starv- 
ing populace. But touching incidents like this could not, any more than the 
general's order, supply the mass of the people with the food for lack of 
which they perished, and there are good grounds for believing that these poor 
wretches went on consuming the "unwholesome or poisonous" stuffs of which 
P. C. speaks. The mortality among the prisoners must have been severe., 
especially in the island, where cholera broke out again on the third or fourth 
day of the siege. There is evidence of a want of tents, which was indeed true 
of the whole army. The further fact that these unfortunate creatures passed 
the night exposed to all the rigors of rain and freezing mud, would in itself ex- 
plain the increasing mortality. It is hardly possible to believe, after reading the 
descriptions published in the European press, for example Barzini's article in 
the Corriere delle Sera, that the isolation of the sick really had the good effects 
alleged by General Vasov. 

The number of deaths has been variously estimated. Major Mitov speaks 
of thirty after the first morning. Major Choukri-bey, a captive officer, puts the 
number in a single day at a hundred ; General Vasov estimated the total number 
of deaths at 100 or 200. The real figures must be higher. The Turk interro- 
gated by the member of the Commission told him that the group in which he 
was, consisted of some 1,800 persons confined in a narrow space indicated by 


a gesture. On the night of March 15, 187 of them, he said, died of cold and 
hunger. The witnesses, it may be noted, put disease second or third among the 
causes of death. The main cause was still, as during the siege, weakness and 
exhaustion resulting from starvation, the agonizing effects of which lasted not 
only during the five days of the final struggle of which Mr. Vasov speaks, but 
for months. It must certainly not be forgotten that the explosion of the bridge 
over the Arda, and the destruction of the Turkish depots, made it difficult to pro- 
vide food for 55,000 prisoners and inhabitants. But when all these admissions 
have been made, there remains as a fact not to be denied, the cruel indifference 
in general to the lot of the prisoners. This fact is fully confirmed by the depo- 
sitions of the captive Turkish officers at Sofia. One is therefore bound to ad- 
mit that the conduct of the victors towards their captive foes left much to be 
desired. Some of the rigorous measures reported by Turkish officers might be 
given as a reason against the attempts to escape made by certain prisoners. But 
that can not explain everything : what about the vanquished who were bayoneted 
at night and their corpses left exposed in the streets till noon? The case re- 
ported by Mr. Machkov, of the Turkish captive officer who, being too weak to 
march, was slain by the Bulgarian soldiers in charge, as well as a Jew who had 
tried to defend him, is fully confirmed by a reserve officer, Hadji Ali, himself 
a prisoner at Sofia. Mr. Machkov gives the name of the compassionate Jew, 
Salomon Behmi ; and at Constantinople the very words uttered, in Turkish, by 
this Jew, "Yazyk, wourma" ("It is a sin: do not kill,") were reported to the 
member of the Commission. Hadji Ali knew the name of the slain Turk, 
Captain Ismail- Youzbachi, and saw him fall with his own eyes. The explana- 
tion given by General Vasov and the Baroness Yxcoull proves that the death 
of the thirteen Turks slain in the mosque at Miri-Miran can not be laid at the 
Bulgarians' door; but the depositions of the Turkish soldiers concerning the 
murder of the sick and diseased prisoners on the Mustapha Pasha route are more 
than probably true. We shall return to this question of the treatment of pris- 
oners in the chapter dealing with international law. 

A Greek version of the pillage of Adrianople reproduced by Mr. Machkov 
is unkind to a degree calculated to prejudice public opinion. Apart from Mr. 
Machkov and Mr. Pierre Loti, who merely repeats the Turkish version pre- 
vailing at the moment without verifying it, almost all the authorities agree in 
recognizing that the pillaging during the days that followed the fall of the town 
was due to the Greeks themselves — to some extent also to the Jews and Arme- 
nians, but mainly to the Greeks, — who simply fell upon the undefended property 
of the Turks. The quotations made above from P. C.'s journal foreshadow this 
truth, which is fully corroborated and removed from the region of doubt by the 
body of evidence collected by the Commission. 

Pillage had begun in Adrianople before the Bulgarian troops entered the 
town, and continued until the occupation and the installation of the army was an 


accomplished fact. Innumerable scenes have been described by eye witnesses. 
A considerable number. — which could be indefinitely increased, — will be found 
in the Appendix. 

Even during the entry by the Bulgarian soldiers the streets were occupied 
by the indigenous mob, which pillaged all the Turkish public buildings, beginning 
with the military clubs, and attacked private houses, beginning with the va- 
cant abodes of the Turkish officers. Patrols were hastily sent out, who lost 
themselves in the labyrinth of streets, and the people were instructed to 
whistle for their aid. However, the mass of the Turks feared reprisals on the 
part of the Greeks. The patrols wandered hither and thither punishing a few 
malefactors to the cries of "Aferim" (Bravo!) from the Turks. But the Turks 
themselves told Mr. Mitov, who described the scenes to us, "you can not be every- 
where at once." And so the pillaging went on. 

An official (whose name we are not permitted to disclose) went through the 
streets on the second day of the occupation. Djouma-bey, the Secretary of the 
Vali, pointed out crowds of men and women on every side, carrying off the 
goods they had stolen. Going into the Hotel de Ville, he asked for a patrol and 
went out with Major Mitov. Everywhere the same sight met their eyes. A 
perpetual stream of women, making off with their plunder. He threatened them 
with his stick. Mr. Mitov pointed his revolver. The women made off, dropping 
their bundles ; then, as the authorities passed on they saw the same women coming 
back and picking up their booty. They arrived at the mosque, where the popu- 
lace had stored its household goods. Standing at the door the Bulgarian officer 
ordered the pillage to stop and the pillagers to go out one by one. As they 
passed out they were hit with the stick and the butt end of the revolver. The 
women, however, would not let go ; in spite .of the bastinado to which they were 
treated they stuck to their thefts. There were too many of them, both men and 
women, to be taken up and punished, and they took advantage of this accident 
of superior strength. 

By the third day the patrols were regularly established; order began to be 
restored. Nevertheless pillage and robbery went on, though under new forms 
suited to the new conditions. Sometimes the thieves dressed themselves up as 
soldiers and having obtained entrance to a house in the guise of a patrol, plun- 
dered at their ease. It was at this point that: the Bulgarian soldiers in their turn 
began to follow suit, or rather to cooperate with the rest in a new kind of 
division of labor. There is evidence to show that the patrols worked to protect — 
the thieves, on condition that they might share in their booty. Major Mitov 
himself admitted that the soldiers had, to his knowledge, often been induced by 
their Greek hosts to take part in pillage, every possible means of persuasion 
being tried as inducement. 

Here again the authorities have simply had to admit their powerlessness. 
The member of the Commission responsible for the inquiry was told that a 


captive soldier "pomak" (i. e., a Bulgarian Mussulman), well known in one of 
the consulates, was given a written permit to go about as a "free prisoner"; but 
on attempting to make use of his permit, he was robbed in the streets by the 
regulars, who stripped him of everything down to his boots. He returned to 
the consulate barefoot and a complaint was sent in to Commander Grantcharov. 
All he could do however was to renew the poor devil's permit and give him a 
medjide (4- l / 2 francs) out of his own pocket, to buy shoes. 

Pillage even went on at the Bulgarian consulate in Adrianople. The consul, 
Mr. Kojoukharov, on returning thither from Kirk Kilisse, whence he had been 
transferred, found his trunks had been emptied. Mr. Chopov, chief of police in 
Adrianople, told us that he was unwilling to make inquiry into Mr. Kojoukharov's 
case, because he was a Bulgarian. On the other hand, Mr. Vasov told us that he 
refused to make domiciliary investigations, "to avoid disturbing the people," and 
perhaps also to avoid creating new opportunities for pillage. Such investiga- 
tions were made, however, — and Mr. Vasov mentioned them himself, — in search 
of soldiers in hiding and disguise. 

Moreover, complaints and requests for inquiries poured in from the pillaged 
people, especially from the Turks, to the number of two or three hundred a day, 
according to Mr. Mitov. Thereupon domiciliary investigations were instituted, 
with excellent results in many cases. A quantity of goods stolen from the Turks 
were discovered in the houses of the Greeks and handed back to their owners. 
The chief of police opened a depot in the Hotel de Ville for goods of doubtful 
origin and unknown ownership; and Mr. Chopov told the Commission that the 
stolen goods were brought in by the cart load. Certificates were then issued by 
the municipality stating that ownership of the goods had been acquired not by 
theft but by purchase. Mr. Mitov explained to the Commission that this became 
an ingenious and novel method of claiming ownership of certain goods which 
had in fact been bought, but at a very low price, by Jews and Greeks. 

Domiciliary investigations of course furnished their own crop of abuses. 
Here again, however, Greek complaints can not always be taken as expressing 
the truth, and nothing but the truth, as is suggested by one case cited by Mr. 
Machkov. In his report he says : "Soldiers, armed with muskets, carried off* 
a quantity of jewelry and precious antiques from two Greeks, the brothers 
Alexandre and Jean Thalassinos ; they wrenched rings and bracelets from the 
hands of their sister." 

A great deal has been said about the pillage of the carpets and library of 
the celebrated mosque of Sultan Selim. The evidence collected by the Com- 
mission enables us to settle this point. That the Bulgarian authorities, as soon 
as circumstances permitted, took every reasonable precaution for safeguarding 
the mosque is clear. It is however not true, nor did the interested parties ever 
try to spread the belief, that the mosque was not pillaged at all. In the first 
confusion the fine building served as a place of refuge and was filled by the 



wretched furniture of the poor Mussulman families who sought an asylum there. 
Mr. Mitov told us how these Mussulmen took their domestic utensils and their 
rags with them when they left. Mr. Chopov added that the carpets of the 
mosque were not injured and the representative of the military governor of 
Adrianople who was attached to the member of the Commission responsible for 
the inquiry certainly made no complaints on the score of this alleged vandalism. 

Fig. 15. — Mosque of Sultan Selim 
A Cupola of the Dome Rent by an Explosive Shell 

The case of the library is different. During an entire day it was at the 
mercy of the populace, thanks to the existence of a private entry overlooked by 
Mr. Mitov at his first visit. On returning to the mosque in the course of the 
next day he perceived clear traces of pillage. Books were lying on the floor; 
some had been torn from their bindings ; everything believed to have been of 
value had evidently been removed. In Adrianople and in Sofia it is said that 
foreign orientalists, enlightened connoisseurs, were happily inspired to save pre- 
cious manuscripts and rare volumes by buying them at their own expense. If 
the happy possessors, now that all danger of destruction is over, restore its prop- 
erty to the mosque, this action will have been admirable. The evidence of 
Baroness Yxcoull shows that order was restored in the mosque, as in the town 
of Adrianople, from the third day of the occupation. 



Let us now, leaving on one side other characteristic incidents, which could 
be multiplied ad infinitum, consider the general criticism passed on the Bulgarian 
administration, during the four months of the occupation, — March 13/26 to July 
9/22. That the general impression on the part of the inhabitants of Adrianople 
today is decidedly unfavorable to the subjects of King Ferdinand is undeniable. 
Those representing Bulgarian authority have thus ample opportunity of esti- 
mating at their true value the official expressions of gratitude which were ex- 
tended to them on behalf of the heterogeneous population of the town. The 
Turks are only too glad to pass once more under the sway of their national 
government. Both interest and patriotism have always made the Greeks hostile 
to the Bulgarians. 

The testimony of foreigners is mixed. Mr. Klimenko, head of the Russian 
consulate during the siege, authorizes us to state in his name that up to his 
departure from Adrianople on April 7, he had no complaint to make of the 
Bulgarian regime. The judgment of the brothers of the Assumption, and to 
some extent of the Armenians, is equally favorable. The documents annexed to 
this volume contain a list, supplied by the authorities themselves, of the measures 
taken by the Bulgarian authorities to restore order and satisfy the various nation- 
alities concerned. On the other hand, Mr. Gustave Cirilli, in his Diary of the 
Siege, speaks of the Bulgarian administration as creating "an irresistible tide of 
distrust or aversion" ; due, according to him, "not so much to vexatious exactions 
which alienated the sympathies of the inhabitants," as to the extravagant nation- 
alism of the Bulgarians, their efforts to impose their religious observances and 
language. At the same time Mr. Cirilli does justice to the administration of 
the last commander, Mr. Veltchev, of whom Mr. Machkov speaks so ill, describing 
his system as "the hand of iron in the velvet glove." 

The Commission's competence was, of course, limited to a record of the 
externals of the regime. It is well known that the municipality retained its 
powers under the Bulgarian domination and that a majority on the council 
belonged to the nationalities (three Bulgarians, three Greeks, three Turks, two 
Jews, one Armenian). The Turks were better disposed than the other nation- 
alities to a Bulgarian administration which saved them from pillage, and fre- 
quently passed official votes of approval upon it. The Greeks, on the other 
hand, did not conceal their hostility. Amusing stories are told of meetings 
between Mr. Polycarpe, the Greek Metropolitan, and representatives of the 
Bulgarian power, the former being visibly torn between deference due to con- 
stituted authority and inward revolt. The most exaggerated statements about 
the misconduct of the Bulgarians emanate from Greek sources. The meas- 
ures taken by General Veltchev are the natural result of the temper of bold 
bravado which again took possession of the conquered or hostile peoples at the 
close of the occupation period. Mr. Bogoyev indeed told us (see Appendix G, 5) 


that Mr. Veltchev called the Turkish and Greek notables together and stated that 
he should hold the Greek Metropolitan specifically responsible in the event of any 
rebellion of the "Young" Greeks. The events described above on the ^Egean 
coasts justified only too fully the Bulgarians' suspicions of the Bishop of Adria- 
nople as the center of the patriotic Hellenic agitation directed to the recovery of 
Thracian autonomy. 

In the irritation produced by national conflict, reinforced by the "vexatious 
exactions" to which the natives were subjected, lies the explanation of their 
verdict on the Bulgarian regime in Adrianople. Wholesale and retail merchants 
were thoroughly displeased with the new organization of the wagons employed 
for importing goods as well as with the maximum prices of commodities fixed by 
the Bulgarian authorities. The highly interesting explanations of Mr. Lambrev, 
apropos of Greek accusations on this head, will be found in the Appendix. They 
describe a most interesting social experiment whose aim was to harmonize mid- 
dlemen's profits with the legitimate needs of the population. 

Complaints also came from the owners of houses occupied by Bulgarian 
officers. Comparisons between Bulgarian and Servian officers are generally dis- 
advantageous to the former. Even friends of the Bulgars admit that, as far as 
externals go, the Servians had "a more distinguished appearance" and that their 
bearing made a favorable impression, in contrast to Bulgarian "arrogance." 
Obviously, therefore, the Servian officer was, generally speaking, preferred as an 
inmate to his colleague. All the same it is also probable that, in the troublous 
days, many people were glad enough to have a Bulgarian officer in the house to 
keep off the blows of the mob and the dubious protection of the patrols. To 
this the Greek notables apparently afforded an exception, however; in certain 
cases they met the demands of the billeting committee with a blank refusal; 1 
and it was sometimes necessary to use compulsion against them. For example, 
no suitable lodging being forthcoming for General Kessaptchiev, he was obliged, 
on his return from Salonica, to put up at the Hotel du Commerce. 

It can hardly be denied that there were cases when departing officers, — and 
not only Bulgarian officers, — did take with them certain "souvenirs" of the 
houses in which they had dwelt. It is, however, a gross exaggeration to speak 
of "train loads of pseudo war booty" being sent to Sofia. Mr. Chopov himself 
has explained the "Chopov case" (see Appendix G, 6) and his explanation could be 
confirmed, if needful, by the evidence from Turkish merchants. There has been 
a certain amount of talk about the story of Rodrigues, an Austrian subject, and 
it is said that the Bulgarian authorities have promised the Inquiry Commission 
to assign responsibility, and refund the loss. Laces, ribbons and even ladies' 
dancing slippers are said to have been carried off from a house in Adrianople, 
the residence of Nissim-Ben-Sousam. 

1 The members of the Committee were Fouad-bey, the Mayor (a Greek doctor named 
Courtidis), an Armenian and a Jew. 


A Sofia paper, the Dnevnik, reported the naive admissions of Mr. Nikov, a 
Bulgarian officer and another devotee of oriental knick-knacks. In the early 
days of the occupation, he saw an old Greek woman carrying a seat of exquisite 
workmanship, adorned with carvings in oriental taste. All the trouble and priva- 
tion he had had to undergo in the long months of the siege, in the muddy 
trenches, came to his mind and strengthened his conviction that he had a right 
to the precious piece of furniture. So, instead of conveying it to the depot 
opened by Mr. Chopov, he took it from the old woman, whose right to it was the 
same as his own. These officers came and gave evidence before the Commis- 
sion or made public confession. There must, however, be others who refrained 
from appearing or saying anything. The carpets of the mosque of Sultan Selim 
were not touched and Mr. Chopov bought his fairly and squarely. But a member 
of the Commission was told that there was a time when the price of carpets fell 
markedly low, and admirable "windfalls" were secured in Sofia. 

Again, sums of money are said to have been extorted for the liberation of 
captured individuals. Mr. Chopov, for instance, speaks of the case of the 
Vali Habil, whose freedom is said to have been obtained by these means. The 
Greeks in Adrianople say that he paid the huge ransom of £T40,000. Such a 
scandalous transaction, had it really taken place, could not have passed unnoted; 
the story must be added to the legends circulated by the Greeks. At the same 
time the Commission would not venture to affirm that there were no abuses 
of this character, on a more modest scale. Tales are told in Adrianople of one 
Hadji-Selim, tobacco merchant and leader of a band, who was finally executed 
but whom, previous to his execution, they tried to compel to sign a cheque for 
f T 1.000 to his credit as a deposit in the National Bank of Bulgaria. Hadji-Selim 
is said to have signed but to have repudiated his signature in prison on the eve 
of execution, in the presence of the public prosecutor, the director of the Otto- 
man Bank who had had the cheque presented to him, his assistant and some 

These incidents, of interest to the moralist in the tangle they present of 
human weakness and honest effort, conscientious performance of duty and the 
crimes that follow in the conqueror's train, may be left to the judgment of the 
reader: a judgment that must allow for the exceptional circumstances of a great 
city in a state of siege. There could be no question, at this stage, of the normal 
administration established later on when the Turks returned as a "tertius gem- 
dens'' when war broke out again after the disagreement between the allies and 
the violation of the first conventions. We have only now to report the events 
of the last period of Bulgarian occupation. 


On July 6/19, the administrative officials in Adrianople received orders to 
return to Bulgaria. The telegram arrived at 11.30 at night; the public knew 


nothing of it. At midnight the Rechadie Gardens were still full of people, the 
inevitable cinematograph films passing before the idlers' eyes. The departure 
of the Bulgarians was sudden. That is why they left their cannon, their store 
of ammunition and their supplies behind them; why also the accusations of 
pillage and outrage made against them fall away, since the very conditions of 
their departure made them impossible. In their haste they even forgot to remove 
the sentinels stationed at the doors of some protected houses. Bulgarian mer- 
chants complained bitterly of the secrecy with which the move was carried out 
by the authorities. It did indeed take everybody by surprise. 

The authorities left Adrianople on the night of July 6-7 (19-20). The 
Turks however did not arrive. In the city itself Major Morfov, with his seventy 
gendarmes, and Commandant Manov, represented law and order, but there were 
no regular authorities at the station or in the Karagatch quarter, and here de- 
plorable incidents took place. On July 7, some eight military trains left the 
Karagatch station; by the time the last train but one departed the marauders 
were already at work and had to be fired at from the carriage roofs. A fire 
broke out in the depots, started, say the Greek witnesses, by a detachment of 
Bulgarian infantry on its way from the south towards Mustapha Pasha. Some 
of these same soldiers told the brothers of the Assumption that the depots had 
been fired by peasants, the Bulgarian army being beyond the station and the 
depots at that time. According to their statement the soldiers only set fire to the 
barracks, which was also used as an arsenal. Anyhow, there is no doubt that 
pillaging began under the eyes of the Bulgarians as they got on board the trains ; 
that the pillagers were peasants from Karagatch and the adjoining districts, 
Tcheurek-Keui and Dolou-djaros; that the soldiers tried to fire on them but the 
departure of the trains" left them free to continue their pillaging. The peasants 
then armed the Turkish prisoners working on the railway — the same, evidently, 
of whom Mr. Bogoyev speaks. During the evening of July 7/20, the inhabitants 
of Karagatch laid in stores of petrol, meal, etc., taken from the depots. 

Time went on and the Turks did not appear. The Bulgarians accordingly 
returned on the morning of Monday, July 8/21. They began by disarming the 
Turkish prisoners. The scene described by Mr. Bogoyev, when the Bulgarians 
fired on. the prisoners and slew at least ten of them, must have occurred at this 
stage. According to the explanation given at the time by the Bulgarian officer 
holding the station, the prisoners tried to take flight in the belief that the Turkish 
army was already in Adrianople. When the Bulgarians asked where the 
Turkish prisoners could have got arms, they were informed that these were 
supplied by the population. From that time on the Bulgarians watched the 
inhabitants of Karagatch vigilantly. Their houses were visited and they were 
ordered to hand over whatever had been taken by anybody from the depots 
within a certain time (up to 3 o'clock in the afternoon), after which requisition 
would be made by force and punishment made. 


Towards evening domiciliary visitations were in fact instituted. It is not 
quite clear how the forty-five persons arrested were selected. One of them, the 
sole survivor, Pandeli (Panteleimon), declared that it was his twelve-year-old 
son who had taken some meal from the depot; he, the father, had restored 
the booty, as was ordered, the original order having been that the goods restored 
should be deposited in the streets, but after that he and his comrades in mis- 
fortune had been detained to carry the sacks to the station. Pandeli described 
what followed in detail and his story, tested by the Commissioner making the 
report by comparison with two other witnesses, one grecophil, the other bulgaro- 
phil, is here reproduced. He said: 

In the evening (July 8/21) the wretched creatures were bound to- 
gether in fours by their belts and conducted along the Marache road by an 
escort of sixty soldiers. Their money and watches were taken from them 
before they were bound. They were told that they were being taken to 
Bulgaria, but when the soldiers got near the bridge across the Arda, someone 
shouted, "Run quickly, the train is coming!" They crossed the bridge and 
reached the opposite bank. There they were placed in line, their faces to 
the river, and pushed into the water. A horrible scene followed. While 
•the poor devils floundered about the soldiers fired on any whose heads 
appeared above the water. Pandeli owed his life to a desperate movement. 
As he fell into the water he broke with an effort the belt fastening him to 
his companions. In the water, alone and free, he began to swim, raising 
his head from time to time. The shots directed at him luckily did not hit him. 
He then pretended to be dead, and lying on his back, allowed the current 
to carry him along. For some time he lost consciousness, then found himself 
stopped by a tree. He crawled up the wooded bank on all fours. A coach- 
man seeing him fled, terrified by his looks. During the night he made his 
way back to the Hildyrym quarter and went to the house of his apprentice. 
(Pandeli is a carpenter in the Karagatch steam mills.) 

The photograph (p. 122) shows the corpses of some of the forty- four vic- 
tims who were fished out of the river some days later. The miserable episode 
did not come under the cognizance of the responsible Bulgarian authorities, but 
there can be no doubt of its truth. The panic and excitement of the final 
moments of departure can not be held to exonerate those guilty of it. The 
member of the Commission who made inquiry on the spot, learned from the 
brothers of the Assumption that other persons were arrested for acts of pillage, 
but they were left as they arrived at the station, people shouting to the escorting 
soldiers from the carriages of the last train: "Hurry up, the train is going." 
This happened at three o'clock in the morning on July 9. 

The departure of the Bulgarians was then a hurried one. It follows that 
it is false to urge that "the Bulgarians, knowing that the Turks were going to 
return, had made every preparation for the final massacre"; that "they were 
going to massacre the Mussulmen, while the Armenians, whom they had care- 
fully armed, were to be compelled to exterminate the Greeks." The Bulgarians 





made no preparations for their own departure, and the "nightmares" spoken of 
in the quotation from Mr. Pierre Loti's article in L } Illustration, never had any 
existence save in the lively imagination of the Greek population which had been 
heated by agitators. The dramatic picture of the "last night," as described by 
the eminent French author, thus betrays but too distinctly the sources from 
which it was drawn. Take one more detail in the same article. Mr. Loti speaks 
of a young Turkish officer, Rechid-bey, son of Fouad, "captured" by the Bul- 
garians in a final skirmish on the retreat. "They (the Bulgarians) tore out 
his two eyeballs," says our author, "cut off his two arms and then disappeared. 
This was their last crime." Assuredly Rechid's death did produce a profound 
impression in the Turkish army, where he had many friends. The Commis- 
sion's investigator was shown the monument set up to his memory and recently 
consecrated on the Mustapha Pasha road. But as a matter of fact the Turks 
showed more equity than their admirer. When the investigator went to the 
office of the Tanine at Constantinople to verify the facts, he was told by the 
paper's special correspondent in Adrianople that in the affray Rechid had re- 
ceived a mortal wound from which death followed instantaneously. The mutila- 
tion was but too real; the torture, however, an absolute invention. Even at 
Adrianople people talked of Rechid's dismembered ears and hands — his hands 
being beautiful — but no one ever spoke of his eyes being put out. 

The account given above of affairs in Adrianople is far from exhausting 
the evidence collected by the Commission. The curious reader may find fuller 
particulars in the Appendix, where he can read the documents in proof of what 
we say. Unfortunately the major portion of the depositions taken at Adrianople 
itself can not be published or reported in detail since they were given confiden- 
tially. But the reader will readily understand that it is those very depositions, 
collected on the spot, which corroborate and support those used by the Com- 
mission in this report. 

2. Thrace 

In order to gain a personal idea of events in Thrace in the course of the two 
wars, a member of the Commission went to see the villages situated to the east 
of Adrianople. He visited the villages of Havsa, Osmanly, Has-Keui, Souyoutli 
and Iskender-Keui. The first of these had been visited by Mr. Pierre Loti, who 
gave a description of it in L 1 Illustration. Unfortunately while describing the 
Bulgarian atrocities in this mixed village, Mr. Loti has not been informed that 
two steps off, at Osmanly, there was a Bulgarian village where the Turks had 
taken their revenge. 

Havsa is composed of two quarters, the Mussulman and the Christian. 
The Christians here call themselves "Greeks" but they are Bulgarian patriarch- 
ists. Their quarter was not burned. The whole population remained there. 
The Turkish quarter, on the other hand, was almost entirely burned. The 
Turkish population fled the village on the Bulgarians' approach, that is to say 


at the beginning of the first war. These Turks took refuge in Constantinople 
and in Asia Minor. They are now beginning to come back ; fifty or sixty families 
have arrived from Brousse, the Dardanelles and Akcheir. One might have 
thought that* everyone had gone; there could have been no one left to suffer 
atrocities. Unhappily there were some exceptions. Rachid, an aged inhabitant 
of the village, told what follows to a member of the Commission. Four Turkish 
families had been unwilling to take flight. They remained. The names of the 
heads of these families were Moustafa, Sadyk, Achmed Kodja, and a fourth 
whose name has escaped us. These families were slain by the Bulgarians, who 
also put to death Basile Papasoglou, Avdji, Christo, Lember-Oghlu and Anas- 
tasius. All the women were outraged, but it is not true, as Mr. Loti asserts, that 
they were killed. Only one woman, Aicha, was killed; and the wife of Sadyk, 
who was among the slain, went out of her mind. 

In the village there were two mosques. One of the mosques was turned 
into an ammunition depot. Another, described by Mr. Loti, was really seriously 
damaged. The member of the Commission found traces of blood on the floor. 
The rubrics from the Koran in the interior were in part spoiled, the Moaphil 
place destroyed, the marble member half broken, the pillars smashed. The 
dung seen by Mr. Loti in the minaret had gone, but some traces of it remained. 
A hole made in the cupola enabled one to get above the higher portion of the 
ceiling; a hole had been made in the middle of the ceiling and Rachid stated to 
the member of the Commission that from here, too, dung was spread on the 
floor below. The sacrilegious intention was even more clearly visible in the way 
in which the cemetery was treated. "All" the headstones were not broken, as 
Mr. Loti states, but some of them were. It is likewise true that one of the 
graves is open. In the bottom of the trench the member of the Commission 
found the remains of a brandy bottle; relic of a joyous revel! Justice compels 
the further remark, that the authors of this infamous deed are unknown, and that 
there are grounds for attributing it to the people of the locality, rather than to 
the regulars. It was noted that the miscreants confined their attentions to recent 
headstones and graves, leaving the older ones. 

As has already been said, at a short distance from Havsa is Osmanly, a 
Bulgarian village, and there the Turks took their revenge, when they returned 
after the retreat of the Bulgarians. There were 114 Christian Bulgarian houses 
in the village. Not a single one was spared. The churches in the villages were 
burned and razed to the ground. The member of the Commission could see 
nothing but the outline of the precincts and the remains of the walls. Research 
in the interior recovered nothing but the debris of two chandeliers. The member 
of the Commission, investigating among the cinders, discovered some bits of half 
burned paper ; they were fragments of the Gospel and the Sunday office, in Greek 
characters (see p. 125). The population had fled to Adrianople and from the Bul- 
garian frontier, i. e., towards Our Pasha. The whole of the cattle had been lost. 
Some dozen villagers were, however, working at the harvest in the village. They 




explained to the member of the Commission that the oxen they were using 
belonged to Turks from other villages whose farmers they themselves were. 

The next village is Has-Keui, a repetition of Havsa. The Bulgarian quarter 
(here they are called "Greeks." and they sing in Greek at church) remained 
intact, but the cattle were carried off together with the produce of the harvest. 
Our traveling companion, a Turk, ventured the hypothesis that this might have 
been the work of bashi-bazouks. But a peasant who was present and spoke in 
Bulgarian to the member of the Commission, said distinctly that it was "askers" 
the regulars who had pillaged and taken everything without payment. Going on 
to the Mussulman quarter, we found it still in a state of devastation. Of fifty- 
five houses only twenty-five remained. This portion of the village was empty, 
and it was explained to the Commission that the men of the village had gone to 
Adrianople in search of their families. The refugees who had returned (some 
twenty-five or thirty families) had gone to dwell in the Christian quarter. 

Of the two mosques in the village, one had been entirely destroyed and 
razed level with the ground, and the school adjoining treated in the same way. 
The other mosque, which was converted into an ammunition depot, was also 
damaged, especially inside; several headstones in the cemetery have been broken 

The two Mussulman villages situated between Has-Keui and Adrianople, — 
Souyoutli-dere and Iskender-Keui, — underwent the same fate as the preceding 
ones. Of the eighty-seven houses in Souyoutli only eight or ten, with forty or 
fifty inhabitants, remain. The population had gone to Anatolia. Those who 
return dwell among the ruins, which they arrange as best they can to shelter 
them from sun and rain. They call these wretched habitations "colibi" (huts). 

Iskender-Keui suffered even more severely. Out of eighty houses but four 
or five remain. The population fled to Adrianople ; all have now returned. The 
few houses still standing owe their preservation to the fact that they were occu- 
pied by Bulgarians. The mosque and school of the village were razed level 
with the ground. 

The conclusion to be drawn from this description is, that as a matter of 
fact, at the outbreak of the first war the Bulgarians destroyed the Mussulman 
villages, that the population fled almost to a man, and that the national Mussul- 
man institutions, mosques and schools, suffered specially. Evidently these are 
not isolated or fortuitous events. They represent national tactics. Bulgarian 
officers have endeavored to explain this conduct to the Commission, pleading 
that the material of the houses was used to make winter cantonments for the 
army. Apart from the fact that such an explanation is equivalent to an avowal, 
it is inadequate to the extent of the devastation, and fails to meet the destruction 
of places of worship and schools. 

Coming now to July, the Bulgarians began to retreat while the Turks 
assumed the offensive. Thrace again became the theater of war. Enver-bey is 


accused with considerable unanimity of having sent Arabian and Kurdish cavalry 
ahead of his regular troops. These "Arabs" are often indicated, in the victim's 
stories, as being the authors of crimes. The Commission has collected a body 
of evidence to the effect that Turkish officers themselves sometimes warned 
those whom they were protecting of the approach of the "Arabs," and told them 
to be on their guard. An "Arab" soldier, a Catholic, actually admitted to one of 
his friends that the express orders of their captains were first to burn and 
ravage, then to kill all the males, next the women (here again all took flight) ; 
and that he had personally carried out the orders given him. We should not 
mention this story were it not that it comes from an excellent source, the name 
of the soldier being known to us, though we naturally refrain from giving 
it here. 

These remarks made and conclusions established, we may pass to another 
part of Thrace, in order to follow the advance of the Turkish offensive, in 
relation to alleged excesses. 

The member of the Commission had opportunity of free conversation with 
the Bulgarian refugees in Constantinople itself. They passed through Constan- 
tinople in groups. The Commission's member did not encounter the group of 
ninety persons from the villages of Tchanaktche, Tarf, Yeni-Tchiflik, Seimen 
and Sinekeli; nor the group of 190 from Baba-Eski and Lule-Bourgas. But 
the third group of sixty-two persons was still there. There were hardly any 
but old people, women and children. Most of them were refugees from the 
villages of Karagatch (130 houses), Koum-seid (twenty-eight houses), and 
Meselim (ten houses), peopled by Bulgarians whom the Turks had brought from 
the village of Bourgas. 

The following is the somewhat rambling story told to the Commission by 
an inhabitant of Koum-seid, who had reached Constantinople on the previous 
night, still haunted by recollected horrors : 

It was Wednesday the 3d (16th). It was night and the village slept. All 
at once the Turks arrived. * * * The women and children were in a 
frenzy. * * * They asked for money. They killed many people. Nico- 
las the shopkeeper (bakal) was killed, Stoyan Kantchev was killed and also 
his son, fifteen years old. Next came the turn of Demetrius Stoyanov, 
Saranda Medeltchev, Demetrius Gheorgiev, Petro Stoyanov, Heli Athanasov 
and his brother, Cone Athanasov (these are his children) ; next Nicolas 
Gheorghiev, his wife and his twelve year old son; Demetrius Daoudjiski. 
Demetrius Christov, Christo Dimitrov — 120 persons were gathered together 
in a single house ; the Arabs arrived and asked them "Who are you ?" and 
they replied "We are Greeks." Thereupon they were asked for money. 
Everything was taken. Their pockets were searched. On the cries of the 
victims the cavalry came up. They did not touch the people ; it was the 
"Arabs" who attacked them. The attack on the village did not last 
more than fifteen minutes. Then the Turks went away in the direction of 
Lule-Bourgas. * * * However, the next day more "Arabs" arrived. * * * 


As the Commission left Constantinople, they met everywhere in Thrace the 
traces of this Arab cavalry, following on local reprisals and hatreds, and the 
excesses of the bashi-bazouks who took advantage of the anarchy inevitable 
in transition from one regime to another. 

Unhappily time did not allow the Commission to visit the places which bore 
the first brunt of the rage of the Turkish army when it resumed the offensive ; 
but the evidence collected by them at Constantinople and in Bulgaria, when 
collated with the reports of special Armenian delegations and some well authen- 
ticated documents emanating from a fresh official source, may supply the defect 
of personal observation. It seems that at the moment of crossing the frontier, 
which had appeared for some months so definitively established by the Bulgarian 
conquest, two sentiments ruled in the Turkish army and population. There was 
vengeance on those of their Christian subjects who had joined friendship with 
the Bulgarian invaders in the first instance, and then with the Armenians. The 
Greeks, although they too had suffered at the hands of the Turks, were rather 
on their side. They too profited by Turkey's recovery to wipe out the traces 
of Bulgarian domination and reestablish their own national pretensions. They 
therefore hailed the Turks' return and often served them as guides and spies. 
The second feeling, natural enough in the Moslem population returning with the 
army to deserted villages, was to recover their goods and take them away from 
their new owners. 

At Rodosto, retaken July 1/14, by 200 volunteers who arrived on board an 
Ottoman gunboat, the first act of the reestablished Ottoman power was the fol- 
lowing proclamation to the Christian and Jewish population of the Sandjak: 

Anyone in possession of goods or arms belonging to the government 
or cattle or goods belonging to emigres in the local population, which have 
been appropriated during the Bulgarian occupation, is invited to come and 
restore them to the Special Commission sitting at Rodosto. Two days' 
delay are allowed, starting from today (July 5/18) for those who are in 
Rodosto, three days for those dwelling in the villages. After the lapse of 
this delay any one found with appropriated goods in his possession will be 
treated with all the rigor of the laws. 

But the volunteers and emigres returning home did not wait for the end of 
this nominal delay. The moment of their arrival they began pillaging and 
massacring the indigenous population. The volunteers had but just disembarked 
at Rodosto when they slew the Bulgarian commissary who handed the town 
over to them; they divided themselves into groups, with four or five bashi- 
bazouks at the head of each, and hastily organized pillage and massacre. They 
slew the Armenians whom they met in the market place, then the people being 
once shut up in their houses, ransacked the houses under pretext of searching 
for Bulgarian soldiers and officers there. The foreign consuls intervened; then 
the assailants turned their activities to the country outside the town, where no 


control could be exercised. The results were nineteen corpses buried in Rodosto 
and eighty-one victims disappeared and evidently slain in the fields. This last 
figure should be higher, — some put it at 300. The more well-to-do had to pay 
for their safety between twenty and sixty Turkish pounds a head. Money, 
jewels and watches disappeared. Even so they were well off, for at eight hours' 
distance from Rodosto, in Malgara, the catastrophe assumed much larger propor- 
tions. There the population was taken by surprise; there were no consuls. 
The heads of the Armenian community were arrested by the Governor at 
Rodosto. The Bulgarian police had just quitted the town, which for a day 
remained without any authorities or public force (July 1 and 2, old style). We 
can not here transcribe the eloquent story told by the Armenian delegation of 
what happened at Malgara in this state of anarchy. The reader will find it in 
the Appendix. But some points, common to the whole of this work of destruc- 
tion, may be mentioned. Here again the motive is the same as at Rodosto and 
everywhere else; the military commander of the place addresses the Armenian 
notables summoned before him, in these terms: — "Armenian traitors, you have 
in your possession arms and other objects stolen from the Moslems." A sub- 
lieutenant uses the other argument referred to : — "You other Armenians, you 
have largely assisted the Bulgarians, but today you shall have your reward." 
Such terms encouraged the population not to wait until legal measures were 
taken. On the second and third days of the occupation public criers in the 
Armenian quarters order "those who have stolen goods belonging to Moslems 
or who are in possession of arms, to give them up." On the fourth day an 
opportunity for beginning the attack presents itself. Two terrified Armenians, 
on being called on by the soldiers to show them the Ouzoun-Keupru road, run 
away instead of answering. The signal is given; the soldiers, the crowd, put 
lighted torches soaked in petrol to the houses of the culprits; and the burning 
of the Armenian quarter begins. At the same time pillage and massacre are 
going on in the market. Some Armenian soldiers stop the fire, but it breaks 
out again in the market and thanks to the strong wind assumes terrifying propor- 
tions. Explosions of barrels of benzine, alcohol, etc., are heard; the crowd 
takes them for hidden bombs. Finally the Kaimakam, the representative of civil 
authority, arrives at Malgara, accompanied by the captain of police and a police- 
man. Even by standing surety for their lives, he hardly succeeds in persuading 
the frantic Armenians to come out of their hiding places and organize a little 
band of some fifty to sixty young people who get the fire under. Results, in the 
town itself, to say nothing of the environs : twelve Armenians killed, ten wounded, 
eight disappeared, seven imprisoned, eighty-seven houses and 218 shops burned; 
a material loss amounting to £ TSOjOOO. 1 This time there was also an epilogue. 

x Le Jeune Turc of August 12 actually admits that 139 houses and 300 shops were 
burned at Malgara. It adds : "with the exception of two houses the entire village of 
Galliopa, consisting of 280 houses, was destroyed by fire; 299 houses were the prey of 
flames in eleven Christian villages, thirty-five persons were killed and nine wounded. 


An Ottoman commission of inquiry tries to cast the responsibility of the pillage 
and assassinations * * * on the Armenians themselves. 

The real massacre begins however when the Turkish army meets Bulgarians 
on its route, and the events described at Rodosto and Malgara fade before those 
which took place at Boulgar-Keui, "a Bulgarian village," as its name shows. 
Boulgar-Keu'i is, or rather was, a village of 420 houses some miles from the town 
of Kechane and not far from another village of 400 houses, Pichman-Keui, 
whose fate was similar. The information collected by the Commission as to 
these atrocious events comes from different sources and the evidence agrees in 
the smallest details. The refugees, women for the most part, scattered in all 
directions. They were found at Haskovo and Varna in Bulgaria, where two 
agents of the Balkan Relief Society questioned them and transmitted their depo- 
sitions to a member of the Commission, — depositions that though coming from 
places very far distant from each other are identical in terms. Another member 
of the Commission was able to meet in Constantinople a male survivor of the 
horrors of Boulgar-Keui and thus obtained possession of some unpublished Greek 
official documents which confirm and complete the oral depositions. From all 
these sources an absolute certainty emerges that the purpose was the complete 
extermination of the Bulgarian population by the military authorities in execu- 
tion of a systematic plan. 

These events recall those at Rodosto and Malgara, but the end is different. 
The Bulgarian peasants, like the populations of the towns referred to, had as a 
matter of fact appropriated the goods of the Turkish emigres, their coats, do- 
mestic utensils, cash, etc. The Turkish soldiers in their turn lay hands on what 
they can find; they demand money, they carry off clothes, they lead off the 
big cattle over the frontier to the village of Mavro. Thus a whole week passes, 
July 2-7. Soon, however, everything changes. The order is given to collect 
the whole male population at the bottom of the village to receive instructions. 
The witness spoken of above believed the order to be a lie and preferred remain- 
ing at home, thereby saving his life. Nearly 300 men appeared. They were 
all killed on the spot by a fusillade. Only three men escaped, one of them being 
wounded (John K. Kazakov). The depositions of the women complete the 
picture. At Haskovo they told the agents of the English Relief Committee that 
the Turks went from house to house seeking for male inhabitants over sixteen 
years of age. Two shepherds, Dimtre Todorov and George Matov, added that 
the Greeks helped the Turks to tie the Bulgarians' hands with cords. A young 
woman refugee at Varna described how her husband, father and two of her 
brothers were shot in front of their house. Another stated that at Haskovo 
she had seen the Greeks sprinkle her husband and some other men with petrol 
and then burn them. Other women at Varna confirmed this horrible story and 
added that the number of victims who perished in this way was twenty-three. 
A shepherd saw the same scene, hidden in a neighboring place of refuge. The 


women put the total number of men killed at Boulgar-Keui at 450 (out of 700). 
The Constantinople witness adds that all this was going on up to July 29 (old 
style) when he left the village. At the end of this period the Turks began 
sticking notices on the walls that there was to be no more killing. A portion of 
the population believed it and returned. But as the male population returned 
killing began again by twos, threes and fives. The people were led into a gorge 
and there shot down. The witness saw that at Pitch-Bonnar and at Sivri-Tepe : 
in the first place he saw as many as six corpses and recognized one of the six 
as the "deaf" Ghirdjik-Tliya. 

The methods employed with the women were different. They were out- 
raged, and Greeks, clad, according to the witnesses, in a sort of uniform, did 
the same as the Turks. In the villages of Pichman, Ouroun-Begle and Mavro, 
the Greeks were indeed the sole culprits, and they outraged more than 400 
women, going from one to another. Young men who tried to defend their 
betrothed were taken and shot. A woman of Haskovo described how her little 
child was thrown up into the air by a Turkish soldier who caught it on the point 
of his bayonet. Other women told how three young girls threw themselves into 
a well after their fiances were shot. At Varna about twenty women living 
together confirmed this story, and added that the Turkish soldiers went down 
into the well and dragged the girls out. Two of them were dead; the third had 
a broken leg; despite her agony she was outraged by two Turks. Other women 
of Varna saw the soldier who had transfixed the baby on his bayonet carrying 
it in triumph across the village. 

The outraged women felt shame at telling their misfortunes. But finally 
some of them gave evidence before the English agents. They said that the 
Greeks and Turks spared none from little girls of twelve up to an old woman 
of ninety. The young woman who saw her father, husband and brothers perish 
before their house was afterwards separated from her three children and out- 
raged by three Greeks. She never saw her children again. Another, Marie 
Teodorova, also saw her husband killed before her eyes, and then, dragged by 
the hair to another house, she was outraged by thirty Turks. Two of her three 
children were seriously wounded and one of them died at Varna. Sultana Bala- 
cheva is the old woman of ninety with wrinkled face, from the village of Pich- 
man, who was outraged by five Turks. 

Here are some extracts from secret Greek reports not intended for publica- 
tion which will serve to show that the same outrages repeated themselves in all 
the countries in which the Turks took the offensive: "Yesterday evening (July 
4/17) from the first hour of the night (i. e., sunset, alia Turca) to six o'clock, 
the Turkish population has invested the Greek village of Sildsi-Keu'i (Souldja- 
Keui to the northeast of Rodosto), set fire to it and massacred the whole village, 
women and children included, 200 families in all. The catastrophe was wit- 


nessed by so and so 1 * * * No one escaped." Isolated massacres of shep- 
herds and workers in the fields, during the same day, by Turkish soldiers and 
inhabitants, are also mentioned in the. villages of Simetli, Karasli (both southeast 
of Rodosto), Titidjik, Karadje-Mourate, Kayadjik, Akhmetikli, Omourdje and 
Mouratli. On the same day (July 4/17) Turkish soldiers killed at Kolibia near 
Malgara the hegoumenos (abbot) of the Monastery of Iveria, Eudocimus, the 
priest Panayote and some other persons. 

This was but the beginning. Since the population of the neighboring vil- 
lages fled to Kolibia the Turks "after killing in the interior of the church, burned 
all the families of the neighboring villages that had found refuge there" (report 
on July 9). In Has-Keui, another village near Malgara, the Turks burned "a 
considerable number of families." In the same village (report of July 12) the 
officer ordered the mouktar (head man of the village) to procure him three girls 
for the night, "otherwise you know what will happen to you," the officer added, 
showing his revolver. The mouktar refused and bade the officer kill him rather 
* * * Then "the men were shut up in the church * * * all the women 
were collected in a spacious barn and the soldiers banqueted for twenty-four 
hours, outraging all the women from eight to seventy-five years of age." The 
army took with it quantities of young girls from each village. At Kolibia a young 
girl, pursued by a soldier, fell from a window. While her body was still breath- 
ing the soldier assaulted her. 

The Greek report is at pains to add : "The ca'imacams demand that a decla- 
ration be signed to the effect that all these infamies * * * were committed 
by the Bulgarian army." The words explain why in the declarations published 
in August, 1913, in Le Jeune Turc, signed by Greeks and written in the name 
of the population, the accusations against the Bulgarians are so numerous. The 
object was in fact to clear the Ottoman troops of all the crimes committed. 2 

Let us add one more report of July 9 on the events at Ahir-Keui (Aior-Keui 
to the east of Visa) which proves that the same system was applied over the 
whole area of the territories again occupied by the Turkish army: "Yesterday 
evening, July 7, the police selected to guard the inhabitants of Ahir-Keui sepa- 

1 Since all these places have remained in possession of the Turks the necessity of 
concealing the names of the authors of the documents will be understood. 

2 For example, at Has-Keui where according to the authority cited there were "a con- 
siderable number of families" killed or burned by the Turks. The following is the declara- 
tion of the village notables presented to the ca'imacam of the Haivebolou casa : "We deny 
categorically the malicious insinuations made against the Ottoman army and in rebutting 
them protest against crimes such as incendiarism and assassination perpetrated by the 
Bulgarian army in our town at Has-Keui and at Aktchilar-Zatar at the time of the Bul- 
garian retreat from these places." Signed Triandaphilou and Yovanaki, members of the 
administrative council of the casa, Greek notables : Father Kiriaco, representing the metro«- 
politan, Dimitri, vicar of Has-Keui : Father Kiriaki, priest of Has-Keui : Polioyos, Greek 
commercial notability." See the Union July 24 which published in the same number a 
supplement entitled "Acts of Bulgarian Savagery in Thrace." The member of the Com- 
mission who visited another village of the same name, Has-Keui, near Adrianople, asked 
to see Constantinos, the priest of the village, who also signed a list equally long, of Bul- 
garian misdeeds there. (See Le Jeune Turc, Sept. 2.) The priest did not appear. 


rated men, women and children. All the men they beat pitilessly and wounded 
many with oxgoads ; outraged the young girls and women, giving themselves up 
to libertinism throughout the night." 

In this way this portion of Thrace was absolutely devastated. The Greek 
report of July 9 states that the Ottoman army "massacred, outraged and burned 
all the villages of the casas of Malgara and Airobol. Nine hundred and seventy 
families from the casa Malgara and 690 from the casa Airobol, i. e., a population 
of 15,960 persons, have been either killed or burned in the houses or scattered 
among the mountains." If this be regarded as an example of the exaggeration 
not uncommon in Greek sources, confirmation may be adduced from a Catholic 
paper. 1 "A commissionaire who came from Malgara and arrived yesterday, 
August 23, at Adrianople, assures us that the whole number of villages burned 
or wholly destroyed round Malgara is not less than forty-five. He stated that 
he smelt the intolerable stench of many corpses as he crossed the fields in the 
neighborhood of Kechane." A month after this deposition the member of the 
Commission who went to Constantinople heard there the story of a Greek, an 
English subject. About a thousand Bulgarians, men, women and children, were 
still wandering in the mountains, whither they had fled before the horrors 
described. But they were surrounded by Ottoman troops between Gallipoli and 
Kechane and exposed to every imaginable kind of suffering. The witness saw 
numbers of terrible scenes and took some photographs. Under his very eyes a 
Turk opened the stomach of a child of seven years and cut it to pieces. The 
witness is known in Constantinople, and it is extremely important that his photo- 
graphs should not be mislaid. We might still be ignorant of facts that have 
come to our knowledge; the whole of this persecuted population might have 
remained there, wandering among the mountains, awaiting the last stroke from 
the soldiers who surrounded them. Very luckily the Greeks made the mistake 
of taking these peasants for compatriots; they received permission from the 
authorities (who shared the error), to lead them to Lampsacus, at the other side 
of Gallipoli. Here the missions concerned themselves with their lot, and the 
Greeks sent a special steamer to bring them to Prinkipo. Only then did they 
discover that they were not Greeks but Bulgarians. They were thereupon driven 
out into the streets. Thanks to the intervention of the Russian Embassy and 
the aid of the Bulgarian exarchate they were reembarked and sent back to Bul- 
garia. Chief among them were women from Boulgar-Keu'i, 412 of whom were 
seen by the English at Varna, as their fellow villager reported when questioned 
at Constantinople by a member of the Commission. 

The space between the frontier ceded at London (Enos Midia), and the old 
Bulgarian frontier was traversed by the Turkish army in three weeks. The 
soldiers arrived with views deducible from the facts. An Arab Christian soldier 
of the Gallipoli army, of which we have spoken above, when asked why he had 

1 La Croix, August 24-25, 1913. 


taken part in these atrocities, forbidden by his religion, replied confidentially in 
Adrianople, "I did as the others did. It was dangerous to do otherwise. We 
had the order first to pillage and burn, then kill all the men." * * * 

Exceptions and distinctions were made however. There was a Bulgarian vil- 
lage, Derviche-Tepe, situated near two Turkish villages, one of which is called 
Khodjatli. When the Bulgarian army approached, during the first war, sixty 
Turks sought refuge with their Christian neighbors. They were given protec- 
tion and did not suffer from the passage of the Bulgarian soldiers. Among 
others there was a rich cattle merchant who related the following story at 
Constantinople : "When the Turks returned they had the order not to touch the 
village. They said to the peasants: Be not afraid of us, since you saved our 
people; we have a letter from Constantinople to leave you in peace." But the 
exception confirms the rule. There were also exceptions in the contrary sense, 
as the history of the village of Zalouf proves. Zalouf was peopled by Albanians, 
Greek in religion. The next village, Pavlo-Keu'i, was Bulgaro-Moslem (pomak). 
During the first war the Zaloufians pillaged Pavlo-Keui, and then thought of bap- 
tizing the Pavlo-Keuians. They called a Greek priest, Demetrius, and he con- 
verted the village. The Turks, on their return, not only killed Demetrius ; they 
razed the village to the ground. At the same time Aslane, the neighboring Chris- 
tian village, suffered comparatively little. At Zalouf, 560 persons were killed. On 
taking the offensive, the Turks transported their habits of pillage across the fron- 
tier. Among the villages destroyed in Bulgarian territory the Commission heard 
of Soudjak, Kroumovo, Vakouj, Lioubimits, etc. When according to the con- 
ditions of the treaty of peace, Mustapha Pasha had to be handed back to the 
Bulgarians, the Turks destroyed it completely, as is shown by the report of 
Mr. Alexander Kirov of October 19 (November 1), which is in the hands of 
the Commission. Mr. Kirov recounts that here too the return of the Turks 
during the second war was signalized by the massacre of the whole male popula- 
tion (eighteen persons). The old woman, who survived this appalling day, 
described how they killed them one by one amid the laughter and approving cries 
of the Moslem crowd. The headsman, a certain Karaghioze Ali, varied the 
mode of execution to amuse the mob. When a young man named Chopov asked 
to be killed more quickly, that he might not see such appalling scenes, Karaghioze 
Ali, smoking his cigarette, replied: "Be patient, my child; your turn is coming," 
and he killed him last. The old schoolmaster, Vaglarov, seventy years of age, 
was killed in the street, and throughout the day his head was carried by the beard 
from quarter to quarter. The mother of the writer of the report was killed on July 
13/26, and thrown down a well. In the courtyard a portion of her hair, torn 
off with the skin, and her bloodstained garments, were found. 

In Western Thrace traveling was impossible during the Commission's stay. 
Those places assigned to Bulgaria by the treaty of Bucharest, were inhabited 
equally by Greeks and Turks. After the departure of the Bulgarian army on 


July 9 and 10 (July 22 and 23), the country was occupied by the Greek army 
and the population little disturbed, ''probably thanks to the nomination of a 
European Commission of Inquiry" (i. e., the Carnegie Commission), in the view 
of a Bulgarian journal, Izgrcve. After its departure, however, September 6/19 y 
up to the time of the definitive arrival of the Bulgarian army, the population was 
entirely in the power of the republican militia, i. e., of the Greek andartes and 
Moslem bashi-bazouks, grouped by the priests, schoolmasters and secretaries of 
the Greek metropolitans (bishops). The Bulgarian population, expecting no 
good at the hands of this militia, was panic struck and threw themselves on all 
sides into Dede-Agatch, where there were still some Greek regulars. But the 
military authorities did not permit them to enter the town, and the crowd of 
15,000 refugees were stationed a quarter of an hour's distance off, in the Bulga- 
rian quarter and barracks. On September 19, the last Greek troops left Dede- 
Agatch with the steamer, and the Greek Metropolitan advised the Moslem volun- 
teers of their departure. This is why the refugees, with the exception of about 
a hundred, had no time to seek shelter in the town. They were discovered by the 
bashi-bazouks "of the militia, and led to Tere and Ipsala like flocks of sheep." 
They passed the night at Ouroumdjik, where their money was taken from them 
and the schoolmaster from Kai'viakov, with his wife from Baly-Keui, were mas- 
sacred. On the morning of September 23, they met upon their way a company 
of Bulgarian volunteers, who delivered the larger part of the refugees from the 
bashi-bazouks. But during the retreat, the bashi-bazouks succeeded in mas- 
sacring about one hundred women and children who had remained behind with 
the baggage, and they took away 100-150 women and children. The rest took the 
road for Bulgaria with their liberators. But on the morrow, September 24, 
there was another encounter with the bashi-bazouks, near the village of Pick- 
man-Keui. In this encounter 500 were slain and 200 women and children made 
prisoners. Newcomers had raised the total to 8,000. At the river Arda 
new slaughter awaited them. After the crossing they counted again and were 
but 7,200." 

The lot of those who remained at Dede-Agatch was no better. A public 
crier shouted on several successive days the orders for the Bulgarians to quit the 
town; recalcitrants and those harboring them, to be punished like dogs. The 
frightened Greeks filled several wagons with Bulgarians and sent them to Bul- 
garia. On their way they saw two wagons full of Bulgarian women and children 
at the station at Bitikili, and two other wagons at the station at Sofrli. The 
number of Bulgarian villages burned in Western Thrace amounts to twenty-two 
and the massacred population to many thousands. 

3. The Theater of the Servian-Bulgarian War 

In the Appendix will be found a selection of the documents on which this 
part of the report is based. In Servia, of course the Commission was not 


accepted by the government and it was therefore compelled to rely on its own 
resources to prove the Servian thesis of the "Bulgarian atrocities." Nevertheless 
the documents contained in the English translation are official: the Commission 
obtained them by purchase from an intermediary. 1 If the conclusion were allow- 
able that, enough having been done to satisfy public opinion, the Servian Govern- 
ment was not displeased in at least allowing information to reach us, the 
Committee would rejoice thereat while regretting the attitude which Mr. Pachitch 
found it necessary to adopt in regard to the Commission. In the documents, we 
have kept whatever seemed to be first-hand information, what seemed to us 
trustworthy and contained no glaring exaggeration. It will be seen that the 
documents become the more convincing in consequence. They are, for the most 
part, official reports sent by the head of the General Staff of the different armies 
to the General Staff at Uskub, in response to an order from the latter dated 
June 20/ July 3, No. 7669. ("In accordance with the order of the General Staff 
No. 7669 of the 20th inst," a phrase appearing at the head of many of the 
documents which we have omitted, in abridging them for publication.) Thus at 
the beginning of the war the Servian government took the steps necessary to 
secure that no single instance of "atrocities" committed by the Bulgarian soldiery 
should remain unknown to international public opinion. Unluckily for itself the 
Bulgarian government took no general step of an analogous kind, so that our data 
as to crimes of this order are necessarily incomplete. 

By way of compensation we have, on the Bulgarian side, information of 
another kind presented spontaneously, so to speak, and recorded on his private 
initiative by Professor Miletits, in the depositions of eye witnesses of the destruc- 
tion of Bulgarian villages during the Servian offensive. The refugees from the 
villages concerned were interrogated when they crossed the border, at Kustendil, 
on the state of things they had left behind them. We publish these among those 
depositions which refer to villages situated along the conventional boundary of 
the rivers Zletovska, Bregalnitsa and Lakavitsa, i. e., the boundary agreed upon 
by the two armies before the opening of hostilities. In the originals (trans- 
mitted to us in a French translation) the names of the witnesses, — eye witnesses 
in every case, — are given. Since the territories in question are actually Servian 
and the population has in part returned thither, we have thought it more prudent 
not to publish the names. 

Concerning the regions round the old Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, the Com- 
mission has in its possession documents of two kinds. On the Servian side, since 
the Commission was unable to carry out their intention of going to Knjazevac 

1 We have not seen the book announced by the Serbische Correspondent of November 
28/December 11, which appeared in Belgrade (publication of the Servian Journalisten 
Verein) in English on the "Bulgarian atrocities," but the summary of the contents does 
not speak of official documents, which constitute the most important and only authentic 
source; and some of the photographs mentioned also appeared in a recent book by Mr. de 
Penennrnn, "Quarante. jours de guerre!' 


they had to be content with the receipt of the documents here published. On 
the Bulgarian side, the Commission actually visited the neighborhood of Vidine, 
which had suffered Servian invasion. 

Examining first the country which ultimately became the theater of the war, 
the regions situated near the ancient Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, the Commission 
admits that the two reports published on the ravages produced by the Bulgarian 
invasion at Knjazevac, — the Servian, official report and the Russian report, are 
entirely convincing. In Mr. de Penennrun's book (p. 292) there is a photograph 
showing the room of a Servian doctor pillaged by the Bulgarians in the neighbor- 
hood of Knjazevac. Comparing this with the descriptions given by the prefect of 
the Timok department, Mr. Popovits (see Appendix H, 3), the accuracy of the 
latter is striking. Yet the first impression of the Russian witness, Mr. Kapous- 
tine, on arriving at Knjazevac, was that of being in a town in its normal con- 
dition; and Mr. Popovits confirms this when he says that only isolated houses 
and shops were burned; twenty-six belonging to twenty owners. When how- 
ever the houses and shops which appeared in a good state of preservation were 
entered, there is unanimous agreement (Mr. Popovits visited fifty and Mr. 
Kapoustine 100) in the sad admission of complete destruction. "It is not a case 
of mere pillage," says Mr. Kapoustine, "it is something worse; something stupe- 
fying." "One was absolutely dumbfounded," Mr. Popovits adds, "by the reflec- 
tion that all that could have been done in so short a time, when there were, as 
the inhabitants assured me, only 10,000 soldiers." In fact, the pillagers were not 
content with carrying off the things of which they could make some use. What 
one might call a fury of gratuitous destruction seems to have led the destroyers 
on. They must have been drunk to behave as they did. Whatever could not 
be carried off was spoiled; the furniture was destroyed, jam thrown into the 
water-closets, petrol poured upon the floor, etc. 

In the environs it was still worse. The peasants told Mr. Kapoustine that 
the Bulgarian soldiers went through the villages in groups of fifteen or twenty, 
pillaging houses, stealing money and outraging women. Mr. Kapoustine did not 
succeed in tracing the outraged women. But as the Commission knows from 
personal experience, the difficulty of conducting an inquiry of this nature, espe- 
cially when the women go on living in the villages, they could not feel justified 
in rejecting the testimony of inhabitants who know that "in the village of Bou- 
linovats seven women were outraged, two among them being sixteen years old; 
at Vina nine women, one of whom was pregnant; at Slatina, five, one of whom 
was only thirteen." 

Turning from this to the impressions actually gained by the Commission 
in Bulgarian territory, it must be admitted that it is unfortunately true that the 
same methods were employed by the Servian invaders towards the Bulgarian 
population. Let us begin however by saying that we have seen homage rendered 
to the superiority of the Servian command in the Bulgarian press itself. A 


correspondent of the Bulgarian paper Narodna Volia felt constrained to admit 
that "to the honor of the Servian military authorities," there were in the village 
of Belogradtchik, occupied by the Servians on July 9/22, "few excesses or thefts 
committed by the army. Such as there were took place in the course of the 
first day and remained secret. The houses and the shops, where there was 
nobody, were ravaged. But on complaints being made by the citizens, the guilty 
soldiers were punished. The commandant, Mr. T. Stankovits, from Niche, a 
deputy in the Skupshtina, showed himself resolute in preserving order and stop- 
ping any attempts at crime." The same can not be said of the Bulgarian military 
authorities in the Knjazevac affair, on the admission of Bulgarians themselves, 
collected by the Commission. 

But with this single exception the procedure in the one case was the same 
as in the other ; another Servian socialist paper, the Radnitchke N ovine, admitted 
it franklvc It was in the villages that the population suffered most. "Quanti- 
ties of people," the Narodna Volia continues, "were forced to hand over their 
money. In the villages of Kaloughere and Bela the gallows are still standing 
by which the Servian "committees" terrorized their victims. On the "commit- 
tees" there was even a priest. Whole flocks of sheep, goats, pigs, oxen and 
horses were lifted. All the seeds that could be discerned were dug up. All 
the clothes and all the furniture were taken. The Bulgarian villages near the 
frontier naturally suffered most. Whole caravans came and went full of booty. 
The Radnitchke Novine speaks of "heaps of merchandise and booty taken to 
Zayechare and sold there. Also no small number of women were violated." The 
Commission can authenticate the truth of the statements in these papers by 
what was heard and seen at Vidia and in the neighborhood. Before leaving the 
Balkans a whole day was spent in visiting the village of Voinitsa, and taking 
photographs there. 

This village, in the Koula canton, comprised sixty-three houses ; thirty-two 
were totally burned and the rest plundered and ruined. The Commission sum- 
moned some of the old men who had remained in the village after the arrival 
of the Servian troops. One of these old men, "Uncle" Nicholas, aged eighty, 
was killed in his house and his corpse covered with stones; the Commission 
photographed his tomb, where a simple wooden cross is to be seen. Another 
old man, "Uncle" Dragane, aged seventy, was also killed. A third, Peter 
Jouliov, aged seventy-three, had the idea of going up to the Servians with bread 
and raki (brandy) in his hands. For only reply one soldier ran him through 
with his bayonet and two others fired on him. "You have killed me, brothers," 
he cried as he fell. When the soldiers went, he crawled on his stomach some 
yards, to the nearest shelter. There for two days and two nights he lay in 
hiding in the forest without eating. His wounded foot was swollen and he had 
found no means of dressing it in the village of Boukovtse. At last on the ninth 
day he reached the Servian ambulance. The doctor made a dressing for him 


and the old man thanked him and gave him six apples. "You do not belong to 
this place, I see," said the doctor, "since no one but you has given me anything. 
You are a man of God; thank you." Peter Jouliov himself told the Commis- 
sion this simple and touching story. 

At Vo'initsa there were also some old women who suffered. Three of them 
were killed: Yotova Mikova, aged seventy; Seba Cheorgova, seventy-five, 
and Kamenka Djonova. A witness, repeatedly beaten by the Servians who 
asked him why the population had fled, saw them set fire to the houses ; only one. 
was saved, and on it some one had scrawled in chalk the word Magatsine, to 
show that it was a food depot. Other witnesses saw the soldiers carrying off 
stolen furniture, carpets, woolen stuff prepared for carpet making, etc. Some 
peasants who thought that we were a government commission, sent to inventory 
their losses, brought us long lists of them. Here are some of the papers which 
we kept for information, after explaining to the villagers the mistake they made : 

House of Tano Stamenov 

1. Woodwork 18 x 10 met. 19 windows, 14 doors f r. 12,000 

2. Light woodwork 16 x 8 2,000 

3. A wine cask 200 

4. Miscellaneous (3 badne) 150 

5. Four barrels .' 50 

6. A German plow 75 

7. A caldron 400 

8. A machine, called tarabi 500 

9. A maize grinder 95 

Total 15,470 

Property of John Tanov 

1. Maize 300 erinas 1 f r. 600 

2. Two oxen, with cart 1,000 

3. Grain, 30 crinas 80 

4. A vat of 600 okas 2 80 

5. A barn 6x2 met 50 

6. A plow 40 

7. Four big baskets (kochla) 50 

8. Wool (45 okas) 100 

9. Three stoves 100 

10. Two beds 40 

11. Six pigs and 3 porkers 200 

12. Eighty hens 80 

13. Haricots — 10 crinas 60 

14. Wine, 20 k 50 

15. Two hives 35 

16. A kitchen garden \ l / 2 dec 100 

17. Three tables 40 

18. Other indecipherable household goods 448 

Total 3,153 
The property of another son, Alexander Tanov, fr. 900. 

1 About a bushel. 

2 Weight about 1,280 grams. 


From the losses here sustained by a single family, — father and two sons, 
amounting to fr. 19,500 (and the prices are not overstated, so we were assured 
by the inhabitants of Vidine), some idea may be formed of the enormous figures 
of the estimated cost of the Balkan War to the inhabitants. The loss caused 
the Servian peasants by the Bulgarian invasions at Knjazevac is rated in the 
document we publish at fr. 25,000,000 or 30,000,000. No one, as far as we are 
aware, has tried to estimate the loss caused the Bulgarian peasants at Belo- 
gradtchik and Vidine by the Servian invasion. 

In the principal area of military operations, in the canton of Kratovo, 
Kotchani, Tikveche, Radovitch, excesses are naturally to be expected of a dif- 
ferent order from those due to military incursions on the Serbo-Bulgarian fron- 
tier. Here were two armies face to face for months at a short distance from one. 
another. Each accused the other of provocation and acts of bad faith. The 
Bulgarians thought they were sure to defeat the old ally and new enemy at the 
first encounter. The Servians rejoiced in advance in the opportunity of restoring 
Servia's military reputation and revenging the defeats of 1885. Each side saw 
in the issue of the conflict the solution of difficulties that were, from the national 
standpoint, questions of life and death. The conflict over, the one side said, 
"We are not vanquished," and the other, after securing the price of victory, 
declared, "For the first time we have really fought; here are adversaries worthy 
of us." "Yes," Mr. de Penennrun agrees after seeing the two armies, "From 
the beginning this great war was savage, passionate. Both sides are rude men 
and knowing them as I know them I have the right to say that they are adver- 
saries worthy of one another." 1 

The "savage war" opened in a way that was savage in the highest degree. 
The first shock was peculiarly cruel and sanguinary; it was to decide the fate 
of the campaign. The general staff of the voyevoda (Poutnik) (commander-in- 
chief), puts the losses of the two Servian armies during the one night attack 
(June 16/29 to 17/30) at 3,200 men ; almost all the men who fell were slain by 
bayonet or musket blows, even after surrender. Mr. de Penennrun, who makes 
this statement, goes so far as to suppose that this Bulgarian fury was intentional 
and decreed by the commandant, who saw in it a means of striking terror and so 
of victory. According to him, the "atrocities were almost always enjoined by 
the officers on their men, who, despite their native harshness, hesitated to strike 
other Slavs, but yesterday their brothers in arms." The spirit of Mr. Savov's 
telegram already known to us seems to confirm this supposition, since it enjoins 
the commandant to "stir up the morale of the army," and teach it to "look 
upon the allies of yesterday as enemies." However that may be, the Servian 
documents we publish bearing almost exclusively on these first days of the war, 
June 17-19 to 25, do prove abundantly that this end was attained and much 

x Quarante jours de guerre dans les Balkans. Chapelot, Paris, 1913, pp. 39-40, 183. 


The reader's attention is drawn in the first instance to documents 1, 3, 7, 10 
(Appendix H). Here we have soldiers miraculously surviving from fights in 
which they were wounded, after enduring the same sufferings as their comrades 
who lie dead on the field of battle. They can recount the treatment inflicted by 
the Bulgarians on the wounded, and when they do so they speak as victims. The 
Bulgarian soldier's first movement was always the same, — to steal the money 
and valuables on the body which would soon be a corpse. After stripping the 
wounded man, the second movement, — the intoxication of combat being some- 
what dissipated. — was not always the same. Should he be killed or no ? Captain 
Gyurits (Appendix H, 2) tells us that he heard the Bulgarian soldiers discussing 
the question among themselves, and that massacre was decided on by the officer. 
Lieutenant Stoyanovits tells us that the men, after pillaging him, prepared to 
go off; but one of them reminded the others that there was still something to do, 
and then two of the soldiers ran him through with their bayonets, and the third 
struck him with the butt end, but without killing him. Lieutenant Markovits 
survived, after being pillaged, because the Bulgarian sanitary staff who had 
stripped him of his valuables did not want the trouble either of killing him or 
conveying him to hospital, as he asked them to do; instead they left him lying 
in the forest for three days until, on June 19, he was found there. Prisoners 
who were not wounded were pillaged likewise, and then kept with a view to 
extracting information from them (case of Lioubomir Spasits, Appendix H, 3) 
or let go and then fired on (Miloshevits, Appendix H, 4 (c)). There were cases 
however in which those who had money to offer were set free while those who 
had none had their throats cut. Cases were also quoted of whole bodies of 
prisoners being shot after capture. On the other hand a case is mentioned in 
which some wounded prisoners not only were taken to the Bulgarian hospital but 
made their escape, after they were restored to health, through the complicity of 
a Bulgarian sergeant (Appendix I, 4 (c) ). 

All this naturally refers only to cases in which the men were able to delib- 
erate and choose. The horrors of battle itself, during which men were actuated 
and dominated solely by its fury, were appalling and almost incredible. The 
most ordinary case is that described in full detail in the two medical reports we 
publish. The profound impression produced by the death of Colonel Arandjelo- 
vits, who was killed during the retreat of July 8/21, and whose death is described 
in the first reports, is largely due to the personality of the victim, an officer 
known and loved by everyone, and decorated by King Ferdinand for his share 
in the siege of Adrianople. The scientific facts were that the colonel, grievously 
wounded but still alive, was finished by a discharge in the back of his neck and 
a bayonet thrust at his heart. 1 The nine soldiers killed during the engagement 
of July 9/22, perished in the same way, as the second report shows. They were 
wounded, more or less seriously, by bullets from a distance; then finished by 

1 Ste photograph of Mr. Arandjelovits in Mr. de Penennrun's book, p. 292. 


violent blows on the head delivered close at hand with the butt end or bayonet, 
or by a discharge. There are quantities of instances of wounded Servian sol- 
diers being stabbed to make an end of them. 

Worse still, killing did not content them. They sought to outrage the dead 
or even to torture the living. Here we have the really savage and barbarous 
side of the second war. Some of the cases may have been exaggerated or 
inexactly reported. But they are so numerous that the agreement of the wit- 
nesses alone proves their authenticity. We will set them down in the order in 
which they appear in the documents, as indicated: 

1. In the fight that took place near Trogartsi, Servian corpses were found 
with mutilated parts stuck in their mouths. 

2. In the fight of June 17 and 18, Andjelko Yovits, still alive, had ears 
and nose cut (H, I, 2). 

3. In the battle of Krivolak, June 21, a Servian volunteer had his eyes 
gouged out (H, 1,4 (b) ). 

4. On June 21 Zivoin Miloshevits and Bozidar Savits had their tongues 
cut out and chopped in pieces because they had no money to buy back their 
freedom with (H, I, 4 (c)). 

5. On June 19 L. Milosavlevits saw the corpse of a Servian soldier with 
his eyes gouged out (H, I, 4 (c)). 

6. Near the village of Dragovo a Servian corpse was fastened to a pillar 
with iron bands and roasted — seen by Corporal Zivadits Milits (H, I, 4 (c) ). 

7. On June 17 a Servian prisoner was thrown up in the air amid cries of 
hurrah! and caught on bayonets — seen by Arsenie Zivkovits (H, I, 4 (c) ). The 
same case is described elsewhere, near the Garvantoi position. 

8. On June 18 a Servian soldier was put on a spit and grilled (H, I, 4 (c)). 

9. On June 25 Captain Spira Tchakovski saw the roasted corpse of a Ser- 
vian soldier to the north of the village of Kara Hazani (H, I, 5). 

10. Captain Dimitriye Tchemirikits saw two roasted corpses, one near the 
Shobe Blockhouse, another near the village of Krivolak (H, I, 5). 

11. Mutilated corpses, with hands and legs cut, have been seen by the patrol 
in various places (H, I, 5). 

12. On the battlefield mutilated corpses are found. One corpse had the 
skin of the face taken off, another the eyes gouged out, a third had been 
roasted (H, I, 6). 

13. At the positions between Shobe and Toplika, June 24-25, mutilated 
corpses are found, some with the eyes gouged out, others with ears and noses 
cut; the mouth torn from ear to ear; disemboweled, etc. (H, I, 6). 

14. At the Tcheska positions the corpse of a Servian soldier — a marine from 
Raduivatz — was burned (H, I, 8). 

15. At Nirasli-Tepe, a soldier had his eyes gouged out (H, I, 9). 

16. A Bulgarian lieutenant broke hands and crushed fingers under stones; 
evidence of Kosta Petchanats (H, I, 9). 


17. At Kalimanska Tchouka the wounded left at the village of Doulitsa 
had their noses and ears cut, eyes gouged out and hands cut off (H, III, 7). 

The Commission can find no words strong enough to denounce such out- 
rages to humanity, and feels that the widest measure of publicity should be 
given to all similar cases, indicating the names of the culprits wherever possible, 
in order to curb barbaric instincts which the world is unanimous in blaming. 

The Commission is not so well provided with documentary evidence as to 
the excesses which may have taken place on the side of the Servian army during 
the combat. Isolated cases, however, confirmed by documents and by evidence, 
show that the Servians were no exception to the general rule. In the Appendix 
will be found a proces-verbal taken by the Bulgarian military commission, which 
proves that five Bulgarian officers, Colonel Yanev (at the head of the Sixth 
Cavalry), Lieutenants Stefanov and Minkov, veterinary sub-lieutenant Contev 
and Quartermaster Vladev. were massacred. After having been taken prisoner 
at Bossilegrade on June 28/July 11, Colonel Yanev was ordered, on pain of being 
shot, to send the Bulgarian squadrons the order to give themselves up to the 
Servians. He obeyed, but his orders were not followed. The five officers were 
then taken outside and entrusted to an escort of ten Servian soldiers, who then 
shot them all, stripped off their boots and plundered them. The sixth, Doctor 
Koussev, had been wounded by a Servian soldier immediately after yielding, 
and this saved his life. A Servian doctor, Mr. Mitrovits, came to see him; 
expressed his astonishment and regret at seeing him wounded and conducted 
him to the Servian ambulance, whence he was conveyed to the Mairie. The 
precipitate retreat of the Servians, who had to abandon their own wounded, 
saved him. We have seen his deposition, which confirms the proces-verbal. 

The conduct of the Servians on the battlefield is characterized further by 
the deposition of a Bulgarian officer in the 26th, Mr. Demetrius Gheorghiev, 
wounded near the Zletovska river during these same days at the beginning of 
the war (June 21/July 4). His story is as follows: 

Our people had beaten a retreat. I crawled into the thicket. Near-by, 
in a clearing, a petty officer of the 31st was lying groaning. I advised him 
not to groan for fear of being discovered. I should have been discovered 
likewise. I was right. A Servian patrol passed, saw him and killed him. 
I was not seen, however; I was hidden in a hollow. A little further away 
from me, at a distance of three or four hundred paces, a petty officer of the 
13th lay, Georges Poroujanov. I saw the patrol discover and assassinate 
him also. Finally, on June 22, the Servian ambulances appeared. I saw 
and called to them. They asked me, "Have you any money?" I had 900 
francs. I replied "Yes." Then the ambulance men came up to me. One 
of them took the money. They thereupon put me on a stretcher and car- 
ried me to the village of Lepopelti. 

The rest of Mr. Gheorghiev's story is omitted. After many difficulties, 
upon the refusal of the Belgrade doctor, Mr. Vasits, to attend to him because 




he regarded him "as an enemy," Mr. Gheorghiev was taken to the Russian mis- 
sion and there attended. 1 

If the information as to the conduct of the Servian soldier on the field of 
battle does not amount to much, our Bulgarian documents call up a sad enough 
picture of the treatment they meted out to the population in the conquered 

Here again the accusations are mutual. We publish a Servian document 
(Appendix H, III) which gives a general description of the ravages produced in 
the theater of war, along the left bank of the River Zletovska and the right 
bank of the Lakavitsa. The document attributes the ruin of these villages, the 
destruction of property and the violence endured by the population, to the Bul- 
garians. This may be admitted so far as it concerns the Moslem population, 
who, according to the document, fled before the Bulgarians and returned later 
with the Servian army. But the other portion of the population was Bulgarian 
and it evidently can not have suffered at the hands of the Bulgarian army, except 
in so far as the population inhabiting the theater of war must inevitably suffer. 
We know from the Bulgarian document we publish that the opposite is the case, 
at least in case of the villages whose names reappear in the Servian and in the 
Bulgarian list, and in that of quantities of others not mentioned by the Servians. 
What we see is the Bulgarian population fleeing before the Servian army to 
escape violence and vengeance at the hands of the returning Turks, or awaiting 
their hour on the spot. The evidence of the refugees is formal and decisive. 
They were perhaps not sufficiently removed from the events to judge them fairly; 
but their intimate and profound knowledge of local conditions compensates 
for this. 

Let us stop and consider these depositions from peasants, priests and school- 
masters, whose names are known to the Commission. We see everywhere the 
reappearance of the Servian army, giving the signal for exodus. It is true that 
the Servians sometimes declare that they are bringing with them "order and 
security," and threaten the population with burning and pillage, only in cases 
where those who have taken flight will not return. Some of the more credulous 
do return. What awaits them? 

It must be recalled that the Servian soldiers do not arrive alone. They are 
accompanied by people who know the village and their inhabitants better. And 
there is Rankovits, a Servian comitadji turned officer, who had been carrying 
on propaganda in favor of King Peter in these same villages since March. 
Then there are the vlachs (Wallachians, Aroumanians) put in charge of the 
administration, because they are ready to call themselves "brothers of the 
Servians," on condition of being allowed to enrich themselves at the expense 
of the population. Their formula for the Bulgarian population, the most 
numerous, is as follows : "Up to now you have been our masters and pil- 

1 For the treatment of the wounded by the Servians, see also Chapter V. 


laged our goods; it is now our turn to pillage yours" (Appendix H, IV). But 
the most important point to notice is that the Turks appeared with the Servian 
army, called by them to their aid and free to pursue them when their turn should 
come (see Chapter IV). The Turks had vengeance to enact for probable spolia- 
tion committed by the Bulgarian army; and in addition for forced conversions 
(Chapter IV). This is what happens. Take the village of Vinitsa (given in 
the Servian document as having been burned and ravaged by the Bulgarians, 
"during their retreat"). The Servian soldiers, as soon as they entered, began 
asking the villagers, "one after another, are they Servians or Bulgarians?" 
Anyone replying "Bulgarian" is forcibly struck. Then the Commander of the 
troops chose seventy peasants and ordered them to be shot. In other villages, 
as we shall see. the order was executed; here it was recalled and the peasants 
taken to Kotchani. Three days after the Servian entry, the Bulgarian army 
returns (June 27) and then leaves the village again. It is only then, after having 
tried Servian "order and security," that the population "mad with terror at the 
prospect of new tortures," leaves the village. The old people, however, remain. 
They are witnesses of the pillage of all the shops and all the houses of the 
Servians. In the Appendix will be found the names of the persons killed and 
tortured for the sake of their money, and women outraged at Vinitsa. 

At Blatets, the same story. The Turks denounce Bulgarian "suspects." An- 
other witness says, they point them out "as being rich." Some twenty are 
imprisoned; a boy's eyes gouged out to make him say where there is money. 
Another is thrown into the fire for the same reason ; whole quarters are pillaged 
and burned. Then the suspects are led away from the village. The officer cries 
"Escape who can!" The soldiers fire on the fugitives and bring them all down. 
At Bezikovo some twenty dead are noted, a child a year and a half old burned 
alive, three women outraged, two of them dying. Sixty houses are burned and 
the harvest also, and the stock carried off. In the village of Gradets, where the 
Servian cavalry promises "order and security," only a few old men are left and 
go to meet the soldiery. On hearing the promises, fifty to sixty peasants, who 
believe in them, return. Then by express order the Turks throw themselves 
on the houses ; between sixty and seventy men are seized, led outside the village 
and there stabbed amid the despairing cries of the women who followed their 
husbands. The Turks want their share; they take three picked young girls 
and carry them off to their village with songs and cries. The next day the 
village is in flames. A day later the chase of the fugitives begins. 

Some 300 went forth; only nine families reach Kustendil. The others are 
killed or dispersed. "The Servian bullets rained down like hail;" men, women, 
children fell dead. In the village of Loubnitsa the Servian soldiers asked the 
wife of a certain Todor Kamtchev for money. As she had none, they stabbed 
a child of four years old in her arms. 

At Radovitch, a town, pillage is the rule. Under pretext of gifts for the 


Red Cross the peasants paid fifteen, thirty, forty-five Napoleons, to escape the 
tortures awaiting them. The guide who points out the "rich men" here is Cap- 
tain Yaa, an Albanian, a former servant in the Servian agency at Veles, now 
head of a band protected by the military government. Our witness concludes: 
"At Radovitch the Servian officers collected a lot of money." In the surround- 
ing villages too "a great deal of money was extorted." The Servians undressed 
and searched a woman for money : then outraged her at Chipkovitsa. At Novo- 
Selo the women fled into the forest ; but the men who remained were plundered. 
At Orahovitsa, a Turkish local magnate from Radovitch wants to have his share. 
He arrives, accompanied by Servian soldiers, and once more money is extorted 
from the women by burning their fingers ; and arms are carried off. 

These are fragments of the dismal annals of these days at the end of June 
(old style) in a small territory which afterwards became the property of the 
invading state. "Order" of a kind is restored, the conquest once accomplished, 
and some of the refugees have returned to their villages. We shall have further 
opportunity of returning to the "order" similarly established in the annexed ter- 
ritories. For the moment we add one observation. The things we have de- 
scribed, horrible as they are, show in their very horror abnormal conditions 
which can not last. Fortunately for humanity, nature herself revolts against 
"excesses" such as we have observed in the conflict of two adversaries. In 
blackening the face of the other each has tarred his own. After judging them 
on their own evidence, we have to remember that in ordinary times they are 
better than the judgment each is inclined to pass on the other and to impose 
upon us. 


The War and the Nationalities 

1. Extermination, Emigration, Assimilation 

The reader who has perused the preceding pages and followed the endless 
•chain of deplorable events studied and described by the Commission, has doubt- 
less discovered the common feature which unites the Balkan nations, though it is 
necessary to discover that war is waged not only by the armies but by the nations 
themselves. The local population is divided into as many fragmentary parts as 
it contains nationalities, and these fight together, each being desirous to substitute 
itself for the others. This is why these wars are so sanguinary, why they pro- 
duce so great a loss in men, and end in the annihilation of the population and 
the ruin of whole regions. We have repeatedly been able to show that the worst 
atrocities were not due to the excesses of the regular soldiery, nor can they 
always be laid to the charge of the volunteers, the bashi-bazouk. 1 The popula- 
tions mutually slaughtered and pursued with a ferocity heightened by mutual 
knowledge and the old hatreds and resentments they cherished. 

The first consequence of this fact is, that the object of these armed conflicts, 
overt or covert, clearly conceived or vaguely felt, but always and everywhere the 
same, was the complete extermination of an alien population. In some cases 
this object expressed itself in the form of an implacable and categorical "order" — 
to kill the whole male population of the occupied regions. We are in possession 
of some letters from Greek soldiers, of unimpeachable authenticity. These 
documents, though written in our own day, throw back to the time of the Assyr- 
ian conquest. "We have taken a small number of prisoners and them we have 
killed, such being the orders received * * * in order that the dirty Bulga- 
rian race may not spring up again" * * * "We are," — such is the order, — 
"to burn the villages, massacre the young, and spare none but the old people, 
children and minors." Here the intention is clearly to spare none but those no 
longer capable of carrying on the race and those still young enough to lose their 
nationality by receiving a Greek education. 

It was the same in Turkey, as we have seen in describing the events which 
took place in the environments of Malgara and in Thrace generally. Men, 
women and children were separated, and all killed without exception. Here 
the testimony of the Christian Arab soldier shows that, at least in certain por- 

^•This term of dismal memory has taken on an altogether fresh significance during the 
latest wars. A bashi-bazouk is no longer necessarily a Turk. He is the volunteer, the Frei- 
scharler of all the belligerent nations without distinction ; the Bulgarian comitadji, the Greek 
andarte; generally speaking he is any combatant not wearing the uniform of the regular. 


tions of the Turkish army, when the offensive was taken, the "order" was given 
to proceed systematically. It would be too much to assume that the outrages 
committed on women were the realization of an "order." 

The orders given to the Slav armies were perhaps a trifle less barbarous. 
It does not, however, follow that there was no intention of conquering the ter- 
ritory without maintaining an alien population there. "Orders of extermination" 
were not given, orders to the contrary were indeed given [see below]. But in 
private conversations the same idea is constantly met. What proves that it was 
not a mere mode of speaking, is the fact that the Turkish population suffered 
at the hands of the Bulgarians, and the Albanian population at the hands of the 
Servians as well. As regards the Bulgarians, this is proved by the villages in 
which all the Turkish quarters were burned, and which were visited by the 
member of the Commission in Thrace. As to the Servians, we possess authentic 
evidence in the shape of a letter from a member of the Servian army, published 
in the Servian Socialist paper Radnitchke Novine, of October 9/22. The con- 
tents of this letter resemble only too closely the letters of the Greek soldiers. 
True, the reference here is to an expedition made to repress a revolt. "My dear 
Friend," writes the soldier, "I have no time to write to you at length, but I 
can tell you that appalling things are going on here. I am terrified by them, 
and constantly ask myself how men can be so barbarous as to commit such 
cruelties. It is horrible. I dare not (even if I had time, which I have not) 
tell you more, but I may say that Liouma (an Albanian region along the river 
of the same name), no longer exists. There is nothing but corpses, dust and 
ashes. There are villages of 100, 150, 200 houses, where there is no longer a 
single man, literally not one. We collect them in bodies of forty to fifty, and 
then we pierce them with our bayonets to the last man. Pillage is going on 
everywhere. The officers told the soldiers to go to Prisrend and sell the things 
they had stolen." The paper which published this letter adds: "Our friend 
tells us of things even more appalling than this ( !) ; but they are so horrible and 
so heartrending that we prefer not to publish them." 

The object of the Albanian expedition, referred to by the correspondent of 
the Radnitchke Novine, is known to have been the repression of the plans of the 
Albanians who had at this period revolted against the Servians. The Albanian 
revolt was represented by the Servians as the result of the activities of the 
Albanians in autonomous Albania, and at the same time of Bulgarian conspira- 
cies. These two reasons are probable enough, but they do not exclude a third, — 
the state of mind of the Albanian population in subjection to Servia. This 
population had its own reasons for complaining of the Servian administration. 
The event is explained in a letter from Elbassan, published by a Bulgarian paper, 
(L'Echo de Bulgarie, September 2S/October 11), and alleged to come "from 
a very reliable source." The Commission was not able to verify these state- 
ments, but there are no reasons for doubting them, in view of all that has been 
seen and heard : 


On September 20 last (new style), the Servian army carried off all the 
cattle of the Malesia of Dibra. The herdsmen were compelled to defend 
themselves, and to struggle, but they were all killed. The Servians also 
killed the two chieftains of the Liouma clan, Mehmed Edem and Djafer 
Eleuz, and then began pillaging and burning all the villages on their way: 
Pechkapia, Pletza and Dochichti, in lower Dibra; Alai, Beg, Machi, Para, 
Oboku, Klobotchichta, and Solokitzi, in upper Dibra. In all these villages the 
Servians committed acts of horrible massacre and outrage on women, children 
and old people. In the town of Dibra itself the authorities published an 
order to the effect that the bazaar was not to be opened on Sunday or the 
inhabitants to come out of their houses on that day. Forty-eight notables 
were arrested. When the Servians saw that the inhabitants of the pillaged 
villages, of which a list has been given above, had come to reclaim their 
cattle and were surrounding the town, they had the notables brought out 
of prison and killed them in the most shameless way. Henceforth terror 
and despair reigned among the Albanians of Dibra and the neighborhood, 
and they rose in revolt. They attacked the Servians with arms, or with 
hatchets, stones and sticks ; they killed some of them and drove the rest 
out. of the town. Nearly all of the men who were killed were Servian 
officials ; the soldiers who remained alive fled to the other side of the 
Radika river. 

After this story, the truth of the general description published by the same 
paper on October 3/16 need not be doubted: 1 

The following villages, with a mixed Albanian and Bulgarian popula- 
tion, were pillaged and burnt — Lochnani, Lissitchani, Gitoche, Dibrichta, 
Harlichte, Dessovo, Gradechnitsa, Ptchelopek. Many Moslem families from 
these villages, including women and children, were pitilessly massacred. 
On entering the village of Portchassie, the regular Servian army led all the 
husbands outside the village, and then brought the wives thither to exact 
money from them in the shape of ransom, if they wanted their husbands 
set at liberty. After the ransom had been paid, however, the wretched 
men were shut up in the mosque, which was then blown up with four shells. 
In the village of Sulp, seventy-three Albanians suffered a horrible death, 
and forty-seven others from the village of Ptchelopek were basely assas- 
sinated. Was it not the Prefect of Krouchevo, when the Servian army 
returned from the Albanian frontier, who openly told them to burn all the 
villages situated between Krouchevo and Okhrida ? 

Thus the Albanian petitioners, who on September 21 addressed themselves 
to the Great Powers in the name of the populations of Djakova, Ipek, Plava, 
Goussinie and the ex-vilayet of Kossovo, did not exaggerate when they stated, 
as regards this other theater of the revolt, that "the Servian and Montenegrin 
regular troops undertook and did everything, from the first day on which they 

1 See also the Reichspost of September 29, and the enumeration of massacres committed 
in the first fortnight of September, 1913, as set forth in the petition of the meeting of 
Albanian representatives at Scutari on September 21, quoted above. 


invaded the Albanian territory, either to compel the inhabitants to lose their 
nationality, or brutally to suppress the Shkiptar race." 

Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent popu- 
lations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of 
every kind — such were the means which were employed and are still being 
employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire trans- 
formation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians. 

We thus arrive at the second characteristic feature of the Balkan wars, a 
feature which is a necessary correlative of the first. Since the population of the 
countries about to be occupied knew, by tradition, instinct and experience, what 
they had to expect from the armies of the enemy and from the neighboring 
countries to which these armies belonged, they did not await their- arrival, but 
fled. Thus, generally speaking, the army of the enemy found on its way nothing 
but villages which were either half deserted or entirely abandoned. To execute 
the orders for extermination, it was only necessary to set fire to them. The 
population, warned by the glow from these fires, fled in all haste. There fol- 
lowed a veritable migration of peoples, for in Macedonia, as in Thrace, there 
was hardly a spot which was not, at a given moment, on the line of march of 
some army or other. The Commission everywhere encountered this second 
fact. All along the railways interminable trains of carts drawn by oxen fol- 
lowed one another; behind them came emigrant families and, in the neighbor- 
hood of the big towns, bodies of refugees were found encamped. 

At Salonica the Commission visited one of these camps, and made inquiries 
of the Islamic Committee, whose business it was to transport the refugees to 
Anatolia. They were Turkish emigrants. Some of them had left their villages 
several weeks ago; they came from all parts of Macedonia, from Soundja, 
Djoumaya-Bala, Nevrocope, Petritche, Razlogue, Tchakova, Demir-Hissar, 
Osmanie, Berovo, Radovitch. At the beginning of September, when the Com- 
mission made its inquiry, about 135,000 emigrants had passed through Salonica 
since the beginning of the second war. Each steamer starting for Anatolia 
carried some 2,500 bound for Mersina, Adalia or Iskenderoum. Why were 
they quitting their villages? The Commission wished to learn the reason from 
their own lips. Some of its members went to the camp, without taking the 
official guide, and entered into conversation with isolated groups of emigrants : — 
"Who are you, whence do you come, wherefore have you departed?" — "We 
have come" — the old man waved his hand to indicate the plain dotted with carts — 
"from twenty-six different villages. It has taken us twenty-five days to get here, 
and we have been here for ten. We were afraid of the Bulgarians." — "Why?" 
Thereupon we heard the story which the reader knows from the chapter on 
Thrace. "But this happened during the first war, and now?" — "Now * * * 
the Greeks have given us the order to go." "Whither are you. going? Who is 
feeding you?" Silence. Nobody knows. 




.... ,rffj 


i i 





, A * 

P % "* 


*: HK 

' * 7 ■ 



■i^' ' * 

— ^_ 

Figs. 19, 20, 21.— Refugees Encamped Outside Salonica 











At the Islamic Committee one thing only was known, namely that 50 Turk- 
ish pounds a day was spent on buying bread. In the last four days, 3,000 men 
had had their voyage to Anatolia paid for them, and the Committee's resources 
were at an end. The Greek government, in spite of the promises of money 
and land lavished to secure the departure of all these people, was doing nothing. 

In Bulgaria things were very much the same. The Commission visited 
various places where refugees were temporarily gathered — Djoumaya, Samakov. 
The government estimated that as many as 111,560 emigrants fled to Bulgaria. 
These refugees 5 'were divided into 38 cantons. About 50,000 of them came from 
the parts of Macedonia now belonging to Servia or to Greece; of these only 
2,400 were repatriated. Thirty thousand came from parts of Thrace which have 
remained under Turkish rule. These figures were published on September 12/25 
{Echo de Bulgarie). On December 22/January 4, 1914, another Bulgarian 
paper, the Mir, published more detailed statistics of the refugees under this 
latter head. Unfortunately, in the course of the events of the last two months, 
the number of these emigrants from Turkey rose from 30,000 to 51,427 men, 
women and children. This was the population of 108 abandoned villages and 
of 10,934 houses. Winter, which was beginning when the Commission was in 
Bulgaria, has since come on. We learn in the letter from Haskovo, dated 
October 24/November 6, that those among the emigrants who possessed carts, 
oxen or camels were sent after the Bulgarian army to Gumurjina, and 6,209 
others had to be sent by railway. Were these all the others? The same corres- 
pondent describes them to us as being insufficiently clad and ill-sheltered, ex- 
posed to the cold and threatened with pneumonia and with typhus, sometimes 
lacking bread throughout whole weeks. 

While the 80,000 Bulgarian refugees are addressing their supplications to Sir 
Edward Grey, the telegraphic agency at Athens informs us that 100,000 others, 
Greeks by nationality, are fleeing from Bulgarian administration. 1 Exact sta- 
tistics are not available, and we are aware that reliance can not be placed on 
figures given by popular meetings, or by official agencies. Nevertheless, it may 
be believed that we are not dealing here with isolated cases, but with a real 
exodus ; a portion of the picture to be seen throughout the Balkans. The Turks 
are fleeing before the Christians; the Bulgarians before the Greeks and the 
Turks, the Greeks and the Turks before, the Bulgarians, the Albanians before 
the Servians ; and if emigration is not so general as between the Servians and 
the Bulgarians, the reason is that these two nations have not, so to speak, en- 

1 The Athenian correspondent of the Times gives these figures on August 21 ; they 
record the numbers passing the frontier. He himself has them from an "individual coming 
from Macedonia" who "gave him details on the emigration movement going on in the dis- 
tricts of Upper Macedonia, which the Greek troops are clearing all the time." This agrees 
with the information received by the Commission from the refugees themselves, at Salonica 
and Sofia, as to the specific character of this exodus, which was prepared and encouraged 
by the Greek authorities who offered carts and even motors to those who agreed to emi- 
grate. (See below.) 


countered on their own soil, while that soil coveted by each, namely Macedonia, 
they regarded as already peopled by men of their own race. 1 That is why we 
have to deal here with a mitigated form of the same principle of the conflict of 
nationalities. The means employed by the Greek against the Bulgarian, by the 
Turk against the Slav, by the Servian against the Albanian, is no longer exter- 
mination or emigration ; it is an indirect method which must, however/ lead to 
the same end, that of conversion and assimilation. 

One example of these forced conversions during the Balkan wars has become 
classic — that of the pomaks by the Bulgarians. The pomaks are a people of 
Bulgarian mountaineers, converted to Islamism by the Turks centuries ago. To 
the number of some 400.000 they inhabit the high plateaus of Northern Mace- 
donia. The male population of the nearest villages spoke Turkish and had 
become entirely Mahometan ; the women on the other hand continued to speak 
Bulgarian and remained faithful to certain Slav customs. In the more remote 
centers, however, among the mountains of Rhodope, or Tikveche, the pomaks 
remain faithful to monogamy, and to their national songs; the Slav type was 
even purer there since they only intermarried among themselves. Unlike the 
Slav aristocracy in the Balkans, they had not become subject to Islam in order 
to safeguard their social position. It was a peasant population, although 
throughout two centuries the young men had served in the Turkish army, and 
they still preserved its warlike and fanatical spirit. Traces of forced conver- 
sion to Islam may sometimes be perceived in certain proper names of places, 
such as Mehrilote or Hibili (in Eastern Rhodope). There, too, the places 
pointed out called in Bulgarian "Delen" or "Setchen," that is to say, the place 
where those were "separated," who agreed to pass over to Islam, and those 
massacred who refused. Unhappily the modern conqueror has revived these 
remote historical recollections. 

To revive a consciousness of lost nationality in the minds of their kinsmen, 
the Bulgarians employed force and persuasion, persuasion of a type as brutal 
as force. The Commission is unable to cite any individual instance, but there 
is no reason for doubting those recorded in accounts emanating from Greek or 
Servian sources. The story of a witness returned from Macedonia is quoted 
in a despatch of August 21, transmitted by the Athenian correspondent of 
the Times: 

The Moslems were ranged in groups. Each group was given some 
baptismal name, generally a name honored in the Bulgarian church or in 
Bulgarian history. An exarchist pope then passed from group to group 
and took aside each of his catechumens sui generis; and while sprinkling 
his forehead with holy water with one hand, with the other he compelled 
him to bite a sausage. The holy water represented baptism, the piece of 

^As this chapter is going to press, Queen Eleonora of Bulgaria speaks in the Neue 
Freie Presse of 60,000 refugees in Bulgaria, destitute of shelter or clothing. 


sausage renunciation of the Moslem faith, since the Koran forbids the 
eating of pork. The conversion was completed by the issue of a certificate 
adorned with a picture of the baptism of Jesus, the price of which varied 
between one and three francs. A friend who arrived today from Thrace 
told me that what is happening in Macedonia is also happening there. He 
showed me two baptismal certificates. He added that the converted were 
obliged to give up their fez, and the converted women to walk in the streets 
with their faces uncovered. 

In an official report to the Sub-Prefect of Kavadar, on March 2, 1913, a 
petty Servian official, Mr. Drakalovits, says : 

At Pechtchevo (Maleche plateau) a special committee has been formed, 
with the Bulgarian Sub-Prefect, Chatoyev, as its President, and among its 
members John Ingilisov, the director of Bulgarian schools, and the priest, 
Chatoyev, the brother of the Sub-Prefect. This committee was instituted 
to convert all the Turks of Maleche to Christianity. By order of the com- 
mittee, 400 peasants of the place were armed with muskets and sticks; they 
attacked Turks of the neighboring villages and forcibly led them into the 
church at Verovo, where they were all baptized. Finally on February 17, 
baptism was carried out at Beloro, where there were ten Turkish families 
and ten Bosnian (Servian) Mahometan families. Pechtchevo alone was 
spared, the reason being (so we were told) that the Sub-Prefect would not 
allow violence in the town. A Turk from Pechtchevo told us that every 
Turkish house had to pay two pounds for its protection. Four Turks who 
could not pay such a sum hanged themselves in despair in their houses. In 
the other Turkish villages conversions were not exacted, because the popu- 
lation was too poor, whereas the Turks at Pechtchevo were known to 
be rich. 

The Commission more than once had opportunity to discuss these conver- 
sions with the Bulgarian civil and ecclesiastical authorities. They were not 
denied by either, although they unanimously regarded them as an outrage on 
humanity and a grave political error in the case of people who were to be Bul- 
garian subjects. The following judgment, which is no less severe than anything 
written even by the enemies of Bulgaria, is commended to the attention of the 
reader. It is that of an intellectual, the Bulgarian writer, A. Strachimirov : 

Those who stand for the thought and the honor of our country ought 
to know that our authorities have, in the countries on the frontier inhabited 
by the pomaks and recently liberated, acted in a way which is a disgrace 
to their country and to humanity. One aim alone was kept in sight — that 
of personal enrichment. Conversion was only a pretext. It did not save 
the poor pomaks from atrocious treatment except where the priests with 
whom they had to deal were conscientious men. Such cases, however, were 
rare. The ecclesiastical mission was beneath criticism. High rewards were 
paid, but the priests sent to carry out this task in the pomak villages were 
drunkards and criminals who could not be kept in Bulgaria. The behavior 


of the police was monstrous. In Bulgaria no one has and no one can have 
any idea of the atrocities committed by prefects, heads of police, and priests. 
Yet at first these pomaks showed the most absolute submission to our army. 
In the last two decades they had conceived a hatred for Turkism. Their prin- 
cipal grievance was the defective condition of their mountain roads and 
the burden of annual duties. They knew that this state of things had been 
largely remedied in Bulgaria, and they held to the idea that the Bulgarian 
government would at least give them roads. At Dary-deri a pomak, an 
officer in the reserve of the Turkish army, came before the authorities and 
had himself baptized because he was fired by the idea that the Bulgarians 
brought nothing but good with them. He was at last disillusioned, and he 
and his children were massacred by their neighbors. 

Nevertheless the Bulgarian government is not ignorant as to the steps 
which should be taken to satisfy the population of the annexed region and 
secure their gratitude. It has itself declared in a manifesto addressed "to 
the inhabitants of the newly liberated region, published the day after the 
conclusion of the Treaty with Turkey, September 16/29, 1913," — most 
formal orders are given to the Bulgarian civil and military authorities to 
display the greatest kindness to the inhabitants of the annexed territories, 
to respect their faith and their nationality, to refrain from any attack on 
their personal liberty, and to maintain the inviolability of their houses and 
their property. The citizens of new Bulgaria are to enjoy, without distinc- 
tion of religion or nationality, the same rights which are secured by the 
constitution of the kingdom to all its citizens. Respect for religious free- 
dom and for education is enjoined, and also respect for the religious beliefs 
and usages, the mosques, cemeteries and other holy places of all citizens 

If only these maxims could be applied today and "the tragic recollec- 
tion of bloody events which have involved the contending nations and their 
subjects in misfortune could forever disappear in the triumph of peace, love 
and concord I" 

As a matter of fact, an understanding between Bulgaria and Turkey, based 
on these fair promises, is by no means impossible. Many Turks have been under 
the Bulgarian regime since the origin of the kingdom ; they seldom had to com- 
plain of their new masters. They were always on the side of the government. 
On the other hand, the principle of religious and educational liberty, although 
rejected by the Young Turk government, is an ancient Turkish principle, to 
which there would be prudence in reverting, after so many trials and defeats. 
The fact that very few Bulgarians are left in Turkey would facilitate such a 
reversion. There is thus reason for hoping that the treaty of Constantinople 
may bring together two governments who have no longer any ground for dispute 
and who might find themselves in agreement, as regards the rights of their 
kinsmen. A happy beginning has been made in Thrace. It is now necessary 
to create an efficient administrative apparatus — it is far from being in existence 
as yet, unfortunately — to put these excellent principles in practice. 

One can not say as much, unfortunately, of the work of the treaty of 


Bucharest. The lines of demarcation therein laid down are far from being 
natural or consonant with the national tendencies of the peoples. The third 
treaty of Bucharest has sown a new seed of discord in its violation of the senti- 
ment of nationality: it divides the Balkan territories on the principle on which 
the treaty of Vienna divided the national regions of Europe in 1815. This 
historical example suggests that here, too, national reaction will follow on the 
work of diplomatic and political reaction. 

It only remains to set out the facts, or rather to complete the outline 
sketched in Chapter I, to afford convincing proof of this. What has become 
of Macedonia, so often the apple of discord, now that the work of concord 
appears to be completed? It displays nothing but violence, and suggests no hope 
of ultimate harmony. 

2. Servian Macedonia 

A comparison of the ethnographic and linguistic maps drawn up by Mes- 
sers Kantchev, Tsviyits (Cviyic) and Belits, with the new frontiers of the 
treaty of Bucharest reveals the gravity of the task undertaken by the Servians. 
They have not merely resumed possession of their ancient domain, the Sandjak 
of Novi-Bazar and Old Servia proper (Kosovo Pole and Metchia), despite the 
fact that this historic domain was strongly Albanian ; they have not merely added 
thereto the tract described by patriotic Servian ethnographers, as "Enlarged Old 
Servia" (an ancient geographical term which we have seen twice enlarged, once 
by Mr. Tsviyits and again by Mr. Belits); 1 over and above all this, their facile 
generosity impelled them to share with the Greeks the population described on 
their maps as "Slav-Macedonian" — a euphemism designed to conceal the exist- 
ence of Bulgarians in Macedonia. And their acquisitions under the treaty of 
Bucharest went beyond their most extravagant pretensions. They took advan- 
tage of the Bulgarians' need to conclude peace at any price to deprive them 
of territories to the east of the Vardar, for example, Chtipe and Radoviche, 
where Bulgarian patriotism glowed most vividly and where the sacrifices accepted 
by Bulgarian patriots for the sake of freeing Macedonia, had always been 
exceptionally great. This was adding insult to injury. 

Mr. Skerlits, a Servian deputy arid member of the opposition, closed his 
speech in the Skupshtina on October 18/31, 1913, with these memorable words: 
"We do not regard territorial results as everything. Enlarged Servia does not 
spell, for us, a country in which the number of policemen, tax collectors and 
controllers has been doubled. New Servia, greater Servia must be a land of 
greater liberty, greater justice, greater general well being. May Servia, twice 
as great as she was, be not twice as weak but twice as strong." 

Unfortunately these generous words are but pia desideria. For some time 
the government hesitated. Nevertheless, Mr. Pachitch must have understood 

^ee chapter I, p. 29. 


that the question whether Servia's acquisitions were to make her twice as weak 
or twice as strong depended on the policy pursued in Macedonia. During the 
days spent by the Commission at Belgrade the question was debated. There 
were two antagonistic views. One, represented by Mr. Pachitch himself, wanted 
a "liberal" regime in Macedonia and the avoidance, at any price, of a "military 
dictatorship." The population of the new territories was to be left to express 
its loyalty spontaneously; to wait "until it realized that its new lot was sweeter 
than the old." Military circles, however, did not share this view. They were 
for a military administration, since a civil administration in their view, "must 
be incapable of repressing the propagandism sure to be carried on by the Bul- 
garians." 1 True, the "liberal" regime as projected by Mr. Pachitch was not so 
liberal as the Bulgarian manifesto to the inhabitants of the annexed countries 
had hoped. The new citizens were not to possess the franchise for fear lest a 
new "Macedonian" party should thus be brought into the Skupshtina to upset 
all the relations between the contending parties in the kingdom and form the 
mark of common jealousy. Some sort of local franchise or self-government was 
considered. A kind of compromise was suggested in the shape of military 
administration with a civil annex and representatives of the departments at 
Belgrade, on the familiar plan employed in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the 
1908 annexation. In any case, the question of the administration to be erected 
in Macedonia displayed so wide a divergence between the views of Mr. Pachitch 
and his colleagues, apart from the military group, that Mr. Pachitch's resignation 
was talked of. 

Mr. Pachitch neither resigned nor insisted on his own standpoint. Silence 
fell on such isolated voices as that of the President of the Skupshtina, Mr. Andre 
Nicolits, who protested in the foreign press against the exceptional regime in 
Macedonia and asked for constitutional guarantees. The Piemont, the organ 
of the military party, declared that such notions were "opposed to the interests 
of the State," and assured the Servian public that "the population of Macedonia 
had never for a moment thought of elections, or communal self-government," 
etc. ; that "nothing save a military regime could be entirely just, humanely severe 
and sufficiently firm to break the will of individuals or groups hostile to the 

Macedonia had thus to be viewed as a dependency, a sort of conquered 
colony, which these conquerors might administer at their good pleasure. In 
the course of the debates on the address in the Skupshtina (November) this 
attitude found highly definite expression in a reply of Mr. Protits, a member 
of the cabinet, interrupted by a member of the opposition. "The question," said 
Mr. Protits, "is — are we to apply to Old Servia the constitution created by the 
Servian Kingdom and which has had happy results ?" Mr. Paul Marinkovits — 

x See the Statnpa, August 13/26. The contents of these communications came to our 
knowledge at Belgrade itself, from reliable, first-hand Servian sources. 


"But Old Servia is the Servian Kingdom." — "No, it is not the Servian Kingdom." 
Such was the spirit in which the Servian government on September 21/ 
October 4, issued a decree on "public security" in the recently acquired terri- 
tories, which amounted to the establishment of a military dictatorship, and called 
forth cries of horror in the foreign press. The document is so characteristic 
and so important that, despite its length, we quote it in extenso: 

Article 1. The police authorities are authorized, in case of a deficiency in the regular 
organization for securing the liberty and security of persons and property, to ask the 
military commander for the troops necessary for the maintenance of order and tranquillity. 
The military commander is bound to comply immediately with these demands, and the 
police is bound to inform the Minister of the Interior of them. 

Article 2. Any attempt at rebellion against the public powers is punishable by five 
years' penal servitude. 

The decision of the police authorities, published in the respective communes, is suf- 
ficient proof of the commission of crime. 

If the rebel refuses to give himself up as prisoner within ten days from such publica- 
tion, he may be put to death by any public or military officer. 

Article 3. Any person accused of rebellion in terms of the police decision and who 
commits any crime shall be punished with death. 

If the accused person himself gives himself up as a prisoner into the hands of the 
authorities, the death penalty shall be commuted to penal servitude for ten or twenty 
years, always provided that the commutation is approved by the tribunal. 

Article 4. Where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels do not 
return to their homes within ten days from the police notice, the authorities have the right 
of deporting their families whithersoever they may find convenient. 

Likewise the inhabitants of the houses in which armed persons or criminals in general 
are found concealed, shall be deported. 

The heads of the police shall transmit to the Prefecture a report on the deportation 
procedure, which is to be put in force immediately. 

The Minister of the Interior shall, if he think desirable, rescind deportation measures. 

Article 5. Any person deported by an order of the Prefecture who shall return to his 
original domicile without the authorization of the Minister of the Interior shall be pun- 
ished by three years' imprisonment. 

Article 6. If in any commune or any canton the maintenance of security demands the 
sending of troops, the maintenance of the latter shall be charged to the commune or the 
canton. In such a case the Prefect is to be notified. 

If order is restored after a brief interval and the culprits taken, the Minister of the 
Interior may refund such expenses to the canton or the commune. 

The Minister may act in this way as often as he may think desirable. 

Article 7. Any person found carrying arms who has not in his possession a permit 
from the police or from the Prefect, or who shall hide arms in his house or elsewhere, 
shall be condemned to a penalty varying from three months' imprisonment to five years' 
penal servitude. 

Anyone selling arms or ammunition without a police permit shall be liable to the same 

Article 8. Any person using any kind of explosives, knowing that such use is 
dangerous to the life and goods of others, shall be punished with twenty years' penal 

Article 9. Anyone who shall prepare explosives or direct their preparation or who 
knows of the existence of explosives intended for the commission of a crime shall, subject 
to Article 8, be punished by ten years' penal servitude. 

Article 10. Any person receiving, keeping or transporting explosives intended for a 
criminal purpose shall be punished by five years' penal servitude, except where he does so 
with the intention of preventing the commission of a crime. 

Article 11. Any person who uses an explosive without any evil intention, shall be pun- 
ished by five years' penal servitude. 

Article 12. (1) Anyone deliberately harming the roads, streets or squares in such a way 
as to endanger life or public health, shall be punished by fifteen years' penal servitude. 

If the delinquency be unintentional the penalty shall be five years. 


(2) If the author of the crime cited above causes danger to the life or health of 
numerous persons, or if his action results in the death of several individuals (and this 
could be foreseen), he shall be punished by death or twenty years' penal servitude. If 
the crime be unpremeditated the punishment shall be ten years. 

Article 13. Any attempt at damaging the railway lines or navigation, shall be punished 
by twenty years' penal servitude. If the attempt is not premeditated the punishment shall 
be for ten years. 

If the author of such attempt has endangered the life of several individuals, or if 
his action results in death or wounds to several persons, he shall be punished by death 
or twenty years' penal servitude. 

Article 14. Any person injuring the means of telegraphic or telephonic communication 
shall be punished by fifteen years' penal servitude. If the act is not premeditated the 
penalty shall be five years. 

Article 15. Generally speaking the concealment of armed or guilty persons shall be 
punished by ten years' penal servitude. 

Article 16. Anyone who knozvs a malefactor and does not denounce him to the 
authorities shall be punished by five years' penal servitude. 

Article 17. Those instigating to disobedience against the established powers, the laws 
and the regulations with the force of law; rebels against the authorities or public or 
communal officers; shall be punished by twenty-one months' imprisonment up to ten 
years' penal servitude. 

If such acts produce no effects, the penalty may be reduced to three months. 

Article 18. Any act of aggression and any resistance either by word or force, offered 
to a public or communal officer charged with putting in force a decision of the tribunal, 
or an order of the communal or police public authority, during the exercise of his duties, 
may be punished by ten years' penal servitude or at least six months' imprisonment, 
however insignificant be the magnitude of the crime. 

Any aggression against those helping the public officer, or experts specially called in, 
may be punished by the same penalty. 

If the aggression offered to the public officer takes place outside the exercise of his 
official duties the penalty shall be two years' imprisonment. 

Article 19. Where the crimes here enumerated are perpetrated by an associated group 
of persons, the penalty shall be fifteen years' penal servitude. The accomplices of those 
who committed the above mentioned misdeeds against public officials shall be punished 
by the maximum penalty, and, if this is thought insufficient, they may be condemned to 
penal servitude for a period amounting to twenty years. 

Article 20. Those who recruit bands against the State, or with a view to offering 
resistance to public authorities shall be liable to a penalty of twenty years' penal servitude. 

Article 21. Accomplices of rebels or of bands offering armed resistance to Servian 
troops or the public or communal officers, shall be punished by death or by at least ten 
years' penal servitude. 

Article 22. Persons taking part in seditious meetings which do not disperse when 
ordered to do so by the administrative or communal authorities are liable to terms of 
imprisonment up to two years. 

Article 23. In the case of the construction of roads, or, generally speaking, of 
public works of all kinds, agitators who incite workmen to strike or who are unwilling 
to work or who seek to work elsewhere or in another manner, from that in which they 
are told and who persist in such insubordination, after notification by the authorities 
shall be punished by imprisonment from three months up to two years. 

Article 24. Any soldier or citizen called to the colors who does not follow the 
call, or who refuses in the army to obey his superiors, shall be condemned to a penalty 
varying from three months' imprisonment to five years' penal servitude. 

Soldiers who assist any one to desert from the army or who desert themselves, and 
those who make endeavors to attract Servian subjects to serve with foreign troops, shall 
be punished by ten years' penal servitude. 

In time of mobilization or war the penalty for this delinquency is death. 

Article 25. Anybody releasing an individual under surveillance or under the guard of 
officials or public employes for surveillance, guard or escort, or setting such person at 
liberty, shall be condemned to penal servitude for a maximum period of five years. 

Where such delinquency is the work of an organized group of individuals, each 
accomplice shall be liable to a penalty of between three and five years' penal servitude. 

Article 26. Th^ Prefects have the right to prescribe in their name police measures to 
safeguard the life and property of those subject to their administration. They shall 
fix penalties applicable to those who refuse to submit to such measures. 


The penalty shall consist of a maximum period of three years' imprisonment or of a 
pecuniary fine up to a thousand dinars. 

The edicts of the Prefects shall come into force immediately, but the Prefects are 
bound to communicate them at once to the Minister of the Interior. 

Article 27. The crimes set forth in the present regulations are to have precedence 
of all other suits before the judicial tribunals and judgment upon them is to be executed 
with the briefest possible delay. 

Persons indicted for such offences shall be subject to preventive detention until final 
judgment is passed on their cases. Within a three days' delay the tribunal shall send 
its findings to the High Court, and the latter shall proceed immediately to the examination 
of this decision. 

Article 28. The law of July 12, 1895, as to the pursuit and destruction of brigands, 
which came into force on August 18, 1913, is applicable to the annexed territories, in 
so far as it is not modified by the present regulations. 

Article 29. Paragraphs 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 302 b, 302 c, 302 d, (so far as concerns 
paragraphs b and c) 304, 306, and 360, and Section III of the penal code which do not 
agree with the present regulation, are null and void. 

Article 30. The present regulation does not abolish the provisions of paragraph 34 of 
the penal military code, in connection with paragraph 4 of the same code, paragraphs 52 and 
69 of the penal military code and paragraph 4 of the same, which are not applicable to 
civil persons. 

Article 31. The present regulation is in force from the day of its signature by the 
King and its publication in the Servian press. 

We order our Council of Ministers to make the present regulation public and to see 
that it is carried into effect: we order the public authorities to act in conformity with 
it, and we order each and all to submit to it. 

Executed at Belgrade, September 21, 1913. 


In the words of the Socialist Servian paper, Radnitchke Nozrine, "If the 
liberation of these territories is a fact, why then is this exceptional regime estab- 
lished there? If the inhabitants are Servians why are they not made the equals 
of all the Servians ; why is the constitutional rule not put in operation according 
to which 'all Servians are equal before the law'? If the object of the wars was 
unification, why is not this unification effectively recognized, and why are these 
exceptional ordinances created, such as can only be imposed upon conquered 
countries by conquerors? Moreover, our constitution does not admit of rules 
of this nature!" 

As a matter of fact, if one did not know what Macedonia is, one might 
guess it from the publication of these ordinances. Clearly Macedonia was not 
"Old Servia" unified, since the population is treated as "rebels in a perpetual 
state of revolt." What the ordinances had in view were not isolated criminals, — 
they had accomplices and people who would hide them everywhere. To punish 
the culprit? That was not enough while his family remained; his family must 
be deported and the friends who were unwilling to "denounce" the culprit, his 
"associates," who seized the opportunity of "setting him at liberty" when he 
was "under surveillance, guard or escort" by officials or public employes — they 
must be deported too. In short, a whole population was "recalcitrant," and to> 
resist it there were only these "public or communal officers" invested with ex- 
traordinary powers. What were they to do, when the population, not content 
with offering passive resistance, became "aggressive." This population, called 
to the colors, refused "to obey the call." When asked to "work" on the "con- 


struction of roads" or on any communal works, they struck, they preferred to 
work "elsewhere or in some other manner." Finally, each one "refused to give 
himself up as a prisoner," always holding himself ready to attack the public 
officers, "to resist them if not by force at least by word!" This last crime is 
punished by the ordinances by "ten years penal servitude, or at least six months 
imprisonment however insignificant be the words or the deeds" The hope 
openly expressed to the members of the Commission from the first half of August 
onwards, was that thanks to these measures an end will be made of the resist- 
ance of the alien population in Macedonia in five or six years ! 

The military party knew what it was about when it insisted on the publica- 
tion of this Draconian edict, which was but a quasi legal sanction given to the 
actual activities of the powers in occupation in Macedonia. But such a formal 
admission on paper (in a document immediately published in the foreign press) 
frightened more than the members of the Servian Opposition. Thus, on Octo- 
ber 15/28, the Servian government, after three weeks' reflection, published cer- 
tain changes in the' ordinances of September 21. The obligation laid upon the 
troops for coming to the assistance of the civil power became less general. It 
was now only in the case of "grave and serious trouble" that they were to do so. 
But the right possessed by the Minister of the Interior not to charge the popu- 
lation "if order was reestablished quickly" (see Article 6) was limited by the 
control of the Council of Ministers. 

The scandalous Article 26, giving legislative power to the Prefects, was 
amended by the addition of the following clause : — "On condition that the ordi- 
nances of the Prefects accord with existing ordinances and the laws." The 
extent of the sanction contemplated in Article 26 (imprisonment up to three 
years and a fine up to fr. 1,000) was reduced to one month and fr. 300. But 
these amendments merely confirm the rest of the edict, and they were clearly 
insufficient. The opposition press continued to attack the government and to 
demand the reign of law for the population of the annexed territories and the 
extension to these territories of the constitution of the kingdom. "If deputies 
for the annexed territories had seats in the Skupshtina," said the Pravda of 
November 13/26, "the foreign press, which is at present ill-disposed towards 
Servia, would no longer be able to retain the credence which its malicious inven- 
tions have won in Europe as regards the Servian atrocities." "A nation can not 
be conciliated," it added a few days later, "by giving it an inferior position under 
the law." Another paper, the Novosti, tried to harmonize these objections with 
the official theory of a Servian Macedonia. "A military regime," it said, "is 
perfectly adapted to a conquered country whose population speaks a different 
language, but this is not the case with a country whose population is entirely 
Servian. That is why," the Novosti concluded, "the introduction of a consti- 
tutional regime in the new territories is absolutely justified." 

The government could not admit that it was precisely this condition of 


identity of nationality which was lacking in Macedonia. The ministerial organs 
were reduced to saying "that the level of culture" was not sufficiently high 
among the Macedonians, and that their "State consciousness" was not suffi- 
ciently developed to permit the immediate grant of full political rights. Finally 
on November 23/December 6, the government decided to announce the draft 
of an abridged constitution for Macedonia, which was to be put in force for a 
period of ten years. This constitution did not sanction the liberty of the press 
nor of meetings ; it conferred the right neither to elect nor to be elected. Rights 
of self-government were not given to the electoral assemblies of the prefectures, 
sub-prefectures or communes; the magistrates were not irremovable and the 
courts of criminal justice did not include juries. The death penalty, abolished 
by Article 13 of the Servian constitution, was reestablished by the simple omis- 
sion of this article in a simplified "constitution." In a word, it could be said 
that the Turkish "law of vilayets," in combination with the ancient rights and 
privileges of the Christian communities, granted to the different nationalities 
by treaties and firmans, gave far better assurance of mutual toleration, and even 
a more effective rein on the arbitrary power of the administration, than was 
afforded by this new draft constitution, which, from the administrative point of 
view, did nothing to abolish the measures laid down in the ordinances of Sep- 
tember 21. 

The opposition press did not fail to point this out. On November 28/ 
December 11, the Pravda asked, "Are the people of the annexed territories to 
have fewer rights now than they possessed under Turkish regime?" The 
Novosti said: — "The population has no rights, only duties." The Pravda 
pointed out that it is better to follow Cavour than Bismarck, and suggested 
(December 1/14), that these "dictatorial paragraphs" were on the high 
road to Zabern. Finally, despite the assurances of the official organ, the 
Sammouprava, to the effect that the new constitution guaranteed the personal 
property of the individual in every case, as well as the moral and economic 
development of the country, the world refused to believe it — and rightly, as we 
shall see. 

As a matter of fact, if it was desired to make "Servian" Macedonia a reality 
instead of allowing it to remain what it was, — a national illusion in which aspira- 
tions were translated into accomplished facts, — it was necessary to understand, 
however little one might approve, the tactics of the government. If the opposi- 
tion were to be logical they must renounce their national view. If they insisted 
upon that, they must admit that for the real attainment of their object of an 
ethnic "unification," everything remained to be done. To admit the end was to sanc- 
tion the means, i. e., the extermination, or at least the elimination of alien elements,' 
and above all of the Bulgarian element. It was the existence and the permeation 
of these elements which throughout decades constituted the essence and, so to 
speak, the Gordian knot of the Macedonian problem. To endeavor to escape 


from the problem by pretending not to know its essential elements, was to ekide 
difficulties instead of solving them. 

The Servian government and the military party to which the task of making 
an end of the difficulty was entrusted, marched direct to the attainment of their 
end. They made, on a truly imposing scale, a sociological experiment in anima 
vili, which governments and nations far better equipped than the Servian king- 
dom could not have carried through with success. 

We have seen the beginning of this work of assimilation through terror. 
It was not until the beginning of the second Balkan war gave the signal for 
putting everything which still bore the Bulgarian name into the melting pot, that 
means were employed to carry out this object which surpassed anything seen 
hitherto. Let us look first at the steps taken by the Servian government against 
the heads of the National church in Macedonia. 

The members of the Commission were profoundly moved by the depositions 
which the six dignitaries of the Bulgarian church were good enough to make 
before them during their visit to the Holy Synod at Sofia. These dignitaries 
were the Archbishops Auxentious of Pelagonia (Monastir-Bitolia), Cosmas of 
Dibra (Debar), Meletius of Veles, Neophyte of Uskub (Skopie), Boris of 
Okhrida, and the Archbishop of Dibra's Vicar, Ilarion Bishop of Nichava. All 
the prelates came to enter a formal protest before the Russian Ambassador at 
Sofia against the declaration made by the Servian embassy at St. Petersburg, to 
the effect that the Bulgarian Archbishops of Macedonia had themselves asked to 
leave their dioceses. "If the Servian government," they said in their written 
protest, "really never intended to drive us forth we are ready to return as soon 
as it may be possible to guard the flocks whose legitimate pastors we are." 1 

We have seen that the Servian and Greek governments had taken all pos- 
sible steps to isolate these pastors from their flocks. When the second war was 
about to break out, the Bulgarian Archbishops regarded themselves as prisoners 
within their Metropolis. Their visitors were watched, questioned, loaded with 
blows and put to the torture. The priests were not even allowed to see their 
superiors except at church, and divine service was the only opportunity which 
these Archbishops had of showing themselves to such persons as were still bold 
enough to enter a Bulgarian church. June 17/30, the day on which the outbreak 
of hostilities became known, was the term of their residence in Macedonia. 
Each in turn, they eagerly told us of their last impressions. Mr. Neophyte of 
Uskub had, on the evening of the 17/30, been shut up in his own house, and 
throughout two days his cook alone was allowed to go out of the Metropolis 
to purchase food. A most thorough investigation then took place, after which 
the cook herself was kept prisoner for two days. The Archbishop had no 
food save bread passed in to him through the window by his neighbors, at great 

^The Servian declaration was published on August 12/25, in the St. Petersburg 
paper the Novoye Vremia. The reply of the Archbishop S. E. M. Nekloudov was signed 
on August 29/September 11, at Sofia. 


personal risk to themselves. The cries of the cook drew the attention of the 
police, and she was once more allowed to go out, this time under escort. On 
June 24/July 7, the head of the police came and suggested to the Archbishop 
that he should go to Salonica, his personal security and respect for his inviola- 
bility being guaranteed (this, as we shall see, was not superfluous). Mr. Neo- 
phyte refused; he was there by the will of the people and there he intended to 
remain. "To what end, since you can not exercise your functions?" — "For 
example, in my private capacity, to purchase Turkish houses, if you please," 
he replied. An hour later they returned to the charge. The prefect regretted 
that he had not been obeyed, for he could no longer answer for the Archbishop's 
safety. Finally, in the evening the comedy came to an end; the Archbishop was 
made to read an indictment under twelve heads. He had said prayers for four 
monarchs, instead of for King Peter alone; he had not said prayers for the 
Servian Archbishop; he had busied himself with civil matters, ordering a priest 
from the village to come and see him in the Metropolis, etc. When Mr. Neo- 
phyte refused to sign, he was given two hours in which to prepare himself 
for departure, and then sent through Niche to Smederevo, on the Danube, 
whence he departed for Bulgaria. 

At Veles the officials of the Archbishopric were arrested and the archives 
were ransacked so early as January 24/February 6. The Suffragan Bishop was 
obliged to leave Veles after another attack on the Metropolis on February 4/17, 
in which an official of the Metropolis, Mr. Mikhilov, was beaten and maltreated 
to such an extent that he lost consciousness. On March 28/ April 10, Arch- 
bishop Meletius returned to Veles. He was closely watched by the police, and 
during his whole sojourn at Veles he was only allowed to see three priests and 
one instructor. On June 17/30. he, like Mr. Neophyte, was made a prisoner in 
his own house. On June 24/July 7, he was told in his turn to leave the town. 
Thinking that this was a temporary measure, he agreed on condition of remaining 
at Uskub until the end of the war. He signed a document to this effect. On 
the 25th he was told that Mr. Neophyte had left Uskub and that he had an hour 
in which to follow him. Mr. Meletius then asked for a written order. "The 
order will be sent to you at the frontier" (this was a lie). We will say nothing 
of the incidents of the voyage. Mr. Meletius rejoined Mr. Neophyte at Smede- 
revo, and they were both sent through Raduivatz to Roustchouk. 

The other three Archbishops, from Monastir, Okhrida and Dibra, did not 
get off so easily. They were sent via Salonica to Constantinople. On June 
17/30. the police arrived, accompanied by officers and soldiers, to arrest the 
staff of the Archbishopric of Monastir. In the course of the perquisition which 
took place, rough drafts of reports of acts of violence committed by the Servians 
on the Bulgarian population were discovered, addressed to the Metropolis at 
S&lonica and the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Sofia. Here the sequestration 
lasted up to the 24th, on which date the authorities proceeded to a sort of inquiry. 


Stress was laid "on relations entered into with a foreign government," and the 
article of the criminal code relative to this form of crime, prescribing a penalty 
of twenty years imprisonment, was read out. After having thus prepared the 
ground, the authorities returned in the afternoon. "You will start tomorrow for 
Bulgaria." "Impossible, it is too soon." "Papers found upon you have annoyed 
the military authorities ; we are ordered to bring you before a court-martial. 
A court-martial, as you are well aware, does not at this moment always observe 
the laws; it often judges as seems fit to it and the sentences passed are executed 
on the spot; well, to save you from such a fate, the prefect is being so kind 
as to make himself responsible for the Archbishop's departure tomorrow in the 
morning." "Agreed." "First of all, a little formality has to be gone through. 
Here is the draft of a letter. Be so good as to transcribe it in Bulgarian, and 
state over your own name that, 'owing to the hostilities between Servia and 
Bulgaria, it is unpleasing to you to remain at Monastir.' What? You refuse? 
Then there is the court-martial. Let us see." Mr. Auxentius signed, though 
his conscience protested. On the next day he was sent to Salonica, and thence 
made his way to Bulgaria via Constantinople and Odessa. 

The case of Mr. Boris of Okhrida is similar. The papers found in the 
Metropolis of Monastir also included reports from the Archbishop of Okhrida 
to the Ministry at Sofia. The chief commander at Uskub was immediately in- 
formed of this and telegraphed the order for the Archbishop's arrest. On June 
25/July 8, he was roused at three o'clock in the morning and given ten minutes 
in which to prepare himself to depart for Monastir. He had hardly time to 
take a shirt and an overcoat with him. At Monastir the same prefect, Mr. 
Douchane Alimpits, played the same little scene. The books of the law were 
brought, Mr. Boris was questioned, a protocol was read to him in which the 
existence of a revolutionary committee, preparing a rebellion against the Ser- 
vian authorities, was inferred, and of which Mr. Auxentius was accused of 
being the president and Mr. Boris his assistant. Its members were the deacons 
and inspectors of the Archbishopric, the secretaries, priests, schoolmasters and 
notables. In vain did Mr. Boris endeavor to prove that this accusation was 
simply the fruit of an overheated imagination. Mr. Alimpits went on repeating 
accusations of "treason," deserving the penalty of death by shooting, etc. He 
then displayed a most active desire to see Mr. Boris saved from the death which 
threatened him, and out of his pocket he drew a paper written in Servian. 
Thereupon, Mr. Boris read the sketch of a declaration somewhat as follows: 
On the outbreak of the fratricidal war he regarded his mission as fulfilled, he 
renounced of his own free will the dignity of exarchist Metropolitan of the 
diocese of Okhrida, and asked for a permit to Salonica and an escort to accom- 
pany him thither. Mr. Boris replied that the whole Bulgarian population of 
the diocese had chosen him as their spiritual chief ; he could not renounce his 
charge on any pretext; he regarded such a demand as an outrage, while the 


declaration could not be valid even for the end they had in view. The prefect, 
with some annoyance, repeated the order, adding that it was the desire of a 
higher commander, and that in case of refusal all preparations were made for 
bringing the Archbishop before a court-martial and destroying him as a traitor 
in the interests of the State. 

"As for me," so Mr. Boris stated to the Commission, "I recalled the fate 
of victims who had been slain and of whom no traces had been left; the death 
of the schoolmaster Luteviev, slain by the soldiers at Prilepe, after the banquet 
at which he had ventured to sing the praises of the Bulgarian army and propose 
the health of King Ferdinand; of Stamboldgiev, a citizen of Monastir, who 
was sacrificed with his whole family. Further, I recalled the inhumanity of 
these wretches, who compelled their own Archbishop Michael to leave his dio- 
cese. I recalled likewise that these were men not given to joking, men who 
tore their princes and their kings to pieces, and * * * with profound bit- 
terness, and in the depths of my soul something of shame, I obeyed the order 
of this brute of a captain, an order which I could not recall." * * * On 
the 26th Mr. Boris left for Salonica and rejoined Mr. Auxentius there. Two 
days later the regent of the Archbishopric of Dibra, Bishop Ilarion of Nichava, 
arrived there likewise. He was less fortunate than the others, for at Salonica 
he was imprisoned and remained there in confinement for twenty-seven days. 
The reason was that the Greeks, having no Bulgarian bishops among their 
prisoners, were already sorry that they had let Messrs. Auxentius and Boris 
go. They therefore kept Mr. Ilarion as a hostage, and did not set him at liberty 
until two days after the conclusion of peace. 

The departure of the bishops was the end of the exarchist church in Mace- 
donia, the end of the official and recognized existence of Bulgarian nationality. 
The powers in occupation were not slow in drawing conclusions thus harmonious 
with their desires. We know in fact that they did not even wait for their 
departure to set to work on the complete destruction of "Bulgarism" in Mace- 
donia. During the first months of occupation, September, October, and even 
November, it was still possible to explain what happened as the result of mis- 
understanding, and as the abuse of power by irresponsible elements or by local 
authorities; later, however, this explanation became untenable. From the com- 
mencement of 1913 we have to deal with a systematic persecution of the Bulga- 
rian nationality, more particularly in the regions assigned by the treaty of 
February 29, 1912, to Servia. After March, at which date it became clear 
that Servia was not going to secure an outlet on the Adriatic littoral, and after 
the Bulgarians, on the other hand, had succeeded in taking Adrianople (March 
13/26), there was no longer any concealment of the preparations which were 
being made for the complete annexation of all the occupied territories in Mace- 
donia. The conclusion of peace with Turkey (May 17/30), and the speech 
delivered by Mr. Pachitch in the Skupshtina, were the signal for beginning 


preparations for conflict between the allies, the search for arms held by suspects, 
the call to the colors of all those on whom it was thought reliance could be 
placed. Two weeks later, every one in Macedonia was saying war with Bul- 
garia was imminent, and acting on that belief. On July 17/30 the decisive 
moment arrived. 

For six months, while waiting for the allied armies to take up arms, the 
Servians had been carrying on guerrilla warfare in Macedonia, side by side 
with the regular army. They armed their old bands, whose captains and soldiers 
wore military uniform. At Uskub, a central committee of "national defense," 
with branches in other Macedonian towns, was formed side by side with the 
higher command, upon the arrival of the troops. The population of Uskub 
called their station behind the house of Weiss, near the Russian consulate, "the 
black house," from the name of the league itself, "the black hand." 1 The 
worst crimes were committed by this secret organization, known to all the 
world and under powerful protection. It was of distinct advantage for the 
regular government to have under its hand an irresponsible power which, like 
this, soon became all powerful, and which could always be disowned if neces- 
sary. There were so many things which were not crimes, but which, from the 
point of view of Servian assimilation, were worse than crimes. Such, for 
example, as being too influential a citizen, wise enough, while remaining an 
ardent Bulgarian patriot, not to contravene the orders of the authority, and 
whose past called for vengeance; the Bulgarian flag, a business house, a library, 
a chemist shop kept by a Bulgarian, or a cafe, not amenable to the prohibi- 
tion of public meetings, etc. The man was taken, one evening he was led 
into the "black house" and there beaten; then for whole months he lay ill, if 
indeed he did not disappear completely. Our records are full of depositions 
which throw light on the sinister activities of these legalized brigands. Un- 
happily all the names can not be cited. * * * Each town had its captain 
who soon acquired fame. At Koumanovo there was a certain Major Voulovits 
and his assistant Captain Rankovits; at Veles one Voino Popovits, a Vassa, a 
Vanguel, etc. Where complaints were made to the regular authorities, they 
pretended to know nothing of the matter, or if,*jthe person complaining was 
obscure they punished him. If he were a personage, as for example in the case 
of the Archbishop of Veles, his complaint was met by sending the bands from 
the town of Veles down to the villages * * * only to replace them imme- 
diately afterwards by bands from Uskub. 

1 The Belgrade Tribune published ("Serb. Cor." November 18/December 1) revelations 
by an anonymous officer who had been a member of the secret organization of "the black 
hand." The object of this organization, formed on the principle of the Carbonari, was, 
according to him, the liberation of the Servians from the Turkish yoke. Later on, the 
comrade by whom he had been initiated, told him that owing to the incapacity of the 
radical government it was necessary to replace this organization by another which was to 
be composed of members of other political parties. He clearly regarded the "black hand" 
as being formed of government partisans. 


It was in the villages that the activity of these bands assumed its most 
fatal form. In the towns the regular authorities kept up appearances and did 
not concern themselves with the bandits; but lower in the administrative scale, 
in the village, the responsible and the irresponsible mingled and were lost in 
one another. This was the easier that from the end of 1912 on the administra- 
tive posts in the villages were rilled by men of the type already described in 
Chapter I — paid representatives of national minorities, Serbo-manes, or Grseco- 
manes, who very often had served as spies with the Turks. * * * These 
people, while possessing a highly intimate knowledge of affairs, had their own 
scores to wipe off * * * they had only to utter the name of one of their 
enemies, and the bands arrest him, leave him to find a ransom, beat him or even 
kill him with impunity. This is the regime of anarchy summed up in a letter 
published in the Manchester Guardian and given below. 1 

What were the results secured by this implacable system at the time of the 
beginning of the Serbo-Bulgarian war? A Bulgarian schoolmaster has de- 
scribed them as follows : "Even if one were an European one would declare 
oneself Servian, if one were alone, without support, in that state of unrestrained 
brigandage, fostered by the legal power." The end, however, was not yet 
attained, and, on the outbreak of the second war, the powers in occupation 
seized the opportunity to undertake new measures of repression which made 
an end of the open existence of Bulgarian nationality. Progress of this repres- 
sion in different parts of Macedonia can be traced in the depositions taken by 

x After citing the Servian ordinances of which we have spoken above the English 
paper goes on : "This is the theory of Servian coercion. The practice is worse. Servia 
is not a country with a large educated population. It has indeed some 80 per cent of 
illiterates. It has to supply rulers for a conquered territory which almost equals it in 
extent, and the abler men regard life in rural Macedonia as exile. Unworthy agents are 
invested with sovereign powers. The consequences are vividly, if briefly, described in a 
personal letter which arrived recently, and is translated below. The writer is a man of 
high character and a minister of religion — it is safer not to indicate his church. He is a 
native of the country, but has had a European education, and is not himself a member 
of the persecuted Bulgarian community : 

The situation grows more and more unbearable for the Bulgarians — a perfect hell. 
I had opportunities of talking with peasants from the interior. What they tell us makes 
one shudder. Every group of four or five villages has an official placed over it who, with 
six or seven underlings, men of disreputable antecedents, carries out perquisitions, and 
on the pretext of searching for arms steals everything that is worth taking. They indulge 
in flogging and robbery and violate many of the women and girls. Tributes under the form 
of military contributions are arbitrarily imposed. One village of 110 families had already 
been fined 6,000 dinars (£240) and now it has to pay another 2,000 (£80). The priest of 
the village, to avoid being sent into exile, has had to pay a ransom of £T.50. Poor emi- 
grants returning from America have had to pay from ten to twenty Napoleons for permission 
to go to their homes. The officials and officers carry out wholesale robberies through the 
customs and the army contracts. The police is all powerful, especially the secret service. 
Bands of Servian terrorists (comitadjis) recruited by the government, swarm all over the 
country. They go from village to village, and woe to anyone who dares to refuse them 
anything. These bands have a free hand to do as they please, in order to Serbize the popu- 
lation. Shepherds are forbidden to drive their flocks to pasture lest (such is the excuse) 
they should supply the Bulgarian bands with food. In a word it is an absolute anarchy. 
We shall soon have a famine for the Serbs have taken everything, and under present con- 
ditions no one can earn a living. Everyone would like to emigrate, but it is impossible to 
get permission even to visit a neighboring village." 


the Commission at Sofia from Bulgarian intellectuals, refugees from Mace- 
donia, and completed by the reports of the Bulgarian ecclesiastical authorities. 

It was to be expected that those territories in Macedonia which were, accord- 
ing to the treaty, to remain Servian, should receive the most serious attention. 
Uskub, Koumanovo, Tetovo, Gostivar, in a word the whole northeast corner 
of Macedonia, was to feel the first brunt of Serbization. At Koumanovo, the 
priest Yanev, the Archbishop's vicar, was driven out on March 11/24, after a 
violent scene with one of those Servian chieftains who became officers, one 
Liouba Voulvits. He pulled the priest by the beard, beat him and finally said 
to him that "he would not kill him, because the Servians were a civilized nation, 
not savages like the Bulgarians." "I give you up to this evening to clear out of 
Servian territory, otherwise, dog, you shall be killed." The violence used by 
this same Voulvits in the villages whose population he was persuading to become 
Servian, not to read Bulgarian books, etc., may be passed over in silence. This 
same Voulvits employed the same tactics for the vicars of Kratovo and Palanka, 
and for the population of the villages. As a result, the towns of Koumanovo, 
Palanka, Kratovo, Gostivar and the surrounding villages, the nehie of St. 
Nicolas, and the villages of Uskub and Tetovo, were formally proclaimed Ser- 
vian at the moment of the outbreak of the war. Schoolmasters and priests who 
were unwilling to submit fled and took refuge in Bulgaria. The only places left 
to resist were the towns of Uskub and Tetovo. 

To terrorize the population of Tetovo was easy. Tetovo had been in a 
state of panic since May 23/June 5. The municipal authorities, followed by 
bands and a crowd of Turkish children, harangued the inhabitants, inviting them 
to become "volunteers" against the "worst enemy" of the Servian state. These 
processions took place daily for three days, but the end not being secured, they 
were followed by repression, domiciliary visitation and the persecution of sus- 
pected citizens. A certain Pano Grantcharov, or Gherov, tried to commit suicide 
to escape being entered as a Servian volunteer. Greater success was gained in 
the villages, after beating the inhabitants, as was done at Stentche, Volkovia, 
Jiltche, Raotintsi, Lechok. On May 29/June 11 the priest Anguelov, the Arch- 
bishop's vicar, was incarcerated and the prefect told him that all those calling 
themselves Bulgarians were regarded as rebels against the authority. They 
were evidently in a hurry to make an end of Bulgarism, and on June 6/19, all 
the presidents of communes and all village priests were summoned together 
in a Serbized monastery. The representatives of Servian temporal and ecclesias- 
tical power were present, and after a long discourse in honor of the historic 
glories of Servia, it was proposed to the assembled priests and heads of com- 
munes, "that they should become Servian and send a telegram to King Peter." 
A single priest saved himself by flight and two village priests were absent. 

At Uskub, under the eyes of the foreign consuls and in the presence of 
"the higher commander," difficulties were met with in the execution of official 


Serbization. But "the black harlti" supplied what was wanting in official activity, 
and several of its exploits are known to the Commission. 1 The state of mind 
of the soldiers quartered at Uskub may be illustrated by a little story. 

On March 7/20, towards 6 o'clock in the evening, a Bulgarian, Demetrius 
Gheorghiev, was standing at the door of his house on the Vardar bridge. A 
little distance off, at the door of another house, there was a Servian officer, 
Major Boutchits. At this moment the Bulgarian General Pitrikov entered the 
town, and his orderly, one Igno, passing along the road, greeted Dimtche. Mr. 
Boutchits at once makes a sign to him to draw near, pushes him into the corridor 
of his house, kicks him with his feet, turns him twice over on the ground, cracks 
his skull and finally is trying to suffocate him, when his father coming up with 
soldiers saved his life. All the time Mr. Boutchits accompanied his blows with 
cynical oaths upon his "mortal enemies," the Bulgarians. 

In January the Uskub government made a first attempt at patriotic statistics. 
The sub-prefect, Boro Milanovits, ordered the heads of the communes to enter 
the Bulgarian population as Servian on pain of fine and imprisonment. This 
time the schoolmasters and priests were also invited to proclaim themselves 
Servian. But the matter did not go off smoothly. On March 16 the peasants 
of the village of Nerezi complained to Archbishop Neophyte. When he spoke 
to Tserovits, the prefect, the latter pretended that the thing was being done by 
"stupid officials" for whom he excused himself before the Archbishop. He 
then summoned the village priest and forbade him to visit his parishioners until 
he had obtained the permission of the Servian Archbishop. The villagers of 
Nerezi were arrested as they came out of the Bulgarian Metropolis and were 
cast into prison. From this time on the peasants from the villages were 
afraid to go to their Archbishop. Next, the same thing was tried with the 
inhabitants of the town; terrorization went on throughout Passion week, and 
it was hoped that the result would be that they would be too much frightened 
to come to the Bulgarian church on Easter day. The Archbishop again com- 
plained at the Russian consulate and at the prefecture, and the Bulgarian popu- 
lation, that is to say the great majority of the Christian population at Uskub, 
took advantage of the last opportunity which it was to have of going to its own 
church and taking part in the religious procession of the second Sunday. Re- 
sistance on the part of priests and schoolmasters in the town went on despite 
every kind of persecution up to the end of May. On May 11/24, the national 
festival of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, the population disregarded the order 
forbidding shops to be closed. A number of domiciliary perquisitions took place 
on the morrow, with the object of discovering a new revolutionary organization. 

At the end of May opportunity for a new demonstration of independence 
was afforded by the enrolling of volunteers. As at Tetovo, the enrolment took 

ilt was this band which beat Methodius. See Chapter I. 


place by force and on May 26/June 8, all those enrolled were gathered together 
at Uskub. Almost all the "volunteers" told the military authorities that they 
had been brought there by force. Their relations came with them and made 
statements before the consuls. Some people were fined and imprisoned, but 
the government was obliged to abandon the use of force and from the whole 
prefecture at Uskub there remained but fifteen or sixteen genuine "volunteers. " 
In the course of the following days there arrived at Uskub volunteers from 
Tetovo, Gostivar, Kirtchevo, Dibra and Okhrida, and Albanians from Katchanik, 
in all some 500. All these new comers heard what had happened and thereupon 
declared that they too were unwilling to serve. They were all sent back except 
some Bulgarians, who being accused of having stirred the volunteers to resist, 
were shot. 

On the heels of these events there followed the fatal day of June 17/30. 
The arrests began at midday and continued until the evening. On the 18th some 
200 schoolmasters, officials of the Metropolis, priests, notables and other sus- 
pected citizens were imprisoned. Ninety-nine selected from among them were 
incarcerated in the Mitrovitza prison, the most remote spot possible from the 
theater of the war. At Uskub arrests went on continually. There were three 
hundred selected prisoners, some of whom came from the villages. Some were 
beaten, others paid their guards to escape beating. At Tetovo, at the same time, 
as many as 200 persons were arrested; at Koumanovo — a pacified town — there 
were 150 arrests, while some hundred of those arrested at Palanka were sent 
to the prison of Prechovo. Three villagers from Palanka, unable to march, 
were killed by the soldiers on the Koumanovo road, like true prisoners of war, — 
Balkan war. 

Now at last it seemed that victory might be celebrated. On June 25/July 
8, after the departure of Archbishop Neophyte, several priests and notables were 
called upon to proclaim themselves Servians, and when they gave an evasive 
reply, they were "permitted" to hold a meeting in the court of the Church of 
St. Demetrius. It was a trap. Fifty or sixty persons arrived, but instead of 
being allowed freedom to discuss together, they were addressed by the chaplain 
attached to the "higher command," who ended by inviting them to sign a decla- 
ration which he brought out of his pocket. With full hearts and tears in their 
eyes they signed. The authorities summoned the public criers, who proclaimed 
in the streets that a reconciliation had taken place, that the exarchists had recog- 
nized Servian nationality and the Servian church. On the morrow the Cathedral 
church of the Holy Virgin was thrown open and the Servian and Bulgarian 
priests thanked God together for reuniting them in a single nation and a single 
church. The Belgrade papers published congratulations and the official agency 
communicated the news to the foreign press. 

By way of completing the victory thus gained, an emissary was sent, under 
pretext of taking clothes to his relations, to Mitrovitza to persuade the notables 


under arrest there also to proclaim themselves Servians. They were given Ser- 
vian papers to read, full of glorifications over the event. Many hesitated and 
they grew to be a majority. The soil thus prepared, a clerk attached to the 
military command appeared before the prisoners. In his hand he had a list of 
the "Uskub Bulgarizers," but he said he was not sure of it and wanted to verify 
it. Clearly there was some mistake, for the whole body had been noted down 
as "Bulgarizers," according to the declaration of the first to whom the question 
had been put. As a matter of fact, it was only the schoolmasters, the officials 
and a few town dwellers who were "Bulgarians." The others were ready to 
declare themselves Servians. They were given another week for reflection. 
Then the same clerk brought them a declaration to sign, in which they made 
formal renunciation of the exarchy and asked to be set at liberty. Most of 
them signed; those who entered themselves as Bulgarians were declared rebels 
and convicted agitators. Nevertheless, both classes were kept in prison until 
the conclusion of the treaty of Bucharest, July 29/ August 11. On their return 
to Uskub, the schoolmasters were invited to remain in the Servian service, or in 
the event of refusal to go to Bulgaria. Forty-two signed a declaration to the 
effect that they preferred to be sent back, and by August 6/19 they had arrived 
at Sofia, coming by way of Niche and Pirotus. A few days later they were 
followed by two other bodies of schoolmasters from Uskub. The Serbization 
of the Uskub prefecture was an accomplished fact. 

At Veles — the first object of Servian pretensions "beyond the frontier" 
agreed upon by the treaty — we find the same methods employed and the same 
stages in the process of Serbization. The name of the captain of the legalized 
band who chased the successor of Archbishop Meletius from Veles on Feb- 
ruary 4/17 after the usual savage scene, was Voino Popovits, and that of his 
assistant, Douchane Dimitrievits. An interim, lasting down to the turn of Mele- 
tius on March 28/ April 10, was employed in seizing the Bulgarian monasteries 
and churches in the town. At the end of February the schoolmasters were 
invited to become Servian officials, and when they refused, they were threatened 
with persecution. The local "black hand" made one or two examples, and the 
schoolmasters were compelled to stay at home or at least to refrain from ex- 
changing greetings in the streets, on pain of being maltreated. Here on the 
eve of Easter the local bands sent into the villages were replaced by bands from 
Uskub, which the consuls had asked to have sent back. In order to spoil the 
national festival of St. Cyril and St. Methodius (May 11/24), the administrative 
authorities ordered the population to repair the streets. The inhabitants of 
Veles did not obey ; disregarding the wishes of the authorities they shut their 
shops to celebrate the festival. 1 

On June 17/30 a particularly large number of arrests took place at Veles. 
All the schoolmasters of the town and villages were arrested, as well as all 

iThis is perhaps the origin of Article 23 of the Ordinances of September 21. 


the priests and officials of the Metropolis, and between 150 and 200 inhabitants 
of the village. This was a form of recognition of the strength of national 
feeling in this little town, which had been one of the most active centers of the 
Bulgarian national movement, ever since its beginning. Martyrs too were not 
lacking. On June 18, in the evening, a priest, John Avramov, was dragged out 
of prison and taken with five young men from the Koinik quarter into the "black 
house." The priest's throat was cut and his body thrown over the bridge 
into the Vardar. The current carried his corpse down and threw it up by the 
side of the stream, where near the shore, the water is almost stagnant. His 
beard had been plucked out. Nobody dared to take up or bury the body. On 
the morrow it had disappeared. The five young men were killed together and 
their relations failed to find their bodies. 

These measures may serve as typical. On the 28th two priests, D. Antonov 
and G. Mikhilov, were set at liberty with a number of notables. The intention 
here was quite plain. They were assembled in a sort of gathering which passed 
a resolution renouncing the exarchy, recognizing the Servian church, and de- 
claring themselves Servians. This declaration was followed by a solemn service. 
A month later, on July 25/August 7, all the inhabitants and schoolmasters re- 
maining in prison were likewise set free, after declaring themselves Servians. 
On August 5/18, a proposal was made at the prefecture to all the schoolmasters 
and mistresses, that they should either become Servian teachers or leave the 
town. With a single exception (Mr. Brachnarov) they all consented. 

At Mionastir (Bitolia), the chief place of the vilayet, and likewise coveted 
by the Servians "beyond" the frontier, the counting of the population was begun 
by the middle of December. Special commissions were sent into the villages 
with the object of persuading the- population to declare itself Servian, by forcing 
the churches and the schools to become Servian. After that the disarmament 
of the population followed. 

From the second half of February on the situation grew worse. Bronislav 
Nouchits, the well known Servian dramatist, who was the prefect, was regarded 
as too moderate, and replaced by someone more sympathetic with the views of 
the military party and of "the black hand." Acts of violence against individuals 
and the arbitrary imposition of fines became of more frequent occurrence. The 
Metropolis felt its isolation growing. A panic was created in the population 
by the case of the Stambouldiiev family, which was massacred within doors 
without the discovery of any traces of the criminals. 1 The persecution of Bul- 
garians became more violent after the declaration made by Mr. Pachitch. 
Individual priests and schoolmasters were compelled to yield and to declare 
themselves Servians. Those who were recalcitrant were dealt with by the 
method of "disarmament," accompanied by domiciliary perquisitions and torture. 

In the course of the days June 17 to 19 (June 30 to July 2) more than 

iSee above Mr. Boris' reference to this case. 


600 persons were arrested at Monastir. They were kept in strict confinement 
until July 13/26, when the Bulgarian defeat had become perfectly well known. 
Then the less turbulent among the peasants and artizans began to be set free, 
on condition of taking no part in national agitation. At the same time the less 
prominent inhabitants were invited, according to the quarters in which they 
lived, to sign the declaration, the text of which was afterwards published in an 
official Servian paper in Bitolia, Opchtinske Novine. The text, which may 
serve as a specimen of what was asked of the Bulgarian population and of what 
it was endeavored to make them believe, is as follows : 

In order that, once for all, the question of our national feelings may 
be firmly established, and that a serious error may, at the same time, be 
wholly refuted, we, Slavs from Bitolia, hitherto attached to the exarchy, 
do today, being assembled in the orthodox church of St. Nedelia, state as 
follows: (1) That we are familiar from history that we have been Ser- 
vians since ancient times, and that the Turks conquered the countries which 
we now inhabit from the Servians five and a half centuries ago. (2) That 
there is no difference either in nationality or in faith, or in language, or 
in customs between us and the Servians, as is proved by many remembrances 
and by the Servian schools, which were the only ones in existence in these 
lands up to the time of the Turco-Servian war of 1876-78. (3) That our 
ancestors were, and that we are, called Servians, but that under the recent 
influence of Bulgarian propaganda, and above all under the terror caused 
by the comitadjis, we have, in quite recent times, begun to turn our eyes 
to the Bulgarians, in the hope that, thanks to their preponderance in what 
was once the Turkish kingdom, they would be better able than the Servians 
to free us from our servitude. (4) That in the last war with the Turks, 
the Bulgarians instead of assisting and freeing us, appropriated Thrace 
and liberated non-Slav populations. (5) That the Servians have, by super- 
human efforts and enormous sacrifices, taken these lands unassisted and 
so put an end to our servitude. (6) That both before and after the war 
the Servians treated us really as their brothers, while on the contrary the 
Bulgarians were at pains to separate us from our liberators. (7) That on 
the 17th of last month the Bulgarians attacked the Servian army, which 
shed its blood for them before Adrianople; an attack for which the whole 
civilized world condemns them. (8) That the Bulgarians desired to expose 
the people of these countries to new misfortunes and to destruction by their 
attempt at sending hither bands of brigands to burn the villages and pillage 
the people. Wherefore, we declare our entire solidarity with our Servian 
brothers and liberators : with them we will work in the future, shoulder to 
shoulder, to strengthen our country — Greater Servia. 

When the signatures even of the most obscure and timid of the inhabitants 
had thus been collected, with the assistance of the police, the commander sum- 
moned a meeting of notables. An old merchant, Piperkov by name, when 
invited to sign, replied: "I am an old man, sixty years of age. My father 
always told me that my grandfather was Bulgarian. Therefore we do not con- 


sent to sign, and nothing but force can compel us to do so." The commander 
then gave him twenty-four hours for reflection. They met to the number of 
eleven in a private house; two of the number were inclined to submit to the 
Servian power. The other nine remained inflexible and were arrested. Their 
wives went to the Russian and Austrian consulates, whereupon they were again 
set at liberty and given a new period of twenty-four hours in which to sign. 
They then did sign (using their Bulgarian names, ending in ov, not in itz, 
which was in itself an act of defiance) a declaration drawn up by themselves, 
in which they described themselves as "Ottoman subjects free from Turkish 
rule by the victorious Servian army who would, in the future, remain faithful 
to their liberators, whose subjects they regarded themselves." The individual 
who told us this story at Salonica, added that these unfortunate men could not 
at this moment admit the possibility that Monastir might become Servian : they 
were as yet entirely ignorant of the issue of the war. 

On July 10/23, the schoolmasters were called before the commander, and 
by order of the general staff the proposition was made to them with which we 
are already familiar, namely, to renounce the exarchy and become Servian 
officials by at once signing individual requests to this effect. They were prom- 
ised higher salaries and assured that the years they had already served would be 
taken into account in estimating their pension. The schoolmasters declared that 
they were unwilling to go against their consciences ; they asked to be allowed to 
live as private individuals and Servian subjects until the political situation of the 
country was decided. They were told that in that case a circular from the 
general staff would order their expatriation on the next day. Their statements 
that they were natives of the country, that most of them were married and had 
children, that they had property and other local ties, and that the question of the 
expatriation was one for their own private judgment, were entirely disregarded. 
Here as elsewhere the irrevocable decision had gone forth, — whosoever calls 
himself a Bulgarian must betake himself to Bulgaria. The final argument pro- 
duced by the authorities was as follows : "The exarchy pays you, that is to say 
Bulgaria pays you; we are enemies of Bulgaria and that is why we treat you 
as agents provocateurs of an enemy power." No attention was paid to the 
protest that the salaries of most of the schoolmasters had been paid by religious 
communities. On July 13/26 they were escorted, to the number of thirty, 
through Prilepe and Veles, and thence through Uskub, where they were joined 
by the other protesting teachers from Prilepe (seventeen) and from Kesen (six), 
to Smederevo. On July 28/August 10 an Austrian Danube steamer landed 
them at Lorn (Bulgaria). It is unnecessary to lay stress on their sufferings 
upon the way. 

At Monastir the end was gained. On July 7/20, divine service was held 
for the solemn celebration of "unity, concord and love," in which service the 
Bulgarian priests who had just renounced their exarchy officiated jointly with 


the Servian clergy. After the service a meeting took place at which Mr. Tavet- 
kovits, the moving spirit of Servian administration in Monastir, made a speech 
on the reconciliation of the people and their return to the bosom of Servia. 
After his speech the declaration with which we are familiar was read out, and 
the meeting terminated amid cries of "Long live Servia! Long live the Servian 
army! Long live King Peter! Long live Prince Alexander, the liberator of 

There is little to add about the other towns in the Monastir prefecture. 
We have in our possession an interesting document about Prilepe, "the town 
of Mark Kralievits," the legendary Servian hero, in the shape of a proclamation 
issued by the commander of the place, Mr. Michael Menadovits, dated March 
6/19. This shows that Mr. Menadovits had lost any illusion as to the "love and. 
concord," of the liberated population. Prilepe, it should be said, was, like 
Veles, one of the strongholds of Bulgarism in Macedonia, and so Mr. Menadovits 
learned to his cost. "I can no longer recognize," he writes, "the people of 
Prilepe of whom I was so proud! Agitators and enemies of the Servian people 
(who are well known to me) have stirred up such a ferment among the peaceable 
and honorable citizens of this town, that I no longer know my old Prilepeans. 
What! Do you repay my love for you by plots against my life?. Is this your 
gratitude for my kindness that you conspire in your houses to cut my head from 
my shoulders ? My. patience is at an end. The Bulgarian army whose arrival 
you await so impatiently from day to day, is not coming. You will be sorry 
to hear that it is never coming ; do you understand ? That I can assure you of, with 
all the weight of my name and my position! Even to wish for it is a disgrace. 
If you want to know to whom Prilepe belongs, go up on to the heights of 
Monastir, to the mountain of Babonna, Bakarno Goumno, and ask your ques- 
tion of the graves of the sons of Servia which are there. * * * I address 
myself for the last time to the honorable men of Prilepe: Remember that the 
secret society called Nodnykra is a more dangerous enemy to you than to me. 
To you, cowardly agitators, I cry, 'do not play with the lives of peaceful citi- 
zens I * * * Massacre Servian soldiers and officers if you like, but remember 
that the payment for their deaths is a far more terrible death !' " 

The Servian commander of Resen (Resna) was equally dissatisfied with 
the state of feeling in that town, which was a republican center, and the birth- 
place of the Turkish Major Niazi-bey, who started the revolution in 1908 there. 
On December 9/22, 1912, he had called the notables of Resen before him to 
accuse them of being disloyal subjects, and of fomenting discord between rival 
nationalities. He added that it was in his power to have them all killed and 
hanged without distinction, great and small, and even old men with white bear'ds 
(by which he meant the Archbishop's vicar) if they did not improve and hand 
over to him the Bulgarian propagandist leaflets. (The leaflets in question were 
the declaration of war by King Ferdinand and the proclamation by the Bulgarian 


Red Cross which had been left with the vicar by some travelers from Bulgaria.) 
On December 14/27, all the schoolmasters of the towns and villages were 
summoned, and told by the commander that "everything taken by the Servian 
army would be kept by Servia," and that in future their salaries would be paid 
them from the Public Instruction office at Belgrade. In reply to the question, 
"Were there no private schools in the Servian kingdom?" the commander at 
first said nothing. Then, "Pardieu" said he, "I do not know, but you may be 
quite at ease about what I told you, since Turkey no longer exists." On March 
15/28, they began taking the census, in which there was no heading "Bulgarian." 
Special commissioners went from house to house, meeting resistance everywhere. 
In the lists the Bulgarian designation ending in ov was successfully preserved 
and only five households entered themselves as Servian. Since, however, the 
official list included no heading but "Servian," the papers published the figures 
as being the totals of the Servian population. "Disarmament" began in July, 
accompanied by the usual violence. The numerous examples of such violence 
found in our documents may be passed over in silence. 

On June 17/30 between forty and fifty citizens and 250 and 300 villagers 
were arrested at Resen, and kept in confinement for a month. A village priest 
was offered his liberty, on condition of praying in the church that God might 
give victory to the Servians. After a few moments' hesitation, the priest replied 
to his interlocutor, "I can not pray to God except for the end of the war." 
On July 10/23, the schoolmasters were brought out of prison and offered the 
usual alternative — "Sign a request to be nominated as Servian officials, or you 
shall be expatriated as Bulgarian agitators and spies." Some signed, the others 
first hesitated and then withdrew their request, after a categorical protest against 
expatriation had been made by a professor. He declared that it was illegal, as 
applied to native persons who had committed no criminal act and possessed a 
perfect right to live at home as private individuals. He with five others was, 
as we have seen, dispatched to Uskub. On July 11/24, the priests of the town 
and the villages were compelled to renounce the exarchy and recognize the 
Archbishop of Belgrade as their spiritual head. On July 26/August 18 some 
notables were summoned, to whom the declaration signed at Monastir was read 
out. They protested against it. "The exarchy," they said, "is not a form of 
propaganda; the exarchy is the work of the people, who constituted their 
church at a representative assembly of all the towns in Macedonia. The Bulga- 
rian comitadjis did not teach us to. be Bulgarians, but the Servian and Greek 
comitadjis do claim to teach us to change our nationality." A new form of 
declaration was then proposed: "Seeing that the exarchy and the orthodox 
church are one and the same, we declare ourselves Servians." When the notables 
again refused their approval they were all sent to prison and dispatched to 
Salonica, "in order," so they were told, "that the Greeks may massacre you." 
There they spent eighteen days under arrest, in a little room with eighty other 
Bulgarians. They were then sent to Bulgaria via Constantinople and Bourgas. 


Krouchevo (the third town of the Monastir prefecture) shows the same 
extortions, under color of requisitions, and the same acts of violence and domi- 
ciliary perquisitions under pretext of a search for arms. On the 17/30, the 
Servian soldiery left the town and their place was taken by a band with one 
Vanguel of Uskub at its head. Since the reputation of the acts of violence 
committed by the band had gone before it, five former Bulgarian comitadjis, 
living in the town, formed a band of their own and took to the hills. On 
June 19/July 2 all the notables were arrested. The prison was in the basement 
of the government building, and through the bars of their windows the captives 
overheard the sub-prefect, Evto Bekrits, delivering a harangue from the balcony 
to a newly formed band of vlach (Roumanian) and Grecizing {Romanize) 
inhabitants, on June 22. "In the absence of the army you are authorized to act. 
Since Bulgaria has declared war, you are authorized to do as you please with 
anyone calling himself a Bulgarian." On the next day, Vantcho Iogov, one of 
these recruits, beat a Bulgarian merchant, Demetrius Krestev, in the open mar- 
ket because the latter had a Bulgarian sign. On the merchant's complaint the 
sub-prefect issued a notice ordering the removal within twenty-four hours of 
all signs in the Bulgarian language: they were ordered, on pain of court- 
martial, to be replaced by Servian signs. (The same facts are repeated every- 
where, at Uskub, Veles, Prilepe, etc.) We need not mention the other acts of 
violence committed under pretext of domiciliary perquisition. Even women 
were beaten and imprisoned for calling themselves Bulgarian. On June 29/ 
July 12, the birthday of King Peter, all the prisoners were brought into the gov- 
ernment hall. The sub-prefect promised them an amnesty if they would agree 
to admit that they were Servians. Two of them replied in the name of all the 
others that it was solely as Bulgarians that they could be loyal subjects of 
Servia and useful to the State. They were immediately taken back to prison 
where they remained for another month. On July 17, Vantcho Belouvtcheto, 
chieftain of the Bulgarian band, was killed by the soldiers of the Servian band, 
after two hours of real fighting. His head was cut off and carried in triumph 
all round Krouchevo. Towards evening it was put on the threshold of the 
prison, the door having been thrown open for the purpose. "So shall heads of 
all those who call themselves Bulgarian be treated," said the sub-prefect. On 
the next day he summoned the Archbishop's vicar, and ordered him to sign the 
written declaration. The vicar, terror stricken, signed without reading, and so 
did the other priests. Two schoolmasters followed their example, but two others 
refused. An hour later, they were sent under escort via Prilepe to Uskub, 
where they remained for two more weeks imprisoned, until peace was con- 
cluded. On August 4/17, they were expatriated; their families meanwhile re- 
maining in Macedonia. 

Even greater resistance was met with in the assimilation of the places on 
the western frontier of Macedonia, at Okhrida and Dibra (Debar) on the borders 



of Albania. We find here, as everywhere else, the ordinary measures of "Ser- 
bization"— the closing of schools, disarmament, invitations to schoolmasters 
to become Servian officials, nomination of "Serbomanes," "Grecomanes," and 
vlachs, as village headmen, orders to the clergy of obedience to the Servian 
Archbishop, acts of violence against influential individuals, prohibition of 
transit, multiplication of requisitions, forged signatures to declarations and 
patriotic telegrams, the organization of special bands, military executions in the 
villages and so forth. The numerous arrests effected on June 17/30, extended 
impartially to all classes. At Okhrida, too, the threat of expatriation was suc- 
cessfully used to compel priests and professors collectively to renounce the 
exarchy. The imprisoned professors were compelled to accept their salary from 
the Servian Ministry of Public Instruction and to sign its receipts. Yet, up to 
the middle of September, the spirit of the people was not altogether broken. 
At Debar, external submission hardly concealed feelings of revolt. The 
exarchist clergy (forty priests) in the month of May formally renounced the 
exarchy by a solemn process of retractation, followed by an oath upon the Tes- 
tament. As at Resen, the schoolmasters proved more recalcitrant. They were 
arrested on June 17/29 and kept in prison until the middle of July. Their 
ultimate fate is unknown to us. We do, however, know that during the months 
of August and September, the idea of resistance remained alive in the popu- 
lation. There was a great deal of talk of a scheme of "union" with the Holy 
See, as a means of preserving nationality after the abolition of the exarchist 
church. This idea appears to have originated spontaneously in the minds of 
the population of Monastir. Preparations were also being made for armed 
resistance, with the definite design for claiming Macedonian autonomy. The 
Servian government laid great stress on the fact that the Bulgarian comitadjis, 
under the direction of the voyevodas, Milan Matov, Stephen Khodjo, Peter 
Tchaoumev and Kristo Traitchev, had taken no part in the Albanian insurrection. 
In fact we know from an interesting story told by one of the initiated, and pub- 
lished in a Bulgarian paper, 1 that Mr. Matov had organized a band at El Bassan 
and prepared an appeal to the Bulgarians and the Moslems in conjunction with 
the Albanians. Owing to the refusal of the Albanian government this appeal 
failed, but Matov had behind him private assistance and support. He was in 
communication with the chieftain Tchaoumev at Okhrida, and with the Al- 
banian and Bulgarian population in the villages. The little Servian garrisons, 
taken by surprise, had to beat a retreat, and for several days Okhrida, Struga 
and Debar were in the insurgents' hands. There was even talk of organizing a 
provisional Macedonian government at Okhrida. 

These events were bound to react on the state of feeling of the populations 
of Western Macedonia. But at Prisrend and Diakovo, as well as at Debar and 

1 See Izgrcve of October 24/November 6— "The truth about the Albano-Macedonian in- 


at Okhrida, the Servians soon made an end of the Albanian insurrection. The 
Albanian population to the number of some 25,000 souls took flight after defeat. 
Those who remained underwent the familiar treatment at the hands of the Serv- 
ians. The Bulgarians also suffered severely. All the notables were imprisoned 
or shot. A number of mixed Albanian and Bulgarian villages were burned in 
the regions of Dolna-Reka, Gorna-Reka and Golo Urdo. After this the official 
"classification" of Macedonia might be regarded as completed. 

In August, when the Commission went through Belgrade (August 10/23, 
to 12/25) the struggle was still going on as we see. In the occupied territories 
the Bulgarian population was still contending, and at Belgrade Mr. Pachitch 
was still unwilling to yield to the military party on the question of Macedonian 
administration. Since the crisis was not settled, the Commission might prove 
an inconvenient witness. This was probably one of the reasons why it was not 
desired at Belgrade that the Commission should move about freely. This ap- 
prehension was betrayed when a Belgrade, paper accused a member of the Com- 
mission of seeking to distract the Commission from its principal object by arrang- 
ing for them to visit Uskub, Veles, Mitrovitsa, Prisrend, Monastir, Tetovo, etc. 1 

True, it was stated that there was no general objection to visits from 
strangers. Only they must be controlled. In our manuscript chronicle of 
events in Macedonia, we find under the date of February 10, a remark by the 
Vicar of Koumanovo: "Yesterday evening three Europeans, Englishmen, ar- 
rived in our town. According to the Servians they were sent to study the con- 
dition of the population. They were put up by the vicar of the Servian Arch- 
bishop. Today they made a tour of the town and went to see the authorities. 
A number of Bulgarians (among them the wife and brothers of Orde Yovtchev, 
who has disappeared) endeavored to interview them, but the government ad- 
mitted nobody. Only a body of Turks were received and questioned as to the 
actual conditions of their life. Having been terrorized in advance, they stated 
that they 'lived well.' " Sufficient honor has been done the Commission to 
admit that it was not so easily satisfied as these simple tourists. 

Is the work of false pacification, as revealed by our documents, definitive 

^Balkan, August 13/26. The Commission had not had any such intention, because the 
time at its disposal and the itinerary drawn up before its departure from Paris did not 
allow of it. As regards Mr. Pachitch, it should be noted that the most substantial reason 
given, by him, for his refusal to the Commission, was that "the army would resent" the 
presence of one member in the interior. The campaign directed against the presence of 
this member of the Commission is still going on in the Servian press. The Paris corre- 
spondent of the Politika, of Belgrade, reports in the issue of November 11/24, that this 
member had offered a sum of fr. 40,000 to the Russian photographer, Tchernov, in the 
name of the Carnegie Endowment, for the purchase of photographs in his possession of 
"Bulgarian atrocities," in order to withdraw the said photographs from publicity. This 
offer Mr. Tchernov was alleged to have refused. The truth is that two members of the 
Commission went to see the photographs which Mr. Tchernov exhibited in the Grand hotel 
of Pans, as evidence not of Bulgarian "atrocities," but of "war atrocities" in general. They 
found the photographs very interesting and quite authentic, and ordered some of them for 
the Commission, which Mr. Tchernov agreed to print at a stipulated price. Such is the 
manner in which falsehoods are spread. 


or lasting? A doubt is suggested by the ordinances of September 21. All that the 
Commission has since learned confirms such doubts. 

True, the Servians are optimistic, to judge from the articles which have 
appeared in their press. This optimism, however, is sui generis, and satisfied 
with very little. Take the patriotic and militarist paper Piemont, which rejoices 
over the condition of affairs in Chtipe at the end of October : 

In Chtipe things are like old Servia. People are getting busier and 
go about and work freely, there is no longer anyone who calls himself a 
Bulgarian, and if you happen to say the word Bulgarian before the citizens 
you are seized and sworn at. Everywhere in the streets people sing only 
Servian songs and dance Servian dances. Vicentius, Archbishop of Uskujb, 
who arrived on the 5th/18th, was received at the Bregalnitsa bridge by 
the population of all creeds, Turks and Jews. In the last few days the first 
betrothals have taken place according to our custom; our photographer, 
Kritcharevits, has got married; the orchestra of the Fourteenth Regiment 
played at the wedding amid indescribable rejoicings. The young women 
of Chtipe are pretty; they are a trifle prudish, but that fault will mend. 

Here is another correspondence sent from Monastir to Vienna via Salonica 
on October 14: 

The town of Monastir is almost surrounded by a military cordon. 
The measures taken by the Servians in apprehension of any movement 
among the Bulgarians grow more and more Draconian * * * The 
authorities desire to compel' the Bulgarians to send their children to the 
Servian schools (the Bulgarian schools are closed). To this end police- 
men go from house to house warning people that those who do not send 
their children to the Servian schools will be fined — the fines being, fr. 100 
for those who do not send their children to school at all, fr. 200 for those who 
send them to non-Servian schools (there are some vlack (Roumanian) 
schools), fr. 600 for those sending them abroad without the knowledge of 
the authorities. Young people between nineteen and thirty are not allowed 
to leave the country. 

Here is another correspondence from Monastir, published in the Bulgarian 
paper Mir, of November 29/December 12: 

On November 12/25, fifty-one Bulgarian peasants were killed in the 
Boumba quarter, and another at Tchenguel-Karakole, by the authorities them- 
selves. The policemen make a practice of pillaging the peasants as they 
return from making their sales and purchases at market. A number of 
peasants from the villages of Ostriltsi, Ivanovtsi, Rouvtsi, Bala-Arkava, 
Vocheni, Borandi, have disappeared. At the village of Krouchevo five 
persons (whose names are given) were beaten; at Ostriltsi nine; at Ivan- 
ovtsi, eight; at Berantsi, nine; at Sredi, seven; at Obrachani, four; at 
Padilo, three, etc. 


At Okhrida, after the retreat of the comitadjis at the beginning of October 
(see above) a panic seized the whole population. There was no village with- 
out its victims, chief among them being priests and schoolmasters. In the be- 
ginning of October alone three priests, five teachers and some 150 villagers, 
Bulgarian citizens, were killed, without counting 500 Turks and Albanians. 
Whole quarters were destroyed on the plea that they belonged to rebels; the 
houses of the families of the chieftains Tchaoulev, and Matov, were among those 
destroyed. All the young men of any intelligence, to the number of fifty, were 
imprisoned. They were tortured at least once a day, and often left without food 
for three days. All the priests were arrested because on December 14 and 15, 
they had prayed in the churches for King Ferdinand and Archbishop Boris; 
when interrogated they replied that such was Tchaoulev's order. 1 

At last the Servians themselves are beginning to admit that things are not 
going as they should. Here, as in Bulgaria, the organs of the opposition press 
lay the blame and the responsibility on the personnel of the administration. 
The Balkan declares that this personnel is in no way different from that of the 
Turkish regime. The government press makes excuses but can not deny the 
fact: "There are not enough trained officials. The conditions of life in the 
conquered countries are too difficult to call forth a sufficient supply of competent 
candidates." 2 The real difficulty, however, the state of feeling of a population 
subjugated but not subdued — was not remedied. Measures were taken to com- 
bat such opposition as was left. They were not quite sure of the clergy, still 
less of the teachers who had taken the oath. In Belgrade itself the Commission 
heard the question discussed whether it would not be better to send the Bul- 
garian officials, although they had submitted, into really Servian regions, such 
as Metohia and Kosovo Pole. The favorable impression to be produced outside 
by these quasi-voluntary acts of submission, which also were useful in assisting 
to hide the complete lack of candidates for administrative posts, led at the 
moment to the simple registration of Bulgarian officials among the Servian 
staff. Later, conditions changed. On October 19/November 1, a Bulgarian 
paper speaks of eighty-eight schoolmasters who had come from old Servia 
(Kosovo and Metohia) and were nominated to former Bulgarian schools 
(twenty-one to Uskub, nineteen to Monastir, seven to Prilepe, ten to Koumanovo, 
six to Okhrida and twenty-five to Veles). On November 11/24, the Serbische 
Correspondent speaks of 200 professorial candidates from Croatia and Hungary, 
ready to take their places in "new Servia." If reliance can be placed on the 
correspondence published in the Bulgarian press, the attendance at the new 
schools is not great, despite the fines for absence. Nevertheless, the number 
of Servian schools increased, although they were inferior to the Bulgarian 

^Correspondence of October 16/29 in the Politika, and that of December 19/Tanuary 
2 m the Vozrajdame. 

2 See the controversy between the Balkan, the Pravda, the Novosti, the Odjek and even 
the Piemont, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Sammouprava in December. 


schools, both in number and in quality. 1 According to official Servian statistics 
(Serbe Corr. November 29/December 12), there are now 395 schools where 
there were 193, with 350 teachers, where there were 240. What is being taken 
over is the Bulgarian inheritance. At Uskub a training school for teachers has 
even been opened. But among the 380 students, 260 come from Old Servia and 
only 120 from the conquered territory, according to the Servian authority. 

The most serious difficulty which remains to be overcome, is the state of 
mind of the population. The latest reports in our possession do not show any 
improvement. The same steps continue to be taken for dealing with discon- 
tent, which is general, by means of terrorism, which is not growing less. The 
Mir of December 23/January 5, contains an Albanian correspondence, from 
which we quote: 

At Kritchovo, 150 peasants were beaten in the presence of the author- 
ities; seventeen persons killed by blows and the corpses burned. The 
others too were seriously wounded and thrown into the stable without any 
sort of medical aid. At Novo-Selo five peasants were beaten by the Servian 
gendarmes. At Plasnitsa we found six peasants killed by a Servian patrol, 
forty peasants killed in October, five houses burned. Gvayace was attacked 
by a Servian band, forty peasants were killed and their corpses thrown into 
the wells. In October, in the same village, 200 peasants were killed and 
800 Turkish books carried off. Toukhine was pillaged by a Servian band. 
At the same time a Servian theater was being opened at Uskub, and the 
Minister of Public Instruction intrusted Professor Hits to collect popular 
songs in the annexed territories; and it was cited by the Minister for the 
Interior as proving that "the fullest liberty of conscience was granted to 
all confessions in the practice of their religious observances," that the 
Moslems were permitted to hunt on their feast days (Serbische Corre- 
sponded) . 

The most elementary condition to be fulfilled before toleration towards a 
conquered country can be claimed, is clearly that formulated by the Greek dele- 
gates at the peace conference at Bucharest, and extended to all belligerents by the 
Bulgarian delegates, but rejected because of the refusal of the Servian delegate: 
"Whereas war against the Ottoman Empire has been undertaken by Bulgaria, 
Greece, Montenegro and Servia, in order to guarantee to all the nationalities the 
conditions of free development; whereas it is impossible that this noble inspira- 
tion should not have survived the events that have since separated the former 
allies * * * Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Servia recognize with the 
newly annexed territories autonomy for the religious communities and freedom 
for the schools." 2 Had this condition been accepted, we might indeed have be- 

1 See the interesting report by a Servian professor Mr. T. M. Yakovlevits, on "The con- 
dition of Bulgarian schools at Macedonia in comparison with Servian schools," published 
October 16/29 in the Serbska Zastava. 

2 See the Proces-verbal No. 10 of the Bucharest Conference session July 26/August 
8, 1913. Likewise rejected was the proposal of the representative of the United States at 


lieved in "the establishment of friendly relations between the four States," and 
the possibility of "insuring to the populations called upon to dwell together an era 
of justice and wide toleration." The Servian delegate, however, replied that "the 
question, in so far as it concerns new Servian subjects, is regulated by the con- 
stitution of the Servian kingdom" — a statement which, as we have seen, was not 
true. The results of this refusal have been seen. It has been easier to conquer 
than it will be to keep the fruits of conquest. The Servian press is full of appre- 
hension as to the true sentiments of the conquered population, and is constantly 
envisaging some rising danger from outside. Today it is Albania preparing new 
disorders for the spring; yesterday the Bulgarian comitadjis were crossing the 
Roumanian frontier with false passports to get somewhere in Macedonia. 
(Serbische Correspondent, November 26/December 11). Another day America 
is allowing Macedonian conspirators from Tetovo or Doiran to organize com- 
mittees for the recovery of the autonomy of their enslaved country (Tregoznnski 
Glasnik) in New York, Chicago, Portland or St. Louis. A new emigration is at 
hand with its army of between 15,000 and 20,000 Macedonian workmen, who 
can not be brought under any ordinances. The Pravda is evidently right in 
thinking that it will not be necessary to wait twenty-five years for a Zabern. But, 
we repeat, the condition is 'Autonomy for the religious communities and freedom 
for the schools," — a return, that is to say, to the minimum of liberalism which did 
up to the last few years exist in fact, guaranteed by international treaties, even 
in old absolutist Turkey. 

3. Greek Macedonia 

The documents in the possession of the Commission are less complete for 
Greek than for Servian Macedonia. But the data at its disposal are sufficient 
to establish the conclusion that here too the same situation is repeated, down to 
the smallest detail* of the assimilation of the Bulgarian population in Southern 
Macedonia (Vodena, Castoria, Fiorina). The procedure is quite analogous to 
that employed to assimilate the same population in the north. As to the alterna- 
tive system, which consists in the extermination of the Moslem population, it 
was repeated on the eastern frontier of Macedonia, on the confines of Thrace, 
like the analogous Servian system on the western frontier on the confines of 
Albania. The only difference is that the two methods of assimilation and exter- 
mination are here pursued with even more system and even less humanitarian 
sentiment. Is it indeed a "human" race, this "dirty" (sale) Slav? They are 
not anthropi. They are arkoudi — bears. The word recurs frequently in our 
depositions, and corresponds perfectly to the Bulgarophage, sentiment that was 

Bucharest, Mr. Jackson, to insert into the peace treaty a provision according full civil and 
religious liberty to the inhabitants of any territory subjected to the suzerainty of any one of 
the five Powers or which might be transferred from the jurisdiction of one Power to that 
of another, "with the same recourse to 'the public law of the Constitutional States repre- 
sented' which would have afforded the consecration of long usage." 


consciously being developed in the army and among the populace by means of 
patriotic verse and popular pictures, of which specimens will be found in the 

We begin with Salonica, the natural center of Greek Macedonia. The Com- 
mission received no great facilities on the part of the Greek government for 
inquiry into the facts that interested them at Salonica. All the same, the mem- 
bers took advantage of the fact that they were free to come and go in the town, 
to investigate the available sources of information. True, the indigenous popu- 
lation with some few exceptions hid away, the Greeks out of hostility towards 
the Commission (as their articles in the local press well show) ; the Jews from 
fear of responsibility. The foreigners remained and although the very name of 
Bulgaria had been proscribed, there were still some belated Bulgarians. From 
Bulgarian governesses about to embark the next day, a member of the Com- 
mission learned the details of the days, June 30, July 1 (June 17, 18), of the 
Bulgarian downfall, which took place soon after the beginning of the second 
Balkan war. Later the Commission was able to test their evidence by that of 
others; on its return the highly important written evidence of the Bulgarian 
prisoners liberated at the end of the year 1913, was added to the oral testimonies 
and confirmed and corroborated it. The most important place among the later 
testimonies belongs to the recollections of the commander of the Bulgarian gar- 
rison at Salonica, Major Velisar Lazarov, which appeared in the Bulgarian paper 
Politica in November. 

Without lingering over the numerous incidents that took place between the 
actual masters of the town and those who aspired to take their place, we may 
draw the general conclusion that relations between the Greek and Bulgarian 
military living side by side in Salonica, were extremely strained during the whole 
time of common occupation. After April, 1913, there were but three companies 
of the Fourteenth Macedonian regiment whose status was regulated in May by 
a special convention between the two governments. This little garrison was 
quartered in some dozen houses situated in the different quarters of the town, 
Hamidie street, Midhat-pasha street, Feisli street, etc. Every day as many as 
sixteen pickets were set to guard the official institutions and the lodgings of 
the high military, civil and ecclesiastical Bulgarian officials. The Bulgarian 
military force was thus distributed in the eastern portion of the town. 

On June 17/30, General Kessaptchiev, representing the Bulgarian govern- 
ment at the Greek quarter general, left Salonica because of the opening of hos- 
tilities. Some army officers who accompanied him to the station were per- 
suaded that the Greeks were preparing an attack. Mr. Lazarov then went in all 
haste from the station to the Bulgarian General Staff, opposite St. Sofia, to warn 
his officers and men. Thence he went to Feisli street, to the Turkish school- 
house, where most of the Bulgarian soldiers were quartered. A letter from 
the Greek commander, General Calaris, followed him thither. The general in- 


formed him that hostilities had been opened by the Bulgarian army and proposed 
to him to leave Salonica with his garrison within an hour, after giving up his 
arms. At the expiration of this delay, the Bulgarian army in Salonica would 
be regarded as hostile and treated accordingly. 

General Kessaptchiev's train started at one o'clock. Mr. Lazarov received 
Calaris's letter before three. Half an hour before, at 2.30, the Greek soldiers 
had begun the attack on the Bulgarian pickets. Mr. Lazarov wrote his reply 
amid shots. In it he asked permission to communicate with his superiors by 
telegraph. At five o'clock, after two hours of steady firing, the Greeks gave 
the order to cease. There had been a misunderstanding. Then the French 
consul, Mr. Jocelin, arrives and wishes to speak with Mr. Lazarov. "Very 
good/' is the reply of Mr. Calaris. After five minutes waiting this is the reply 
that came: "The conditions are refused." Mr. Jocelin departed. The fusillade 
began again on both sides. The French consul had been told that Mr. Lazarov 
would not see him. The last hope of preventing the catastrophe disappeared. 
Towards evening cannon and shell began to speak. Night came on; an hour 
after midnight the Greeks again ordered, "Give up arms!" Mr. Lazarov's 
reply was the same. He asked permission to communicate with his superiors. 
Fighting began again, with redoubled fury. Many houses were in flames, some 
were destroyed by cannon, about eighty peaceable citizens and nearly a hundred 
Bulgarian soldiers were killed. The night ended and Mr. Lazarov himself this 
time offered to surrender on condition of keeping arms (without bayonets), 
baggage and money. The conditions were accepted ; then on the pretext that 
the Bulgarian soldiers might have tried to keep the bayonets, refused. The Bul- 
garian soldiery were arrested unconditionally. 

On the morning of June 18/July 1, two merchant steamers, poetically named 
Mariette Ralli and Catherine, were ready to convey the prisoners to Greek for- 
tresses. There were no arrangements for the comfort of the prisoners on these 
boats, and no intention of making them. The soldiers were shut up in the hold 
of the boats, near the engines and the coal, in an insupportably thick atmosphere. 
The officers, to the number of twenty, were lodged in a cabin with two beds. 
Neither officers nor soldiers were allowed on the bridge. The only drink they 
were given was stale water mixed with brine, and on the second day, some 
mouldy biscuit as their only food. Yet the officers were soon to see that their 
lot was not the worst. After the soldiery, persecution of the Bulgarian civil 
population at Salonica began, under pretext that they were all comitadjis. 

The members of the Commission of Inquiry heard horrible stories of what 
happened at Salonica in the streets and in the Bulgarian houses on July 18. 
But there again it is not always convenient to cite the names of those who 
suffered, still less of those who gave evidence. We shall begin with a foreigner, 
at once victim and witness, who was taken for a Bulgarian and consequently 
for a comitadji. His story, which we shall cite in extenso, will serve as an 


John (Jovane) Rachkovits, Austrian subject, born in Dalmatia, was a mer- 
chant in Salonica. On June 17/30, he came out of his shop to go to the Austrian 
post office, where he had an order for fr. 300 to cash. He had the sum of ninety- 
francs in his pocket. A spy pointed him out to the police as a Bulgarian comi- 
tadji. This was enough to cause him to be arrested, brought before the police, 
interrogated, and his reply being doubted, put on board the steamer and shut 
up in the coal bunker. There he spent three days and three nights, in company 
with seventy-two Bulgarian prisoners. All that he had was stolen from him, 
and when he tried to protest, in his quality of Austrian subject, his Austrian 
passport was snatched from him and torn in pieces. Some soldiers were shot 
during the crossing, and he "suspected" that some one had been thrown into 
the sea. [We shall see that this suspicion was well founded.] No bread was 
given out, only biscuits. The drinking water was brackish. When they arrived 
at Trikeri (the prison at the opening of the Gulf of Void), they were given 
bread, olives and onions. There was no doctor at Trikeri, and the prisoners 
died at the rate of five to seven a day. After protests from the Austrian consul, 
Mr. Rachkovits was sent back to Salonica, but he suffered even more on the 
return voyage. His hands were tied so tightly behind his back that his chest 
was strained* 'Afterwards water was poured on the cords to make them tighter 
still. Ten days after his arrival at Salonica a member of the Commission saw 
his swollen and diseased hands; part of the skin had been taken off and the 
marks of the cords could still be clearly seen. 

Here is the fate of another civil prisoner, this time a real Bulgarian, Spiro 
Souroudjiev, a notable known in Salonica. He had already been arrested, ques- 
tioned and set at liberty. A week later he was arrested again and sent to 
Trikeri. He was a rich man, and his wife succeeded in seeing her husband 
again by paying the sum of £T500 (the figure was given to a member of the 
Commission by people who knew). But in what a state did she see him! The 
poor man was half dead, and could not speak. At his second interview with 
his wife, he could only just pronounce the words "We have been horribly 
beaten." His clothes smelled of excrement. For seven nights he had not slept, 
having been fastened back to back with another prisoner. On his wife's in- 
sistence he was transported to the French hospital of the Catholic sisters, but 
the next day he was transferred to the cholera barracks, where, after two 
injections, he died. 

Here is a third case, and one of a kind that will not be forgotten. The 
victim is the vicar of the Bulgarian Archbishopric at Salonica, the Archimandrite 
Eulogius, who by duty and conviction alike represented the national Bulgarian 
cause throughout the whole vilayet. This time we have a declared enemy of 
Macedonian Hellenism. A member of the Commission made his acquaintance 
during his journey to the Balkans in January, 1913. He was a highly educated 
man, having studied at an ecclesiastical high school in Austria Hungary, and then 


in Paris; an enlightened and ardent patriot of noble and elevated views. He 
was subjected to persecution by the Greek authorities even at this time, and 
took great pains in the use of the Bulgarian language in the teaching of the 
Episcopal See, which the Greeks frequently tried to prevent. The Bulgarian 
soldiers lodged just in front of the Episcopal house; and it was thanks to the 
protection of the temporal power that the spiritual maintained its existence. 
But with the extinction of this last dream of Bulgarian sovereignty, the Arch- 
bishopric was at an end. The Archimandrite Eulogius lived his last on June 
18/ July 1. During the night attack he escaped by hiding under the staircase; 
in the morning he was taken and put on board the steamer Mariette Ralli, where 
Commander Lazarov and Dr. Lazarov, a doctor at the hospital, joined him and 
conversed with him. Their two depositions have now been published, 1 and it is 
important to compare them with the assertion of the agency at Athens, that "It 
appears from the public inquiry that Eulogius was at the head of Bulgarian 
comitadjis at Salonica, who fired on the Greek troops which were trying to 
reestablish order. Eulogius was killed at the moment he fired on the Greeks." 

Unfortunately it is not true that Eulogius died in defending himself against 
the Greek soldiers who were "reestablishing order" by sacking the Bulgarian 
Episcopal palace. About midday on the 18th the two brothers Lazarov saw him 
on board the Mariette Ralli. Towards evening on the same day he was trans- 
ferred on board the Catherine. On the 19th at half past two the Catherine 
took to sea. Three hours later, Eulogius was no more. Here again eye wit- 
nesses confirm what the Commission heard said in Salonica. F. Doukov, a Bul- 
garian prisoner, just returned to Varna from Greece, says for example: 

He was arrested on June 17 about midday, and incarcerated in the post 
office at Top-hane. At seven o'clock, four soldiers from the bank picket 
were brought to the post office also, and with them the cashier of the bank, 
Helias Nabouliev, and Jankov, the accountant. On the next morning all 
the Bulgarians who had been taken were gathered together, Nabouliev 
was called, stripped and deprived of fr. 850. The others were also pillaged. 
Before noon all the prisoners were put on board the steamer, Nabouliev 
and Jankov a little later. On the same day towards evening, the vicar of 
the Salonica Archbishopric, the Archimandrite Eulogius, was brought with 
his deacon, Basil Constantinov, and George Dermendjiev, the Metropolitan 
archvicar, his secretary, Christian Batandjiev, being put on another steamer. 
Before noon on the 19th several Greeks from Salonica came on board the boat 
and jeered at and beat the prisoners. The Archimandrite was maltreated in 
the most shameful way. In the afternoon at half past two the steamer 
started. When it passed the big promontory of Kara-Bournon, the Archi- 
mandrite was thrown into the sea. Three shots were fired at him and he 

^The story of Commander Lazarov in the Politica of November 14/27, 1913 (in Bul- 
garian) and that of Dr. Lazarov as an appendix to the Reply to pamphlet by the Professors 
of the University of Athens — Bulgarian Atrocities in Macedonia, by the professors at the 
University at Sofia, p. 115. 


drowned. J. Nabouliev, Jankov and Nicolas Iliev were put to death in 
the same way. 1 

Another witness is Basil Lazarov, the forester of Kazanlik, who says : 

On June 19, at half past three in the afternoon, 223 soldiers, eight men 
employed on the railway, Ghnev and Vatchkov, officials at the station, Tor- 
danov, the physician of the Fifth Hospital, Mr. Nabouliev, cashier of the 
Bulgarian National bank, Mr. Jankov, the accountant of the same bank, 
Eulogius, vicar of the Bulgarian Archbishopric of Salonica, and many other 
Bulgarians and a large number of peaceable citizens of the Macedonian 
countries occupied by the Greeks, were conveyed on board the steamer 
Catherine to the Island of Itakon. After a voyage of three hours, near 
Cape Kara-Bournon, we saw a man being put to death; the Greek soldiers 
threw the Archimandrite Eulogius into the sea, and fired three shots at him 
for fear he might escape drowning. On June 21, about seven in the 
evening, Jankov the accountant, Nicolas Iliev the courier, and Nabouliev 
the cashier were called up to the bridge. When they went up the exits of 
our prison were shut by means of planks, and we were told not to try to 
get out. At this moment the three persons whose names I have just given 
had already been cast into the sea. 

Another eye witness, the soldier, G. Ivantchev, described the scene of the 
murder of Rev. Father Eulogius in the following words : 

We were a number of soldiers on board the steamer. I happened to 
stand a little apart. The Greek soldiers ordered our people to go down 
into the hold. When I found myself alone I was afraid of being thrown 
out of the ship and held my breath. At this moment the Vicar of our 
Archbishopric, the Rev. Father Eulogius, was brought up and two Greek 
soldiers having hastily robbed him transfixed him with their bayonets and 
threw him into the sea. I saw his long black hair floating for some time 
on the water, and then everything disappeared. 

The Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency actually gives the names of the Greeks 
at Salonica who came on board the steamer on June 19/July 2 to see Eulogius 
maltreated. "The President of the Greek revolutionary committee, a fanatic 
called Cherefa and Dr. Mizo Poulos" were the people "who came on board the 
Catherine where the andarte hit the Bulgarian prelate twice and even kicked 
him in the shins. 

After such scenes of refined barbarism, it is hardly necessary to record the 
numerous stories of domiciliary perquisitions and arbitrary arrests which took 
place at Salonica during the days between the 17th and the 19th, which have 
come to the knowledge of the Commission. The picture may be completed by 
mentioning that avarice as well as cruelty played its part in all this. The vic- 
tims were systematically robbed before they were put to death, and frequently 

iPolitica. October 20, 1913 (old style). 


money was taken as a ransom for life and liberty. Money was taken from the 
soldiers who were sent to Trikeri, but most of them kept something back. The 
device employed by the Greek guards to compel their prisoners to give up what 
they had kept back was as follows i 1 

Twenty-eight prisoners were transferred from the ship to the shore in 
a little boat. When they got near land, the Greeks made holes in the 
bottom of the boat and it began to fill with water. The prisoners were 
then asked to give up their money on pain of being drowned. Our wit- 
nesses say that the threat was not vain; two prisoners who had no money 
were drowned. All the others gave what they possessed. 

Even at Salonica people who did not want to be sent to prison or shut up 
paid the police agents who took them. When in the first instance the arrest 
was made by officials of a lower grade, the business was easier and cheaper. 
Thus at Salonica names are given of people arrested and set free the same day 
at the police station. Once the prisoner was transported to the central prison, 
it became more difficult and troublesome; but all was not yet lost. Thus the 
Dermendjievs, father and son, paid £T100, Mr. Piperkov, fifty pounds, and 
Mr. Kazandjiev an amount not known. The case of Mr. Karabelev, a Stam- 
boulist deputy from Plevna, and proprietor of the Grand Hotel, is more com- 
plicated. Being arrested eleven days before the catastrophe of June 30, he 
handed over the key of his strong box to the Russian consul. A proposal to 
set him at liberty at the price of twenty-five Napoleons was made. The police 
then appeared to make a legal perquisition in his strong box. It was too late; 
the police found the strong box broken and the whole contents, diamonds, bonds 
and some thousands of Turkish pounds disappeared! 

But a simple plan open to any Greek soldier was to appear in a Bulgarian 
house and say: "Your money or your life." A story is told by a Bulgarian in 
the documents of Mr. Miletits. 2 "On June 20/July 3, two soldiers came into our 
house and threatened to kill G , as they had already killed many other Bul- 
garians. You can imagine the fear and horror which filled the house. The 

soldiers then said that they would not touch him if he gave them fr. 500. G 

had a hundred francs which he offered them, but the soldiers refused it. 

G then told them to wait while M went to get some money from Yosko. 

M found two Cretan policeman who suddenly appeared, told them what was 

going on and brought them to the house. The soldiers made off and the incident 
was thus at an end." 

To the knowledge of the Commission these brave Cretans more than once 
turned what might easilv have become a tragedy into a farce. The Cretan 

1 This story was heard by the Commission at Sofia, and they are acquainted with the 
names of the Bulgarian prisoners who witnessed it. 

2 Documents on the Greek atrocities extracted from the book by Professor L. Miletits, 
Greek Atrocities in Macedonia, p. 65. 


police often had to defend the Bulgarian population at Salonica against the 
tacit complicity of the evzones and the Greek soldiers with the Greek popula- 
tion. Here is another scene in the Commission's documents : After June 18 one 
of the two houses occupied by the Bulgarian girls' school remained unhurt. 
The schoolmistress, Ivanova, came to lock the house up. She found Greek 
soldiers feasting before the door. Seeing Miss Ivanova shutting the doors, the 
Greek inhabitants suggested to the soldiers getting in by the windows. Soldiers 
and inhabitants climbed up to the window and pillaged the property of Miss 
Ivanova: they then asked for her keys to make legal perquisition. The school- 
mistress complained to the Cretans. They asked her to show them the 
Greek houses in which the stolen goods were to be found. She went from house 
to house with the police, finding here her cushion, there her clothes, and in 
another house her wardrobe, which a Greek soldier had sold for five francs. 

The abuses committed in such an atmosphere may readily be imagined. 
Worse, however, than these abuses was the use of legal force. The notion of 
having to deal always with comitadjis became a kind of obsession. The prisons 
of Salonica were overflowing with Bulgarians, arrested in the town itself and in 
the vilayet, for having dared to proclaim themselves Bulgarians. It was reck- 
oned that between 4,000 and 5,000 had been sent to Greece while as many as 
a thousand were shut up in the prisons at Salonica (at Yedikoule, at Konak, 
and in the "new" prison). We shall have another opportunity to return to the 
condition of these prisons and their inmates and to the violations of the Red 
Cross conventions during the memorable days of the 17th, 18th and 19th of June. 
We may, however, quote here the case of a witness who was heard by the Com- 
mission, to show the way in which people who had committed no crime but 
that of being Bulgarians were being treated at this time. This was a scholar 
of the Salonica Realschuli, Demitrius Risov, a youth of seventeen. On June 17, 
he was walking in the street when he was arrested and led "before a captain." 
The latter asked him, "Who are you?" He replied, "I am Bulgarian." He was 
searched and a photograph of his father, a Bulgarian officer, found upon him. 
"What is that?" Without waiting for a reply, the officer hit him and sent him 
to prison under the guard of a soldier. There there were seventeen policemen 
and soldiers who beat him for five or ten minutes, until he lost consciousness. 
He was thrown down from the top of a step-ladder, and since the ladder had no 
steps he fell against the wall and lay there for some time in the mud and wet. 
In the evening as many as thirty other civil prisoners were brought in, and since 
there was very little room below the ladder, Risov had to stand on it. In this 
position he heard a Cretan policeman boasting of the massacres of civilians. By 
way of proof one of the policemen produced a paper in which there was a 
severed human ear, which Risov said that he saw less than a yard off. Every- 
body laughed at this proof of courage. At the end of about an hour and a half, 
they saw Risov sleeping as he stood. Somebody pushed him and he fell down. 


A soldier came down after him and said, "Only wait two or three hours and we 
will send you all to sleep for good." Some peasants among the prisoners began 
saying their prayers and making the sign of the Cross, when they heard these 
words. Forty-eight hours passed thus, during which no food was given them, 
despite their complaints; then the door opened again and Risov was pointed out 
and again interrogated. To frighten them, he said that when he was arrested 
he had been to the American consulate before starting for America. He was 
set at liberty. But the way was long and Risov knew that Bulgarians found 
in the streets were being killed every day. He asked for a written passport, or 
a soldier to take him home. The officer refused; Risov went out alone and 
taking precautions returned to his family. Alas, he found his mother in tears, 
for his father, an old man of sixty-five, was in prison. Thence he was sent to 
Greece. His younger brother, who had been severely beaten, was very ill; his 
elder brother, a deaf mute, had also been beaten, for they had taken his infirmity 
as a 'device. A week later the Cretans visited the house again. They looked 
for somebody or something. They took hold of the deaf mute and pulled his 
tongue to make him speak. They found nothing, and left the house, threatening, 
"If you do not become Greeks in three days, we will water your deaf mute with 
petrol and burn him with the house." The mother, in despair, threatened to go 
out of her mind. Risov then remembered that the mother of one of his friends 
was a Frenchwoman. He asked her to get the consulate to intervene. Salva- 
tion thus came at last from France. After a new perquisition the Risov family 
was left in peace. 

The Commission could quote other witnesses of the same kind, but it seems 
that what has been said is sufficient to enable the reader to draw his own 

The country behind Salonica is inhabited by a yet more mixed population, 
from the nationalist point of view, than that of Northern Macedonia (see the 
ethnographic map). Apart from the Hellenic population, which occupies a 
narrow strip to the south of Macedonia, the Tchataldjic peninsula, and the coasts, 
which constitutes a more or less important part of the town population, you 
meet Bulgarians, Turks, Wallachians (Vlachs or Roumanians), Albanians, Jews, 
Gypsies. At the end of the two wars and the oppressive measures of which 
we shall speak, the ethnographic map of Southern Macedonia had undergone 
profound changes. But we have a recent picture of the state of things before 
the war in the ethnographic map just published by Mr. J. Ivanov, of the Uni- 
versity of Sofia — in 1913. 1 The total numbers belonging to the various nation- 

ethnographic map of Southern Macedonia, representing the ethnic distribution on the 
eve of the 1912 Balkan war, by J. Ivanov, lecturer at the University of Sofia. Scale 1: 
200.000. Explanatory notes. Sofia, 1913, p. 8. The author employed the Turkish electoral 
lists and the Salnames, Greek statistics made in 1913 by Mr. Kalixiopoulos ; the unpublished 
returns of the detailed statistics undertaken by the 1912 Exarchate, and the new Roumanian 
statistics of A. Rubin & Co. Noe, etc., and "verified all information at his disposal on the 
spot." The map shows all the towns and villages in proportion to their size, and marks the 
proportions of the various nationalities in color. 



alities in a territory a little larger than the portion in the same region ceded to 
the Greeks by the Turks was as follows : 

Bulgarians 329,371 

Turks 314,854 

Greeks 236,755 

Wallachians 44,414 

Albanians 15,108 

Gypsies 25,302 

Jews 68,206 

Miscellaneous 8,019 

Total 1,042,029 

The statistics accepted by the Greeks differ considerably from these. To 
give some idea of the difference, the figures of Mr. Amadori Virgili are repro- 
duced (in brackets) with those of the Messager d' Athene s of February 2/15, 
1913, quoted in a recent work by Mr. Charles Bellay, L'irredentisme hellenique 
(Perrin, 1913), as representative of the Greek point of view: 

Sandjaks (Divisions of vilayets) 






Orthodox Greeks 

Exarchist Bulgarians . . 






















































(201 ,674) 









Clearly, in the Greek statistics, the Moslem total is swollen by the addition 
of the pomaks (Bulgarian Moslems), from whom, in the Bulgarian statistics, 
the Turks are separated. In the Greek figures the "orthodox" Greeks include 
the patriarchist Bulgarians and Wallachians, whom they call "Bulgarophone 
Greeks" or "Wallachophones" (Roumanianizers). With these exceptions, the 
difference is not considerable, when it is remembered that the territory is not 
quite the same; and it may be admitted that if language rather than the religion 
is used to determine nationality, Mr. Ivanov's figures are or were nearer the 
truth. The polemics of the Servian press put the number of "Slavs" annexed by 
Greece at 260,000; a figure which the Greek press reduced to 120,000. The 
secret Greek-Bulgarian treaty, as we know, contained no indication as to the 
frontiers on which the two parties had agreed. This was one more incitement 
to "Hellenic irridentism." In Greece, as in Servia, two opposing tendencies 
were at work after the first successes of the Hellenic army. Like Mr. Pachitch, 
of Belgrade, and Mr. Guechov, of Servia, Mr. Venizelos was for moderation, 
seeing therein the sole means of safeguarding their common creation, namely, 


the Balkan alliance. The discontent of the military party grew more and more 
outspoken, and as in Servia so in Greece, found a leader and interpreter in the 
person of the heir to the throne. The Greek diaspora was a much stronger and 
older organization than the scattered colonies gathered round the Servian school- 
masters and band leaders. Here the patriotic organization was based on a con- 
siderable settlement of really Greek population, and was accustomed to obey the 
word of command from Athens. From the months of January and February 
onwards, a regular campaign was organized, with addresses, memoranda, tele- 
grams, congress resolutions, etc., despatched to the Ambassadorial Conference 
in London and to the Hellenic government, all demanding annexation by Greece. 
On March 1/14, one of these memorials was presented to the Hellenic chamber 
in the name of the "Hellenes of Thrace and of Eastern Macedonia, who consti- 
tute almost the whole of the Christian population of these regions." The peti- 
tioners "proudly proclaim that Hellenism alone has, in the present war, made 
more moral and material sacrifices than any other of the allies or than all the 
allies together"; and demand their national regeneration through union with 
their mother country, Greece. 1 Mr. Venizelos entered an interpolation here, and 
his reply afforded a remarkable example of a political wisdom, soon to find itself 
swept away by the chauvinistic passion of the dominant party: "Necessarily," 
said the initiator of the alliance, "Greek populations and groups composed of 
these populations will pass under the domination of our allies. And the reason 
is not that these countries have been conquered by our allies, or that our allies 
demand it, but the force of geographical considerations. This is so true that 
even were our allies disposed to allow us to extend our frontiers towards their 
regions, and encompass the Greek populations, I at least, in my capacity of 
responsible Minister, would never accept a line of demarcation which for us is 
full of peril. If we are to go on extending in unbroken continuity along the 
sea, to encompass all the Greek population of Thrace, Greece thus extended and 
without any vertebral column, would be weaker than if its frontiers were rounded 
off differently. * * * I hope that no one from these benches will encourage 
resistance on the part of these disturbed and troubled populations." When he 
was violently attacked for these words, Mr. Venizelos added: "A similar decla- 
ration was made three or four weeks after the declaration of the war of libera- 
tion. * * * From that time on I have stated that I was making the sacrifice 
of a large part of Hellenic Thrace. * * * I felt it my duty to communicate 
this statement to the Chamber because * * * I knew that a movement was 
being worked up among their Greek populations which are destined to remain 
inside of Greater Greece. * * * Those who are urging such an attitude upon 
them are the true enemies of their country." 

Nevertheless, while speaking against the procedure of the patriotic Hellenic 

iSee this and the sixty-two other memorials published in the appendices to the inter- 
esting and instructive work of Mr. Charles Bellay, L'irredentisme hellenique, cited above. 


organizations in Thrace, Mr. Venizelos said nothing about Eastern Macedonia, 
which came within the scope of the "Deliannis formula," nor about Southwest- 
ern Slav Macedonia, at whose expense it was evidently hoped to accomplish the 
"rounding" of the Greek frontiers. As a matter of fact, the common Greek- 
Servian frontier had been already discussed in the "Salonica-Monastir train," 
and it is clearly in this sense that Mr. Venizelos understood the division among 
the allies of which he spoke in the chamber. This idea of a "division" of the 
territories in condominium among all the allies has already been substituted for 
the idea of Serbo-Bulgarian "arbitration." Some days after Mr. Venizelos's 
declaration, the heir, Prince Constantine, became King of Greece (March 6/19). 
The effects of this change made themselves felt on the relations between 
the Greeks in occupation and the indigenous population. We may begin our 
examination of these relations with Castoria. From the beginning of the occu- 
pation, the authorities there pretended to ignore the very existence of the Bul- 
garian population. It is true that Prince Constantine's proclamation on Novem- 
ber 14/27 announced that in the occupation regions the Greeks would respect 
the language and religious customs of the nationalities. That however did not 
affect the Bulgarians, who evidently were no more than "Bulgarophone Greeks" 
in the eyes of authority. Announcements and appeals to the population were 
published in Greek, Turkish and Yiddish, exactly as though the Bulgarian lan- 
guage did not exist, and Bulgarian remonstrances remained unheeded. To make 
the reality harmonize with this theory, the occupation army had recourse to the 
acts of violence which we know. After a sufficient demonstration had been 
made by the population, of the fate awaiting those who persisted in calling them- 
selves Bulgarians, formal retractations began to be demanded. These declara- 
tions, which the villagers were forced to sign, conformed in the Castoria region 
to two types. According to one of the two declarations, the people were made 
to say that they had been Greeks from the most ancient times, but had called 
themselves Bulgarians under the influence of Bulgarian propaganda. According 
to the other, they were made to say that up to 1903 the population had been 
Hellenic, but that between 1903 and 1906, they had been forced to call them- 
selves Bulgarians by the threats of the Bulgarian bands and comitadjis. The 
two models ended with the same declaration, namely, that immediately on the 
army's arrival the population felt its Hellenism and asked to be received into 
the bosom of the "Great Church of Jesus Christ." The Bulgarians were not 
"Christians" in "our sense." The Greek bishop of Castoria received the deputa- 
tions sent to him from all the villages, and was in fact the center of this active 
assimilation. The evzones played the part of apostles in this conversion at the 
bayonet's point. As examples we may cite the villages of Gabreche, Drenoveni, 
Tchernovitsa, Tourie, Ragoritchani, Dembeni, etc. In the villages of Breznitsa, 
Gorno and Dolno Nestrame, all the inhabitants were thrown into prison and 
driven thereby to call themselves Greeks. The reply given to a man who said 
he was a Bulgarian was : "Wast thou born at Sofia ; there are no Bulgarians in 


Macedonia; the whole population is Greek." To maintain this principle, a pass- 
port was given to those few natives who had to be admitted to be Bulgarians, 
declaring them to have been born in Bulgaria. The Commission knew of a 
passport of this kind given to the incumbent of the Bulgarian diocese of Cas- 
toria, although the man was born at Risen (in Macedonia) the Greek passport 
stated that the place of his birth was in Bulgaria. He was in fact permitted: 

vd fietaOr, elg deGGahovixyv xai sxslOlv elg tyjv ftovXyapiav 8% ag xarayerac 

and this was not an isolated case. The Mahometan pomaks of the village of 
Gerveni were also entered as Greeks by the enumeration commission; from the 
moment at which they spoke Bulgarian and not Turkish, they were revealed 
as Greeks. 

Victory secured in the villages which were disarmed, then came the turn of 
the intellectuals, the Bulgarian clergy, schoolmasters and officials. A number of 
persons whose names and cases are cited in the documents in the possession 
of the Commission, were arrested, beaten, put in prison and even killed. The 
Bulgarian Metropolis of Castoria was, at first, ignored by the authorities so far 
as its legal institution went : then cut off from the population under severe penal- 
ties for any communication; and finally, about the beginning of June, formally 
blockaded by twenty or thirty soldiers and searched by the police. Afterwards, 
by order of the government, all the officials and schoolmasters were shut up in 
their own houses until further orders. At this moment the Greek papers were 
already talking of the war as imminent. The Embros, in a letter from Salonica, 
said on June 14/27, "the great struggle for the existence of Hellenism will begin 
in a few days." On June 14/27, Proodos said, "We are on the eve of war. 
* * * On his departure for Salonica the king took his field uniforms with 
him. * * * The war proclamation * * * is ready." War began on the 
17/30, and the Greek citizens of Castoria were singing before the Metropolis 
verses inviting "A draught of Bulgarian blood." On July 31, after the conclu- 
sion of the treaty of Bucharest, the frourarque of Castoria summoned the head of 
the diocese, the officials of the Metropolis, and the schoolmasters, and told them 
"By order of the new government I give you forty-eight hours delay, in which 
to quit Greek territory." The expatriated, all natives of Macedonia, were given 
certificates to the effect that "they were returning to Bulgaria, where they were 
born." "He who goes to live in Bulgaria," was the reply to the protests, "is 
Bulgarian. No more Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia." 

We have also sufficiently complete data on events at Vodena (now called 
Edessa). Our informant there, as at Castoria, remembers how the Hellenic 
army entered in triumph on October 18/31, amid cries of joy from the popula- 
tion. Each house harbored ten to twenty soldiers, freely and without asking 
pay, and the town distributed gratuitously 6,000 okas of bread per day. The 


time had not come of forced requisitions, without receipt, demanding everything 
without allowing any merit to the giver, who had to obey. Ten days later, the 
Greeks were beginning to say, "We shall cut your tongues to teach you to speak 
Greek." They began confiscating private property, and sending things they liked 
to Greece; furniture, cattle, etc. The churches and schools were immediately 
taken, the Slav inscriptions destroyed, the offices burned, the priests beaten and 
driven out. Then began the arrest of influential persons in the different villages, 
such as Vestchitsa, Tsarmarinovi, Piskopia, Arsene, St. Elvas, Vettecope. The 
soldiers said to the notables in prison in Vestchitsa, "If you want to be free, 
be Greeks." 

War once declared — June 20, 21/July 3, 4, as many as 200 Bulgarians, the 
vicar, priest, notables, schoolmasters, inhabitants of the town and of the villages, 
were arrested. They were beaten and sent in fours to Salonica. On June 30 
the last Bulgarian church was confiscated; the Slav national images of St. Cyril 
and St. Methodius were burned and their ashes covered with dung. (The 
Greeks and Servians regarded these images, symbols of the independence of the 
Slav church, with special detestation.) At the beginning of July the population 
was asked to sign the following declaration: "Under compulsion from the ex- 
archist propaganda, and terrified by the comitadjis, we became Bulgarian. We 
now confess the true orthodox faith and our Hellenic nationality." Emissaries 
were then sent to Salonica to offer liberty to the prisoners from Vodena if they 
would declare themselves to be Greeks. "We remained pure," Mr. Atanasov, 
one of these prisoners, records, "our consciences immaculate, and we were all 
thirty-three freed without making any engagement on August 7/20. 1 But a 
Bulgarian schoolmaster from the village of Palati, who became a Greek, wrote 
in a Greek paper, Imera, that the prisoners had not suffered in any way and 
that "not a hair of their heads had been touched." He only forgot one thing, 
according to Mr. Atanasov: that had they remained in prison a month after 
this, not one would have come out alive. Mr. Atanasov gives a picture of the 
Salonica prisoners, which is known to be unhappily too correct. "There were 
130 of us in a single room," he said, "and often we had to stand throughout a 
whole night, waiting our turns to lie down. For fifty days we remained in this 
same room without crossing the threshold. The air we breathed can be imagined. 
There were others who had been there 100 days and more without having been 
interrogated. Their shirts were indistinguishable from their coats. In addi- 
tion to this filth and to the infection of the air, our food was ill-cooked bread, 
full of impurities. We were as though buried alive, waiting for death to set us 
free. I intentionally omit the moral suffering caused by the soldiers who were 
let in for the purpose. Among us there were wretched prisoners from Gumundje, 
Yenidje-Vardar. Fiorina, Castoria and Salonica. After a delay of five to six 
days at Salonica, they were sent into exile. Some were sent directly from the 

iSee the story of Mr. G. Atanasov, published in the Mir, September 30/October 13. 


station to the steamer; on embarkation their money and watches were taken 
from them; they were ill-treated; sometimes they were thrown from the top 
of the ladder into the hold. A man from Gumundje had his ear cut open, 
another his head broken; some had bayonet wounds, and all had been struck 
with the butt end of musket or stick." 

We have before us also depositions of witnesses as to what happened at 
the Ka'ilare sub-prefecture. Situated between Vodena and Castoria, it was nat- 
urally treated in the same way. There, too, Bulgarians were forced to become 
Greeks, and the peasants made to sign a declaration testifying that they had 
become Bulgarians only fifteen years ago and under compulsion from the 
comitadjis. The Slav offices were destroyed; the Bulgarian clergy were not 
allowed to administer the sacrament until they had been ordered to do so by 
the Greek bishops ; the schoolmasters were driven out and the scholars forced to 
attend Greek schools under threats of punishment for the parents. Soldiers were 
billetted on the Bulgarians, and requisitions made without either payment or 
receipt; andartes, placed in control of the administration, persecuted the Bulga- 
rian population in every way, killing the men, outraging the women and burning 
the houses with impunity. We could give names of the persons and villages 
which suffered. The villages most often mentioned are Embore, Rakita, Biriatsi, 
Kontsi, Debretse, etc. 

Despite all these persecutions, it may be said that in Greek Macedonia the 
simple fact that the ethnic difference between conquerors and oppressed is 
greater than in Servian Macedonia did serve to protect the Bulgarian population 
against assimilation. Although the victors were satisfied with having changed 
names and statistics and teaching the peasants to say "Good morning" and "Good 
evening" in Greek instead of in Bulgarian, there was no real change in national- 

There was indeed one thing which hampered the assimilation by the Greeks 
of the Slav element, namely, the presence of that same element in the immediate 
neighborhood. True, in Servian Macedonia the elements which outside still 
call themselves Bulgarian, are forced to give themselves out as pravisrbi, — 
true Servians. But that does not prevent the conservation of the sentiment of 
Slav affinity. In the allied Servian government, this sentiment found expres- 
sion in a tendency to desire the conservation and protection of the Slav element 
in Greek Macedonia. It is interesting that the first news received from Salonica 
by the Commission of the Greek drownings, was given by a citizen of the allied 
nation which had just taken precautions against the importunate curiosity of the 
Commission as to its own relations with the "Macedonian Slavs." The oppressed 
Slavs in Greek Macedonia in their turn seemed to look more favorably on the 
oppressors of their brothers in Monastir and Okhrida. If they may not have 
Bulgarian schools, some of them are ready to ask for Servian ones, — so long as 
they may keep their Slav school. The only objection of the Greek ally to the 


Servian ally is that the latter does not reciprocate by tolerating Greek schools 
in Servian Macedonia, or, if he allows them to be opened, forbids school children 
to attend them. Tit for tat. The Greek papers only disagree as to the number 
of Slavs with a moral right to protection by the Slav ally. Recognition of the 
very existence of the Slav element, although reduced to 120,000, is thus implied 
beyond dispute. 

This is not the case with the Moslem element, though equally numerous in 
Greek Macedonia. True, our documents prove that at the beginning of the 
occupation, when it was a question of ferreting out the Bulgarian committees, 
the help given by the Turkish element was highly appreciated by the andartes. 
Their end once accomplished, however, and especially after the treaty of Buchar- 
est, the tactics adopted towards the Moslems were entirely changed. The Jeune 
Turc seems justified in its complaints of the lot of its co-religionists in Mace- 
donia. "Mass arrests of Turks and Jews," it states towards the middle of 
October, "take place daily in Salonica on the most ridiculous grounds. Espionage 
is widely developed and persecution is attaining revolting dimensions." Unhap- 
pily the truth is worse. Another Turkish paper, Tasfiri Efkiar, 1 adds that per- 
secution extends from town dwellers to simple villagers. "The Moslems of the 
neighborhood of Poroi (between Doiran and Demir-Hissar), were shut up in 
forty wagons and conveyed to Salonica. The Greek authorities also persecuted 
the Moslems of Langadina (northeast of Salonica) ; on pretext of disarmament 
all the young people were conveyed to Salonica and ill treated. At Saryghiol 
(near Koukouche), all the men were conveyed to Salonica and the Greek sol- 
diers then outraged the women and young girls. At Sakhna, at Serres and 
Pravishta, conversion was carried on with such success that in the case of 
Sakhna not one Moslem is left." "The number of Turkish prisoners in the 
Salonica area amounts to the enormous total of 5,000," adds the Echo de Bui- 
garie (December 20/January 2). Some months later, Mr. Ivanov remarks in 
his "Explanatory Notes" that "the Turkish groups of Saryghiol (south of 
Kailare), Kailare and Ostrovo, strong in numbers and prosperity, were partic- 
ularly severely tried after the Greek invasion. All the towns and the villages 
of the region were laid waste and the population sought safety in flight. Flight, 
too, was the resource of the Moslem population of the towns in the Yenidje 
valley, especially Voden, Negouche (Niansta), Karaferia (Veria), Yenidje- 
Vardar. This last town suffered most of all ; the whole market and the Moslem 
quarters were laid in ruins." 

We must now glance at Eastern Macedonia, of which we spoke in chapter 
II. and whence the Bulgarian population fled en masse to Bulgaria, the Turks and 
Greeks taking the road to Salonica. Documents not hitherto mentioned com- 
plete the picture of what is almost a total extermination. As the most authori- 
tative document for the violence with which the Turkish population was treated 

'These two quotations are from the Mir, of October 24 and November 2 (old style). 


by the Greeks, we publish in Appendix A, 13 a, a complete list of persons killed 
and pillages effected in one casa in Pravishta (O. de Kavala). The original 
document was given to the Commission in Turkish ; it is an official proces-verbal, 
drawn up and sealed by the Moslem community of Pravishta. It contains 
names and facts solely ; but these names and facts have a dreary eloquence. 
"Of the 20,000 Turks of this casa only 13,000 remain." "Among the persons 
killed there are unhappily many imams, Turkish notables and men of education. 
This shows that the Greeks were pursuing a definite object." Here is the pic- 
ture of the central city of Pravishta, taken by the Bulgarian comitadji, Voyevoda 
Baptchev, but where the Greek Bishop, presiding at the improvised tribunal, 
pronounces the sentences of death executed by Baptchev, while protecting the 
young Turkish girls and the mosques against the fanatical chauvinism of the 

As to atrocities committed by the Greeks in the northern part of eastern 
Macedonia (principally populated by Bulgarians), the Commission collected at 
Sofia a portion of the depositions afterwards published by Professor Miletits. 1 

Out of all our documents we select as a specimen the story of a merchant, 
Nicolas Temelkov, which gives a general picture of the state of the country after 
the retreat of the Greek army, which as regards the whole region traversed 
between Strumnitsa and Djoumaya, was picturesquely characterized by another 
witness in the phrase "There was not a cock left to crow." Mr. Temelkov, whose 
evidence is not included in Professor Miletits's document, allows us to give 
his name. Towards the end of August (old style) he was returning from Bul- 
garia with some refugees. He crossed the Kresna Valley, in the upper Strouma. 
In the village of St. Vratche there were only some men feeding on the corn which 
had fallen on the road from the military convoy. The women did not dare to 
appear; they remained hiding in the mountains. The priest of the village, Con- 
stantine, and five notables, had been killed, and no one knew where their bodies 
were. Passing through the village of Lechnitsa you met nobody. The village of 
Sclara had been burned, but twelve or thirteen families were left. The other 
families were still in the mountains, in fear of another Greek invasion. All the 
women of the village between the ages of ten and fifty had been collected by 
the Greeks in the house of Mito Konstantinov, and divided among the soldiery 
one woman to every thirty soldiers. A girl of eighteen years old, Matsa Andone 
Pantcheva, who had finished her school time, would not give herself up. She 
offered them money to give to the women of the streets if they would leave her in 
peace. The soldiers got sixty Turkish pounds. When, after that, they still tried 
to outrage her, she resisted, crying, "I had rather die honest." She was killed 
by bayonet thrusts. 

1 See his Greek Atrocities in Macedonia during the Greek Bulgarian war, Sofia, 1913, 
and Documents, extracts from this book, published with certain changes in style, Sofia, 


Mr. Temelkov and his companions then passed through the villages of 
Khotovo and Spatovo. There was nobody there ; the population still kept to the 
hills. The villages had been burned to the ground. They passed through Mand- 
jovo and Tchiflitsi, which the Greek press stated had been burned by the Greek 
population, who would no longer live there under the Bulgarian regime. Mr. 
Temelkov, like the other witnesses, states that the town had not been burned ; only 
the military casino, hotel and post office (in the same building as the casino), 
had been burned. The Greek houses were empty; the Greeks had taken their 
furniture with them. Mr. Temelkov was told that the Greeks emigrated by the 
express orders of the Greek government; the order being given when it was 
known that Melnik was to remain Bulgarian. Automobiles and carts were sup- 
plied to enable the Greeks to take all their goods with them to Demir-Hissar. 
The men were beaten to make them take the carts and go. The same order was 
given and executed at Nevrocope, where force had to be employed to make the 
Greek inhabitants depart. By order of the officers, all the contents of the big 
Bulgarian shops in Melnik belonging to Temelkov Nadjiyanev (the father of 
Temelkov), and Constantine Pope-Tachev, were seized. The little Bulgarian 
shops and private houses were left to be pillaged by the population. 

Mr. Temelkov had news from his father and mother, who remained in 
Melnik, while he fled to Bulgaria. The military authorities sent for his father 
and said to him, "What are you going to do now ? We want men here, not bears. 
Become a Greek, if you want to live here." Mr. Temelkov's father, an old man 
of sixty, replied, "I was born in this country and I shall remain here without 
changing my nationality." He was summoned a second time and asked, "Where 
are your sons?" "They are in Bulgaria." "You must give up their property." 
"They have none." Then some officers ransacked the house and found the 
dowry of Mr. Temelkov's wife, which amounted to £T250. This money was 
seized. Then Temelkov, the father, a rich merchant, was asked for 400 pairs 
of empty sacks for aniseed, and 100 for cotton, which had cost him eighty 
Napoleons. Then Mr. Nadjiyanev was taken to Ormane-Tchflik and to Livou- 
novo, under pretext of taking him before the commander. When they arrived 
at Ormane, he was threatened with death and asked for money. He promised 
to give it and the same Greek officers took him back to Melnik. He paid them 
£T180. He however possessed another property at Scalve. All his corn, wheat 
and barley were seized (30,000 and 40,000 okas) and his sixteen bullocks. For 
all that £T200 was paid him. Finally on the Greeks' departure, it was decided 
to kill him and his wife. But a Greek friend, Nicolas the bazardji, 1 warned him, 
and advised him to flee with the Greeks without delay, since within a few hours 
they would come to look for him. He agreed, took flight and hid in the Bulga- 
rian village of Kaikovtsi. While he was being searched for at Demir-Hissar, 
he escaped on horseback across the Pirine mountains. But he did not return to 
Melnik. Worn out, he stopped at Scalve, and died there of exhaustion. 



Counting the Bulgarian villages whose burning he remembers, Mr. Temelkov 
names: Marikostinovo, Morino Pole, Koula, Kapatovo, Kroumidovo, Dzigvelia, 
Mandjovo, Tchiflitsi, Khotovo, Ladarevo, Laskarevo, Sclave, Spatovo, half of 
Livounovo (after the departure of the general staff), Ormane Tchiflik, St. 
Vratche, Polevitsa, Khrsovo, half of Vrana, Katountsi, Spantchevo, the upper 
and the lower town. He told us that only the mountain villages are left. The 
whole of the furniture, cattle and grain was taken by the Greeks. But the last 
stroke certainly was the destruction of the town of Strumnitsa, almost under 
the eyes of the Commission. An Austrian officer, Mr. Br — , tells us that he 
was taken by the population of Strumnitsa for a member of the Commission, 
when, after the end of the war he was making his way on horseback between 
Sofia and Salonica in company with a German officer, Mr. de R. T. Mr. Br — ; 
published his story in the Vienna Reichspost, and sent a report to the Austrian 
consulate at Sofia. This is his story, which thus falls within the scope of the 
Commission's inquiry: 

On July 28 (old style), peace was concluded. On August 8 [the day 
before he started on his journey], that is to say, ten days after the con- 
clusion of peace, the Greek military element began burning and pillaging 
the town. The method of incendiarism was as follows : benzine was poured 
on the different buildings, they were then set on fire and blown up with 
pyroxiline bombs. I have never been able to discover the chemical com- 
position of these bombs. They did not explode until thrown upon the fire. 
I sent a piece to the Austrian Legation at Sofia. At the same time the 
Greek soldiers compelled the inhabitants to hide in their houses, and cut 
off all the water pipes and fountains, so that there were no means of put- 
ting out the fire. Throughout the whole time, between August 8 and 15, 
motors came and went three times a day to carry off the stolen property. 
Everything was carried off that the people had not succeeded in hiding, 
even chairs, boxes, frames, portraits, beds, etc. Anything that could not 
be taken was destroyed. All the cattle of one of the biggest proprietors in 
the region, the Moslem Nasif-effendi was stolen, and his house burned after 
his wife had been so outraged that she died of it. His child was taken 
from him and not found again. All the goods of the Jew Novak Koze 
were taken from him, and his wife outraged. A rich merchant, Bandesev, had 
all his goods taken, and motors came and went for two days to take every- 
thing out of his house. His wife, too, was outraged, "and so on." 

Mr. Br — left Strumnitsa on August 24 (old style). But the Commission 
has highly trustworthy evidence from a person who was at Strumnitsa August 
15/28 — i. e., who saw the end of the fire. The evidence of another witness, a 
Strumnitsa governess, Miss Itcheva, who remained in the town throughout this 
time, has been published by Mr. Miletits. 1 From all these sources we know 

documents, pp. 166-168. We have also the evidence of a Bulgarian schoolmaster, who 
reached Strumnitsa on August 19. 


that the destruction of Strumnitsa was but the execution of part of a plan drawn 
up at the conclusion of peace by the Greek authorities. "From July 27 on," says 
Miss Itcheva, "the Greeks began a propaganda among the Greek population, and 
invited them to leave the country. They put into their minds the fear of being 
tortured or even killed by the Bulgarians. They promised the people to build 
them a 'new Strumnitsa' in the town of Koukouche. 1 The Greek king himself 
was going to look after the population. As a matter of fact it was known 
beforehand that after the forced expatriation of the Greeks, Jews and Turks, 
the town itself was dedicated to destruction like Xanthi, Gumuldjina, and 'the 
other places in Thrace.' The foreign consuls at Strumnitsa thus informed, 
consulted together and telegraphed to their representatives to make representa- 
tions at Athens. The Greek government agreed to keep all these places until 
the arrival of the Bulgarian army. But this news was received at Salonica on 
August 8/21, the very day on which the fire began in Strumnitsa. During 
the ten previous days the Greek inhabitants had come and gone in the town 
at their leisure, carrying off their goods in motors put at their disposal by the 
government. The Turks and Jews had been compelled to follow them. This 
operation completed, the Greeks set fire to the markets in the southwest por- 
tion of the town, near the house of the Greek doctor, Rixopoulo. The idea 
was that the news being spread in Salonica before the catastrophe, international 
opinion might be made to think that the population had set fire to their own 
houses, out of fear of remaining under the Bulgarian yoke. The population 
of the Bulgarian quarters (but a quarter of the whole), seeing the market on 
fire, came out into the empty streets, and during the night of the 8th and 
9th they succeeded in putting out the fire. They thought then that the Greek 
army was gone; in reality it was only hidden. On the morning of the 9th, 
the Greek soldiers appeared and threatened to kill the Bulgarians. From that 
time the Bulgarian population retired to its houses and did not dare to come 
forth and put out the fire. It was then that the Greeks cut the water pipes 
and broke the fire engines. In the evening the fire was relighted, and during 
the night the Greek and Turkish quarters began to burn. The Greek soldiers 
no longer hid — a great number of witnesses saw them at work. They had 
bombs in their hands, which they put under the buildings, and in a few minutes 
the houses were in flames. Six or eight soldiers were seen setting fire to the 
barracks three times before they got it going." A vlach told our witness that 
a uniformed Greek policeman had awakened him and his family and told him 
to come out at once, as his house was going to be burned, and would be as soon 
as they had cleared out. This lasted a whole week, until by the 15th the entire 
town, with the exception of the two Bulgarian quarters, lay in ashes. Three 
days later the Bulgarian army arrived. One of our informants told us that 

1 Vladevo, a village near Vodena, has actually been called "New Strumnitsa." 


an attempt was made to get the Bulgarian Lieutenant Colonel sign an official 
declaration to the effect that the houses had been burned by their owners. The 
Bulgarian officer refused. 

The Strumnitsa affair throws a vivid light on a number of similar events 
where the intention and preliminary organization are not so easily discernible. 
If it seems to transcend all the instances hitherto given, this is simply due to the 
fact that we have been better able to follow it up. In concluding this part of 
our report with this act of unqualified horror, we have only to set down the 
moral conclusion. 

The events described above serve to afford one more confirmation of an 
ancient truth, which it is useful to recall. That legitimate national sentiment 
which inspires acts of heroism, and the perverted and chauvinistic nationalism 
which leads to crime are but two closely related states of the collective mind 
Perhaps indeed the state of mind is the same, its social value varying with the 
object to which it is directed. We regard as just and legitimate, we even admire 
the deeds, the manifestations by which nationality defends its existence. We 
speak constantly of the "good cause" of oppressed nationalities, or nationalities 
struggling against difficulties to find themselves. But when these same nation- 
alities pass from the defensive to the offensive, and instead of securing their own 
existence, begin to impinge on the existence of another national individuality, 
they are doing something illicit, even criminal. In such a case, as we have seen, 
the theory of State interests and the State feeling or instinct, is invoked. But 
the State itself must learn to conform to the principle of the moral freedom of 
modern nationalities, as it has learned to accept that of individual freedom. It 
is not nationality which should sacrifice its existence to any erroneous or out- 
worn idea of the State. In applying this sound maxim to the facts of the second 
Balkan war, the conclusion is forced upon one, that in so far as the treaty of 
Bucharest has sanctioned the illegitimate claims of victorious nationalities, it is a 
work of injustice which in all probability will fail to resist the action of time. 
Would it not be more in consonance with the real feeling of solidarity of peoples 
to re-cast the treaty, than to wait for the development and ripening of its evil 
fruit ? The question of the moment is not a new territorial division, such as 
would probably provoke that new conflict which the whole world wishes to avoid. 
Mutual tolerance is all that is required; and it is justified by the fact that the 
offence is mutual. The confused tangle of Balkan nationalism can not be 
straightened out, either by attempts to assimilate at any price, or by a new migra- 
tion. But in the question of the Macedonian Slavs in Greek Macedonia, each 
national group needs the protection of some neighboring State, — the Roumanians, 
the Bulgarians, the Turks, the Greeks, even the Servians. The way to arrive 
at such mutual protection is simple enough — a return to the Greek-Bulgarian 
proposals so wrongly rejected at the Bucharest Conference. All that is needed 
is an effective mutual guarantee of religious and educational autonomy. If there 


be any utility in the grave lesson of the events we have described, it must be to 
lead the allies of the day before yesterday, the impassioned foes of yesterday, the 
jealous and frigid neighbors of today to solidarity tomorrow in their work for 
the welfare of the Balkans. The treaty of Bucharest needs to be revised and 
completed in this sense, if it is not to be broken down by some new caprice of 


The War and International Law 

Our whole report is an answer to the question put in this chapter. That 
answer may be summed up in a simple statement that there is no clause in inter- 
national law applicable to land war and to the treatment of the wounded, which 
was not violated, to a greater or less extent, by all the belligerents. 

This chapter is not, however, a mere recapitulation of what has been 
already said. We have reserved for this stage some questions touching more 
nearly on the domain of international law in time of war. As for the ques- 
tions already considered we shall use the opportunity of adding supplementary 
notes and quoting certain documents not referred to in previous chapters. 

1. Before speaking of the war, let us look first at the question of treaties. 
We have seen that the Balkan war was the result of the violation (an extraor- 
dinary violation, be it said) of a treaty which was itself the basis of common 
action crowned with success, and a treaty which assumed the continuance of 
common action for eight years. We have seen, it is true, that Servian politicians 
plead not circumstances which did not extenuate (since they did not recognize 
what they did as a misdeed), but which would have authorized their violation 
of the treaty of February 29/March 13, 1913, with the Bulgarians. They recalled 
a clause of which much has been said in international law to the effect that 
treaties are to be observed — pacta sunt servanda — only if there is not change 
in the condition of things — rebus sic stantibus. After the statesmen 1 came the 
professors to prove, on scientific data, the sound foundations of these patriotic 
claims. Dr. Mileta, Dr. Novakovits and Dr. Lazar Markovits (who translated 
Balcanicus' book into German,) published in the Belgrade Diebo two articles in 
which they had recourse to Keffler, as authority Bluntschli, Jellinek, Martens, and 
above all a recent study by Mr. Erich Kauffmann, professor at Kiel University, 
Das Wesen des Volkerrechts und die claudula rebus sic stantibus (Tubingen 
Mohr, 1911, p. 231) to prove that Servia had a right to demand revision of the 
treaty and, in case of refusal, to regard it as abrogated. 2 On the authority of 
Professor Kauffmann, the Servian professors cited as precedents, the Russian 
declarations of October 29-31, 1870, on the Black Sea, and of June 13, 1886, 
on Batoum; the refusal of Prussia and Austria Hungary in 1864 to conform 

1 In Chapter I, reference was made to a book by Balcanicus (pseudonym of one of the 
Members of the Cabinet) which opened the campaign for treaty revision in the govern*- 
ment journal Sammouprava in April, 1913. His book consists of the collected articles that 
appeared in the paper. 

2 See the reprint of the articles by Novakovits and Markovits (in Servian) Srpsko- 
bourgarski ongovove so glediehta medjunarodnog prava. (The Serbo-Bulgarian treaty 
from the standpoint of international law.) Belgrade, 1913. 


to the London Protocol of 1852; the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1908. The authors of the articles add the revision, in 1912, of the Franco- 
Spanish treaty of 1904 on Morocco. 

This report is not a legal study, and we may leave to specialists the task 
of deciding whether the clause rebus sic stantibus can be applied to the question 
of revision and to the breach of the treaty. The Commission expressed its 
opinion (Chapter I) when they showed that the allegations of a change in the 
circumstances was but a pis aller, to which recourse was had upon the failure 
of the attempts at giving a forced interpretation to the terms of the treaty and 
thereby proving that the Bulgarians had been the first to violate it. What makes 
the violation particularly odious, is that a condition vital, nay essential, to one 
of the contracting parties, indispensable to the conclusion of the treaty, was 
violated by another party as soon as the common end had been attained. The 
Servians did not show what the English call "fair play." It is true that on both 
sides the question was regarded as one of ''force" — (eine Macht-frage). If 
formal right was entirely on the side of the Bulgarians, they lost their moral 
right in so far as they transformed the war from one of liberation to one of 
conquest (see Chapter X). But even so the moral right of Macedonia remained, 
guaranteed by the treaty, violated by the war, and abolished by the treaty of 
Bucharest. If the clause rebus sic stantibus could be applied to the loss of 
the Adriatic and the acquisition of Adrianople, why could it not also be applied 
to the Roumanian occupation? If the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty ceased to be in 
force from the moment when there was no longer any real force to defend it, 
why should the treaty of Bucharest stand after the occupation ceased? Such 
are the dangerous conclusions that could be drawn from the Servian application 
of the clause, — and above all from its method of application. It may be said, 
with Jellinek, that there is not only no international treaty, but even no general 
law to which the clause rebus sic stantibus may not be applied. There could 
be no progress were there no means of adapting legislation to changing cir- 
cumstances. But it does not follow that the series of necessary adaptations can 
be understood as a series of breaches of the law (Rechtsbruche) . One law is 
changed by another law. A treaty must be changed by another treaty. This 
principle is formally recognized in one of the cases cited as "precedents" by the 
Servian professors, that of Russia's refusal in 1870 to regard herself as bound 
by Articles XI and XIV of the treaty of Paris of 1856. In a note of November, 
1870, Lord Granville protested categorically against such a violation of the 
principle of the obligatory force of treaties. Italy and Austria Hungary sup- 
ported the English protest. A new conference was summoned in London on 
January 17, 1871, and on Lord Granville's motion it began its sitting with this 
unanimous resolution: "The plenipotentiaries of North Germany, Austria Hun- 
gary, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey, this day joined in conference, 
recognize that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can 
release itself from its treaty obligations, or modify their provisions, without 


the consent of the contracting parties reached by friendly understanding." This 
is a principle which can not be abrogated by any precedent or sophistry, if inter- 
national law is to be a reality at all. 

2. The question of the opening of hostilities is regulated by the Convention 
of the Second Hague Conference, the first article of which lays it down that 
"hostilities between the contracting Powers can not comm;ence without pre- 
liminary notice, of no equivocal kind, which must take the form either of a 
reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration 
of war." The Conference however rejected, on the ground of "the exigencies 
of modern war," the Netherlands' amendment which tried to insist on twenty- 
four hours' delay after the declaration. 1 

Much was not asked therefore, and the little that was asked did not rule 
out surprises or the use of military ruse. But the case of course was not fore- 
seen of a State's opening hostilities without itself knowing clearly whether it 
wished to begin war. It is true that there could be no surprise, since the Ser- 
vians and Greeks had regarded war as inevitable from the beginning of time. 
They were in fact in a much better state of preparation, from a military point 
of view, than the Bulgarians. The latter in beginning war were "without being 
aware of it, playing the Servians' game," as Mr. de Penennrun well observes. 2 
As for the Greeks, we have seen that King Constantine left Athens for Salonica on 
June 14/27, with the war manifesto in his pocket and "grounds for supposing 
that war would that week begin all along the line from Pirot to Elevtera." 3 
Were General Savov's telegrams haply known to the Greeks? Anyhow the 
element of the unexpected in the opening of hostilities was evidently taken thor- 
oughly into consideration by the adversaries. But this does not prevent the 
judgment that the steps taken by the Bulgarians did formally contravene in- 
ternational endeavor to make appeal to mediation or arbitration, which in this 
case was provided for in the treaty. The undertaking to this effect in the Serbo- 
Bulgarian treaty was formal. A mutual undertaking was made in Article 4 of 
the secret annex, in terms that admitted of no tergiversation or misunderstand- 
ing: "Any difference that may arise as regards the interpretation or execution 
of any one of the clauses of the treaty, of this secret annex and of the military 
convention, shall be submitted for definitive decision to Russia as soon as one 
of the two parties shall have declared that they regard it as impossible to reach 
an understanding by direct negotiation." The Servians had consented to the 
execution of this clause and their reservations were in no sense obligatory on the 

*See the discussion on this subject at the Second Hague Conference. Lemonon, 344-345. 

2 Cf. up. cit, p. 72. Mr. de Penennrun published a fac-simile (pp. 32 and 48) of an 
order taken on a Bulgarian officer and dated June 16/29, with dispositions for the com- 
mencement of hostilities on the morning of the 17/30. The Bulgarians on their part have 
published a fac-simile of the war proclamation prepared in advance by the Servians with 
the date June 18 inserted in writing in the printed text (see the Mir of June 28). The 
printed proclamation ran — '"Our Greek allies", and "our Montenegrin brothers march with 
us against the Bulgarians." 

3 See Chapter IV, the article by Proodos of June 14/27. 


arbiter. Had the Bulgarians, after this, violated the clause while continuing to 
invoke it, they would have sanctioned the violations which the Servians had 
allowed themselves in Macedonia, and dealt a final blow at the legal existence 
of the treaty. This is why, while recognizing that Servia's violation made con- 
flict inevitable, the responsibility of formal breach must lie with the Bulgarians. 

The element of ruse was not lacking either. The Servian papers have pub- 
lished stories of a banquet given by Bulgarian officers to Servian officers, at 
which they were photographed together a few hours before the battle; and told 
how, as they took their visitors home, the Bulgarians measured the distances 
and observed the dispositions of the advance guard. The Servians also accused 
the Bulgarians of having tried to prejudice international opinion by instructing 
their Ambassador at Belgrade, Mr. Tochev, to enter a protest against an alleged 
act of Servian aggression eight hours after the nocturnal attack of June 16/29- 
17/30. If as there is reason to suppose, although Mr. Tochev denied it in the 
press, he was one of those who pressed on the war and was au courant with the 
events that were to take place, this action is all the more blameworthy. But to 
accuse Mr. Tochev of not having been in a position to know what was happening 
on the Bregalnitsa at the moment when he was making his remonstrance at the 
Ministry at Belgrade, is excessive. The telephone was there; thanks to it, Mr. 
Hartvig could accuse Mr. Danev, on June 9, of "protesting" against Servian 
agreement to Russian arbitration ; and it must have been in equally good working 
order a week later. 1 

3. We are on much firmer ground when we pass to the law and custom of 
land warfare, violated by all the belligerents despite the existence of an inter- 
national convention signed by them all: namely, the "Convention concerning the 
laws and customs of land warfare," and the annex accompanying it, elaborated 
at the Second Hague Conference in 1907, which have replaced the 
Convention of July 29, 1899, signed by the Powers after the first Hague 
Conference. Bulgaria, it is true, made certain reserves on the question of an 
amendment changing the 1899 Convention. This amendment forbade any bel- 
ligerent to force the members belonging to the nation of his opponents dwelling 
in his territory, to take part in operations of war against their own country, and 
provided further that if the said belligerent invaded the enemy's country he might 
not compel the inhabitants to give information about the opposing army and its 
means of defence. But with this exception, Bulgaria, like the other representa- 
tives of the Balkan States, signed the Convention. 

In its first article the Convention lays it down that "the contracting powers 
shall give their armed land forces instructions in conformity with the regula- 
tions * * * annexed to the present Convention." Since by Article 3 the 
belligerent party was made "responsible for all acts committed by persons form- 
ing part of its armed forces" (and under "armed forces" the regulations com- 

*Mr. Tochev has denied these revelations which Mr. Hartvig himself said were in- 
correctly reported by his interviewer, Mr. Gantchev. See the Mir, November 13/30, 1913. 


prised, over and above the regular army, the "militia" and "volunteer corps"), 
it might have been expected that the governments signing the Convention would 
feel a particular interest in seeing that their army knew their obligations. Was 
this done in the Balkans? In particular, were any such notions introduced into 
the military instruction of soldiers and officers? The Commission's information 
on this important head is incomplete, owing to the lack of aid from the Greek 
and Servian governments in their inquiry into the war. Indirectly, however, the 
conclusion may be reached that the 1907 Convention (and likewise that of 1899), 
remained unknown to the Balkan armies generally, with the possible exception 
of one or two isolated officers. All that was known was the Geneva Convention, 
more or less. Today, as in 1900, "the conscientious exercise of the Hague Con- 
vention by the governments signing it, is still to come. They must give their 
armies instruction in conformity with the Convention. It is desirable that such 
instruction should form part of the compulsory teaching in military training 
establishments and in the instruction of the soldier. Only on this condition can 
the application of the Hague Convention be seriously guaranteed/' 1 In the 
Balkans these words of Mr. Marten's are at this day a puim desiderium as they 
were ten years ago. As far as the Commission is aware, exception can only be 
made, and that to a limited extent, in the case of Bulgaria. The Commission 
learned that the Convention of Geneva, at any rate, was taught to the officers 
in training, not to the soldiers. Only in Bulgaria was the Commission able, 
after repeated attempts and through a private source, to procure documents 
showing that during the last war at least some efforts were made by the heads 
of the different army corps to stop crimes against the laws and customs of war. 
These documents possess such interest in view of the Commission's object, that 
they are here translated verbatim, with regret that they are the only ones we 
can quote: 


Order to the Twenty-second Infantry Thracian Regiment of his Royal Majesty Charles 
Edward Saxe Coburg Gotha N. 93. October 14, 1912, Pekhtchevo Camp 

I have noticed that certain soldiers of the regiment, after crossing the frontier, com- 
mit arbitrary acts which become serious crimes in time of war. I see with great regret that 
the heads of companies consider these acts lightly as of no weight, and permit them to be 
done under their eyes. Thus in the camp at Tsarevo-Selo, I saw some soldiers leave the 
camp and go into the neighboring village, which had been abandoned by its inhabitants, to 
pillage, each for himself, forgetful of his duty of remaining at his post. I have also seen, 
in camp, soldiers taking from somewhere unknown goods and cattle in order to make 
themselves a meal different from the company's. Thus a large number scattered. This 
shows either that the soldiers are too greedy or that their superiors do not look after their 
food. I have also seen some soldiers either through negligence or by intention, destroying 
the telegraph lines, doing damage to houses left vacant by the people and even going into 
Bulgarian houses. [Here there is a small lacuna in the MSS.] Some of them behaved ,ill 
to the wounded and captive enemy soldiers. It might seem superfluous, but it is necessary 
to recall to the captains of companies that it is their duty to explain to the soldiers the 
provisions of the laws and the responsibility of anyone offending against them. I order 
that the following instructions as to foraging and the penal laws be conveyed to all the 
soldiery : 

1 See preface to a book by Mr. F. de Martens, La Paix et la Guerre. Paris, 1901. 


1. All factories, furnaces, workshops, military depots, transports, provisions, State and 
communal banks within the sphere of our army are military booty. The property and 
provisions of individuals are not to be touched. If the population has left the town or 
village, but the authorities remain, their property also is inviolable. Even in cases where 
there are no public powers, private property is regarded as belonging to the State or the 
commune. Military booty is State property. This is why the appropriation of objects of 
military booty is regarded and punished as a theft of State property. 

When a regimental detachment enters an inhabited place where there are goods form- 
ing military booty, the head of the detachment must take steps to preserve these objects 
and if possible remove them after making a report to the general staff of the regiment; but 
he must not take anything without express orders. The head of a detachment may not 
take goods he needs except in case of extreme necessity, or when permission has not ar- 
rived in time. 

When a detachment gets no supplies of food, the head may make requisition himself 
of what is necessary to feed his men and fill up his reserve, if broken into. In such a case 
he must send in a report. Receipts must be given for goods requisitioned. 

Soldiers are absolutely forbidden to prepare their food themselves. The ration allowed 
is more than sufficient. It should be remembered that it is one of the most important of 
the captain's duties to know how to make good use of local food supplies. 

2. The soldiers must be made to understand that the Turkish telegraph lines are 
necessary for our communications, and they must not destroy them. 

3. It must be remembered that military honor, the laws and customs of war and inter- 
national conventions oblige us to treat the peaceful population of the enemy's country well 
and prisoners of war the same. It is not becoming in a soldier to show courage against 
a disarmed enemy, incapable of defending himself. Prisoners are in the power of our 
government, not of the individuals and corps who have captured them. Ill treatment of 
prisoners is forbidden ; to assassinate an enemy soldier who has given himself up or been 
taken, is to commit a murder. To pillage dead or wounded soldiers and prisoners is also 
a crime according to our laws. 

4. The following articles of the military penal code are to be read to the soldiers : 

Article 241. Those guilty of pillaging the dead on the battlefield ar.e committed to a 
disciplinary company for six months to one and one-half years, with confinement in cells 
and transference to the second conduct grade. 

Article 242. Those guilty of pillaging the wounded or prisoners are committed to 
a disciplinary company for two to three years with confinement in the cells and trans- 
ference to the second conduct grade. If the pillage has been accompanied with violence 
the punishment is death. 

Article 243. Anyone guilty of having intentionally burned or otherwise destroyed 
munitions of war or other objects of defence and commissariat, in places being de- 
fended against the enemy, or of destroying or damaging the telegraphs, water pipes, 
railways, bridges, dykes and other means of communication, shall be punished with 

Article 246. Those guilty of premeditated murder, of outrage, pillage, brigandage and 
premeditated arson, shall be punished with death. 

Seal of the Regiment. 

Commander of the Regiment, Colonel Savov. 
Adjutant Major, Captain Ghigev. 

Army Order No. 69, Lozengrad {Kirk Kilisse), December 13/26, 1912 

Information has reached the general staff which, to our great regret, causes us to suspect 
that certain individuals and corps allowed themselves to commit with impunity various acts 
of pillage and violence against the peaceable population of the conquered countries. Since 
actions of this kind, highly blameable and inhuman, compromise the Bulgarian name and the 
Bulgarian nation in a high degree, and on the other hand sap the confidence of our future 
subjects (especially the peaceful Moslem population) in our power to guarantee their 
honor, property and life, I order : 

1. That the commanders of the armies and the military governors take severe and 
prompt measures to open an inquiry on actions of this kind committed in the zone of 
occupation of the army under their charge, and to bring the culprits immediately before a 
tribunal in accordance with the law, without distinction of rank or class. * * * The 


members of the Military Hierarchy are notified that they must be severe and show no clem- 
ency in suppressing actions of this kind; they must not forget the weight of responsi- 
bility resting on them if they do not observe this conduct. 

2. That the most stringent measures be taken to introduce order and discipline in the 
rear guard of the army. The persons not belonging to the army, and those who while 
belonging to the army, do not behave worthily, are to be sent immediately into the Kingdom. 

3. That the military as a whole be warned that the peaceful population of the country 
occupied is placed without distinction of creed or nationality under the protection of our 
military laws, and that in conformity with these laws any unjustifiable severity, any violence 
and any injustice will be punished. I invite the military and civil authorities to devote them- 
selves to the attainment of the end proposed. 

4. In conclusion, let it not be forgotten we have undertaken the war in the name of an 
elevated human ideal — the liberation of this population from a regime made insupportable 
by its severity and its injustice. May God help the valiant sons of Bulgaria to realize this 
noble ideal, may they assist in restraining one another from compromising this great and 
glorious work in the eyes of the civilized world, and of their dear native land! 

The Aide-de-Camp of the Commander in Chief. 

General Lieutenant of the General Staff Savov. 

It is with the sense of moral well being that one pauses, in the midst of 
the horrors which we have been compelled to describe, to read these lines, so 
different in their spirit from the august threats which speak in the well known 
telegram of King Constantine: "To my profound regret I find myself involved 
in the necessity of making reprisals in order to inspire their authors (the authors 
of the "Bulgarian monstrosities'), with salutary fear and to cause them to 
reflect before committing similar atrocities." To compare the conscientious spirit 
which animates these men, full of desire to preserve the high character of their 
mission, with the boastfulness based on hatred and reproach for "barbarian 
hordes" who "have no longer the right to be classed in the number of civilized 
peoples," is to be prepared to see a change in the standard of values. 

Alas, in the actual practice of the "laws and customs of war," the contrast 
grows less. The sublime and the hateful, heroism and barbarism, come neaf 
together. Nevertheless, the desire to remain just and noble is a merit which 
we desire to note. It is a tendency we have only found among Bulgarian officers 
and intellectuals. It will certainly cause us satisfaction if, after the publication 
of this report, the information lacking to us shall be produced in the shape of 
similar documents, which not satisfied to make a candid avowal were equally 
anxious to apply a remedy. Unhappily, other indications prove that even the 
consciousness of having committed faults and crimes is wanting. 

Faults and crimes are found in profusion everywhere. We will recapitulate 
them, comparing the sad reality with the fine resolutions taken in the Hague 
Convention of 1907, which were signed by the belligerents. In our classification, 
we will follow the order of the articles in the Convention. We begin with the 
important question "Prisoners of War." 

Article 4. Prisoners of war are in the power of the enemy government, but not of 
the individuals and corps who have captured them. They are to be treated with humanity. 
All their personal possessions, except arms, horses and military papers, remain their 

Article 5. Prisoners of war may be subjected to imprisonment in any town, fortress, 


camp or place, with the obligation of not going outside certain fixed limits; but they 
may not be imprisoned unless the security of the State urgently demands it, and then 
only during the continuance of the circumstances necessitating this step. 

Article 6. The State may employ prisoners * * * with the exception of officers, 
on works. These works shall not be excessive, and must have nothing to do with the 
operations of war * * * Work done for the State shall be paid for according to the 
military rates in force * * * The Government * * * is charged with their mainte- 
nance. As regards food, sleeping accommodation and clothing prisoners shall be treated 
on the same footing as the government troops * * * Prisoners escaping may be sub- 
jected to disciplinary penalties. 

Article 23. To kill or wound an enemy who having laid down his arms, or having 
no means of defence, has yielded at discretion, is forbidden. 

What a gulf between these generous maxims of an enlightened age and the 
realities of the Balkan war! Inspiration in the one case is drawn from the 
principle of Montesquieu: "The whole right which war can give over captives 
is to secure their person so that they can no longer do any harm." 

In the other case we go back almost to the maxims of Germanicus and of 
antiquity as a whole: "Make no prisoners." Their fate here is decided by 
revenge and cupidity, the sole difference being that instead of being carried into 
slavery, people are pillaged and killed, or else killed and pillaged. Prisoners are 
still made, but very few on the battlefield, and those taken are often not left to 
live. The overheated mind of the soldier can not understand that the disarmed: 
and wounded enemy whom he finds lying on the ground is a prisoner of war, 
whom he ought neither to kill nor to wound in accordance with Article 23 of the 
Convention quoted, and Article 2, of the revised Convention of Geneva (1906). 1 
In the Balkans they kill their man. If he is made prisoner, disapprobation from 
very high quarters is sometimes incurred. "What is the use of dragging this 
rubbish about?" Such was the phrase reported to the Commission by a Bul- 
garian prisoner who said he had heard it spoken by a high Servian official, 
when the ambulances were carrying the Bulgarian wounded. 

As to the Bulgarians, numerous cases are quoted in our Chapter III, on the 
assertion of documents collected by the Servian general staff. For the Greeks 
we have, in the first place, the admissions made in the famous letters and reports 
of their soldiers. "We only took (during an attack) a few (prisoners) whom 
we killed, for such were our orders." 

It is still more horrible that when the battle is over, any prisoners that are 
made are not kept : it is preferred to make an end of them. Here are some more 
terrible admissions from Greek letters. "Out of the twelve hundred prisoners 
made at Nigrita, only forty-one are left in the prison." * * * "We took 
fifty (Bulgarian comitadjis) whom we divided among us. For my part I had 
six and I did 'clean them up.' I was given sixteen prisoners to return to the 
division, but I only brought two back. The others were eaten in the darkness, 
massacred by me." We can not quote any admission on the part of the other 
belligerents equal to these. But, acts of this sort, fewer in number perhaps, must 

1 See for previous changes Armand du Payrat: The Prisoner of War in Continental 
Warfare. Paris, A. Rousseau, 1910, pp. 133-135. 


be imputed to all. The following is a Servian story published by the Servian 
Socialist paper Radnitchke N ovine (No. 162, August 12/25) : 

We imprisoned 300 Bulgarian soldiers. We were ordered to put up a 
machine gun in a valley. I guessed the object of these preparations. The 
Bulgarian prisoners watched us at work and seemed to guess what was 
awaiting them. We put them in a line : then our machine began to work 
along it from one end to another. * * * When we buried them we found 
in the pocket of a non-commissioned officer Le Messager Ouvrier and a 
detailed journal of the war. Probably he was a socialist democrat. 

Assassination of prisoners on the march is also found among the Bul- 
garians. But the motives are different. Those who can not march or who tried 
to escape are killed (contrary to the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention, 
which imposes "disciplinary penalties"). The mass massacre of Turkish 
prisoners by the Bulgarians at Stara Zagora is explained (but naturally not 
justified) by a panic produced by rumors announcing the arrival of the Turkish 

A Turkish prisoner at Sofia, Mr. Haki-Kiamil, of the fifth regiment of 
sharpshooters, told us of an episode whose detestable character admits of no 
doubt, although here again it was a question of panic. He gave himself up to 
the Bulgarians in the neighborhood of Adrianople. Soon afterwards a panic 
arose and the Bulgarian officers ordered all prisoners to be killed. They were 
put at the bottom of a wall and all shot. He himself received eleven wounds 
but was saved by the ambulance. Captain Noureddine and Lieutenant Nadji 
were also killed at Adrianople on the day of the capture of the town, after having 
given themselves up. They were escorted by non-commissioned officers. The 
soldiers said to them, "You have done us a lot of harm with your machine guns ; 
now you are going to pay for it." And they began to kill the prisoners — twenty 
soldiers and two officers. Before the end of the slaughter, a Bulgarian officer 
arrived and saved the life of the witness, of one Medmed Begtchete, and another 
soldier. The third prisoner told us that a body of 157 prisoners was taken from 
Erikler. The soldiers beat these prisoners and pushed them with their sticks. 
Three prisoners wounded in the feet could not march fast enough; they were 

The few among the wounded who did not die under such horrible treatment 
were, once they reached the hospital, on the whole well treated by the sanitary 
staff. It is true that sick enemy soldiers occupying the same room often behaved 
in a most unworthy manner towards them, especially in the earlier days. Later, 
an improvement almost always took place; thanks to the hospital staff (mostly 
foreigners), the rights of humanity were restored. The members of the Commis- 
sion found this to be the case wherever they have happened to visit the hospital. 

As regards the next stage, the treatment of healthy prisoners incarcerated in 
various spots, the divergence from the prescriptions of the Convention, was not 



Fig. 23. — A Bulgarian Red Cross Convoy 




|PP Willi 

■ , I 

Fig. 24. — Roumanian Ravages at Petrohan 


wide in Bulgaria or in Servia. Generally speaking, despite mutual recrimina- 
tions in the press, prisoners did not suffer severely either at Sofia or at Belgrade. 
A Bulgarian officer, Mr. Kissditzy, told us at Sofia that the quarters for officers 
and particularly for soldiers were bad at Belgrade; for example, there were as 
many as a hundred persons in a room which only held thirty. The medical 
treatment was insufficient; the Servian doctor, our friend, Mr. Vasits, came 
rarely. The other doctor, a Greek from Gumurjina teased the prisoners so 
that they themselves asked not to be attended by him. The Turkish prisoners 
we saw at Sofia looked tolerably well, but they complained of the bad quality 
of the food. The Greek prisoners did not criticize the food, which they said 
was mediocre. A Servian prisoner in flight from Bulgaria, a farmer, said : "There 
was enough bread; they (the Bulgars) gave us what they had themselves." As. 
to prisoners' work (allowed by the Convention) the Bulgarian government states 
that those employed on State works were remunerated at the same rate as the 
Bulgarian soldiers, that is to say, they got no money but were lodged, fed and 
clothed. Those working in connection with private enterprise, "ought" to receive 
a stated daily wage. The Minister admits that malversion was possible, but 
knows no case of it. The Turkish soldiers explained to the Commission that 
they were forced to work on the fortifications against Knjazevac (contrary to 
the Convention) and that they received no pay. 

All this, however, is nothing in comparison with what the prisoners of war 
endured in Greece. Contrary to the Convention they were shut up in prisons, 
not temporarily but permanently. These Greek prisons ("the Bastilles of the 
twentieth century" as the Patris called that at Athens, May 29) were hor- 
rible. Bulgarian prisoners returning in October from Priekes, from Ithaca, 
and from Nauplion, told appalling stories. We select one which is very well 
substantiated as a specimen. 1 The author, Mr. Lazarov, was captured on board 
the steamer Catherine, on which the horrible scenes of drowning which are 
described in Chapter IV took place. 

On June 24/July 7, we arrived at the Island of Ithaca. The soldiers 
were the first to disembark. They were all searched and shut up in the 
prison. Then the civil prisoners were taken off and beaten one after 
the other, before being shut up. We heard agonizing sobs from children 
and old people of seventy. The prison is constructed in the middle of the 
sea, 2 on a plateau of 3,100 m. c. of which 2,000 are occupied by the 
building. The prison is damp and gloomy. There we spent a month locked 
up, during which time we only had three hours a day to breathe the open 

a Mr. Lazarov's story was published by the Mir, October 24/November 6. 

2 In the official Greek denials a great deal of fuss is made because the stories of the 
Bulgarian prisoners allude to the "uninhabited islands" of Ithaca and Trikeri, whereas 
Ithaca is inhabited by 20,000 inhabitants, and Trikeri is not an island but a big town at 
the extremity of the Volo peninsula. As regards Ithaca, Mr. Lazarov replies that the 
prison is clearly situated near the channel of the island. Trikeri was taken by the 
prisoners for an island, probably because they could not see behind the mountain, the 
lower portion of which unites it to the continent. 


air in the courtyard. At the end of the month we were let out, but for 
this fifty centimes were taken from each of us. Nevertheless the civilians 
continued shut up until October 22/November 4. The only people who 
saw the country were those who were led into the town to work as street 
porters. Before going into the prison, the 223 soldiers had taken from them 
108 pairs of boots, ten belts, a pair of trousers, eight razors, five watches, 
four purses, thirty francs, and a cross which had been given as a reward for 
courage. We sent a written protest to the Commander of the Island of 
Ithaca. He returned it to us saying that he could do nothing since he 
did not know the culprits, although we had named them in our report. 
From the civilians there were taken fr. 3,882 (a thousand francs being taken 
from Nabouliev alone, the man who was drowned), without counting coats 
and shoes. Their protest was equally unavailing. Although there was 
spring water in the town, well water was brought to us in barrels : it was 
stony and tasted detestable, indeed it was hardly drinkable, and we could 
not use it for cooking our soup which consisted exclusively of beans. We 
were fed mainly on chick-peas, lentils, haricots, rice, potatoes, stinking and 
rotten olives, bad fish, poor cheese and raisins. Out of 226 dishes only 
twenty-two were meat dishes. And this meat was goat, which even dogs 
will not touch with us. For three days, June 18, 24 and 25, we had no 
food at all and ten times we were only given one meal in the twenty-four 
hours. There was absolutely no medical attention. Men who were griev- 
ously ill were left without attention. The dampest room in the prison was 
assigned for a hospital, and the sick were left there without medicine, food 
or medical attention, that they might die, not that they might recover. 
We had, in fact, to look after ourselves. Those among us who belonged to 
the ambulance service, secretly visited the hospital to see the sick people and 
make out prescriptions, which we sent into the town in wine bottles. We 
had to pay ten times too dear for our medicine and our pockets were 
empty. Collections had to be made to buy milk, eggs, etc., for the sick. 
Those who had toothache had to. put up with the services of the town barber, 
who made extractions at two francs a tooth. Our ambulance people had 
even to look after the Greek sanitary staff, who complained that their 
doctor understood nothing, and refused to look after them; that they could 
not get medicine and that the chemists would not give the State credit. 
Throughout the time of our imprisonment we had fifteen soldiers sick, 
without counting civilians. The principal diseases were fever, diarrhea, 
stomatitis, angina, erysipelas, etc. A typhoid patient in a delirious state 
came out of his room, which was two yards from the sea, and drowned 
himself. I myself suffered from rheumatism for two months and a half; 
not only was I never attended by a doctor, I was not even given a mattress, 
but had to lie on the damp boards. After enduring great sufferings on 
September 13/26, we sent a request to the commander asking him to remove 
us from the damp prison and place us in houses suitable for prisoners of war, 
to treat us as prisoners of war and not as convicts ; to give us blankets as many 
of us had no cloaks ; to allow us to write to our relations, and to go out into 
the town to buy necessaries ; to provide us with water fit for washing instead 
of dirty water. Only this last request was granted. Our allowances were 
paid us regularly, one franc, fifty centimes per month for a soldier, three 
francs for a corporal, nine francs for a non-commissioned officer of low grade, 
fifteen francs for a higher grade non-commissioned officer and for a sergeant 


major. Two days after our departure we were asked to sign a declaration 
in Greek to the effect that we had been well treated, and took away with 
us all that we had brought. Not to sign was impossible. We signed ma- 
king, however, a reservation by adding two letters upon which we had 
agreed: O. M., private opinion, which they did not see (ossobaye mneniye). 

The captive officers were no better treated, as may be seen from the story 
of Major Lazarov, commander of the Bulgarian garrison at Salonica. Mr. 
Lazarov describes their sufferings on the steamer, their four days stay at 
Piraeus, in a damp and dirty prison, where they slept on boards in an unwholesome 
atmosphere, were ill fed, not allowed to go out except to be photographed, and 
then were exposed to the insolence of the crowd and the curiosity of journalists. 
After their departure, these journalists stated in the press that the Bulgarian 
officers had been received in the best families, had mixed in high society, visited 
theatres and cinemas, but that since they had abused their hospitality they had 
finally been sent to Nauplia, because one young officer had been incorrect in 
his behavior to some ladies of the high society of Piraeus. Mr. Lazarov, after 
his return to Bulgaria, sent the following telegram to Mr. Venizelos : — 

The captive Bulgarian officers of the Salonica garrison protest energeti- 
cally against the way in which they were treated during their captivity in 
Greece. They were robbed of their baggage and most of them of their 
money, thrown into a medieval prison, where they were buried alive in a 
dungeon in the fortress of Nauplia, deprived of air and light, deprived 
also of any communication with their families. The doctors not excepted, 
they endured every humiliation and every form of suffering that the most 
refined cruelty could invent. 

Here we do not speak of the "civilians," although their sufferings, especially 
in the dungeons in Salonica, were even greater. In their case the point of view 
taken was that they were rebel Greek subjects. It may be noted that generally 
speaking the term, "prisoner of war," was interpreted too widely in the Balkans. 
At Sofia, the Commission was greatly astonished to see old men of eighty years 
and children pass before it in the guise of "prisoners" returned from Servia. 
We questioned these good people, who were dressed as peasants, and dis- 
covered that they belonged to the population of villages in remote regions, and 
had endured a form of temporary servitude in the middle of the twentieth 
century. The 1907 Convention demands that there should be "a fixed distinc- 
tive mark recognizable at a distance," to show who is "belligerent." At a 
distance it is easy to see the age of these old people and to see therefore 
that they could not be called "prisoners of war." (The photographs in the posses- 
sion of the Commission of a "review of prisoners" at Sofia, prove clearly enough 
that one could see from a long way off the sort of people with whom one had to 

By Article 23 of the 1907 Convention, "It is forbidden * * * to use 
arms, projectiles or other material likely to cause needless suffering." 


With regard to the "needless suffering," we already know that there were 
a thousand ways of causing it. The fundamental principle of the introduc- 
tory Article (22) of the chapter on the "methods of injuring" was interpreted 
in the Balkans in an inverse sense, and the maxim there employed ran— 'Bel- 
ligerents have an unbounded liberty of choice of means of injuring the enemy." 
As regards forbidden arms and projectiles, the rules of the Convention remained 
a dead letter. It is known that during the first Balkan war expanding or 
"dum-dum" bullets were used by the Turkish soldiers. It will be seen that the 
same projectiles were used by Christian soldiers. 

As regards the Bulgarian army, the Commission is in possession of official 
Servian reports to the general staff of Uskub, from Tsrny Vrah on July 13, and 
from Bela-Voda on July 21, 22. General Boyovits wrote from Tsrny Vrah 
(No. 2446) that "the enemy is using 'dum-dum* bullets, a fact confirmed by the 
doctor." Eight days later, Colonel Marinkovits (Choumadia division, second 
reserve, No. 2070) sends specimens of these bullets and of dynamite projectiles to 
the general staff, with some observations communicated to him by the commander 
of the Tenth Regiment, Second Reserve. The commander's remarks are as 
follows : 

During the fighting with the Bulgars it was observed that in each combat 
they employed a quantity of "dum-dum" bullets. Herewith are sent five 
bullets and a portion of one. In addition, it was noticed that they used 
ammunition with dynamitic contents ; this was specially remarked during the 
engagement at Bosil-Grad, where the majority of the wounded, even though 
slightly wounded, died very soon. As an example, there may be cited 
Milovan Milovanovits, fourth company, third battalion of this regiment, who 
comes from Bresnitsa, district of Liubits, department of Rudnik. He was 
wounded in the leg and although immediately attended by the army doctor, 
he died within an hour. I shall receive accounts of the use of these bullets 
from the commanders of the Tenth Regiment, first reserve and the third 
surplus regiment, first reserve. I know of a case in the Tenth Regiment, 
first reserve, where a sergeant was wounded by a bullet of this kind and 
had his whole face destroyed. 

The testimony of the doctor was sent by Colonel Marinkovits on the same 
day, July 21 (No. 2079), to the general staff: "In connection with the report, 
No. 2070, today's date, I beg to submit the report of the commander of the 
Third (Auxiliary) Regiment, first reserve. On perceiving in the course of the 
engagement with the Bulgars on July 15 and 17, that the enemy's bullets had a 
totally different effect from hitherto, I consulted the army doctor, whose state- 
ment is as follows : 

I have not much experience of dum-dum bullets, but according to the 
accounts of the wounded and of all the participators in the combats of 
Preslata, with the Albanians, I beg to state my opinion to the commanders 


that the Bulgars have a certain amount of these bullets at hand, and espe- 
cially used them at night. The action of these bullets consists in their 
expansion when striking a body; thus the wounds are deformed and heal 
with greater difficulty. I beg that this be verified on the patients, and that 
attention be drawn to the fact in appropriate quarters." 

On the following day, July 22 (No. 2085), the statement of the army doctor, 
Mr. Mihilovits, was sent to the general staff. It was countersigned by Colonel 
Marinkovits : 

In connection with the reports, 2070 and 2079 of yesterday's date, I 
have the honor to send you the following report of the army doctor of the 
Tenth Regiment, first reserve. 

In reply to the commander's question whether the Bulgars employed dum- 
dum bullets, or bullets of a dynamitic nature, in the combats along the Vlasina 
frontier, the doctor made the following statement: 

I beg to state that I found eight cases among the wounded of our first 
battalion, who fell in the combat of the 7th inst., where the injuries had 
been caused by firearms of small caliber. In each case the flesh looked as 
though it had been dragged and torn with a pair of tweezers. There were 
two openings in each case, where the bullet had penetrated and emerged, 
i. e., it passed right through. These holes were both disproportionately 
large. One of these eight cases of injuries caused by dum-dum bullets is 
very characteristic, namely, that of Sergeant Krasits, of the first battalion. 
He has the right side of his upper lip cut and the whole of his face and 
throat are covered with burns about the size of a five para piece [this is 
about the size of an English penny]. Sergeant Krasits was brought to the 
hospital three hours after he had been wounded. His head was much 
swollen, especially his face and eyes. His lids were swollen to such an 
extent that he could not see. His eyeballs were uninjured. In my opinion, 
Sergeant Krasits's injuries were caused by a rifle bullet of dynamiticai or 
other explosive contents. It is quite obvious in his case. In several other 
cases of injury, it may be stated with certainty that they were caused by 
dum-dum bullets. Many of the wounded whom I attended that day told 
me that the Bulgarian bullets explode a second time when they enter the 

As for the Greek army, the Commission received a proces-verbal signed on 
July 21/August 3, at Sofia, by Dr. Toramiti (head of the Austrian Red Cross 
mission), Dr. Kohl (head of the Princess Elizabeth of Reuss' mission), and Dr. 
Mihilowsky (head of the Clementina hospital at Sofia). On the request of 
General Savov, these officers formed a special commission to determine whether 
or no dum-dum bullets had been used in the Servian army. Their conclusions 
are as follows : 


A packet was put before them composed of four samples, the ends of 
which had obviously been artificially filed with a view to assisting the action 
of the bullets, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The 
samples do not appear to represent something specially manufactured, but 
rather something improzrised; they are something half way between an ordi- 
nary bullet and an explosive bullet. The wounded men examined by the 
Commission, Peter Khristov, of the sixty-second infantry regiment, and 
Michael Minovski, of the second regiment, showed more serious wounds 
than are produced by normal bullets in steel cases, wounds that may be 
attributed to explosive bullets. Similar wounds, however, might be pro- 
duced by a bullet meeting a rigid object on its way, and so entering the body 
out of shape. 

The following is a copy of the verbal note sent by the Bulgarian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs to the embassies of the six great Powers at Sofia, July 24/ 
August 6 (No. 2492), on the employment of the dum-dum bullets by the Greek 

In the course of recent actions, the Greek troops used bullets against 
the Bulgarian soldiers which have the ends cut and carry incisions of two 
millimeters in diameter and 4-5 millimeters in depth, in the middle of the 
grooved portion : the ravages produced by these bullets in the human body 
are ten times worse than those made by ordinary bullets. While the wounds 
made by the ordinary Greek bullet passing through the human body show a 
diameter of 6.5 millimeters — equal to the caliber of the Greek rifle, — those 
produced by the bullets with their ends cut are as much as seven centimeters 
in diameter, that is to say, the wounds are ten times as bad. The doctors 
attached to the army operating against the Greeks bear witness to the exist- 
ence of hundreds of cases of this kind. Three doctors, two being foreigners, 
in fact drew up a statement ad hoc. 

The effect of bullets cut in this manner and incised in the middle of 
the grooved portion, may be explained as follows : As a result of its impact 
on the human body the cut bullet alters its shape while continuing its move- 
ment, while the air in the cavity formed in the middle of the grooved por- 
tion is compressed and, tending to recover its normal density, acts as an 
explosive, at the moment of the deformation of the bullet in the human body. 
The result is terrible wounds. 

The use of bullets of this kind having been prohibited by Article 23 
of the Regulations of the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, drawn up 
by the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, the Royal Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs protests against the infraction of this provision com- 
mitted by the Greek troops, and begs the Royal Imperial Embassy of * * * 
to be so good as to bring the above facts to the knowledge of their gov- 

The military authorities are in possession of three cartridges containing 
the bullets in question. 

Photographs of these Greek cartridges were shown to the Commission ; on 
them Greek letters can be seen— HE2 1910 and EI1KEAAAI. The filed 



Fig. 25. — Shortened Greek Cartridges 

ends can also be seen very distinctly. Before judging the facts alleged in the 
document cited, the reserves made by the doctors consulted at Sofia must be 
remembered. The bullets in question are "improvised," and not officially manu- 
factured; moreover, a certain number of the wounds explained by the action 
of dum-dum bullets are capable of another explanation. This certainly does 
not change the nature of the offence, but it may change its degree, and leave in 
suspense the question of guilt. The governments concerned ought to make it 
their interest to make inquiry among themselves with a view to discovering the 
explanation of the facts established, instead of merely denying them, which would 
lead to a suspicion of their guilt. 

4. Article 23 f. 

The undue use of the white flag is forbidden. 

Article 32. It (the white flag) enjoys inviolability, as do the trumpet, the bugle and the 
drum, the standard bearer and the interpreter who accompany it. A captain to whom a 
white flag is sent is not compelled to receive it in all circumstances. He may take >all 
the necessary steps to prevent the white flag from taking advantage of the opportunity 
to reconnoitre. In case of abuse he has the right to retain the white flag temporarily. 

Generally speaking proper respect for the white flag was lacking in the 
atmosphere of mutual distrust, a distrust perhaps justified in part by the con- 


tempt for moral obligations and formal rights to which this report bears witness. 
The parties accused each other mutually of attempts at "undue use." This, 
however, can not justify the direct attacks on bearers of the white flag, which 
indubitably took place. A telegram from Uskub, published in the Servian press, 1 
records the following fact. The commander of the Servian troops besieging 
Vidine at 11:30 in the morning of July 18/31, sent an officer and three horse- 
men to inform the commander of the garrison at Vidine of the conclusion of 
an armistice, and to begin pourparlers on a line of demarcation. The bearer of 
the flag of truce was on the road, the trumpet was played and a soldier carried 
the white flag. When the flag was thirty paces from the village of Novo 
Seltsi, the Bulgarians opened fire. The envoy was not wounded, but his two 
companions were hit. The telegram does not state what followed, but the, 
Bulgarians evidently ceased to fire and the bearer of the flag of truce completed 
his task. 

The Servians were guilty of even more serious violation of the Conventions 
regulating the use of the flag of truce. On June 18/July 1, an order was given 
to the Bulgarian army to cease the offensive. For forty minutes the Bulgarians 
ceased and some officers were sent as bearers of the flag of truce. This, as we 
know, was the last opportunity on which it was still possible to avoid war, 
since the government at Sofia had disavowed the orders given by General 
Savov, and he had been obliged to beat a retreat. We possess the stones of 
those who bore the flag of truce, which show the reception given by the 
Servians to this attempt to stop the hostilities which had hardly begun. Lieuten- 
ant Bochkov was arrested; his eyes were bandaged, and he was led first before 
the commander of the regiment, and then before the commander of a division. 
Contrary to the Convention, he was told that he was taken prisoner. He refused 
to remove his bandage himself, and was thereupon told that he was regarded 
as a spy. The affair was reported to Prince Alexander, the heir to the throne, 
who replied that he refused to negotiate with the Bulgarians, or to receive envoys 
from them. Here he was, of course, within his rights, but he had transgressed 
them for the two following reasons, in declaring the man Bochkov prisoner: 
(1) the Bulgarians had not declared war; (2) he had not got full power. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Bochkov had been sent with a flag of truce by the com- 
mander; and when the heir-apparent accused him of being a spy, he replied 
that it was not usual for spies to appear with their eyes bandaged. Alexander's 
sole reply was to push him brutally with his hand. His photograph was taken 
and published in the Servian papers as that of a Bulgarian spy. With his 
own eyes .he saw a Bulgarian peasant shot by the order of the heir to the 
throne, who accused him of being a spy. He himself was led off on foot behind 
a horseman who was charged to take him to Uskub; he had to sleep on the 
street while his escort lay under a roof. Throughout the journey to Belgrade, 

1 See the Odyeke of July 22/ August 4. 


he was insulted and mocked at. Another bearer of a flag of truce, Reserve 
Lieutenant Kiselitsky — of whose imprisonment we have already spoken, — reports 
the same fact. "We had two white flags (with Mr. Bochkov). The Servians 
took us prisoners and again began firing on our lines." Mr. Kiselitsky saw 
a Bulgarian soldier thrown out of his litter to make room for a Servian soldier, 
on the order of the heir to the throne. He saw Bulgarian prisoners being 
pillaged all along the way. He himself was insulted and made the mark of 
dubious jokes. The Commission heard a third witness, Mr. Maguenev, an 
officer of the 31st Regiment of Reserve. He was one of the bearers of a flag 
of truce, who was asked to give his full authority. He replied that he was 
ordered not to enter upon pourparlers, but to inform the Servians that the 
Bulgarians had received orders to stop firing. The Servian Lieutenant-Colonel 
Solovits then took his revolver, cartridges, etc., but stopped when Mr. Maguenev 
said that if he did so he would blow his brains out. He was then sent to the 
general staff and the firing began again. They tried to pass him off as a 
comitadji. The prefect of Niche swore that he knew him, that he was one 
Stephen Yovanovits, born at Veles. Although this attempt failed, the Servian 
policeman who took him to Belgrade shouted to the crowd which assembled 
at every stop : "Behold the Bulgarian spy." He was insulted like the others. 

An even more serious case is that of Captain Minkov, of the general staff, 
who was also sent to the Servians as the bearer of a flag of truce. When 
he reached the Servian line, Minkov asked to be led before the commander. The 
commander, an old man, interrupted him and without leaving him time to explain 
himself said, "We are no longer in 1885. You may have an order to stop 
hostilities but we have an order to go straight on to Kotchani." With these 
words, he struck Mr. Minkov with his riding whip, and said, "You are my 
prisoner." Four soldiers siezed Mr. Minkov, and as they moved the commander 
shouted the order again. The witness of this scene, Petko Ivanov, a Bulgarian 
non-commissioned officer, who accompanied the captain and told us the story, 
could not understand the words spoken at this point, but he gathered their 
general sense, the more that at that moment the soldiers fired and he saw 
Captain Minkov fall. He saw the captain stretched on the ground, struggling 
for a few minutes in convulsive agony ; then he was led off himself. The tragedy 
of this scene was enhanced by the fact that at the moment of its occurrence 
the Bulgarian army had received the order to cease the offensive. 

5. Article 27. During sieges and bombardments, all necessary measures shall be taken 
to spare as far as possible sacred edifices, hospitals and places in which sick and wounded 
persons are collected, so long as they are not at the same time being employed for directly 
military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate such edifices and places tty 
special visible marks, to be notifed in advance, to the besieger. 

Article 21. The obligations of belligerents as regards the service of the sick and 
wounded are regulated by the Convention of Geneva. 


We have here two of the Articles in the legislation agreed upon between 
belligerent nations with which compliance was clearly very easy, and most im- 
portant for the belligerents themselves. Nevertheless, even this Article was 
violated. The places and circumstances are precisely indicated in a report by a 
Russian doctor at the Bulgarian hospital at Serres, Mr. P. G. Laznev. 1 Mr. 
Laznev took over the direction of the hospital after the departure of the 
Bulgarian troops on June 23/July 6. Side by side with the Red Cross flag 
which already floated there, he caused the Russian national flag to be hoisted. 
Mr. Laznev's story is as follows: — 

On the next and following days, the members of the Greek revolution- 
ary committee repeatedly presented themselves. They took away arms 
belonging to the sick, which had been placed in the cellars of the hospital. 
They did not indulge in any other acts of violence; on the contrary, they 
offered their services. The women of the town stole some of the goods 
belonging to the cholera patients. After the arrival of the Greek troops, 
as before, Apostol, the Greek Bishop of the town of Serres, was at the head 
of the municipal administration. He told us that the stolen goods would 
be restored to the soldiers, and the women thieves executed; their names 
were known. The stolen goods were not restored, and not one of the 
thieves was punished. 

On June 28, the Bulgarian infantry and mountain artillery appeared on 
the heights above the hospital. A combat took place between the Bulgarians 
and the Comites who were hidden behind the hospital. The Comites were 
compelled to retire, and the Bulgarians were in possession of the hospital. 
This, however, lasted but for half an hour, since more powerful detachments 
of Greek infantry and cavalry came up. An uninterrupted fusillade and 
cannonade took place between the enemies and lasted from three to six 
o'clock in the evening. As before, the hospital was the center of the fray, 
since it served to cover the Greeks, as it had but now covered the Bulgarians. 
Many windows in our hospital were broken and we were obliged to place 
the sick on the ground near the wall, to protect them against stray bullets ; 
as it was, one of our patients was wounded in the ear by a ricochetting 
bullet. I tried in vain to show the Greeks, as before the Bulgarians, that the 
hospital should not be chosen to cover the enemy's troops. They would 
not listen. 

Evidently the inviolability of the hospital was abused by both sides, with 
the effect that the sole condition under which the hospital was inviolable, was 
annulled. No account at all, in fact, was taken of war legislation. The combat 
over, violence followed. Let us quote further from Mr. Laznev: 

The victors then arrived worn out and exasperated by the battle. They 
could not be said to enter; they forced the doors of the hospital. They 
then threw themselves on the soldier belonging to the ambulance service 
who barred the way ; he was clad in his white hospital apron and carried the 

a Dr. Laznev's report is published by Professor Miletits in his collection "Documents, 
etc.," pages 107-140. The passages quoted are taken from a copy of it in our possession. 


red cross on his left arm. This did him no good for he was cruelly beaten. 
They then forced the doors of the rooms reserved for the wounded, their 
rifles in their hands. They threatened them all with death, because "the 
Bulgarians had burnt the towns." 1 I and my assistant, Kamarov, tried to de- 
fend the wounded to the best of our power, by means of course of persuasion, 
not of arms. Kamarov received several blows on the chest and the shoulders 
from the butt ends of muskets. The nozzles of the muskets were turned 
towards me. Raising my voice, I told them, through my interpreter, that I 
was neither a Bulgarian nor a Greek, and that they had no sort of right 
to do any acts of violence where the red flag and the Russian flag were 
floating. I succeeded in persuading them, and they went off. The patients 
got off with a serious fright. At this moment, I heard a noise in the upper 
story in which were the kitchen, the dining room and my room. I went up 
to see what was going on. I found some Greek soldiers busy pillaging, 
under pretext of searching for arms. Each was taking what he could lay 
his hands on, glasses, towels, sugar — nothing escaped. I found my room 
in a state of frightful disorder. Some dozen soldiers were busy, forcing the 
locks of my boxes and trunks, and rifling them. All the things had been 
thrown out and were lying about everywhere. Ejach was taking what pleased 
him — cigarettes, tobacco, sugar, my watch and chain, my linen, my pocket 
book, my pencils — nothing was beneath their notice. I was very much 
afraid, because in my hand bag there was both my money and that of the 
hospital; luckily, however, the Greeks did not see it. An officer appeared 
and seeing the Russian national flag and that of the red cross affixed to the 
balcony, had them torn down, despite our protestations, and hoisted the flag 
of the Greek navy. Until nightfall the Greek soldiers went on coming in 
groups, each of which had to be appealed to not to maltreat the patients. 
This day, June 28, was the worst for the Serres hospital. From June 29 
onwards, they began sending us Greek cholera patients, and little by little 
looked upon us with more favorable eyes. 

The Commission was informed of a case in which the sick found in hospitals 
by the Greeks were even more cruelly treated. Dr. Tauk was a Turkish doctor, 
attached to the hospital in the town of Drama. When the Greeks took Drama, 
they found five sick Bulgarian soldiers in the hospital. They ordered the doctor 
to give them up. The doctor refused. The Greek authorities thereupon had the 
wounded taken out of the hospital, and these five were conveyed to a barracks 
outside the town. Our witness, whose name we are not able to give, states that 
these wounded men were massacred. 

At Vidine, the Commission had the opportunity of finding that the Servian 
army could not be altogether exonerated from behavior of this kind. The Bulgarian 
hospital in this town seems to have served as a mark for the Servian artillery 
during the siege. The proof is a proces-verbal signed by the director of a hos- 
pital, by the priest of Vidine, Mr. Nojarov, by the departmental doctor, Boyadjiev, 
and two other members of the medical corps. The Commission visited the spot 
and was able to verify these statements in the proces-verbal. 

1 For this alleged "fire" see the evidence of Dr. Laznev himself and his colleague, Mr. 
Klugmann, in Miletits and in our 'Chapter II. 


This day, July 17/30, about four o'clock in the afternoon, the Servian 
artillery directed a violent fire against the walls of the Vidine hospital. 
Round the hospital there fell more than twenty shells, in the court and in the 
street. One shell struck the infectious ward, in which wounded soldiers 
and other patients were being treated; it destroyed two walls and exploded 
in a room, wounding the patient, George Trouika, from Iassen, in the Vidine 
canton. The red cross flag was hoisted near the demolished part of the 
building. Another shell struck the main ward, piercing the cornice under 
the roof below the red cross flag without exploding. But the fall of the 
projectile created a panic among the wounded, and even those in a serious 
condition and those who had lost limbs, threw themselves on to the staircase. 
The above mentioned facts are confirmed by photographs taken by Mr. 
Kenelrigie, an English engineer, and Mrs. Kenelrigie. 

The firing on the hospital by the Servians was intentional ; they knew 
that many wounded people were being treated there. The flags served as 
targets. The hospital is situated outside the town, and is visible from ten 
miles off, especially from the position occupied by the Servian artillery. 
Moreover, two white red cross flags, one two meters square, the other 
one meter, eighty, were floating from the walls of the hospital. 

6. Article 25. It is forbidden to attack or bombard, in any way whatsoever, houses, 
villages, dwellings or buildings which are not defended. 

Article 28. It is forbidden to hand over a town or place, even when taken by assault, 
to pillage. 

The most important instance of violation of Article 28 would, if the accusa- 
tions made against the Bulgarians were true, be that of Adrianople. But we have 
seen that the commander did all that was in his power to put a stop to pillage 
(begun by the population itself), as soon as the town was taken. This can not 
be stated with equal certainty as regards individual soldiers, who attempted to 
take part in the pillage. Unfortunately, the case was different at Kniajevats, 
where it is evident that the military authorities connived at pillage, which assumed 
extraordinary proportions. The Commission will not refer to the treatment of 
Salonica by the Greeks, because that episode belongs to a period previous to the 
Commission's inquiry, and has not formed the subject of any special study. 

The cases where villages were pillaged are so numerous that we can not 
go into them at this point. It may, however, be stated, that it was almost normal 
in the case of certain localities referred to in this report. 

Cases of bombardment of undefended places, in violation of Article 25, are 
also known to the Commission. An Englishman named R. Wadham Fisher, who 
at first watched the progress of the war and afterwards took part in it as a 
lieutenant in the fifth battalion of the Bulgarian militia, stated to us that the 
Turkish fleet had bombarded places situated on the shores of the sea of Marmora, 
namely, the little town of Ghar-Keui (Peristeri), and the village of Mireftchi 
(Myriophyto), although they were not fortified and had no artillery. At Char- 
Keui, it is true, there had been some Bulgarian militia, which was driven off by 
the Turkish attack on January 26, 1913. According to Mr. Fisher, the Bulgarians 


left seventeen wounded there. Three days later, January 29/February 11, when 
they returned, they found that they had all been killed by the Turks. "I saw," 
said Mr. Fisher, "the dead body of a child of fifteen years, stretched out on the 
ground near the fountain whither he had come to draw water, with a jug in his 
hand. A girl of twelve years old, who bore the marks of twelve bayonet wounds, 
had been outraged by four Turks. She soon died. Six old women of about 
seventy-five years old had also been killed. Two young girls, the daughters of 
the priest, had been carried off by the Turks on their steamers. So much for 
'pillage.' " * * * 

7. Let us now to another order of facts : the relations of the conquerors and 
powers in occupation, to the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Here the 
mass of facts is so enormous that to recapitulate them, after what has already 
been described, would be superfluous. We may, however, pause a moment to 
touch upon a class of misdemeanors which may be said to have been of daily 
occurrence, in order to make the picture of the violations of the laws of warfare 
complete, and once again confront the text of the law with the tragic reality. 

Let us begin with the contributions and requisitions to which all the inhabit- 
ants were subjected, and which were foreseen and regulated by the terms of 
the Convention of 1907: 

Article 48. If the power in occupation, within the occupied territory, raises taxes, 
duties and tolls for the advantage of the State, it is to do so as far as possible in 
accordance with the scale and distribution in force in the country. * * * 

Article 49. If * * * the power in occupation raises other taxes in money in the 
occupied territory, this is only to be done to meet the needs of the army or of the 
administration of the said territory. 

Article 51. Contributions are only to be collected by the authority of a written order 
* * *. A receipt shall be given to the contributors. 

Article 52. Payments in kind and services requisitioned * * * shall be proportion- 
ate to the resources of the country. As far as possible they shall be paid for in ready 
money, if not, receipts shall be given. 

The Commission has in its possession a number of proofs which show that 
the regulations were not carried out by the Powers in occupation, Servians and 
Greeks ; especially not by the latter. Among the documents in the Commission's 
possession there is occasionally mention of a number of receipts for goods requi- 
sitioned, but the documents are generally valueless. The Commission heard of 
cases in which, instead of writing the value of the goods taken upon the receipt, 
oaths or jokes were written upon it; for example, so much "rubbish" was taken; 
or there were simply illegible words. Corn, hay and cattle, to the value of 
fr. 30,000, was taken from an old man of seventy years of age, Mitskov by name, 
of Krouchevo, in return for which a receipt for fr. 100 was offered him. As Jie 
was courageous enough to protest, he was shut up in the dampest cell of the 
dungeon at Krouchevo. Next day his son was summoned, compelled to accept 
the hundred francs and sign the receipt. More often, however, no receipt was 
given the villagers. Sometimes some excuse was made, but this was compara- 


tively rare. The excuse generally given was, that "Turkish" property was being 
taken, not that of the Slav inhabitants. One particularly interesting instance 
may be quoted in full : 

A Servian soldier, Milan Michevits, arrived in the village of Barbarevo 
(canton of Kratovo), with several men belonging to his company. He made 
requisitions in every house, and arrested a man called Guitcho Ivanov, to compel 
him to declare that his corn is Turkish corn. Another individual, Arso Yanev 
by name, is beaten and tortured during the whole night, to compel him to say 
that his sheep are Turkish sheep. With the same object he arrested, beat and 
tortured Guiro Yanev ; he beat Ordane Petrov to make him call his cow Turkish 
property; he tortured Mone Satiovsky, an old man of eighty years of age, by 
stripping him to the skin and making him stand the whole night on a hill, to 
force him to state that the fifteen goats taken from him are Turkish ; etc. 

We frequently find that goods thus taken were sent to Servia or Greece. 
We know of cases in which Servian officers obtained "subscriptions" for the 
red cross; and others in which the resources of the area were absolutely ex- 
hausted by the repeated levy of contributions, etc. In fact, it goes without saying 
that where pillage is organized in this way and left thus unpunished, no respect 
for established rules regarding requisition and contribution can be expected. 

8. Article 47. Pillage is formally forbidden. 

Article 45. To compel the population of an occupied territory to take the oath to the 
enemy power is forbidden. 

Article 46. Family honor and family rights, the life of individuals and private property, 
religious convictions and the practice of worship, are to be respected. 

The reader need only recall Chapters II to IV of this Report, to reach the 
conclusion that in the Balkan war pillage was universally admitted and practiced. 
So far as we know, the orders above, published by the Bulgarian military author- 
ities, represent the sole attempt made to recall to the soldiers the opposing 
principle of international law as applied to warfare. And even this order proves 
that the principle was violated and that subalterns enjoyed an indulgence which 
encouraged rather than prevented crime. Nevertheless the operations of the 
Bulgarian army were carried on in regions where the mass of the population was 
composed of kinsmen. The time was insufficient to allow of "reestablishing and 
securing order," in accordance with Article 43, of the Convention of 1907. The 
forces "in occupation" were the Greek and Servian armies; it was into their 
hands that, "the authority of legal power" passed for the most part in the regions 
conquered from the Turks. We know that their first act, in their capacity as 
"Power in occupation" was, as soon as the cession had taken place, to compel 
the population to "take the oath" and to recognize themselves as Servians or 
Greeks. According to the treaties the occupied territory ought to have been 
regarded as possessed in "condominium," by all the allies. But we have seen 


that all the relations between the population and the occupying army were, from 
the very beginning, perverted by this tendency to appropriate the occupied 
territory and to prepare for its annexation; this created a relation as between 
conquerors and conquered. Thus the solemn words of Article 46 have all the 
effect of sarcasm. 

"Family, honor and family rights, the life of individuals and private prop- 
erty * * * are to be respected." In reality, no one is astonished by outrage ; 
they forget even to look upon it as a crime. In this connection, the Bulgarians 
are probably less guilty than the others. More patriarchal or more primitive 
in their ideas, they preserve the feeling of the soil, and are more disciplined than 
the others. The mocking Greek women call them "girls in great-coats." This 
certainly could not have been said of the Greeks. 

"Individual life" was certainly rated cheap during these months of war, and 
"private property" at nothing. Theft was as common as outrage, and both 
represented infringements of the law of warfare. This was the so-called "peace- 
ful occupation," as carried on most notably by the Roumanian army. Some acts 
of destruction carried out by the Roumanians at Petro-hane, the highest point on 
the road between Sofia and Vidine, are fresh in the memory of the Commission. 
The little villa in which the late Prince of Battenberg used to spend the night 
when he came there for hunting, was destroyed, and the meteorological station 
ruined, the splendid instruments broken and the observation records, the work 
of many years, torn up and burned. In comparison with this the unfortunate 
scientists of the observatory thought nothing of the young women outraged in the 
neighboring village, or the food and cattle taken and not paid for; they sank 
into insignificance in comparison with this irreparable loss. This was "peaceful" 
occupation. Previous chapters have shown what occupation by force was like. 

Was any tenderness shown for "religious convictions" and "the forms of 
worship"? Unhappily not. We have described the destruction of mosques and 
churches, the ruin of sepulchral monuments, the profanation of tombs. One 
party began: the other came to take revenge; it was a form of tit for tat. We 
have verified and partly confirmed Mr. Pierre Loti's description of what happened 
at Havsa, while drawing his attention to the events of a neighboring Christian 
village. For Mr. Loti's edification, another example of Turkish sacrilege may 
be given. We read in a Greek report of July 9/22 as follows : 

Yesterday about three o'clock in the afternoon, the sailors of the Turkish 
warship, which has been anchored at Silivri for the last four days, went to 
the cemetery of the orthodox Greek community and overthrew all the crosses 
on the graves there. 

Against this there may be set a Turkish complaint, sent by Colonel Dr. 
Ismail Mail to the commander of the garrison at Stara Zagora, where he and a 
great number of Turkish soldiers were held captive. "Several days ago," writes 


Dr. Ismail Mail, on April 3/16, "a captive soldier came here and told us that 
various means, advice, promises, threats, had been employed to compel him and 
his compatriots, 'Moslem pomaks,' to conversion. * * * I replied by telling 
the soldier not to be worried, since such a thing seemed to be impossible. Today, 
however, I learn that some 400 prisoners, all Moslem pomaks, have been led away 
into an unknown place." * * * Dr. Ismail Mail protests because of the 
risks of "contagion." As to the result of his complaint we are ignorant, but 
we have already had occasion to say that the Bulgarians themselves admit that, 
in their relations with the pomaks of the occupied countries, the principle of 
Article 46 was not observed. Moreover, the mere fact cited above affords an 
instance of the violation, or of the intention to violate, Article 18: "Every 
latitude is left to prisoners of war in the exercise of their religion." 

To sum up, there was, as we said at the beginning of this chapter, no single 
article in the Convention of 1907 which was not violated, to a greater or lesser 
degree, by all the belligerents. International law as governing war exists, and 
its existence, if not always known, is at least guessed at by all the world. Yet, 
although all the belligerent States had signed the Conventions in question, they 
did not regard themselves as bound to conform to them. 

It should, however, be added that the mere fact of the presence of the 
Commission in the Balkans has already done something to recall the nature of 
their obligations to the belligerents. Where, as in Eastern Thrace, the Commis- 
sion was expected, a Bulgarian paper observes that "the atrocities have dimin- 
ished." On the Albanian frontier, on the other hand, where atrocities were 
beginning again, the journey of the Cbmmission was opposed. In this connec- 
tion a question was raised by a Servian paper which deserves notice, whatever be 
the motive for their action. On the very day of the forced departure of the 
Commission (August 13/26), the Trgovinski Glasnik tried to justify the action 
of the Servian government by stating that an international inquiry, claiming juridi- 
cal powers, was going to be undertaken in the Balkans, whereas such powers 
belonged exclusively, in an independent and sovereign country, to the govern- 
ment. The establishment of such an inquiry was, according to the paper, a 
limitation of sovereignty and an interference with the rights of the State. In 
so far as the State does not consent and grant special permission for inquiry to 
be made, the mere nomination of such a Commission constituted by itself "an 
act of international arbitration." 

The organ of "the mercantile youth of Belgrade" indubitably went rather 
far. The function of the Commission was in no sense "juridical," and its con- 
clusions (to some extent foreseen by the paper referred to), are in no way 
analogous to intervention by international diplomacy. The Commission only 
represented pacificist public opinion, although in the course of its work it fre- 
quently received assistance from the States concerned. This was the case in 
Bulgaria, where it had the opportunity of interrogating official personages on the 


facts which interested it; where it received information not only from private 
persons but from the government itself; and where it was permitted to search 
the archives (the Greek letters) and to communicate with State institutions (the 
government departments, the Holy Synod). This was also the case in Greece 
to some extent. 

Nevertheless the question raised by the Trgovinski Glasnik is not super- 
fluous, and the Commission deals with it here. Were it possible for there to be a 
commission of inquiry with the belligerent armies, during war, not in the shape 
of an enterprise organized by private initiative, but as an international institution, 
dependent on the great international organization of governments, which is 
already in existence, and acts intermittently through Hague Conferences, and 
permanently through the Hague Tribunal, — the work of such a body would 
possess an importance and an utility such as can not attach to a mere private 
commission. Nevertheless, the Commission has succeeded in collecting a sub- 
stantial body of documents, now presented to the reader. It has, however, met 
with obstacles, in the course of its work, which have cast suspicion on its mem- 
bers. A commission which was a permanent institution, enjoying the sanction 
of the governments which signed the convention, could exercise some control 
in the application of these conventions. It could foresee offences, instead of 
condemning them after they had taken place. If it is stated, correctly enough, 
that conventions can not be carried out so long as they do not form an integral 
part of the system of military instruction, it may be stated with even more force, 
that they can not be carried out without a severe and constant control in the 
theater of war. Diplomatic agents and military attaches are given a special place 
with the army in action. Military writers have already mooted the idea of 
establishing a special institution for the correspondents who follow the army. 
Attention ought, therefore, to be given to the control which could be exercised 
by an international commission, not there to divulge military secrets, but as the 
guardian of the army's good name, while pursuing a humanitarian object. 

If the work we have done in the Balkans could lead to the creation of such 
an institution as this, the Commission would feel its efforts and its trouble richly 
rewarded, and would find there a recompense for the ungrateful task under- 
taken at the risk of reawakening animosity and drawing down upon itself re- 
proaches and attacks. May their task then be the prelude to a work destined 
to grow ! 


Economic Results of the Balkan Wars 

From the economic point of view war is a destruction of wealth. 

Even before war is declared the prospect of conflict between the countries, 
in which serious difficulties have arisen, affects the financial situation. Anxiety 
is aroused and failures caused on the market by the fluctuations of government 
and other securities of the States concerned. Credit facilities are restricted; 
monetary circulation disturbed; production slackened; orders falling off to a 
marked degree ; and an uncertainty prevails which reacts harmfully on trade. 

Then comes the declaration of war and mobilization. The able bodied men 
are called to the standards ; between one day and the next work stops in factories 
and in the fields. With the cessation of the breadwinners' wage, the basis of 
the family budget, the wife and children are quickly reduced to starvation, and 
forced to seek the succor of their parishes and the State. 

The whole of the nation's activities are turned to war. Goods and passenger 
traffic on the railways come to an end; rolling stock and rails are requisitioned 
for the rapid concentration of men, artillery, ammunition and provisions at strate- 
gic points. 

Not only does the country cease to produce, but it consumes with great 
expense in the hurry of operations. Its reserves are soon exhausted; the taxes 
are not paid. If it can not appeal for loans or purchases from abroad, it suffers 

Then the fighting begins, and with it the hecatombs of the battlefields, the 
earth heaped with dead, the hospitals overflowing with wounded. Thousands 
of human lives are sacrificed; the young, the strongest, who were yesterday the 
strength of their country, who were its future of fruitful labor, are laid low by 
shot and shell. Those who do not die in the dust or mud, will survive, after 
countless sufferings, mutilated, invalided, no longer to be counted on for the 
prosperity of the land. And it is not only the population, that essential wealth, 
that is thus annihilated. In a few hours armies use up, for mutual destruction, 
great quantities of ammunition; while highly expensive supplies of cannon, gun 
carriages and arms are ruined. There is destructive bombardment of towns, vil- 
lages in flames, the harvests stamped down or burned, bridges, the most costly 
items of a railway, blown up. 

The regions traversed by the armies are ravaged. The noncombatants have 
to suffer the fortune of war ; invasion, excesses and it may be flight, with the loss 
of their goods. Thousands of wretched families thus seek security at the price 


of cruel fatigue and the loss of everything, their land and their traditions, 
acquired by the efforts of many generations. 

The Commission arrived in the Balkans after the fighting was over, and was 
able to study the results of the war, at the very moment when, the period of 
conflict closed, each nation was beginning to make its inventory. 

The armies were returning to their homes after demobilization. The soldier 
again became peasant, workman, merchant; the hour of the settling of accounts, 
individual and collective, had struck. 

The government, which had been in the hands of the military during the 
war, was restored to the civil authorities and the period of regular financial 
settlement began. 

Nevertheless, the traces of the war were still fresh. The Commission noted 
them. If the corpses of the victims were not visible their countless graves were 
everywhere, the mounds not yet invaded by the grass that next summer will hide 
them away. Visible too were the wounded in the hospitals and the mutilated 
men in the streets and on the roads; the black flags, hanging outside the doors 
of the hovels, a dismal sign of the mourning caused by the war and its sad 
accompaniment, cholera. 

The members of the Commission saw towns and villages laid in ashes, their 
walls calcined, the house fronts torn open by shell or stripped of their plaster 
by riddling shot. They went through the camps at the city gates where streams 
of families fleeing before the enemy made a halt. All along the roads they came 
upon their wretched caravans. 

The Commission has endeavored to make an estimate of the cost of the 
double war. Instruction on this head is needful. Public opinion needs to be 
directed and held to this point. It is too easily carried away by admiration for 
feats of arms, exalted by historians and poets; it needs to be made to know 
all the butchery and destruction that go to make a victory ; to learn the absurdity 
of the notion, especially at the present time, that war can enrich a country; 
to understand how, even from far off, war reacts on all nations to their dis- 
comfort and even to their serious injury. As Mr. Leon Bourgeois put it at a 
conference recently held at Ghent: 

The smallest, imperceptible movements of the keel of every barque that 
sinks or rises in the tiniest port on the coast of France, Belgium or England, 
are determined by the vast ebb and flow of all the tides and currents that 
together make up the breathing of the ocean. In the same way the profit 
and loss of every little tradesman in the corner of his shop, the wages of 
every workman toiling in a factory are influenced incessantly by the tremen r 
dous pulsation of the universal movement of international exchange. 

Every war upsets this universal movement, especially today when the soli- 
darity of international interests is so marked. Let us see how far the Balkan war 
was a cause of national and international economic disturbance. 



—.. 1 ' 

m''i" : ' m 

■ fV 











The balance sheet of the war must bear at its beginning, in order to charac- 
terize it properly, the list of the dead and wounded. Human lives brutally 
destroyed by arms, existences broken off in suffering after wounds and sickness, 
healthy organizations mutilated for ever; this is the result of the war, these its 
consequences of blood and pain. 

Below is the sinister inventory. 

Bulgaria had 579 officers and 44,313 soldiers killed. Seventy-one officers, 
7,753 soldiers are reported missing, — how many of these are dead? One thou- 
sand, seven hundred and thirty-one officers, 102,853 soldiers were more or less 
seriously wounded. A great number of these will remain invalids, reduced 
greatly in strength or deprived of a limb. An idea of the extent of the ravage 
caused upon the surviving men who were struck by projectiles, may be gathered 
from the following telegram published by the agencies, October 20, 1913. The 
telegram comes from Vienna : 

Queen Eleonora of Bulgaria, who distinguished herself during the war 
by her humanitarian efforts, has just ordered a large number of artificial 
legs to be supplied to the soldiers who underwent amputation. 

The Queen has had workmen experienced in this line sent to Sofia to 
open a factory for artificial legs in the town. 

This is an economic result of war to be noted, — the creation of the artificial 
leg industry. 

Servia published first of all the following losses: about 22,000 dead and 
25,000 wounded. These figures were given to us, dated September 30, 1913, 
by the secretary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Information coming from another source gives a smaller number of dead, 
16,500, but a greater number of wounded, 48,000. Sickness is said to have 
attacked 45,000 men of the Servian army. On February 27, 1914, the official 
figures were given to the Skupshtina by the Minister of War. They are 12,000 
to 13,000 killed; 17,800 to 18,800 dead as the result of wounds, cholera, or 
sickness; 48,000 wounded. 

Servians and Bulgarians bore their wounds with a physical endurance that 
all the doctors and surgeons remarked upon. The wounds healed rapidly. This 
shows that these people are sober and their organs are not poisoned and enfee- 
bled by alcohol. 

It was impossible for us to find out the figures of the Greek, Montenegrin 
or Turkish losses. In spite of our persistence in asking the Greek Minister of 
Foreign Affairs for this information, we have not yet been able to get it; 
reports on this matter not yet having been centralized. The losses of the Greeks 
must have been a good deal less than those of the Bulgarians or Servians. The 
Montenegrins are said to have had a great many killed in proportion to their 
number on account of their attitude under fire. Their pride made them expose 


themselves to the bullets, refusing to lie down or shelter, fighting as in the old 
times when weapons were of short range and less murderous. 

From Turkey we have no official information, in spite of our reiterated 
requests. It is probable, too, that Turkey possesses no means of establishing 
even approximate statistics. All that the war correspondents have related en- 
ables us to say that Turkey must have paid heavy toll to death, as much from 
the blows of their enemies as from the epidemics following their want of care 
and lack of provisions in the panic of confusion and defeat. 

This is not all. Arms were not only taken up against the belligerents, but 
massacres took place in Macedonia and Albania. Old people, villagers, farmers, 
women and children, fell victims to the war. What must their number be? 

It is not possible to compute, chapter by chapter, the extent of the material 
losses by destruction of property. The Balkan States in their claims before the 
Financial Commission of Paris, did not detail them, except Greece, which certainly 
underwent the smallest loss in the first war. In the war of the allies, the part 
of Macedonia which was given to Greece was, on the contrary, widely devas- 
tated, and the vast fires of Serres, Doxato, Kilkish, were real, material disasters. 

Greece has made the following claims for destruction of property due to 
the first war: 

In the course of hostilities, the Ottoman armies fleeing before the 
Hellenic armies, left behind them a country absolutely devastated by pillage, 
massacre and fire. Nearly 170 villages were the prey of fire, several thou- 
sand old people, women and children escaping from death, ruined, starving, 
exhausted, sought and found refuge in the neighboring provinces of Greece. 
For several months they lived at the expense of the Hellenic government, 
which when the campaign was over, had to supply them with means to enable 
them to go back to their native country. 

The Hellenic government has met 414 claims for these unfortunate 

Among the claims, ninety came from burnt villages where the losses, 
duly certified by competent Metropolites, amount to fr. 7,737,100. 

The total of the 414 claims is fr. 10,966,370. 

The preceding chapters have given the reader some means of forming for 
himself an idea of the devastation committed in the Balkans. The photographs 
which we reproduce spare us from describing it. The havoc committed was of 
two kinds : one lawful and the other directed against private property. 

The first was that which strategy or the security of the troops necessitated. 
Bridges blown up by dynamite, railway tracks destroyed, fortifications razed, the 
bombarding of the cities that offered resistance, burning the hiding places of the 
enemy, destroying, in retreat, provisions and ammunition, in order to leave noth- 
ing for the enemy ; all these are lawful acts in time of warfare. 

Then there are the reprisals ; made as they are in the ardor of the struggle, 



Fig. 36. — Ruins of Voinitsa 

in the heat of victory and in a moment of anger, they are often an excuse for 
odious vengeance, for unpardonable violence against things and people. 

And once started, how is it possible to hold back the soldiers? They set 
fire to everything, pillage and destroy for destruction's sake. In the Balkans 
there was, in this way, ruin of every kind amounting to millions. 

The Balkan wars were not, however, in point of view of their economic 
consequences, wars such as may occur between great industrial states. They 
exhibit special characteristics which we must throw into relief. 

General mobilization would be a real disaster in any industrial country. 
Every factory, except those which provide the necessaries of existence or arma- 
ments, must be shut down in the absence of their hands. Even those which 
might contrive to keep running by using the labor of women and those old men 

Fig. 37. — Ruins of Voinitsa 


exempted from military service, could not do so long in the stoppage of the 
necessary supplies of raw material which follows the requisitioning of the per- 
manent way and rolling stock of the railways for the transport of troops. 

Furnaces shut down, machinery silent, huge factories deserted, — such is the 
immediate result of mobilization. It is a dangerous time for capital investments, 
and, if prolonged, leads to heavy failures. 

Workmen's families subsisting on weekly or fortnightly wages are soon re- 
duced to starvation when the husband and grown-up sons have gone to the front. 
Small economies can not keep the wife and children left behind going for long. 
Millions of persons are thrown on the resources of the parishes and of the 
State, and in spite of the heavy charge thus created, the people endure severe 

At a time of mobilization payment of debts is suspended by the moratorium. 
This causes great inconvenience to trade which is further deprived of a great 
body of consumers. Provisions become dear, communication with the exterior is 
cut off, and with the interior monopolized by the military administration, produc- 
tion is at a standstill. Those who draw their income from investments or pen- 
sions find the sources of their daily expenditure dried up; this is the case with 
landlords whose rents do not come in and bondholders whose interest is reduced 
or delayed by the State, which is giving all it has to the war. 

The point need not be labored; it is easy to imagine the immediate distress 
which is produced in any highly developed industrial State by mobilization. 

These consequences were found by the Commission to have been produced 
in the Balkans to some extent, remarkably lessened, however, by the fact that 
Servia and Bulgaria are almost exclusively agricultural countries, and that 
Greece, too, although more developed industrially, is predominantly agricultural. 

From the appearance of the countryside in Servia and Bulgaria one would 
hardly have guessed that war had deprived the fields of their normal laborers. 
In the husband's absence the wife worked in the field, taking a kind of pride in 
producing a good harvest. Thus when foreign trade restarted there were con- 
siderable quantities of oats and maize from the fields to export and current coin 
came in to pay for these exports. The Bulgarian Minister of Commerce put 
the receipts that would come into the country from the sale of cereals as soon as 
trade restarted at fifty-five or sixty million francs' worth (two million, two 
hundred thousand, to two million, four hundred thousand pounds). 

Thus in the Balkan States war has not produced the depths of individual 
misery which it would cause in a country with an industrial proletariat dependent 
on a daily wage. Over a large part of Bulgaria, Servia and Greece the circum- 
stances under which the family lives and develops are those of peasant pro- 
prietorship. When the head of the family went to join the army he left his 
dependents in a homestead, in which there was always a certain supply of 
provisions on the soil from which food of some sort was always to be gotten. 


Though there was less comfort, there was no such distress requiring the succor 
of the State as would arise where the workers live in large agglomerations. 

In the fields the women and children continued to subsist on their own 
resources, and to produce. The calls upon the savings banks came from the 
towns, and from the soldiers, who did not wish to join the army without some 
pocket money. In Bulgaria, down to July, 1912, the rate of deposits and with- 
drawals from the savings bank was normal. In July marked variations began. 
The number of deposits fell from 22,834 in July to 19,914 in August, and their 
value from fr. 3,167,645 to fr. 2,889,400. This tendency grew more marked,* 
in September there were 10,516 deposits worth fr. 2,020,723; in October 3,637 
worth fr. 1,193,656. The effect on withdrawals was naturally still more marked. 
In February, 1912, their total exceeded three millions, higher than at any time 
in 1911. In August the figure was the same. September, when mobilization 
took place, saw a perfect rush of depositors ; on the same day on which the 
mobilization order was issued, all those presenting themselves received in full 
the sums demanded. Seven paying desks were opened. On the 18th payments 
were limited to fr. 500; on the 29th to fr. 200, the rest of the sum demanded 
being paid five days later. Exception was made in the case of soldiers ; they 
were paid in full without delay. This limitation of payment lasted for twenty- 
five days. In September fr. 4,210,244 were withdrawn. It was the only month in 
1912 in which withdrawals exceeded deposits. Throughout the war the total 
of the latter remained at a pretty high level. 

In 1913 business became regular ; in May deposits rose to over three mil- 
lions. July, the month in which demobilization took place, was a repetition of 
August of the previous year. Withdrawals exceeded deposits, being fr. 1,573,196 
against fr. 1,209,522. 

The figures supplied us by the savings bank acting in connection with the 
Athenian banks show that there was no panic among savings bank depositors in 
Greece either. The total amount of deposits was fr. 40,257,000 on June 30, 1912; 
it had risen to fr. 59,365,000 on June 30, 1913. 

Those who suffered most from the war in Bulgaria and Servia were the 
artisans, small traders and small manufacturers. Their position will not be able 
to be gauged till after the expiry of the moratorium. In Bulgaria it was pro- 
claimed on September 17, 1912, to last a year. The Commission was in Sofia 
when it terminated; representatives of the banking houses having agreed to 
prolong it in fact. They decided simply to take steps to protect themselves 
against suspected debtors without going so far as to act against them. 

The Servian moratorium was prolonged by law to January 3, 1914. 

In Servia and Bulgaria the war put a stop to all productive transport by rail ; 
in Greece to most of the sea transport. Greece had eighty-seven ships held up at 
Constantinople, and twenty-three cargo boats in the Black Sea. The receipts 
of the Bulgarian railways, which amounted to fr. 29,602,355 from September, 



'f r A 



f& ' * 

^t LLCS 



■ ■^^'.'•■.•>, : -'- : V 





Fig. 38. — Ravages of the War. 

kfifcl : /.' 

^^■SSM ^C^ ' 


|P I|JPP ;"* 


Fiu. 39.— ^Ravages of the War 



Fig. 40. — Ravages of the War 

Fig. 41. — Ravages of the War 


1911, to September, 1912, were nonexistent for the corresponding period 1912-13. 
The rails and stock were mobilized and used exclusively for the army, which 
owed the State a sum of fr. 7,637,418 on account of transport. On the other 
hand, mobilization involved considerable wear and tear of material and special 
accommodation works; war brought with it the destruction of bridges; at Dede- 
Agatch, Greece seized some engines and carriages which had just been disem- 
barked on their way to Bulgaria. Bulgaria's expenses from these sources are 
put at fr. 22,984,680. 

Thus for Bulgaria the railways' account works out at: loss of receipts, 
nearly fr. 30,000,000; expenditure on repairs and purchases, fr. 23,000,000. On 
the other hand, the State is in its own debt on account of army transports to the 
extent of nearly f r. 8,000,000. Figures under this head for Servia are not avail- 
able. In 1911 the receipts from its railways amounted to fifteen to sixteen 
million francs, a sum which must have failed entirely during the war. 

Greece estimates the cost of railway transport of her troops at fr. 6,000,000, 
and sea transport at fr. 30,000,000. 

Just as the war did not prevent the harvest in Bulgaria and Servia from 
being collected, Greece, at the top of a wave of economic prosperity, was able 
to support it too without a crisis. Its economic activity was impeded but not 
brought to a standstill since the army was thrown at once across the frontiers 
invading Turkish territory ; the soil of Greece itself was spared the movements 
of troops and battles. 

The absence of the men on active service did, of course, cause a stoppage 
of industrial productivity. For example, the central office of the National Bank 
of Athens was 120 employes short, a third of its staff. Grave losses were 
sustained by the mercantile marine, which is one of the principal Greek indus- 
tries. But there was no financial panic. The moratorium was used exclusively 
by the Bank of Athens, and for a very short time, because of its branch estab- 
lishments, in Turkey. Government stock fell at the beginning of the war, but 
the fall was brief ; business soon revived and rising prices followed. 

The balances of the savings banks instituted by the banks increased, as 
has already been pointed out. There was a slow increase in loans on securities ; 
a falling off in loans on goods. 

The war showed Greece that she had resources to some extent scattered 
all over the world. Effective aid in men and money came from those of her 
sons who had emigrated. The exodus of the Greek population is so considerable 
that Mr. Repoulis, Minister of the Interior, found it necessary to pass a law 
for its regulation. From 1885 down to the end of 1911, 188,245 Greeks left 
their native land, most of them going to the United States. In 1911 the total, 
37,021, was composed of 34,105 men and 2,916 women. The age distribution 
was as follows: between fourteen and forty-five, 35,485; under fourteen, 1,006; 


over forty-five, 430. Thus, those who leave are the flower of the population. 
Emigration takes 9.5 in every thousand a year ; in Italy only 5.8 per thousand. 

It is true that the Greek abroad guards his nationality and his traditions 
jealously; and when his country is in danger he returns, no matter how remote 
he be, to defend it. In the late war between 25,000 and 30,000 men came back 
to Greece and helped to carry the national arms to victory. 

At all times Greek emigrants bear their share in the national prosperity by 
sending home their capital. In 1910 fr. 20,427,062.65 were received from 
America in postal orders; in 1911, fr. 19,579,887.65. From the same source 
there stood in the banks deposits amounting in 1910 to fr. 55,471,460; in 1911 to 
fr. 47,323,059. The influx of wealth, resulting from emigration, will certainly 
end in arresting the tide of departures. The Greek, indeed, leaves his country 
because the supply is in excess of the demand of labor; also to some extent 
under the stimulus of the love of adventure, because of a character more in- 
clined to commercial than productive activity, and because of the attractions 
held out by emigration offices. 

The capital thus acquired abroad will enrich the country. There are plenty 
of places, admirably watered, which are not used for market gardening. Greece 
imports fr. 210,000 worth of eggs; honey, a national product, is also imported. 
According to Mr. Repoulis, the ignorance of the cultivators is something incred- 
ible, with the result that the soil produces but half the average yield in wheat 
of more advanced countries. Very high prices for land are now being gotten in 
some provinces, thanks to the emigrants' money. When they have made their 
fortune, the Greeks come back more and more to settle in their native country, 
bringing with them new methods and a spirit of initiative, thus keeping on 
the land, by giving them work and instruction, the peasants who would other- 
wise have gone abroad in their turn. 

The maintenance of a monetary currency by Greece during the last war 
is due in part to the fact that the emigrants who returned to take their places 
in the ranks brought considerable sums of money with them which they deposited 
specially in the national Dank. Between September 30, 1912, the month in which 
war was declared, and July 31, 1913, the amount of deposits in the national bank 
grew steadily. From fr. 197,785,000 at the former date it rose to f r. 249,046,000 
on the latter. The same is true of all the branches of the Bank of Athens. The 
total, which was fr. 352,762,000 on June 30, 1912, rose to fr. 441,681,000 on 
June 30, 1913. 

Thus, thanks to the preponderance of agriculture, to the system of small 
estates, and, in Greece, to emigration, Bulgaria, Greece and Servia were able 
to bear a long war, which was sometimes painful and cruel, without any pause 
in their production, and without any deep upheaval ; this is due to the economic 
resistance shown by each family firmly established on its own land. 


Nevertheless, there were antagonistic tides of feeling, due to national jeal- 
ousy and enmity, which threw numerous families into exile. 

One of the saddest spectacles presented to the Commission was the case 
of the refugees. Their presence caused grave financial difficulties to the States 
which took them in and their reestablishment presented an important economic 
problem. The refugees seen by the Commission in Greece and in Bulgaria 
were fugitives from countries which conquest and treaties had transformed into 
alien territories. In Greece there were Moslems from parts of Macedonia and 
Thrace, now Bulgarian, who followed the Greek army, encouraged thereto, ac- 
cording to the evidence we have collected, by the Greeks, who promised them 
protection, subsistence, lands. In Bulgaria there were again Moslems and in 
larger number Bulgarians who had fled before the Serbs and Greeks, the new 
and jealous masters of the parts of Macedonia in which they had been 

A sort of classification thus took the place of the tangle of nationalities in 
Macedonia and for a time the population of the country, newly divided between 
Servia, Greece and Bulgaria, was willy nilly divided according to nationality 
within the new frontiers. This did not last, for the emigrants, weary of wan- 
dering and of the pain of starvation and drawn to their abandoned fields, grad- 
ually returned home. 

At the gates of Salonica the Commission saw a countless herd of more than 
ten thousand persons stationed in the plain. The families were installed under 
the high wagons with heavy wooden frames and wooden wheels, without iron 
hoops, which had brought them there with their worldly goods in the shape of 
a rug or two and a few domestic utensils. The cattle were straying in the field. 
As need drove them the refugees sold their animals for ludicrous prices, a cow 
for two pounds, an ox for three. The men hung about ready for long idle 
talks with strangers. In Salonica all the unoccupied houses were filled with 

At Sofia the schools and public buildings sheltered thousands of these 
wretches. Everywhere the Commission came upon them, waiting in crowds for 
the free food distribution, drawn up in long lines of caravans on the roads, 
collected in groups under any sort of shelter, suffering from famine, decimated 
by disease. In the market place of Samokov a woman told us her story, which 
was that of most: "When they cried out that the Greek horse were coming, my 
husband took two children and I took two. We ran. In the scrimmage I 
dropped the smallest one, whom I was carrying. I couldn't pick him up again. 
I don't know where my husband and the other two are. I want him, I want 
him," she cried again and again, as she told us of the poor little one, trampled 
under foot. In her arms she held the one she had saved. In the night he died. 

It is impossible to think without emotion of what this exodus of peoples 
caused by war represents in terms of suffering and tears. 



Fig. 42. — Refugees 

Fig. 43. — Refugees 



Fig. 44. — Refugees 

Fig. 45. — Refugees 



Fig. 46. — Refugees 

Fig. 47. — Refugees 




"■'".-."' f^ix ' ■ i :■ '" .' 

'i-;«cs^.r : '' - -. f V 

' : '-i^'^W-*. W '^ 


■ r 

• * ?* hs-it^O^&SsL 


., ■."» ; ^ b ^ K j^«ayjft 



».. Pi- ■■■'.■;;■_' 'P'\* ;V;^ '■'■"^ftlt'C" j -- 

Fig. 48. — 

Fig. 49. — Refugees 


For the State the refugees were a heavy burden. Greece had close on 
157,000 refugees on her hands, all of which cases were investigated and assisted. 
The maximum number was reached on August 11, when there were 156,659 
refugees. The necessary means of transport were provided for the Moslems 
who desired to go to Turkey-in-Asia, by national committees constituted for 
the purpose. The Commission saw two great transport loads of these emigrants 
leave Salonica. For the others Greece had to provide food, and meat, bread 
and biscuits were distributed among them. Philanthropic societies collected 
clothes and blankets for them. The State estimated the cost per refugee at 
fifteen centimes, which shows that only the necessaries of bare subsistence were/ 

Committees were appointed to consider the best means of settling the re- 
maining refugees, whose number was put at about 90,000. Landowners and 
manufacturers came forward with offers of employment for larger and larger 
numbers every day, as agricultural and day laborers and farmers. The villages 
abandoned by the Bulgar population and the vast Turkish public domain afforded 
lodging and land. 

Greece, who has already established thousands of refugees, under identical 
conditions, in Thessaly, hopes to derive much profit from the living wealth of 
this influx of population. The period of disorder once over, the people, well 
directed and well distributed, will be an element of prosperity to the nation. 
But, before this day comes, great expenditure will have been required on main- 
tenance, buildings, agricultural implements and the small capital sum to enable 
each family to take root. To put the expenditure at twenty-five or thirty mil- 
lion francs is not an excessive estimate. The experience gained in Thessaly 
in 1906 may afford a basis for calculation. After the Roumelian incidents, there 
were 27,000 Greek refugees. After the first shock was over a certain number 
of families returned; 3,200 remained, representing between 17,000 and 18,000 
persons. Greece undertook to establish them as peasant proprietors. For two 
and a half years they were maintained at an expense of nearly twelve million 
francs. Then land was bought, villages created, houses built for their establish- 
ment, at the cost of an additional thirteen million. Greece had no intention of 
making them a present of all that, but the advances have been repaid on so small 
a scale, that the loan has become a bad debt. 

This experience should serve also to show the error of making the State 
the creditor of poor refugees. The declared intention of Mr. Diomedes, the 
Finance Minister, is to make the refugees of 1913 peasant proprietors through 
the medium of an agricultural bank, which will advance them the necessary money. 

Bulgaria harbored 104,360 persons. There, as in Greece, they had to 
be supported so far as resources permitted. At Sofia the Commission could see 
that real attention was given to the refugees, with important help, it is true, from 


•charitable societies. The cost of their daily maintenance was estimated at forty 
centimes per head. 

Of these refugees some 30,000 came from parts of Thrace recovered by 
Turkey, and 50,000 from Macedonian districts assigned to Servia or Greece. 
According to returns made by the Bulgarian government, 40,000 persons, or 
10,000 (families, left their homes without hope of returning. Homes will have 
to be found for them then on the banks of the Maritza or the Arda or on the 
^Egean littoral; the expense of such settlement will be heavy and may be put 
sX eighteen or twenty millions. It is not only the unhappy refugees, however, 
who present a problem of nationality and of settlement to the countries which 
liave harbored them. 

Foreign concessionaires and heads of industrial concerns are established in 
the conquered territories; their status must be denned in relation to the con- 
quering countries, allowance being made for rights already acquired. The task 
is a delicate one, and was handed to the Financial Commission in Paris, which 
arrived at a solution in Tune-July, 1913. The Balkan States have succeeded to 
the rights and charges of the Ottoman Empire with regard to those enjoying 
concessions and contracts in the ceded territories. No one has contested the 
principle of this succession, and it is probable that had any difficulty been raised 
about it the Great Powers would have upheld the material interests of their 

On the question of the nationality of these companies, the Financial Com- 
mission on Balkan matters sitting in Paris, unanimously agreed that a non- 
Ottoman company should, under whatever circumstances, retain its nationality, 
despite the annexation of the territory in which its field of operations lay. 
Turkish companies having their headquarters and their entire works in the same 
annexed territory, should adopt as their right, the nationality of the annexing 

Companies with headquarters in Turkey, while the whole of their workings 
lay within a single one of the annexing countries, might elect to adopt the 
nationality of the annexing country, and in that case to transfer their head- 
quarters thither or state that they intended to retain Ottoman nationality. 

The position of mining concessions was determined as follows : 

Succession will take place by right without any further formalities than 
a conventional deposit and the registration of the terms of the agreement, the 
whole free of stamps or any expense. The mining regulations of the annexing 
State apply to the concessionaires only in so far as they involve no infringement 
of acquired rights, that is to say, in so far as they are not contrary to the clauses , 
in the concession, agreement or contract. At the same time such clauses can not 
be made use of to appeal against the application of police supervision and in- 
spection designed to secure safety in working or against forfeiture of the con- 
cession where work is not done. The annexing governments succeed the Ottoman 


government in the obligation to hand over, free of charge, a warrant with the 
same judicial force as the Imperial firman, and issued by a competent authority, 
to mining concessionaires whose concessions were signed before the outbreak of 
hostilities but not confirmed by firman until after the declaration of war. This 
same succession by right applies to forest and port concessions. 

There are still a number of important problems to be solved. They concern r 

1. The position of companies whose workings will in future lie within 
two or more territories, such as the lighthouse company, road and railway 
construction companies, etc. 

2. The determination of the distribution of mileage securities, the cal- 
culation of receipts, and the share thereof accruing to the different govern- 
ments, and the charges on the said share. 

Probably a permanent Liquidation Committee will be instituted in succession 
to the Financial Committee to ensure detailed application of the principles it 
has laid down; while an Arbitration Tribunal, international in character, will be 
set up for the final adjudication of matters in dispute. 

In the territories ceded to the Balkan States the Imperial Ottoman govern- 
ment had conceded the construction and working of eleven lines of railway, of 
five ports (Salonica, Dede-Agatch, Kavala, St. Jean de Medua, Goumenitza), of 
high roads, hydraulic works (Maritza, Boyana, Okhrida). Sixty- three mines 
had been conceded. The nationality of the concessionaires was as follows : 

Ottoman 37 

British 10 

French 1 

French and Austrian 3 

Ottoman and Hellenic 2 

Italian 6 

German 1 

Ottoman, French, Italian 1 

Ottoman and Austrian 2 

The Ottoman State had passed sixteen contracts for the lease of forests to 
nine entrepreneurs. 

There were, moreover, a certain number of tramway, lighting, motive 
power, hydraulic power, and mineral water concessions outstanding, permits for 
mining and quarry exploitation, and a large number of contracts for the con- 
struction of roads, public buildings and other works of public utility and for 
forest workings which had been made either by the central government or by 
local authorities. 

The Balkan wars simply emptied the factories and fields of their male 
workers. Out of 2,632,000 inhabitants, Greece mobilized 210,000 men ; Bulgaria 
620,567 out of its 4,329,108 inhabitants; and Servia 467,630 men out of 2,945,950 
inhabitants. The result was a considerable deficit in the taxes collected, a falling 


off in the state receipts. We will quote the example of only one country, Servia, 
the same phenomenon having occurred to the same extent in the other belligerent 
countries. Servia experienced the following variations in its monetary resources. 
Taxation produced 2,879.577 dinars in the month of October, 1913, against 591,315 
in the corresponding period of 1912, and 5,817,493 in 1911; that is, an increase 
in 1913, of 2,188,251 dinars on the results for 1912. 

In the first ten months of the year 1913, taxation, which had brought in 
33,911,817 dinars in 1911, and 24,443,984 dinars in 1912, only brought in 
10,623,800 dinars. The, decrease of 13,820,184 dinars between the figures for 
1913. and those for the year before, is explained by the peculiar circumstances. 
In 1912, the taxes were in fact regularly paid for the first nine months, whereas 
during the greater part of the corresponding period of 1913, Servia was in a 
state of war. 

Then, too, war, besides depriving States of their ordinary receipts, causes 
heavy expenditure on armaments, ammunition and equipment; the Balkan States 
estimated this expenditure as follows : 


Expenditure on the army fr. 824,782,012 

Pensions and Maintenance of prisoners of war 487,863,436 

Total fr. 1,312,645,448 


Expenditure on the army. fr. 317,816,101 

Expenditure on the navy 75,341,913 

Pensions 54,000,000 

Maintenance of prisoners of war 20,000,000 

Total fr. 467,158,014 


Expenditure on the army fr. 100,631,100 

Maintenance of prisoners of war 2,500,000 

Total fr. 103,131,100 


Expenditure on the army fr. 574,815,500 

Maintenance of prisoners 16,000,000 

Total fr. 590,815,500 

Are these figures to be regarded as exact? They are evidently open to the 
suspicion of being exaggerated. They were supplied by the belligerent States 
to the Financial Commission as a basis of the claims to be formulated and in- 


demnity or compensation awarded against the defeated Turk. As one of the 
ministers whom we saw told us, the States "pleaded" before the Commission. 
The case is not yet decided. But there is already more moderation about the 
corrected figures furnished by some States. Thus in a document sent us by the 
secretary general to the Servian Foreign Minister (Appendix I) the total 
of the various heads under which war expenditure is classified amounts to but 
fr. 445,880,858, a reduction of fr. 128,934,642 on the total sent in to the Finance 

In the absence of documents it is to be presumed that Montenegro can not 
have spent fr. 103,000.000, even if its reserves were exhausted, its allies and 
friends called in and everything possible in the country requisitioned. 

After this comment we may ask how the hundreds of millions consumed by 
the war have been or are to be paid ? The belligerents have depleted their treas- 
uries. They will seek to get what is necessary by means of loans. At home 
they will convert the requisition bonds into government stock. In Bulgaria 
three hundred millions of those bonds are in circulation; a third will be paid up 
and the rest consolidated. But for the greater part of the bill appeal will be 
made to European financiers. The result will be a considerable increase in the 
public debt of the Balkan States. 

On June 1, 1913, the Hellenic government made an attempt to justify the 
sums at which its expenditure on army and navy had been valued; i. e., 
fr. 393,158,014, and estimated that of this total fr. 119,598,213 was outstanding 
debt, which would make its real cash expenditure fr. 273,559,801. 

What were the resources available to meet such a heavy expenditure? On 
the eve of the war the treasury contained fr. 122,856,768 of gold drawn from the 
following sources: 

Available balance from the 1910 loan fr. 73,537,941 

Budget surplus from 1910 and 1911 19,318,827 

Postponed expenditure on the 1912 and 1913 
budgets and funds used provisionally, 
about 30,000,000 

Total fr. 122,856,768 

After the declaration of war Greece acquired resources as follows : 

Treasury bonds discounted by the Greek Na- 
tional Bank fr. 10,000,000 

Advance arranged in Paris, December, 1912.. 40,000,000 

Advance arranged with the Greek National 

Bank, April, 1913 50,000,000 

Advance arranged with the same, May, 1913. . 40,000,000 

Total f r. 140,000,000 


The grand total then of the sums contained in the treasury and obtained 
by a series of financial operations, amounts to fr. 262,856,768. 

The treasury possessed on June, 1913, some fr. 12,000,000. It spent 
fr. 250,856,768, a sum which with the addition of the debt outstanding, prac- 
tically corresponds to the total returned expenditure. There thus remain 
fr. 119,398,213 of expenditure not yet settled, and the pensions and repairs of 
armaments, etc. There is also the organization of new territories to be provided 
for, and which for a considerable time will bring in nothing in the way of re- 
ceipts. Finally, the receipts for 1912 and 1913 being markedly diminished by 
the war, there is sure to be a deficit from these two sources. 

Thus one may conclude, from figures furnished by Greece herself, that the 
State debt, amounting to fr. 994,000.000 on January 1, 1913, will be augmented,, 
as the result of the increased expenditure and diminished budget receipts due to- 
the war, by some fr. 500,000,000, which will produce by way of interest and 
sinking fund an annual charge on the budget of fr. 35,000,000 to pay for the 
expenses of the war. That is to say the sum, fr. 37,650,712, actually required 
for debt, according to the 1913 budget, will be almost doubled. 

The effect of war expenses on public finance in Bulgaria was put as follows - 
by the delegates before the Finance Commission on July 2 : 

Part of the expense incurred by the Bulgarian treasury during the war 
has already affected the public debt. On September 1 last the consolidated 
debt, consisting of the 6 per cent loan of 1892, 5 per cent of 1902 and 1904 r 
\y 2 per cent of 1907 and 1909, 4^4 per cent of 1909, amounted to* 
fr. 627,782,962. The floating debt amounted to close upon fr. 60,000,000 r 
i. e., fr. 32,875,775 to the National Bank of Bulgaria, fr. 2,040,398 to the 
Banque Agricole, and fr. 25,000,000 of treasury bonds. The total 
Bulgarian debt consequently amounted to fr. 687,699,135 before the war. 
It has since risen by about fr. 395,000,000. The situation on May 1, 1913, 
was as follows : 

Consolidated debt fr. 623,635,206 

Floating debt to the National Bank 60,625,398 

Debt to the Banque Agricole 313,583 

Treasury bonds 125,829,000 

Treasury bonds (requisition bonds) 249,815,300 

Excess over from previous statements 23,071,304 

Total fr. 1,083,289,791 

The consolidated debt has been reduced by the normal operation of the 
sinking fund, by a little over four millions. The advances made by the 
National Bank of Bulgaria have almost doubled. Treasury bonds to the 
value of 125 millions have been issued abroad. Finally, the major part of 
the expenses of the war have been met by the issue of requisition bonds. 


From the beginning of the war down to May 1, Bulgaria spent rather 
over fr. 400,000,000 and increased its debt by fr. 395,590,737. Let us hasten 
to add that this sum is far from representing the real cost of the war. 
Sums incurred and not yet met are not included. The indirect expenses, 
above all, of recreating materiel and commissariat, paying pensions to the 
wounded and to the families of the dead soldiers, which would more than 
double the total 400,000,000, are not included. 

The total, further, does not include the losses to the Bulgarian treasury 
involved in the diminution of receipts and economic and other losses. 

The Servian public debt, which was 659 million francs, has also been heavily 
swollen, — by about 500 millions. 

Territorial conquest imposes obligations on the conquerors which must 
aggravate their financial position. Moreover, Servia's new territories must be 
organized, equipped with administrative machinery and officials, reforms must 
be introduced, industrial arrangements improved, railways laid, and the army 
increased. The Turkish debt which weighs on them must be cleared off. 

The Financial Commission made an estimate of the share of the Ottoman, 
debt accruing to the Balkan States in return for their annexations. 

Three systems of distribution were suggested. Only those figures need be 
given which show that the share of nominal capital in the loans and advances 
of the Ottoman government in circulation at the end of the war, transferred to 
the Balkan States, will amount to between twenty-three and twenty-four million- 
Turkish pounds, or 575 to 600 million francs. 

It is not easy to foretell what economic alterations will be effected in the 
country by the new distribution of territory, which regions will benefit and which 
suffer by the change. Greece, which has been isolated, as its railways did not 
form part of the European system, is thinking of changing this state of things, 
which is harmful to its development. 

The breaking up of Macedonia will alter the position of the trade centers, 
which each government will place in the middle of its own territory. This will 
certainly be to the detriment of Salonica, whose commercial hinterland is inter- 
sected by the new frontiers. In November, 1913, the receipts of the custom 
house of Ghevgheli on the Servian-Greek frontier amounted to 600,000 dinars. 
When Servia has organized its new territory, the Ghevgheli custom house will 
in all probability be an obstacle to trade with Salonica. 

The events of the Balkan war reacted upon Austria Hungary and Russia. 
Before and during the period of crisis these two States held themselves in readi- 
ness for any eventuality and remained partially mobilized for several months. 
These preparations must have cost Austria Hungary alone some thousand mil- 
lion crowns. 

Roumania also mobilized and invaded Bulgaria at the moment when Bulgaria, 
stood opposed to the Greek, Servian and Turkish armies. But as the price of 
this intervention, which was absolutely without danger, Roumania received a. 


rich territory equal to a twelfth of the whole area of Bulgaria, and paying in 
thirty to thirty-two million francs worth in taxation annually to the Bulgarian 
Exchequer. So she was amply repaid. 

As soon as peace was concluded, the belligerent States set in search of 
money. Servia first took steps to obtain the millions needed to repair its losses 
and realize its conquest,, from the international finance market. The Skupshtina 
voted a projected loan of 250 million dinars, half to cover the cost of the war, the 
other half to go in subventions to agriculture, especially in the provinces ot 
New Servia. 

Bulgaria and Greece are also looking for the necessary millions. Turkey 
the same. A thousand millions of francs (£40.000,000) is an inside estimate of 
what the Balkan States want from the savings of Europe. The capital will be 
supplied them by loan establishments, controlled, however, clearly, by the gov- 
ernments of the countries where the shares are issued and taken up. 

It is right and proper that government should make the pecuniary aid thus 
afforded to the Balkan nations subject to certain considerations of general in- 
terest. It is the duty of governments which allow millions to be borrowed from 
the savings of their people to see that conditions are imposed salutary to bor- 
rowers and lenders. The wealth lent must go to increase industrial and agricul- 
tural values above their present level ; unproductive and dangerous trade must 
be limited. In a word, governmental intervention should take the form of re- 
fusing to authorize a loan unless the borrowing nations guarantee to restrict 
their armaments within definite limits. European governments which really care 
for peace, ought to use this powerful argument. 

Finally, the Balkan States, immediately after the war, took up the position 
of conquerors ; in Belgrade, in Athens and in Sofia, the sovereign and the troops 
made triumphal entries. 

Today, the Balkan States are acting as beggars. They are seeking to borrow 
money to pay their debts and build up again their military and productive forces. 

Such is the result of the war. Hundreds of thousands of deaths, soldiers 
crippled, ruin, suffering, hatred and, to crown all, misery and poverty after vic- 
tory. War results in destruction and poverty in every direction. 


The Moral and Social Consequences of the Wars and the Outlook 
for the Future of Macedonia 

In the first war there was much of that cheerful response to the call to arms, 
that fearlessness and that heroism which have been sung by poets in all time, 
and which the world has ever approved. Centuries of oppression and suffering 
at the hands of the Turks, the unpromising outlook for good government in 
Macedonia because of hostile factions in the Turkish government, and the 
possibility of the alliance of Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria in what seemed a 
just and holy cause, were felt to fully justify the concerted movement against 
the Turks. The peasants who cheerfully left their homes and their families, 
while the government took their animals and their carts for purposes of trans- 
portation, went forth in a glow of national feeling and patriotism not unmixed 
with the thought of liberating their brothers in Macedonia. Though the instincts 
and motives which inspired them were primitive, they were nevertheless real and 
genuine and belonged to that class of better human traits which war is believed 
by many to call forth. 

From first to last, in both wars, the fighting was as desperate as though 
extermination were the end sought. However glorious the public accounts 
appeared, the Turkish war and the war of the Allies constituted a ghastly chapter 
of horrors. Both among the regular troops as well as the irregular bands which 
accompanied the armies, there were many of low, criminal, and even bestial type, 
with no human feeling and no care for civilized standards, who were ready at 
all times to do atrocious deeds; and the history of the first war, however lofty 
in purpose it may have been, is tarnished by many burnings, slayings, and viola- 
tions for which no possible excuse can be given. There is evidence to show that 
in some cases these acts were committed by soldiers acting under orders. It is 
to be feared that many a young man learned for the first time to commit acts 
of violence and crime not permitted in civilized warfare. 

We have to do with the second war chiefly, and it is here that moral results 
and consequences are the most terrible. The nations which had been in alliance 
and had invoked the aid of Heaven in a war of deliverance suddenly awoke to 
fierce hatred of each other. National jealousy and bitterness, greed for terri- 
torial expansion, and mutual distrust, were sufficient to initiate and push forward 
the most uncalled for and brutal war of modern times. Those who fought side 


by side at Tchataldja and Adrianople were now ready to kill, mutilate, and to 
torture each other. 

To the man who sits at home, or to the casual observer, war assumes a 
certain glamor. It seems to be the open door to glory and renown. The Com- 
mission witnessed at Belgrade, at the close of the second war, the return of some 
of the crack Servian regiments and the celebration of the victories, with proces- 
sions of soldiers, triumphal arches, banners, flowers, and music. The King, 
Crown Prince, distinguished officers and the populace all entered into the spirit 
of a grand holiday. Similar scenes were enacted at Sofia, Salonica, Athens, and 
Bucharest. It would be difficult to say which caused the greater joy, — the vic- 
tories over the Turks or those over their former allies, the Bulgarians. In the 
speeches made on these occasions there was, we venture to say, little mention 
made of the fact that nearly one hundred thousand young men, more or less, 
were lost to the nation, either through death, wounds, sickness, or massacres. 
The mothers and sisters of the lost soldiers who, in mourning dress, were scat- 
tered numerously through the crowds, received, we venture to say, little public 
notice. Each of the three nations which fought, and Roumania, who seized an 
auspicious moment to steal a choice piece of her neighbor's territory and force 
her to sign a treaty at the point of the bayonet, posed before the world as those 
that had defended a righteous cause. 

We also saw the demobilization of the Servian troops, for we met in our 
slow journey of two days from Belgrade to Uskub more than thirty military 
trains loaded with men, horses, oxen, carts, cannon, equipage, and, I fear, much 
property unlawfully taken from the homes and shops of noncombatants. 
Often the railway carriages were decorated with flowers or branches of trees. 
Now and then one could hear patriotic songs. Thus the going and returning of 
the soldiers was attended with patriotic ardor and joy. This is the brighter 
side of the picture; but it is the reverse side, so dark and sinister, which we are 
compelled to examine. Upon this picture only one ray of light seems to fall. 

We visited the great military hospitals at Belgrade and Sofia and the smaller 
Greek hospital at Drama. In the midst of maimed, sore, and suffering humanity 
devoted women, some of them from other lands, some persons of high sta- 
tion — for example, the wives of the Servian minister in London and the Greek 
minister at Athens, both of American birth, and Queen Eleonora of Bulgaria — 
were ministering patiently and sympathetically, not only to those who were 
recovering, but to the dying as well, and in all cases there were a few, a very few, 
of the enemy receiving apparently the same care as the others. We heard also 
of instances of self denial and magnanimity on the battle field, and we wished 
that there had been more of them. 

In considering the moral effects of the atrocities which have already been 
so fully described, we must take account of the sufferers as well as those guilty 
of committing them. When a band of soldiers or comitadjis, either under 


orders or, as was many times the case, under the impulse of hatred, greed, and 
lust, surrounded and attacked a village, the very doors of Hell seemed to be 
opened. No language can describe the tortures and griefs which followed. Re- 
peated instances of death by fright of girls and young children attest the horror 
of the orgy of crime which was enacted. In one house in Doxato, to which fifty 
persons had fled for safety, all but one little girl, Chrisanthe Andom, were 
slaughtered like beasts in the shambles. In the same town a well to do family 
of thirteen owned and occupied one of the best houses. After extorting £3,000 
from the head of the family on the promise that they would be spared, the Bul- 
garians and Turks proceeded to kill them all. These are typical instances of 
the many which are found in the depositions contained in the appendices. Can 
we estimate the moral effects of such atrocities upon the survivors? They are 
often stunned by the enormity of their losses. Despair is written on their faces. 
This was true of a Bulgarian and his wife in the village of Voinitsa. They 
stood beside a wretched shack in which they were trying to live, while a few 
meters away were the ruins of their once attractive home, which contained the 
savings of a lifetime, and which the Servians had destroyed. Widespread and 
almost universal maltreatment of women and girls by the soldiers of the three 
nations has left behind moral consequences which can not be estimated. 

But what shall we say of the reflex influence upon the perpetrators? When 
before, in modern times, have troops been commanded by their officers to commit 
atrocities? That this was done is shown by letters of Greek soldiers captured 
by the Bulgarians and copies of which are to be seen in Appendix C. Greek 
officers on the other hand claim to have captured evidence that Bulgarian com- 
manders were guilty of permitting and directing atrocities in Greek towns. The 
moral effect upon hundreds and thousands of young men, who either participated 
in or were cognizant of these crimes officially sanctioned, can not easily be 
effaced. Acting upon a people who have not obtained the stability of character 
found in older civilizations, the moral loss is irretrievable. 

To this list of primary consequences must be added the long series of 
reports and instances of torturing, mutilating, and slaying of wounded soldiers 
collected by the Foreign Office at Belgrade, each report containing the names 
of the victims, the name of the person making the report, and properly attested 
by the commanding officer. Then there are instances of ill treatment of pris- 
oners, especially of Turks by Bulgarians and of Bulgarians by the Servians and 
Greeks. No less serious were the sufferings of Turkish refugees, more than 
200,000 in number, who were either driven out by the Greeks or who, from fear 
of the Bulgars, fled from the territories about to be occupied by them. We 
saw thousands of those refugees in and near Salonica, and thousands more at 
Drama and Kavala. They were always a pitiful sight, camping as they were 
on the open ground, without shelter, the children often being nearly naked, with 
winter approaching, and not knowing where they would find a home and safety. 


They had left their farms and their crops, taking with them only some animals, 
which were often stolen from them, or which they were compelled to sell for a 
mere pittance. We saw some of them embarking on steamers for Asia Minor, 
where it is to be feared that many will die from hunger and exposure the coming 
winter. More than 135,000 Bulgarians were fugitives from territory newly 
occupied by the Greeks. This list includes priests, schoolmasters, and leading 
citizens whose interests and sympathies are known to be Bulgarian. 

It is sufficient to refer to what has already been said about nationalities. 
There could be no more appealing picture of moral and social confusion than 
that of metropolitan bishops, schoolmasters, and notables who have been arrested, 
maltreated, and imprisoned without due process of law. If permitted to live, 
they were driven from their homes and compelled to leave behind the churches 
and schools which they had cherished, as well as the property belonging thereto 
or to them personally. Often they were prevented from communicating with 
their families before they were driven away. These supreme acts of intolerance 
on the part of Greece and Servia toward educational institutions, which had long 
been a saving grace in Macedonia, may find some defense in the militant nature 
of the national propaganda which priests and schoolmasters carried on ; but such 
coercion and ill treatment employed by one set of Christians against another, all 
adherents of the same orthodox church, can not hope to escape the censure of 
the civilized world. They were fiendish, both in their conception and in their 
execution, and were appropriate only to the times of the Spanish Inquisition. 

Statistics showing the number of Bulgarian, Servian, and Greek schools and 
teachers in Macedonia before the new alignment of territory are impressive, as 
showing Bulgarian enterprise in education, and in suggesting the vast moral and 
social harm which is wrought in their destruction. Here again the moral conse- 
quences are far reaching, for they affect 60,000 pupils and 1,600 teachers and strike 
a blow at the educational and social advancement of the communities involved. 
They also convict the Greeks and Servians of mal-administration and intolerance 
at the very beginning of their avowed work of reconstruction. Recalling that 
under the Turks there had been a high degree of liberty in education and worship, 
is it strange that large populations are now wishing that the Turks were again in 
control? In some respects, at least, war for the deliverance of Macedonia has 
brought to the people of that country a new set of sufferings and trials. The vice- 
rector of a Real Gymnasium in Salonica, attended and supported by Bulgarians, 
told one of the Commission of his own experience. After twenty years of 
service as director of science in that institution, during which time he had organ- 
ized physical, chemical, and zoological laboratories equal, if not superior, to any 
others in that region, he had been compelled to see his work utterly destroyed. 
Standing in the street a few days before, he had witnessed the systematic looting 
of the entire building by soldiers and others, and the destruction of whatever 
was not carried away. 


A craily journal called The Independent, published in Salonica, in its issue 
of September 4, publishes an interview with Mr. Tsirimocos, the Greek Minister 
of Public Instruction and Culture, in which he sets forth elaborate plans for 
primary and secondary education in Macedonia. No mention, however, is made 
of the schools which have been destroyed and of the hundreds of teachers who 
have been driven away or of his plans for filling their places. 

Reference has already been made to the reflex psychological effect of these 
crimes against justice and humanity. The matter becomes serious when we 
think of it as something which the nations have absorbed into their very life, — a 
sort of virus which, through the ordinary channels of circulation, has infected 
the entire body politic. Here we can focus the whole matter, — the fearful 
economic waste, the untimely death of no small part of the population, a volume 
of terror and pain which can be only partially, at least, conceived and estimated, 
and the collective national consciousness of greater crimes than history has 
recorded. This is a fearful legacy to be left to future generations. If we look 
for palliating causes of these gross lapses from humanity and law, we must find 
them in the extreme youth of these nations, the immaturity of national and civic 
character, as well as in the conditions which have beset them during their long 
period of vassalage. Life was cheap ; nothing was absolutely safe or sure ; 
deeds of injustice and violence were common facts in their daily lives ; and danger 
of some kind or other was generally imminent. Events, however revolting, are 
soon forgotten by the outside world and it is in the inner consciousness of moral 
deterioration and in the loss of self respect that the nations will chiefly suffer. 

There is one other fact, partly economic but distinctly social, which should 
not be overlooked. Including Turks, upward of a million and a half of men 
have been under arms during the past year. For those who have been demo- 
bilized and have returned to their homes and vocations there is little to be said 
in this connection, but to the large contingents which are kept in the service, 
composed mostly of young men, there is a probability of permanent harm. To 
be withdrawn from useful productive labor is bad enough; but life in the bar- 
racks, with much idleness in the streets of cities and large towns, is sure to be 
demoralizing and harmful. The Commission in its wanderings seemed every- 
where to be enveloped by soldiers, who went to increase the number, already 
large, of those who thronged the cafes and places of amusement. War causes 
many kinds of human waste and this is one of them. The life of the recruits 
who are kept in service under present conditions in the Balkan States is unnat- 
ural and not favorable to moral growth. 

The next portion of our inquiry relates to present social conditions in these 
countries and the future prospects for Macedonia. To what extent have Greece, 
Servia, and Bulgaria shown themselves competent to administer their new 
domains? What are the guaranties of their future growth in good government 
and the arts of civilized life? Each nation is working out its destiny under a 


•constitutional government in which the people are duly represented. While there 
is a certain instability caused by the number of political parties, there is the 
free play of popular will and opinion. Undoubtedly the most promising safe- 
guards and the most important means of progress are found in the systems of 
education which the several nations have established. Each has its university, 
technical, secondary and primary schools, and all have taken steps to organize all 
of these forms of special education which are considered essential in modern 
times. Greece, by reason of her longer period of independence, has been able 
to extend and broaden her system and to connect it somewhat with the economic 
interests of the people. For example, she has a good number of agricultural 
schools distributed in her several provinces. Servia has also shown worthy 
attempts to make her schools of social importance through the study of agricul- 
ture and domestic economy. The fact that not more than seventeen per cent of the 
people of Servia can read and write indicates, however, that the system has not 
"been efficiently applied so far as the elements of education are concerned. As 
•one friend of the nation has expressed it, "Education in Servia is strong at the 
top and weak at the bottom.' , 

Bulgaria, in her thirty-four years of independent existence, has made rapid 
progress in organizing an efficient school system. The reduction of illiteracy in 
Bulgaria has proceeded so rapidly during the last ten years that it is possible 
to predict that before many years the people will all substantially be able to read 
and write. Similar results may properly be expected in Greece. Bulgaria is con- 
siderably in advance of her neighbors in the relative number of schools and teach- 
ers provided, in the literacy of both males and females in the entire population, in 
the number of recruits who can read and write, and in the provision for secondary 
education. But the efficiency of school systems can not be judged by statistics 
alone; it is necessary to inquire concerning the results of education as seen in 
the social and economic life of the people. We may properly ask whether edu- 
cation has been effective in improving healthfulness, thrift and good taste as 
seen in the homes; in modernizing commercial and industrial methods; and in 
raising standards of public health and sanitation. 

In the capital cities, especially in Sofia, Athens, and to some extent Belgrade, 
-we see well paved streets, a system of public water, partially constructed sewers, 
and many indications of civic enterprise. The beginnings in these directions are 
found also in some of the large towns; but in the villages, in which dwell the 
majority of the people, there is still a large amount of squalor, dirt, and con- 
tusion, which have been transmitted through the centuries with little change. 
There is too much complacency on the part of officials, too low a standard of 
human comfort and welfare among the masses. This conservatism and back- 
wardness whereby the people cling to the methods of their ancestors, can only 
be overcome by more vigorous methods of social education than have yet been 
applied. Every schoolmaster and every schoolmistress should become a working 
agent for social regeneration, not only in the old sections of these States, but 


especially in the new. They should not only train the children in habits of 
cleanliness, health, and neatness, for which the studies in the official program 
make provision, but they should try to reach sympathetically and helpfully the 
parents as well. They should tactfully suggest better plans for making the 
homes convenient and comfortable, by the use of proper floors, simple but useful 
furniture, better provisions for health and decency, and the planting of grass, 
shrubbery, and trees. They should also encourage a healthy rivalry in these 
and other directions, so that the whole village may become interested in the idea 
of freeing itself from all obnoxious sights and smells, and in keeping its streets 
smooth and clean, so that every citizen may be proud of his home and its 

The relatively low place held by women in the Balkan States, as shown by 
the high rate of illiteracy of females, is emphasized when so large a proportion 
of the peasants are under arms and the hard labor in the fields must be per- 
formed by women, frequently without the aid of animals. Examples of loyalty 
and devotion thus afforded do not compensate for the physical and social loss. 
A people can not rise high in the social scale while women are permitted to 
bear the heaviest burdens and perform the hardest labor. The greatest social 
need in the Balkan States today is the raising of the standard of home life among 
the peasants and the elevation of women by education which is both cultural 
and practical. 

The conditions in Macedonia make it necessary that broad, considerate, and 
helpful administrative methods be applied. Those forms of coercion, intoler- 
ance, and anti-social management, to which reference has been made already, 
give to Greece and Servia a bad name before the world. Nothing short of 
complete, generous provision for education undertaken along social and voca- 
tional lines will make amends for the evil done. The situation is serious and 
far from hopeful ; something more than military force is needed. The Com- 
mission has met several governors, civil and military, in new Greece who, pos- 
sessed of real sympathy, are endeavoring to help a distressed and long defrauded 
people to repair their losses and to enter hopefully upon a new era of security 
and peace. Any attempt to revert to former methods of national propaganda 
through bands of more or less irresponsible adventurers should be discounte- 
nanced and vigorously opposed. Such brigandage is worse than war, for it 
promotes incessant fear and insecurity and renders civilized life impossible. 

In the older civilizations there is a synthesis of moral and social forces 
embodied in laws and institutions giving stability of character, forming public 
sentiment, and making for security. In some notable cases there is the re- 
enforcement of the Church in its teaching of righteousness and charity and in its 
practice of social service. This is largely wanting in the Balkan States. The 
Church does not systematically teach either morals or religion; its bishops and 
priests are the employes of the State and they are the propagandists of nation- 


ality. Conversion with them means a change from one nationality to another, 
whether accomplished by persuasion or force. Religious conviction or faith 
have nothing to do with it. As typical of the methods of conversion employed, 
a Bulgarian teacher from Macedonia reported that one Sunday the Servian 
soldiers surrounded a Bulgarian church. When the worshipers came out at the 
close of the service, a table stood before the door upon which were a paper and a 
revolver. They were to choose between these ; either they were to sign the paper, 
signifying that they thus became Servians, or were to suffer death. They all 
signed. But what a travesty upon the true mission of a church and what a 
perversion of the idea of human government! 

The Commission, from what they have seen and heard, indulge in no opti- 
mism regarding the immediate political future of Macedonia. Servia is now 
at war with Albania, Bulgaria is brooding over what she regards as her unjust 
treatment, and Greece is not yet sure of her tenure in some parts of the new 
territory. None of these nations can reduce their armies to a peace footing, 
for their neighbors are as ready to break treaties as they are to make them. 
Doubtless the greatest menace to the moral and social welfare of the Balkan 
States is the increasing tendency to militarism, whereby they become a prey to 
the agents of the makers of guns and other war material, involving enormous 
expenses and leading to national impoverishment. Where the economic interests 
of a people are mainly along agricultural lines and where scientific farming is 
not largely developed and where most of the people are relatively poor, there 
can be only a moderate annual surplus. If this is required to pay interest on 
the national debt, as well as to provide for the abnormal cost of occasional wars, 
national progress will be retarded and enterprise will be throttled. What the 
Balkan States need today more than anything else is a long period of assured 
peace so that industry and education may have a broader and richer development. 

This suggests a final inquiry concerning the relations of the Balkan States 
to the new world movement for international cooperation and justice. The 
bearing of international law upon the conduct of war and the treatment of 
people and of private property by belligerents has already been discussed. It is 
the larger moral question which is here raised, for upon it depends the future 
destiny of the Balkan peoples. If the treaty of Bucharest had been in accord 
with fair play and justice, or if the question of boundaries could have been 
referred to mediation, there would have been stronger hopes that the interrela- 
tion of the Balkan nations could be improved and strengthened, that through 
cultural exchange, trade, and friendly intercourse these peoples would begin to 
learn what other nations have discovered, viz., that their interests are mutual, 
that in a high human sense they are one, that they injure themselves by trying 
to injure one another. Under present conditions, which this report has fully 
disclosed, the case seems well nigh hopeless ; and yet, in each country, were 
found men and women of rank and education who expressed the most fervent 


wish that hatreds and jealousies might be removed and that good will and co- 
operation might take their place. What then is the duty of the civilized world 
in the Balkans, especially of those nations who, by their location and history, are 
free from international entanglements? It is clear in the first place that they 
should cease to exploit these nations for gain. They should encourage them 
to make arbitration treaties and insist upon their keeping them. They should 
set a good example by seeking a judicial settlement of all international disputes. 
The consequences of the recent war, economic, moral, and social, are dreadful 
enough to justify any honest effort by any person or by any nation to alleviate 
the really distressing situation. 

The recently dedicated Peace Palace at The Hague stands as a witness to 
the new and larger patriotism. As in the long past individuals have brought 
precious gifts to their favorite shrines, so have the nations of the earth from 
the East and West brought to this temple their offerings in varied and beautiful 
forms, thus pledging their belief that through justice peace is to reign upon the 
earth. The Commission has performed as well as it could a serious and trying 
duty. In reporting to the world its findings it has felt obliged to use plain 
words, to make revelations which are at once startling and painful ; but its mem- 
bers feel like appealing to the world for sympathy and aid on behalf of nations 
which have heavy burdens to carry and hard lessons to learn, among which is 
the supreme value of peace and good will. 


Documents Relating to Chapters II, III, and VI 


Documents Relating to Chapter II 


No. i. Evidence of Rahni Effendi, of Strumnitsa. 

The Bulgarian army arrived on Monday, November 4, 1912. With the two Bishops 
and two other notables I went out to negotiate the surrender of our town with the comman- 
dant. On entering the town, the Bulgarians disarmed the Moslem inhabitants, but behaved 
well and did not loot. Next day, a Bulgarian civil authority was established, but the 
Servians had the military control. The Bulgarian army marched on to Doiran; on its 
departure looting and slaughter began. I saw an old man of eighty lying in the street 
with his head split open, and the dead body of a boy of thirteen. About thirty Moslems 
were killed that day in the streets, — I believe by the Bulgarian bands. On Wednesday 
evening, an order was issued that no Moslem might leave his house day or night until 
further notice. A commission was then formed from the Bulgarian notables of the town; 
the Servian military commander presided, and the Bulgarian Civil Governor also sat 
upon it. A local gendarmerie was appointed and a gendarme and a soldier were told off 
to go round from house to house, summoning the Moslems, one by one, to attend the 
commission. I was summoned myself with the rest. 

The procedure was as follows : The Servian commandant would inquire, "What kind 
of a man is this?" The answer was simply either "good" or "bad." No inquiry was made 
into our characters ; there was no defense and no discussion ; if one member of the 
commission said "bad," that sufficed to condemn the prisoner. Each member of the com- 
mission had his own enemies whom he wished to destroy, and therefore did not oppose 
the wishes of his fellow members. When sentence was pronounced the prisoner was 
stripped of his outer clothes and bound, and his money was taken by the Servian com- 
mander. I was pronounced "good," and so perhaps were one-tenth of the prisoners. 
Those sentenced were bound together by threes, and taken to the slaughter house; their 
ears and noses were often cut off before they were killed. This slaughter went on for 
a month; I believe that from three to four thousand Moslems were killed in the town 
and the neighboring villages. 

Note. — At this point the conversation became general and the four notables from 
Strumnitsa each related how he had lost a son, a grandson, or a brother in this massacre. 

No. 2. Abdul Kerin Aga, of Strumnitsa, confirmed the statements of the previous 
witness. His own son was brought bound to the gate at his house ; he then went to Toma, 
the chief of the Bulgarian bands, and tried to bargain with him for his son's life. Toma 
demanded a hundred pounds; he had previously paid on two different occasions £50 

Note. — x The reader will note here and there in the appendices faulty phraseology, which 
has not been translated into good English. These documents reproduce testimony given by 
soldiers, peasants and uneducated people, and the Commission has endeavored to preserve 
the original wording in all such cases. 


and £70 to save this same son. He told Toma that he had not the money ready, but 
would try to sell a shop if the Bulgarians would wait until evening. Toma refused to 
wait and his son was shot. 

No. 3. Hadji Suleiman Effendi, of Strumnitsa, agreed with the account which Rahnr 
Effendi had given of the doings of the commission. The Servian troops left the town 
and Bulgarians replaced them, and remained up to the outbreak of the second war. On 
the whole they behaved fairly well. There was, however, some looting when they evacuated 
the town after their defeats in the second war; and about thirty people were then killed,, 
including the Greek priest. The Greek army then occupied the town. They subsequently 
gave the order that the Moslems must abandon the town; and added that they, the 
Greeks, would burn the houses if the Moslems would not. I myself offered £3 to the 
Greek patrol which came to burn down my house. The sergeant refused to take it, and 
said that if he did not burn the house another patrol would. The buildings were all 
systematically burnt, and the same thing was done in about thirty-two neighboring villages. 
"We [pointing to the others who were present] were all large farmers, employing, each of us,, 
nearly 300 laborers and tenants; now we have nothing." (See also No. 65.) 

No. 4. The Carnegie Commission visited the camp of the Moslem refugees outside 
Salonica and talked with two groups of them who came from villages near Strumnitsa. The 
Greeks told them that the Bulgarians would certainly massacre them if they stayed in the 
town; they urged, and pressed and persuaded. Most left under pressure. A few remained,, 
and these were forced to leave. They heard that other villages had been burnt after they 
left, and some of them actually saw their villages in flames. They had received no rations 
from the Greeks for four days; they had no plans for the future, did not wish to go to 
Asia, nor yet to settle in Greek territory. They saw "no good in front of them at all." 

A group of these refugees from the village Yedna-Kuk, near Strumnitsa, gave their 
experiences during the first war. The Bulgarian bands arrived before the regular army, 
and ordered the whole male population to assemble in the mosque. They were shut in 
and robbed of £300 in all. Eighteen of the wealthier villagers were bound and taken to 
Bossilovo, where they were killed and buried. The villagers were able to remember nine 
of their names. 

No. 5. The officials of the Comite Islamique, of Salonica, informed us on September I 
that there were 135,000 Mohammedan refugees in and around the town, most of whom had 
arrived since the second war. Of these, six or eight thousand had already gone to Asia 
Minor, chiefly to Mersina, Adalia, and Skenderoun. The Greek government had promised 
to supply five steamers, and in the last few days 3,000 had received tickets. The com- 
mittee reminded the Greek government that it was responsible for the refugees now in 
Salonica, since it had obliged them to quit their homes. It has requested the government 
to supply these refugees with bread. The committee was then spending £50 daily on bread. 
In reply to questions, the committee did not believe that any considerable number of the 
Moslem refugees would be given lands in Greek Macedonia. Some perhaps might be 
given at Kukush, but not more than one or two thousand people could be absorbed as farm 

No. 6. Early Events at Kukush, in the autumn of 1912. 

The Catholic priest Gustave Michel, superior of the mission at Kukush, gave the fol- 
lowing information to the correspondent of Le Temps (July 10). He could testify to cer- 
tain massacres perpetrated by the Bulgarian bands at Kurkut. A Bulgarian band led by 
Donchev shut all the men of the place in the mosque, and gathered the women round it, 

Appendices 279 

in order to oblige them to witness the spectacle. The comitadjis then threw three bombs 
at the mosque but it was not blown up; they then set fire to it, and all who were shut 
up in it, to the number of about 700 men, were burnt alive. Those who attempted to flee 
were shot down by comitadjis posted round the mosque, and Pere Michel found human 
heads, arms, and legs lying about half burned in the streets. At Planitsa, Donchev's band 
committed still worse atrocities. It first drove all the men to the mosque and burnt them 
alive; it then gathered the women and burnt them in their turn in the public square. At 
Rayonovo a number of men and women were massacred; the Bulgarians filled a well with 
their corpses. At Kukush the Moslems were massacred by the Bulgarian population of the 
town and their mosque destroyed. All the Turkish soldiers who fled without arms and 
arrived in groups from Salonica were massacred. 

Note. — The Commission failed to meet Father Michel, and must leave to the corre- 
spondent of Le Temps the responsibility for his statement. 

No. 7. Ali Riza Effendi, of Kukush, states that the Bulgarian bands entered Kukush 
on October 30, after the Turks had left. Toma of Istip, their leader, installed himself as 
governor, and told the people to have no fear. Both Servian and Bulgarian detachments 
passed through the town, but only a very few soldiers were left there while the main army 
went on to Salonica. After the occupation of Salonica, disarmed Turkish soldiers in groups 
of two to three hundred at a time marched through Kukush on their way to their homes. 
They were captured by the Bulgarian bands and slaughtered, to the number of perhaps 
2,000. A commission of thirty to forty Christians was established, which drew up lists of 
all the Moslem inhabitants throughout the district. Everyone was summoned to the 
mosque and there informed that he had been rated to pay a certain sum. Whole villages, 
were made responsible for the total amount; most of the men were imprisoned and were 
obliged to sell everything they possessed, including their wives' ornaments, in order to 
pay the ransom. They were often killed in spite of the payment of the money in full; 
he, himself, actually saw a Bulgarian comitadji cut off two fingers of a man's hand and 
force him to drink his own blood mixed with raki. From the whole county (Caza) of 
Kukush £T1,500 were taken. The chief of bands, Donchev, arrived and matters were still 
worse. He burnt three Turkish villages in one day, Raianovo, Planitsa and Kukurtovo — 
345 houses in all. He shut up the men in the mosques and burnt them alive; the women 
were shut up in barns and ill used; children were actually flung against the walls and 
killed. This the witness did not see, but heard from his Christian neighbors. Only twenty- 
two Moslem families out of 300 remained in Kukush; the rest fled to Salonica. Twelve 
small Moslem villages were wiped out in the first war, the men killed and the women 
taken away. He was in Kukush when the Greeks entered it. The Bulgarians in leaving 
the town burnt nothing but the bakers' ovens. The Greeks systematically and deliberately 
plundered and burnt the town. He believes that many aged Bulgarian inhabitants were 
burnt alive in their houses. He himself found refuge in the Catholic orphanage. 

No. 8. Report Signed by Youssouf Effendi, President of the Moslem Community 
of Serres, and sealed with its seal. 

On November 6, 1912, the inhabitants of Serres, sent a deputation to meet the Bui- 
garian army and surrender the town. Next day Zancov, a Bulgarian Chief of bands, 
appeared in the town with sixteen men, and began to disarm the population. A day later 
the Bulgarian army entered Serres and received a warm welcome. That evening the Bul- 
garian soldiers, on the, pretext that arms were still hidden in the houses of the Moslems, 
entered them and began to steal money and other valuables. Next day the Moslem refugees 
from the district north of Serres were invited to appear at the prefecture; they obeyed 
the summons ; but on their arrival a trumpet sounded and the Bulgarian soldiers seized 


their arms and began to massacre these inoffensive people; the massacre lasted three hours 
and resulted in the death of 600 Moslems. The number of the victims would have been 
incalculable had it not been for the energetic intervention of the Greek bishop, and of 
the director of the Orient bank. 

The Moslems of the town were then arrested in the cafes, houses and streets, and 
imprisoned, some at the prefecture and others in the mosques; many of the former were 
slaughtered with bayonets. Bulgarian soldiers in the meantime entered Turkish houses, 
violated the women and girls and stole everything they could lay their hands on. The 
Moslems imprisoned in the overcrowded mosques were left without food for two days 
and nights and then released. For six days rifle shots were heard on all sides; the 
Moslems were afraid to leave their houses; and of this the Bulgarian soldiers took advan- 
tage to pillage their shops. Moslem corpses lay about in the streets and were buried 
only when they began to putrify. For several days the Bulgarian soldiers destroyed houses 
and mosques in order to obtain firewood. The corn and animals of the Moslems were 
seized by the Bulgarian authorities without any receipt or note of requisition. Com- 
plaints made on this subject were ignored. The furniture and antiquities belonging to the 
schools, mosques and hospitals were taken and sent to Sofia. The Bulgarians subjected 
several Moslem notables to all sorts of humiliations; they were driven with whips to 
sweep the streets and stables; and many a blow was given to those who dared to wear a 
fez. In a word, during the Bulgarian occupation the Moslems were robbed and maltreated 
both in the streets and at the prefecture, unless they had happened to give board and 
lodging to some Bulgarian officer. The Bulgarian officers and gendarmes before leaving 
Serres took everything that was left in the shops of Moslems, Jews and Greeks, and 
pitilessly burnt a large number of houses, shops, cafes, and mills. 

September 5, 1913. 

No. o. Lieutenant R. Wadham Fisher [an English Volunteer in the Fifth Bat- 
talion of the Macedonian Legion]. 

Lieutenant Fisher explained the circumstances of the massacre which occurred at 
Dede-Agatch. "A sharp fight took place outside the town between the legion and the 
army of Javer Pacha; wherever the Turkish villages showed the white flag, our troops 
were forbidden to march through them. Our men had been much inflamed by reports of 
outrages committed by Turks on Bulgarians near Gumurjina. We entered Dede-Agatch under 
fire towards 9 p.m. after marching and fighting all day. Javer Pacha insisted on withdraw- 
ing into the town and we were obliged to pursue him. Bullets were still whistling through 
the streets, but the local Greeks came out to show us where the Turkish soldiers were 
posted. The Greeks feared a massacre and regarded our coming as their salvation. I saw 
something of the search for arms; no one was harmed. At 11 p.m. we received an order 
to withdraw from the town, and to march to a village twenty-five kilometers away. Some 
150 men were left in the town, either because the order did not reach them or because they 
were too exhausted to obey it. No officer was among them, and they were organized by a 
private soldier, Stefan Boichev, a contractor of Widin. The Greek bishop afterwards 
stated that Stefan Boichev had done good service in reestablishing order. On November 
19 the lower class Greeks and the soldiers began to pillage the town together. A certain 
number of the local Turks were undoubtedly killed. These excesses must be explained by 
the absence of any officers. 

No. io. Boris Monchev, Bulgarian Mayor of Dede-Agatch. 

This witness confirmed Lieutenant Fisher's account, believed that not more than twenty 
Turks were killed in the massacre, and insisted that the local Armenian porters (hernials) 
had taken the chief part in the disturbances. There were in the town fully 8,000 Turkish 


refugees, of whom all the men were armed and had taken part in the fight outside the 
town, from 7 to 9 p.m. After the first disastrous night, everything was done to maintain 
order by a commission which included the Greek bishop and himself. The 142 Macedonian 
volunteers obeyed their orders. The Bulgarian army returned to the town six days later, 
November 25, and order was fully restored. 

The notorious incident of the killing of Riza-bey, the Imperial Turkish Commissioner 
of the Junction railway line, is to be explained by the fact that as he was being taken 
under arrest to the school he attempted to snatch a rifle from a Macedonian volunteer, 
and was killed by the volunteers on the spot. 

In the course of a search on the eve of the second war twenty-seven Gras rifles and 
letters used for signalling were found in Greek houses; also a store of rifles at the bishop's 
palace. In consequence of this, fifty leading Greeks were arrested as hostages for the 
good behavicr of the town, and sent to Bulgaria. It is probable that some of these were 
liberated after paying bribes. The town was without a regular government from July 
22, and much robbery took place; but he had previously taken the precaution of sending 
the Armenian hamals, who were always a troublesome element, out of the town. 

No. ii. Vasil Smilev, a Bulgarian Teacher at Uskub. 

He stated that on the entry of the Servian army into Uskub, efforts were made by 
the Servian authorities to persuade all the Bulgarian teachers to join the bands which they 
were forming in order to pursue the Turkish bands. He served for twenty or thirty days, 
but left the band because it was continually engaged in burning, torturing and killing. He 
witnessed the slaughter of eighteen Turks who had been collected in the Bulgarian school 
of the Tchair quarter of the town. They were killed in the open and their bodies thrown 
into a well near the brickworks. This happened about 9 p.m., four days after the festival 
of Saint Paraskeva. He named four of them. Later he witnessed the Servian chief of 
police, Lazar Ilyts, who had been responsible for this massacre, superintending the pillage 
of the village Butel. Near this village he met a number of Albanian villagers fleeing from 
their village. A Servian major unveiled and kissed a young girl among them. Her father 
killed him on the spot. Thereupon the Servian band massacred the whole body of fugitives, 
men and women, to the number of sixty. This he witnessed personally and reported it at 
the time to the Russian consulate. After this he refused to have anything further to do 
with the Servian bands. He was expelled afterwards from Uskub with the other Bul- 
garian teachers. 

No. 12. A Moslem Notable of Yailadjik (name suppressed), a village one and a half 
hours' distant from Salonica, states — On Nov. 7, 1912, most of us fled to Salonica, leaving 
about twenty-five men in the village. On the 8th the Bulgarian soldiers came and did no 
harm, except to take the food and forage they required. They passed on after spending a 
<iay and a night, and two days later the Greek soldiers came, together with people from the 
neighboring Greek villages. They killed fifteen Moslems, and took all the furniture, 9,500 
sheep and goats, 1,500 cattle, and all the grain which they could find, and then burned the 
250 houses of the village. 

No. 13. Bulgarian Courts-Martial. 

On January 10, 1913, the headquarters of the Bulgarian army issued the following tele- 
graphic order (No. 2360) to the commanders and military governors of Thrace and Mace- 
donia : 

Following on the secret order of December 13, I order and hold you personally 
responsible for the execution of my order that inquiries be instituted into all excesses, 


robberies, and violations, which may have been committed against the inhabitants of 
the enemy's country occupied by the troops under your orders. We came to liber- 
ate these countries in the name of freedom and order, and the commander-in-chief 
can not remain indifferent towards the criminal acts of individuals, since otherwise 
we should lead the world to suppose that our civilization is in no respect superior 
to that of our adversaries, and the honor of the Bulgarian army would thereby be 
compromised. This would result in causing unforeseen difficulties to our country. 
The Bulgarian army must prove to the eyes of the whole world that now, as always, 
justice and legality are supreme within its ranks and that criminals do not go un- 
punished. Report immediately on the subject of the crimes which you have ascer- 
tained to have taken place and the measures you have adopted. 

On February 15, 1913, the Supreme Military Tribunal transmitted to the President of 
the courts-martial the following order: 

(No. 989). Report immediately the number of persons condemned up to the 
present moment for various crimes, and especially murders, violations, and pillage 
committed against the local population, whatever its nationality, and particularly 
the Turkish population. * * * The essential interests of this State demand that 
cases of this kind should be dealt with with the utmost despatch and should be given 
preference over all others. The military courts must enable the government to show 
the civilized world that the crimes committed in the course of the war of liberation 
have not gone unpunished. 

No. 13a. A report drawn up by the Moslem community of Pravishta, on the atroci- 
ties committed in that town and the neighboring villages since the withdrawal of the Turk- 
ish authorities on October 24, 1913. 

[Note. — The names of all of the killed (195 in all) and of some of those robbed, and 
also those of the aggressors, are fully given in the original Turkish document, but are 
omitted in the following summarized translation]. 

Village of Giran. — Twenty-one Moslems killed by the Greeks of the village of Nikchan, 
and a sum of about £T3,000 stolen. Six hundred goats were also stolen for the benefit 
of the Greek church at Nikchan and 2,400 goats taken by the Greeks of Djerbelan. 

Village of Palihor. — Six Moslems killed by the band commanded by Demosthenes, head- 
master of the Greek school of Palihor, pillage to the extent of about £T3,000. One woman 
(named) was violated by Demosthenes and another. 

Village of Micheli. — Demosthenes and other Greeks pillaged the village, carried off 
many oxen and much corn and stole credit notes for a sum of £T3,000. 

Village of Drama. — Two Moslems killed by Greeks of Pravishta. 

Village of Osmanli. — Six Moslems killed by Greeks of Holo; about £T1,500 stolen. 

Village of Samalcol. — 'Twenty-one Moslems of this village were taken by Miltiades Ma- 
chopoulos of the band of Myriacos Mihail to the ravine of Casroub, where they were 
massacred by the Greek bandit Leonidas and others. Over £T1,500 were stolen from them; 
a shop looted of stock worth £T1,500, and about £T7,000 stolen in the village generally. 

Village of Tchanahli. — Two Moslems killed by Greeks of Holo; 200 sheep and a mule 

Village of Mouchtian. — Twenty-five Moslems killed by Myriacos Mihail, his band and 
some local Greeks in the ravine of Casroub. "In the twentieth century of progress, thfe 
skeletons which may still be seen in this ravine, present to the eyes of Justice a monument 
capable of enlightening her regarding Hellenic civilization." About £T3,000 stolen. 

Village of Dranich. — £T2,000 in money, seven goats and 1,000 sheep stolen by the Greeks 
of Palihor and Nikchan. 

Village of Ahadler. — Nine Moslems killed by Greeks of Casroub, and sums amounting 
to £T258 stolen. 


Village of Tchiflik. — Ten Moslems killed by the same Greeks of Casroub, and about 
£T1,000 stolen. 

Village of Pethor. — Fourteen Moslems killed by the grocer Myriacos Mihail, member of 
the bishop's council, Panahi, priest of Boblan, and Miltiades Machopoulos. [The band led 
by these three men is frequently mentioned.] Local Greeks stole about £T1,500. 

Village of Rehemli. — Three Moslems killed by Greeks of Holo. 

Village of Sarili. — Five Moslems killed by Greeks of Pethor, and about 1,000 sheep 
and goats stolen. 

Village of Dedebal. — Eight Moslems killed by Myriacos Mihail and his band; about 
£T1,000 stolen. 

Village of Deranli — Three Moslems killed by Myriacos Mihail and his band; about 
iT3,000 stolen. 

Village of Orphan o. — Three Moslems killed by the Greeks. One of these was seized by 
the priest Panahi on a telephonic order from the Greek bishop of Pravishta and killed at 
Essirli. The bishop had had the telephone removed from the Turkish governor's office to 
his own house, and by this means he gave orders to the whole district. 

Village of Boblan. — Eight Moslems killed by Myriacos Mihail and his band, specially 
sent for the purpose by the bishop; about £T800 stolen. 

Village of Carpan. — Four Moslems killed by the band of Myriacos Mihail sent by 
the bishop. The Greeks of Carpan stole all the goods and corn belonging to the local Mos- 
lems, and did not leave them even the grain which they had in their household jars. The 
Greek bravoes brutally robbed the women of their ear-rings. Later Greek soldiers joined 
the villagers and began to violate the young women, until they were obliged to take refuge 
In the towns and villages held by Bulgarian troops. About £T500 was stolen in this village. 

Village of Left era. — Four Moslems killed by Greeks. The wife of Arnaut Agouchagha, 
who voluntarily embraced Islam fifty years ago, was taken to Pravishta to be reconverted 
to Christianity. She told the Bulgarian chief, Baptchev, that she did not consent to this 
conversion. Baptchev had her released, but on her return to the village she was 
"'odiously lynched by Greek savages." Baptchev took £T500 from a Turk at the instigation 
of the Greek priests of the monastery of Nozle, who also robbed the villagers of about 
2,000 sheep. 

Village of Kochkar. — Two Moslems killed by Greeks of Drazeni and about £T1,000 

Village of Kale Tchfflik. — Five Moslems killed, and all the cattle seized by the priests 
of Nozle. 

Village of Devekeran. — Four Moslems killed by Greeks of Pravishta; about £T500 

Village of Essirli. — Nineteen Moslems killed in the ravine of Casroub by Greeks of that 
village. About £T1,500 stolen. 

Village of Kotchan. — One Moslem killed to satisfy the vengeance of the bishop and of 
the priest Nicholas. ""It is worthy of remark that many Imams figure among the list of 
victims in the district of Pravishta * * * further that the victims are almost always 
men known for their enlightenment. * * * The reason why the assassins killed Imams 
and the most enlightened notables for choice is obvious when one reflects that there are 
13,000 Moslems in this district out of a total population of 20,000." 

Town of Pravishta. — Ten Moslems were killed, including one woman, while the town 
was held by Bulgarian bands, under the command of a chief named Baptchev, who estab- 
lished himself in the governor's palace and acted as governor and commandant. They were 
killed by three Greeks (named) and the Bulgarians. On the evening when an assassination 
was to take place, the students of the Greek school assembled in the courtyard of the govern- 
ment house and sang the Greek national anthem. 


The Greek bishop formed a municipal council composed of the priest Nicholas, the 
grocer Myriacos Mihail, and others (named). The sentence of death was passed by this 
council, approved by the archbishop, and communicated to Baptchev to be carried out. 
Similar councils were formed in the villages which took their orders from that of Pra- 
vishta. The Bulgarian chief Baptchev served as the tool of the Greek bishop and notables. 
In this town the Moslem population has incurred a loss of about £T3,000, stolen by the 
Bulgarian bands, guided by the Greeks. 

The daughter of the commander of the gendarmeries, Suleiman Effendi, who is now 
in Constantinople, was summoned one night to the bishopric to be converted to Christianity. 
The bishop threatened her, in order to convert her, but the Bulgarian chief Baptchev, when 
he heard of this, went to the bishopric, saved the girl, restored her to her family, and thus 
prevented her conversion. Some days later he gave her a passport to go to Constantinople. 

Thanks to the orders issued by Baptchev the mosques of the town and the villages were 
preserved intact, and no one was molested on account of his religion. 

Neither the Bulgarian officers, nor their soldiers nor even the members of the bands 
committed any violence against women, but Baptchev took money to the value of about 

The priest Panahi of the village of Nikchan and the Greek antiquarian Apostol, of the 
village of Palihor, who disapproved of the unworthy conduct of the bishop, were killed 
by his orders. The Bulgarian authorities after a careful inquiry were convinced of the 
bishop's guilt. The bodies of the victims of the town of Pravishta are still in the ravine of 
Cainardja, at the place called Kavala Bachi. 

We certify that this report is in complete agreement with the registers of the Moslem 
community of Pravishta and true in all its details. 

[Seal.] Moslem Community of the Caza of Pravishta, 1331. 

Documents Relating to Chapter II 

A. The Doxato Affair 

No. 14. Evidence of Commander Cardale, R. N. (Reprinted from the Nation of 
August 23, 1913). 

My Dear Cassavetti, — I received your wire yesterday, and have taken twenty-four hours 
to consider my reply. You see my reports of what I saw at Doxato have been so garbled by 
reporters and others that I am naturally rather chary of saying anything: not that this 
applies in your case, of course. Also, as you may well imagine, the horrors of that place 
of blood have so got on my nerves that I hate to speak of them. Still, as you ask me, I 
will tell you all I saw, and you have my full permission to make use of all, or any portion, 
of this letter you may think fit for the purpose of publication. 

I went to Kavala immediately after the Bulgarians vacated the place; my duties there 
I need not go into. I was acting under the orders of the Greek government, which, as you 
know, I am serving at present. On my arrival there I heard many stories of the horrible 
occurrences at Doxato, and it was alleged that practically all the inhabitants had been massa- 
cred by the Bulgarian troops passing through on their retreat. You will probably understand 
that having had a surfeit of these yarns, and knowing that war is not fought in kid gloves, 
1 did not believe all I heard, and at first believed that it was purely a question of the burning 
of the town by retreating Bulgarians enraged by their reverses, and perhaps a few regrettable 
incidents where noncombatants had been killed in the excitement of a retreat. However, 
after seeing wounded and mutilated persons being brought into Kavala from Doxato day by 
day, and hearing detailed accounts from disinterested persons in Kavala of all nationalities, 
I determined to go to Doxato to see for myself what had occurred. I accordingly took 
a carriage and drove there, accompanied by a Greek naval officer, a Greek gentleman of 
Kavala, and my Greek angeliophores. The distance is about seventeen miles. I have not 
measured it on the map, as I have none with me at present, but I estimate it at that. It 
took us about three and one-half hours to drive. The Bulgarians must have left Kavala 
in a hurry, as they did not even strike their tents, which we found standing some miles out- 
side on the Phillipi road. 

At each village we passed through on our way to Doxato we found some of the 
wretched survivors of the Doxato massacre, who were homeless, but did not wish to return 
to their ruined homes there after all they had suffered. Arriving at Doxato we found 
it like a town of the dead, everything burned and devastated, and such an odor of blood 
and decomposed bodies as I never hope to encounter again. Indeed, five minutes before 
we entered the town, while driving through the plain, the stench was insupportable. In this 
plain were heaps of corpses thinly covered with sand, where the survivors had tried, for 
sanitary reasons, to cover up their dead, but they were all too few to do so thoroughly, and 
for all practical purposes the bodies were unburied. On entering Doxato we found a few 
persons who were still living among the ruins of their former homes, and from them we 
endeavored to get an account of what had occurred. Practically all the Greek portion of 


the town was burned, and one saw everywhere in the streets charred remains of what had 
been human bodies. Burial in the town had been impossible, so they had covered the bodies 
with petroleum and disposed of them in that way. 

In some of the gardens and courtyards we saw children's graves, each with a few wild 
flowers on them, but they do not appear to have buried any except the children. Poor 
souls ! after the horror of it all, one wonders how they buried anyone. The Turkish quarter 
was, with a few exceptions, unburned. According to the accounts of the survivors, it was 
there that the greater part of the massacres took place. I saw many rooms where the floors 
were soaked with blood, and rugs, mats, and cushions were covered with blood and human 
remains. The very stones in the courtyards of these houses were stained with blood; it is 
said that most of those who were killed in these yards were stoned to death. The survivors 
showed us one house surrounded by a high wall enclosing a courtyard and vineyard where 
a number of Greeks were put to death, and certainly the place was marked with blood- 
stains everywhere in the yard and garden; hoes and other agricultural implements stained 
with blood we found there also, and the steps leading into an outhouse were covered with 
blood, where the survivors state children were overtaken and killed. I was informed, apro- 
pos of this courtyard, that the house and environs were the property of a Turk, who, on 
hearing of the possibility of a massacre, had sent round to the Greeks of Doxato to offer 
a sanctuary to their women and children, and that after upwards of 120 were assembled 
there, he and several of his compatriots, under the direction of a Bulgarian officer, had 
butchered them all ! This, of course, is simply what I was told by the survivors. I can only 
say from my own personal observation that the place was like a shambles, and, whoever did 
the deed, there must have been a very considerable number killed in this place. In fact, the 
vineyard, courtyard, and the house leading out of them reminded me forcibly of the stories 
one has read of the Cawnpore massacres. One hears of places reeking with blood; with- 
out wishing to be sensational, this little town did literally do so. They told us that Bulga- 
rian cavalry riding into the place cut down some of the inhabitants, and that the infantry, 
following soon after, killed all they found in the streets, but that after that the greater part 
of the massacres were carried out by the Turkish inhabitants incited by the Bulgarian offi- 
cers. How far this is true I can not say, not having been there at the time to see for my- 
self, but certainly it is significant that the Turkish quarter was not burned, that very few 
Turks seem to have been killed, and that all the original Turkish inhabitants have fled, 
while their houses are intact but bloodstained, and bearing the evidence of unspeakable atro- 
cities. I might, perhaps, give you more details of the evidence of atrocities 
which took place, but there are some things one can not bring oneself to speak about. 
I have been asked to estimate the number who were killed at Doxato. It is quite impossible 
to do so, as many who are supposed to have been killed have, I understand, since been 
found, having escaped at the time the massacres took place. By counting the bodies I saw, 
and the heaps of charred remains and the evidences of massacres in the gardens and court- 
yards, I estimated that the number killed was not less than 600, and that the greater number 
of these were women and children : how many more than this number there may have been 
it is impossible to say. — With kindest regards, believe me, yours very sincerely, 

Hubert Cardale. 

Hotel Imperial, Athens, 
August 4, 1913. 

No. 15. Evidence of Captain Sofroniev, of the King's Guard. 

"I commanded two squadrons of the Macedonian cavalry, a regular body of troops, 
consisting largely of reservists. On July 10, while stationed at Otoligos, about 20 kilometres 
from Doxato, I sent out scouts. They reported that the last detachment of our troops re- 
tiring from Kavala had been fired upon by the villagers of Doxato, some of whom wore 


:the 'Greek uniform. They killed many of our men and looted the convoy. The horse-cars 

-escaped, but those drawn by oxen were captured. I sent Sub-Lieutenant Pissarov with 
thirty troopers to report on what was happening at Doxato and to reestablish order. My 
first scout then returned from a second expedition, and reported that he had encountered 
a large force of Greek insurgents marching from Kavala, and that he had learnt from 
Turks that they were under Greek officers. They had killed all the Bulgarian and Turkish 
villagers whom they captured on the way. He saw beheaded children and women whose 
bodies had been ripped open. There was a general panic among all the population of the 
country side. (We saw the original penciled note of this scout's report). Lieutenant Pissa- 
rov reported that Greek troops were quartered near the ruins of the bridge at Alexandra. 
The Greeks were killing without pity men, women and children. Doxato was strongly 

■ occupied and two Greek battalions with mountain guns were marching up from Valtchista. 
He had assisted the local Bulgarian and Turkish population to flee. [We saw the original 
text of this report.] I then reported to the commander of my division, General Delov; 
he ordered me to go at once to Doxato to make those responsible prisoners, and to re- 
store order. I started on the night of July 13, but lost my way in the dark and found 
myself at dawn between Doiran and Doxato. I had with me two mounted squadrons of 
about 250 men. The enemy opened fire at once and three scouts whom I sent to reconnoitre 
their position were killed. The heaviest fire came from the edge of the village Doxato. 
The plain was black with people looking for cover. I sent one squadron towards Doxato, 
and the other, under my own command, advanced toward Doiran. Firing continued for 
about two hours, seventeen of my squadron were killed and twenty- four wounded. We 
eventually charged with the sabre. The enemy, who were all armed, kept their ranks and 
awaited our onset. At least 150 of them were killed in the charge, possibly as many as 
300. Many surrendered. I then heard that the Greek column from Valtchista was march- 
ing to Alistrati. I therefore decided to withdraw and hurried to join the column of Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Barnev. I left the Turks, who had hurried up from neighboring villages, 
to guard my prisoners, and told them to disarm the people of Doxato, and to keep order. 
They armed themselves with rifles and cartridges, chiefly Martinis and Gras, taken from the 

! Greek dead. We had had no earlier dealings with these Turks, but they always helped our 
scouts with news. Next day, July 14, we fought a battle to allow the peasant fugitives 
to reach the mountains. The fleeing Turks from Doxato told us that the Greeks had 
killed all the Bulgarians and Turks whom they found in Doxato. I asked them why they 
did not flee in time. They replied, "Because we were giving ourselves up to rapine and 
vengeance." My scouts reported this day that a terrible thing had happened in Doxato. 
The Turks began to massacre and then the Greeks came and massacred the Turks; the 
fields were covered with bodies. Next day, July 15, the Greeks destroyed the purely Bul- 
garian village of Guredjik. The villagers were unable to flee, and were massacred almost 
to a man; three or four escaped and gave me the news." 

In reply to questions the Captain stated, that he was not himself actually inside the 

'town of Doxato. Probably some of the infantry may have gone there, but of this he can not 
speak with certainty; he can give his word of honor as an officer that the men of his two 

rS,quadrons killed no peaceful citizens. 

From a written deposition by Captain Sofroniev, we take the following passage: 

On returning to the neighborhood of Doxato [from attacking the distant body 
of insurgents] towards 2.30 p.m. we saw the Turks who had previously fled, and 
were now returning to the village in a state of savage excitement. [Exaltation 
Jorouche.] As we had no time to spare, we told them to gather the rifles scattered 
about. At the same moment we saw the village take fire. I do not know who 
caused that. 


No. 16. Evidence of Mr. Givko Dobrev, Civil Governor of the Drama District. 

The population of the Drama district totaled 18,000, of whom 13,000 were Moslems,, 
and of these latter 3,000 were pomaks and the remainder Turks. Doxato, with two- 
neighboring villages formed a Greek oasis in a compact mass of Turks, with whom it was 
always in conflict. It thus naturally became the center of the Greek insurgent movement. 
During the first war, in the latter half of October, the Greeks, acting as allies under the 
shelter of our troops, began to take their private revenge upon the Turks, killing, looting 
and • violating. The administration had been organized from among the local notables, 
chiefly Greeks, more especially the Bishop, who knew of all these atrocities. The appetite 
for robbery grew, and the Greeks began to enforce declarations from the Turks assigning 
their lands. The Bulgarian government accordingly, with a view of protecting the Turks, 
published a general edict declaring all contracts regarding land made during the period of 
the war invalid. I reached Drama on December 3, though the place had been taken on 
November 5. I was too late to prevent much injustice to the Turks, but I returned their 
mosques to them in spite of the protests of the Greeks, and helped them to get back some 
part of their stolen goods. 

On July 8, the Bulgarian officials left Kavala, and the place remained for a week with- 
out regular government. A reconnaissance was sent on July 10, to learn what was happen- 
ing in Kavala; and in the course of it one trooper was killed and one wounded at Doxato. 
A larger party was sent out on the 11th, numbering about thirty men, and this also was 
fired upon from Doxato. On the night of July 11, a larger party, composed of two squad- 
rons of cavalry, two companies of infantry, and four guns. [Note. — There is here a dis- 
crepancy of one day in the dates given by Captain Sofroniev and Mr. Dobrev; the 
dates of the former are accurate]. There was now a regular insurrection in Doxato, which 
aimed at cutting off Drama from the shore. The cavalry surrounded Doxato. The infan- 
try were received with a volley, whereupon the commander threatened to use artillery and 
thrice demanded the surrender of the town. When the artillery began to fire, five to six 
hundred armed men, and all the local population took to flight. Our cavalry pursued them. 
The village was set on fire by our shells, and an enormous explosion took place, as if a 
depot of ammunition had been set on fire. The explosion continued intermittently for 
quite an hour. The Bulgarian infantry was composed largely of Moslems, from the Bul- 
garian kingdom. It became excited during the explosion of the magazine and began killing- 
indiscriminately. It is possible that children were killed. I arrived on the afternoon of 
July 12 [13?] and found that the local Turks were going about from house to house, rob- 
bing. I saw one house with its door half open, and a woman killed inside. The house was 
pillaged, I saw a Turk standing on a ladder in the act of pouring petroleum from a 
tin over the house in order to set it on fire. I ordered him to stop, but others began to do 
the same thing in other parts of the town. I again visited Doxato at 2 p.m. next day, July 
13 [14?]. The houses were still burning and most of the people had fled to the neighboring 
village of Tchataldja. The rest ran to meet me. There were women among them, of whom 
one had been wounded by a trooper's saber. I took her to Mr. Lavalette's farm to be cured. 
Everything was quiet in Tchataldja. Its mayor and notables had asked me on the previous 
day to send soldiers to their village, since the insurgents of Doxato were trying to induce 
them to join in their rising, and were threatening them. I sent sixty men. Later, I sent 
police, on July 14 [15?] to bury the corpses at Doxato. They counted 300 killed. While- 
this was going on the Greek army arrived, marching not from Kavala but from Ziliahovo-.. 
Some of my policemen were killed by the Greek population. 

No. i6a. Deposition (Communicated) of Mr. Milev, Sub-Lieutenant of Reserves, for- 
merly Mayor of Philippopolis and Prefect of Stara-Zagora, who Commanded a Detach- 
ment of Infantry at Doxato. 

On the morning of July 13, a detachment comprised of cavalry, infantry and artillery 


marched from Drama toward Kavala in order to watch the movements of the andartes. 
At a distance of one kilometer from Doxato, we were received with rifle shots. This fu- 
sillade became hotter as we approached the village. Parliamentaries were sent in advance,, 
but the Greeks refused to receive them and went on firing. Then the infantry formed in 
line of battle and continued its march, but without firing. At 500 paces from the village 
the order was given to answer the Greek fire, and to aim specially at the school, which was 
the headquarters of the andartes, and over which the Greek flag was flying. The firing con- 
tinued for two hours, after which the andartes left the school, set fire to it, and fled towards 
Kavala. When the infantry entered Doxato, it realized that not all the andartes had left 
the village, for several of them continued to fire on our troops from the Greek houses. 
Then the fighting began in the village and lasted till midday, when the resistance of the 
inhabitants of Doxato was broken. Only twenty-seven andartes were killed in the village; 
the rest succeeded in escaping toward Kavala and the neighboring hills. 

The people of Doxato had succeeded in effecting the escape of most of their women 
and children, who left on July 11 for Kavala. After the battle, the Bulgarian infantry 
found only about a hundred women and children in the village, and these were by order 
placed in several houses and courtyards, and protected by the Bulgarian soldiers against 
the local Turkish and gypsy population, who from the beginning of the fight were burn- 
ing, pillaging and violating women and girls. Two Turks were caught in the act, and were 
executed on the spot by Bulgarian soldiers. The Bulgarian army has therefore no crime on 
its conscience. If women and children were killed in some isolated parts of the village (it 
was one long street, a kilometer in length) that was the work of local Turks and gypsies. 

It was afterwards proved that the andartes under the instigation of Greek soldiers and 
officers deliberately set fire to the school, in order to burn some Bulgarians alive, who 
were shut up in it, to the number of about twenty. These were laborers arrested in the 
fields, and were found bound hand and foot by the Bulgarian soldiers who delivered them, v 
after being kept four days without food. 

The army left Doxato at 2 p.m., leaving twenty soldiers behind to keep order. 

No. i6b. Colonel Barnev, who directed the operations against the evzones and 
andartes round Doxato, has made the following deposition [communicated] : 

On the morning of July 13 the two squadrons of cavalry which I commanded reached 
the neighborhood of Doxato, and there I found other Bulgarian detachments sent for the 
same purpose. At about 800 paces from Doxato, I met an orderly with dispatches. As I 
was engaged with the orderly, I directed Captain Sofroniev to continue the forward march 
in the direction of Doxato-Kavala, after which I would rejoin the troops. I noticed that 
all the country round the village was occupied by armed men, who lost no time in opening 
fire. The company under Sub-Lieutenant Milev, which was advancing to the south in a 
line parallel to ours, changed front towards Doxato, in the presence of this unexpected 
attack, formed in order of battle and advanced on the village; for the fire was directed 
against it, and threatened it seriously. The situation demanded first defence, and then the 
energetic pursuit of the andartes. The appearance of the squadrons of cavalry put the 
andartes to flight, and they were forced to leave their positions and seek refuge on the 
heights to the northeast of Doxato, where they entrenched themselves. Meanwhile other 
troops and andartes were reported coming from Kavala. In presence of these insurgents, 
who in their turn opened a heavy fire upon us, we were obliged to attack them, for we were, 
exposed to a murderous fire. Part of them retired to the same heights, from whence they 
kept up their fire. The cavalry charged then. After the pursuit I gave the order to attend 
to the wounded, to carry them into shelter, and to send them away by the road Dadem- 
Tchiflik. We had hardly passed the village of Doiran when Sub-Lieutenant Tanev sent me- 
an orderly to inform me that andartes coming from Kavala were advancing; that they had 
already occupied the heights near the ruins of Alexandros; and that the road to Dadem-.. 


Tchiflik was also cut. I sent Captain Sofroniev in haste in the direction in question; the 
insurgents fled to Kavala. At this moment I received word from my scouts that a Greek 
column was reported marching from Valtchista in the direction of the station Anghista- 
Alistrati. Seeing our retreat threatened, I gave orders to return and occupy our original 
positions (the pass of Prossetchen). 

. From information received, the local Moslems, moved by vengeance against the Greeks, 
gave themselves up to excesses till midnight. It is these excesses which have been attrib- 
uted by the Greek press to Bulgarian soldiers. 

All the descriptions of the alleged misconduct of my troops at Doxato are false. I 
•deny these accusations, and affirm that the Bulgarian soldier has given every proof of 
tolerance and discipline. 

B. Events at Serres 

No. 17. [Note. In the semi-official Greek pamphlet Atrocites Bulgares, published by the 
director of the university at Athens, the narrative published by Signor Magrini in the Secolo 
is adopted as an authoritative statement of the Greek case. Signor Magrini states that 
he was present at the inquiry conducted at Serres by the consuls general of Austria and 
Italy, who had come from Salonica to hear witnesses on the spot.] 

We were able to reconstitute the eventful week through which the Macedonian town 
passed. On Friday, July 4, the Bulgarian advocate adviser attached to the Italian consul, 
informed him that the following order had arrived: 1 

"If it appears that Serres is lost to the Bulgarians, destroy the town." 

On the evening of the same day General Ivanov, beaten at Lahana, passed through Serres 
station on his way to Demir-H'issar. On Saturday, July 5, the shops and houses were 
pillaged; seventeen notables were massacred; 2 four other notables, among them the head 
master of the gymnasium, the director of the hospital, and the manager of the Orient bank, 
were led outside the town and killed with bayonet thrusts. 3 

Thereafter General Voulkov, Governor of Macedonia, and all the Bulgarian officials, 
soldiers, and gendarmes left hurriedly. On Sunday and Monday the town was tranquil 
in expectation of the arrival of the Greek army; the inhabitants armed in order to repel 
a probable attack by the comitadjis. On Tuesday and Wednesday skirmishes took place be- 
tween the inhabitants and groups of soldiers who attempted to enter the town and to set 
it on fire. On Thursday the inhabitants, foreseeing the catastrophe, sent a deputation to 
Nigrita to demand help, but it was too late. 4 

With the Austrian consul general, 1 questioned the Moslem Ahmed-Hafiz, formerly at- 
tached to the Bulgarian police ; he made the following declarations : 

On Thursday evening the Bulgarian officer Monev appeared at my house and 
told me, that the Bulgarians were going to burn Serres next day. He invited me to 
join in the pillage and the burning with a band of Moslems. I refused. Then Monev 
asked me for petroleum; I replied that I had none. On Thursday, during the night, 
four guns were posted on the hill Dutli, which commands Serres, and next morning 
about eight o'clock the bombardment began and created an enormous panic. Soon 
more than 500 infantry, several groups of cavalry, numbering ten each, and fifty 

1 We can discover no confirmation of this statement. , 

2 This may refer to the thirteen persons murdered in the prison. Clearly not all of 
them were notables. 

3 The manager of the Orient bank is alive and well, and was never wounded. 
4 Observe that all mention of the schoolhouse massacre is suppressed. 



comitadjis entered the town, armed with bombs, and the atrocities began. Among 
the soldiers several officers were recognized, including Dr. Yankov, secretary of Gen- 
eral Voulkov and councilor of the government, and the late chief of police Kara- 
giosov and Orfaniev, chief of the gendarmerie of Serres. Clearly there was a 
well-arranged plan. The doors of the houses and shops were opened with sticks 
tipped with iron, with which the soldiers were provided. The buildings were entered 
and pillaged; the booty was loaded on some hundred wagons, specially got together 
for this purpose. Then the houses, emptied one by one, were sprinkled with petro- 
leum and other inflammable substances and fire put to them. By an application of 
the law of the economy of effort, in each group of three houses, only the middle 
one was set on fire, clearly in the belief that the wind, which was blowing with 
violence, would complete the work of destruction. The soldiers fired on the inhab- 
itants who attempted to save the burning houses, consulates, and foreign buildings. 

In the quarter Kamenilia twenty-eight persons, among them Albert Biro, a Hun- 
garian, were massacred. The Austrian vice consul with the people who had sought 
refuge in the consulate was carried off to the mountain, his magnificent house was 
pillaged and then burned. All the buildings protected by foreign flags were treated 
in the same fashion. At the Orient bank an attempt was made to open the safe by 
means of a bomb, but it failed, and the assailants had to content themselves with 
burning the building. The Italian consular agency, a well-built house, surrounded 
by a vast garden, was saved almost miraculously from destruction; it is the only 
house saved in a whole quarter which was burnt down, and the Italian consular 
agent Menahem Simantov explained to us, that at noon on Friday several infantry 
soldiers ordered him to open his house, in which 600 people had taken refuge, mainly 
women and children. He showed himself at a window, the soldiers demanded £T400. 
His knowledge of Bulgarian enabled him to save them. He persuaded the soldiers 
to be content with £54 and to withdraw. The presence of the young Bulgarian Mav- 
rodiev, says Simantov, saved the agency from catastrophe. None the less in the 
course of the day it was necessary to buy off other soldiers with a fresh ransom. 
The agency, filled with refugees, was surrounded on all sides by flames ; we were 
barely able to protect it. 

No. 17a. Statement of Mr. Zlatkos, Vice Consul of Austria Hungary at Serres: 
(Atro cites Bulgares, p. 23.) 

On Friday toward noon soldiers of the regular [Bulgarian] army attacked my house,, 
forcing me to go out into the street with my family and a large number of persons, who- 
had fled from the massacre and the fire and had taken refuge with me. Immediately there- 
after we were led up to the mountain. All the children and women who accompanied me- 
were threatened with death, and it is only by paying large ransoms that we were released. 
I am safe and well, but as my house fell a prey to the flames I am, with my family, with- 
out shelter or clothing. All our subjects who live here are in the same situation as myself. 

No. 18. The Schoolhouse Massacre {see also Nos. 56, 57, 58). Evidence of Demetrv 
Karanfilov, formerly a dairyman and afterwards a Bulgarian gendarme at Serres. 

On Saturday, July 5, the Bulgarian army left the town. I was unable to go with it 
since my wife was ill. Everything was quiet until Monday. There then arrived Greek 
andartes (Insurgents) with villagers and some soldiers. I hid and saw very little 
of what went on. On Tuesday, shots were fired at my house and I heard voices- 
say, "Bulgarians live here." They came in and searched for arms. There were one or two 
soldiers among about twelve men. I was then taken to the Archbishop's palace and brought 
before a civil commission, which included the Archbishop of Serres (an old man) and a 
young bishop, who presided. The soldiers said to me on the way, "We've come to exter- 
minate the Bulgarians." The bishop asked me who and what I was. I replied, "A Bulga- 
rian gendarme." I was searched and five francs were taken from me. I was then taken to 
a room of the girls' high school, and was kept there for four days, guarded by both sol- 
diers and civilians, who came both from Serres and from the villages. Many other Bulga- 
rians were with me. We received bread once a day, and were not at first maltreated. Ten» 


people were taken up to a room above and never came back. We heard cries, and believe 
they were killed. I was ordered with three other men to carry out two corpses. They were 
•covered with blood, and I believe that they were Bulgarians of Serres. On Friday morning, 
-a soldier came in and said: "Don't fear, our army is coming, but do all that we tell you." 
So we were rather relieved. Then those in our room were bound two by two, taken up- 
stairs and were never seen again. When my turn came; I was bound with another man 
taken up to a room which was full of corpses. There were quite fifty of them; you couldn't 
see the floor, some were lying in heaps, and there was blood all over the place. I was 
then struck with a Martini bayonet on the back of the head and through the neck and on 
the shoulder. [We saw these wounds and also a hole in the man's coat.] The blow on my 
shoulder was dealt me by Christo, a neighbor of mine. I do not know who the others were. 
When I fell, another fell on top of me; I fainted and came to some time afterwards. 
1 noticed that somebody else was moving, and soon five or six were stirring. The Greeks 
had all gone and we heard a fusillade outside. The town was already in flames and soon 
the school would be burnt also. We went out of this room and saw another room heaped 
with corpses. Some were still alive and groaning. The doors were open and we made up 
• our minds to go out, crossed the street, went up the hill, and met the Bulgarian soldiers, 
who tended our wounds. I have had no news of my wife to this day. 

No. ig. Evidence of Christo Dimitrov, Miller of Serres. 

On July 5 I left my mill on the advice of a Bulgarian soldier, and went to my house 
to fetch my wife and children. There were shouts of Zeto! (the Greek cry) all round, and 
neighbors shouted "the Greek army is coming." My neighbors bade me have no fear and 
undertook to save me. I slept that night at home, and saw next morning a crowd of 
Greeks and Turks in the street, who shouted that they would destroy everything Bulgarian. 
I saw them arrest two men from Dibra, Marko and Christo. Three Greeks returned to 
Christo's house and came out with his wife half an hour later; she was crying "Is there 
no one to save me !" The crowd in the street was shouting, "Show us the Bulgarian houses." 
On the 6th, I went to a Turk's house for hiding. On the 8th the crowd came again shout- 
ing, "There are still Bulgarians here." My neighbors tried to save me, but in the end when 
the crowd threatened them, they advised me to go quietly to the Archbishop's palace, as I 
had done no harm. The neighbors came with me to give evidence before the Archbishop 
in my favor. But I was taken straight to the school and robbed on arrival of my money 
(5 Napoleons) while soldiers stood around. I spent the day there with about twenty other 
Bulgarians. That evening I was bound and taken up to a room where eleven dead bodies 
were lying on the floor. I was ordered to lie down ; my hands and feet were bound be- 
hind me; I was heavily struck and left. I talked with two other men in the room who 
were still alive, including my neighbor Christo of Debra, and each asked the other "What 
crime have we committed?" I recognized two Greeks among our jailers, a certain Janmaki, 
brother of the Greek Consul Cavass, and one Taki, son of the innkeeper Peter. They said 
to an evzone, "We must not leave one alive." They then beat Petro, Christo, and Procop to 
death with a big stick. Another Greek civilian then came in and, pointing to me, said: 
"Fourteen are enough ; we can't bury them all. Let us leave this one till tomorrow." They 
evidently reckoned that they could only bury fourteen in a night. The others were then 
taken out, and Petro, who was not quite dead, was forced to walk. "We'll kill him down 
there," they said. I was left alone, bound. On Thursday morning, July 19, I was taken 
down to another room, where were some men from Strumnitsa; I asked and received 
some bread and water. Eight men were then brought in from the villages. The Greeks all 
the time kept shouting, "Long live King Constantine!" On Friday morning, July 11, my 
wife arrived, and brought me some bread, some tobacco and three francs. Women look- 
ing out of the neighboring houses threatened me, "You Bulgarian dogs, we'll kill you all, 
to the last man." Then- four 'Bulgarian -soldiers were brought in as prisoners, three Bui- 


•garian comitadjis and the secretary of the mayor of the village of Topoleni. About eleven 
o'clock I heard the Greek women of the quarter calling out to the men, "Flee! for the Bul- 
garians are coming, and they will kill you." About sixty surviving prisoners were brought 
together; about fifty other Greeks came in, including some evzones, who bound the prison- 
ers and took them out two by two. Mine was the sixth turn. I was led to an upper room, 
ordered to lie down, and received four wounds. I then groaned and feigned death. [We 
saw the scars of his wounds and the holes in his coat.] Others were then brought in and 
killed. I heard a sort of gurgling, like the sound which sheep make when they are being 
killed, in the room next door. Presently I heard firing outside, and the Greeks went down 
to fight, and left us alone. I saw that all was clear. Ten of us were alive and rose to go 
out, but two, Tlia Penev and Simon, fell at once and could not proceed. Eight of us got 
safely out to the hills and reached the Bulgarian soldiers. I have heard no news of my 
wife since that day. 

No. 20. Evidence of Dimitri Lazarov, of Moklen, near Serres. 

Seven men were sent from our village by the mayor to see if the Bulgarians were still 
in possession of Serres. Three gendarmes were among us, and all of us had our rifles. [He 
gave the names of all seven.] We were arrested near the village of Soubashkoi by about 
one hundred armed Greek villagers. They kept us for five days in the village schoolhouse; 
ropes were arranged from the rafters to hang us. Then firing was heard in the neigh- 
borhood and the Greeks, in fear lest Bulgarian troops should arrive, took the ropes down. 
There were five Bulgarian soldiers prisoners in the same place. I saw four of these shot 
in the garden of the school in daylight; the fifth begged hard for his life and was saved. 
We were now bound with this soldier in groups of four and were taken to the Bishop's pal- 
ace. I had one hundred piastres in money, and of the others, one had £T2 and another £T14. 
We were taken before a priest, who was alone in a room. I think he was a bishop; the 
evzones took our money, and put it on the table before the priest, who put it in a drawer. 
We asked for water. They gave it us, but the evzones struck us in the face before the 
bishop. He asked us no questions, and we were taken to the school. The evzones beat us 
■and mocked us with shouts of "hourrah !" (the Bulgarian cry). The gendarmes were taken 
to a room apart. In our room there were ten dead bodies; these were afterwards removed 
by Turkish porters. One of the gendarmes died this day from beating. We were stripped 
perfectly naked. Next day, Friday, July 11, forty-four new Bulgarian prisoners were 
brought in. [The witness, like all Balkan peasants, reckoned the dates from the nearest 
•church festival.] About midday we heard cannon — perhaps twenty shots. Then we could 
see from the window that the town was in flames. Three soldiers wearing the Greek uni- 
form came into our room, but one of them wore vlach trousers. They took four prisoners 
out to another room. We heard cries. The same three then came back with their hands 
and bayonets covered with blood; we tried but failed to get out by breaking the windows. 
I was taken out almost the last to a room full of dead bodies. The vlach struck me two 
blows on the head and two on the neck, and I fell. [We saw his wounds, the skull was 
deeply indented.] Another man fell on top of me and I lost consciousness. When I came 
to I heard rifle firing. Four men rose with me. Angel Dimov of Carlukavo is the only 
one I knew. We found water, which the butchers had used to wash their hands. We heard 
the Bulgarian cry "hourrah," went out, and found a Bulgarian soldier who got a mule for 
me. The whole town was on fire. 

No. 2i. Evidence of Blagoi Petrov, of Serres, mason, aged eighteen years. 

On July 10 four citizens of Serres, whom I knew, dressed in Greek uniform, took me 
to the schoolhouse prison. About one hundred others were there. We were beaten with 
the butts of their rifles and most of us had our hands tied to something, such as the pillars. 
An armed Greek civilian came in and said, "We must not kill these young lads, but we'll 


give them a beating." They insisted that I should stay to see my father killed; they evem 
promised to give me my liberty at once if I would kill my father with my own hand. About 
one o'clock I saw him killed with five blows from the butt of a rifle; many others were 
killed at the same time. Five youths were released. The names of my fathers murderers 
are, Teochar, a mechanic, and Athanasios Petrov, a tobacco worker. 

No. 22. Evidence of Dr. Klugmann, Russian civil doctor, employed at Serves in the 
special service organized by the Bulgarians to deal with the epidemic of cholera. 

On going out to my work as usual at eight o'clock on Sunday morning July 6, I 
found all the houses shut and the people beginning to flee. A Bulgarian officer with two- 
or three soldiers was in the street, with rifles presented, but they did not fire. Towards 
midday firing began and went on all day, but I can not say who was responsible. Monday 
was quiet. I went out on my balcony and saw a priest announcing to the people in the 
street, "Let any one who wants a gun go to the bishopric and get it." I saw them coming, 
out armed, an hour later. Rifles were given out to Turks. Firing began soon afterwards- 
and went on all day and night. On Tuesday morning some Greek andartes came to my 
house and arrested me. It was useless to explain that I was in the town to fight the cholera 
for the benefit of the whole population; I was taken to the bishop who, fortunately, spoke 
Russian, and eventually released me. I was again arrested on Thursday and taken by the 
bishop's orders to the Greek hospital. During all this time the Bulgarians up and down 
the town were being arrested. Another Bulgarian who was arrested at the same time as 
myself was beaten by the soldiers in my presence. On Thursday, while I was at the 
bishop's palace, about twenty-five Bulgarian prisoners were brought in before a commis- 
sion composed of priests and civilians. As far as I could understand the proceedings they 
were condemned to death [the doctor knows little or no Greek, but thought he could 
guess the meaning of what went on]. I was removed with the bishop's consent to the 
Bulgarian hospital, where there was another Russian doctor, Laznev, and an assistant named 
Comarov. On Friday morning we saw the whole population fleeing in the direction of 
Nigrita. About eleven o'clock shots were fired from the hill behind our hospital, four- 
teen or fifteen in all. The firing went on for an hour. Toward midday everything 
was quiet. I then saw that the town was burning. In the afternoon many Greek soldiers- 
entered the hospital and threatened to kill me. They stole everything in the hospital, 
including Dr. Laznev's watch. [Note. — Dr. Klugmann went on to give many details of 
the difficulties which he and his colleagues in the Bulgarian hospital met with from the Greek 
authorities.] I wish in conclusion to affirm my strong conviction that the Bulgarians can- 
not have burnt Serres. I am unable to say how it was set on fire. 

No. 23. Evidence of Commandant Ivan Kirpikov. 

On Thursday, July 10, while at Zurnovo, I received orders to march on Serres with 
my column, to look after the munitions which had been left in the town, to resume the 
administration, and to restore order. I understood this to mean that I was to stay in the 
town, if possible, unless driven out by superior force. I had a battalion and a half of 
infantry, one squadron of cavalry, and one battery of artillery. We marched throughout 
the night, and by six o'clock on Friday morning were within five or six kilometers of 
Serres. I met on the way two companies of the dismounted cavalry, who had been driven 
back from the town the day before by the insurgent population. I ascertained that ,the 
Greeks held three positions on the hills surrounding the town, and estimated from their fire 
that they must number at least 1,000 rifles. I used my artillery against each of their posi- 
tions in succession, and our infantry was able eventually to capture all three positions. 
From the last hill above the town 1 saw the population fleeing from the town in all direc- 
tions over the plain. The enemy's fire meanwhile continued from several houses, from an 


•old tower, and from a little hill which was practically in the town. I sent a detachment 
to march down the principal street with orders to shout as they went that the people 
should keep calm and fear nothing. My men were fired upon from every house as they 
marched, and balls fell even where I was standing with the artillery. I then directed one 
of my guns against two big houses, from which the fire chiefly came. This had the effect 
of checking it. I then sent three patrols of ten men each to report if our depots were 
intact. They were fired upon. 

I now noticed groups of people in three large masses in the plain, near the railway 
line. I could see with my glasses that they were all armed and were wearing the Greek 
peasant costume peculiar to certain villages which we regarded as the center of the Greek 
propaganda. I sent a squadron to the railway station, but it was stopped by hot fire from 
the station. I now realized that a counter attack was being prepared and decided to march 
through the town and give battle to the groups of men near the station. Meanwhile a big 
building exploded, presumably a magazine. I sent my patrol to see what it was, but 
they were again repulsed from the same big building. I ordered my patrol to localize the 
conflagration which had now begun in various places. The groups of peasants had now 
begun to advance on the town. We never reached the house that was blown up and my 
infantry were never able to penetrate far into the town because of the continual fire from- 
the houses. As they marched, Moslems and Bulgarians began to join our men and to 
embrace them. 

I now realized that the force opposed to me was much superior to my own, and my 
object now was to clear the plain and isolate the town. I ordered my guns to fire on the 
groups in the plain. The fire was now spreading all over the town. With my binoculars 
I could see large columns of the Greek regular army approaching from Orlov. I con- 
tinued to use my guns in order to keep the groups dispersed. I then heard of another 
column of the regular army which was approaching from another direction. Realizing that 
I should be unable to face these, I sent patrols to our depots, which were in front of the 
governor's palace, with orders to blow them up if they found them intact. I then arranged 
to cover my retreat. Shells had begun to fall in the town from the Greek guns, and some 
of these fell on the hospital. The Greek vanguard with the townsmen attacked our rear 
guard. They shelled us steadily as we retreated, and some of their shells fell among 
refugees from the town who had fled to us. 

In reply to a question whether he knew anything regarding the Austrian vice consul, 
the commander replied, that his patrols reported to him as follows : 

We met a person w r ho said he was the Austrian vice consul; we took him and his 
family with us for his own protection, to ensure that neither the population nor the 
troops should molest him. We asked him if he preferred to come with us, or to stay 
in the town? He said he preferred to come with us. Later, when he saw that the 
Greek army was arriving he changed his mind and wished to go back to the town.. 
This we allowed him to do. 

Before leaving the town [continued the Commander] some Bulgarian civilians came to 
me and told me that about 250 Bulgarians had been imprisoned and massacred in the school 
house. The refugees who fled with us, told me that the explosion which we had heard, came 
from a Greek magazine of cartridges, which the Greeks themselves set on fire. The wind 
was blowing violently from east to west, and this house, which was in the east of the town, 
seems to have started the conflagration. I can not believe that our shells caused the fire. 
We have often tested this; they do not have the effect of setting houses on fire. 

^ No. 24. Evidence of Doctor Yankov, Advocate and Counselor to the Governor of 

I left Serres on July 5, and heard later that a detachment was returning. I accompar- 


nied it on Friday morning, July 11. Our detachment fired two cannon shots against the 
enemy, who was outside the town towards the north. On entering the town it pursued 
the Greeks, who were not regulars but andartes. Towards half past eleven I saw flames 
in the town. I notified the commandant that we were causing loss to the state. He replied 
that our shells could not possibly be the cause of the conflagration. The cavalry then 
entered the town and T went with it, accompanied by Karagiosov and Orfaniev. On the 
invitation of a leading Mohammedan I entered his house and found there about one hun- 
dred Turks including many notables. We spoke of the conflagration, which was increasing, 
and went out with several Turks to attempt to check it. In the town I learnt that one of 
the two Bulgarian depots of rifles was already burning. The Greeks had set it on fire. 
The houses in Serres are closely packed together, the streets are very narrow, and the wind 
was violent, so that the fire spread rapidly. I looked for fire engines at the municipality, 
but failed to find them. I went to look elsewhere and then heard that the Bulgarian army 
was already in retreat. I met the vice consul of Austria, Mr. Zlatkos, a Greek, and with 
him about a hundred Greek refugees. He demanded my protection. I accompanied him 
back to the town, a distance of perhaps one hundred metres. Karagiosov disappeared and 
we have had no further news of him. 

No. 25. Evidence of Lazar Tomov, a Bulgarian Teacher at Uskub. 

Mr. Tomov was driven out of Uskub, and traveled to Serres during the early days 
of the second war. He passed through Doiran, saw that all the Bulgarian villages were 
burned, and near the village of Gavaliantsi saw the corpse of a little cripple girl, wounded 
and mutilated. She was about fourteen years of age. On July 11, he entered Serres with 
the Bulgarian army, but did not actually penetrate into the town. He saw heaps of corpses 
in the girls' school, and met four of the survivors of the massacre. One of them was the 
man Lazarov. The Bulgarian troops were moved to intense indignation, but there was no 
outbreak. He saw both Turks and Bulgarian villagers setting houses on fire. Turks were 
carrying sacks through the streets, from which he inferred that they were looting. 

No. 26. Evidence of Commandant Moustakov, Secretary to General Voulkov, Gov- 
ernor of Serres and Macedonia. 

Referring to the documents published in the Greek pamphlet Atrocites Bulgares, p. 54, 
in which he is represented as proposing the arrest of a number of Greek notables, the com- 
mandant explained, that neither of the orders therein attributed to him is genuine. There 
was no reason why he, working in the same office as General Voulkov, should have addressed 
a written communication to him. The commandant produced the official register in which 
his orders were copied. 

(1) The first order attributed to him bears an authentic number (No. 8265). An order 
with this number does exist and is entered in the register; but its contents are quite dif- 
ferent from those of the document published in the pamphlet. (2) No order bearing the 
number 8391 exists. 

[We examined the register, which fully bore out the commandant's statement. The num- 
bers in the register were not consecutive, and no entry had been made corresponding to 
the number in the pamphlet]. 

Further, in reply to the statement made on p. 30 of this pamphlet that disguises and 
other compromising articles had been found by the Greeks in the governor's house, the 
Commandant stated (1) that no such articles had ever been in his possession and (2) that 
in any event they can not have been found, since the house, which belonged to Nechid-bey, 
had been burned before the entry of the Greeks. 

In explanation of the circumstances which attended the evacuation of Serres, the Cora- 


inandant stated that on Saturday, July 5, there was in the early morning a panic in the town, 
due to a rumor that the Greek army was approaching. The town was almost entirely de- 
serted. The Bulgarian troops went out to reconnoitre; he himself went about calming the 
people. By his orders a squadron of dismounted cavalry marched through the town sing- 
ing. It was fired on from the houses, and one soldier was killed and another wounded. 
This occurred about 5.30 p.m. Two men were arrested and probably killed. At 9 p.m. he 
left the town with General Voulkov. A detachment of about 200 men of the territorial 
army was left behind under Commandant Toplov; but in view of the danger of surprise 
attacks it passed the night outside the town and entered it again the next day, again retiring 
at nightfall. The Commandant returned on July 8, towards midday on a locomo- 
tive, with ten soldiers. He found Serres station surrounded by Greek andartes and skir- 
mished with them till evening. He had asked for cannon, which arrived late; he remained 
in the neighborhood of Serres on the hills on July 9, but neither used his cannon nor en- 
tered the town. On July 11 took place the attack in force under Commandant Kirpikov. 
He himself had intended, if he had been able to enter the town, to burn the Bulgarian 
stores and depots of munitions which had been left behind. The larger force had no doubt 
the same orders. 

With reference to the statement that prisoners were killed by the Bulgarians on leaving 
the town, the Commandant explained that headquarters were aware of a revolutionary 
movement among the Greeks of Serres; the Greeks had large quantities of arms. He had 
inquired of the commandant de place what measures had been taken to prevent an outbreak. 
The reply was that "this in no way concerned him." On July 1 there were five Greek nota- 
bles under arrest at the prefecture. He failed to obtain any explanation as to what would 
be done to them. The idea was that by arresting these notables a revolution might be pre- 
vented. This was an absurdity, but he believes these men were in the end liberated. 

On July 3 Mr. Arrington asked him to procure the release of his imprisoned porter 
■(cavass). He explained that this was a matter which concerned the Commandant and 
not the Governor. He ascertained that two or three cavass belonging to the tobacco ware- 
houses had been arrested because the rumor was in circulation that the famous Greek insur- 
gent chief, Captain Doukas, was in the town disguised as the cavass of a tobacco ware- 
house. He gave orders before leaving Serres, that prisoners of all races including some 
thirty or forty Bulgarian comitadjis accused of crimes committed during the war should 
be released. The prisoners numbered about 105 men. The Greeks and Turks among them 
were persons of no importance. No soldiers were left at the prison, and its governor had 
fled. It is conceivable that the Bulgarian prisoners may have killed the Greek prisoners. 

C. Events at Demir-Hissar 

No. 27. Report of the General Commanding the Sixth Division of the Greek 
Army, dated July 12. 

I have the honor to inform your Majesty that an officer of my staff sent to Demir-His- 
sar, reports as follows: 

The Bulgarian captain of gendarmerie, Meligov (Velikov?) arrested the bishop, Mgr. 
Constantine, the priest Papastavrou, the notable Sapazacharizanou, and over one hundred 
other Greeks, who were imprisoned in the confines of the Bulgarian school. On July 
7 and 8 the Bulgarian soldiers and gendarmes massacred them, and requisitioned Turkish 
peasants to bury them in the precincts of the school, outside the wall on the east side. An 
officer of my staff ordered the exhumation of the bodies in order to verify the facts. He 
found the heaped bodies of the victims at a depth of over two meters. 

Further, officers and soldiers violated several girls; they even killed one, named Agatha 
Thomas, the daughter of a gardener, because she resisted them. 

The shops of the town have been sacked and destroyed, with all the furniture of the 


houses of our countrymen, of whom some were saved by the Turks who sheltered them 
in their houses. The town in general presents a lamentable spectacle of destruction. 

No. 27a. The report of the commission of Greek deputies which visited Demir-His- 
sar, contains the following additional details: 

The number of notables arrested was 104; eighty were at once killed by bayo- 
net thrusts. Twenty- four others, by feigning death, survived, though seriously 
wounded. Among the victims are two women and two babies aged two and three 
years. * * * The bishop and three priests were killed by Captain Anghel 
Dimitriev Bostanov with his own hand. He first gouged out their eyes and cut off 
their hands. * * * All these atrocities were committed by the soldiers and non- 
commissioned officers of the Bulgarian regular army belonging to the Twelfth and 
Twenty-first regiments. * * *" 

There follows an account of the search for arms at the bishop's palace, in which this 
statement occurs : "The soldiers knocked at the door, and as the bishop resisted, they broke 
it down." In describing the exhumation of the bodies, it is stated that only eight were 
actually exhumed. The corpse of the bishop was lying face downwards. The Commission 
have before it an official list of seventy-one persons killed and five wounded, and of others 
who have disappeared, making a total of 104. It includes one priest (not three), and is 
comprised largely of working men who can not have been "notable." 

No. 28. In its issue of July 13/26, the official Echo de Bulgarie published the follow- 
ing statement: 

As regards the acts of repression at Demir-Hissar, it is necessary to explain that the 
Greek population of this town, roused by agitators, revolted on July 8, when the Bulga- 
rian troops withdrew. It pillaged the military magazines, the public buildings, and the 
Bulgarian houses, and massacred a number of soldiers who fell into its hands, as well as 
the sick and wounded of an ambulance train which arrived that day from Serres. The 
bodies of sixteen soldiers were found in the immediate neighborhood of the town; the 
exact number of those massacred in the town itself has never been exactly ascertained. 

The rebels took up positions all around the town, whence on the following day a Bul- 
garian detachment coming from Serres in ignorance of what was going on, was obliged 
to dislodge them by force. On its entry into the town, it was met with a fusillade from 
other rebels concealed in the houses. Order was none the less promptly re- 
stored. Some individuals taken with arms in their hands were shot. An inquiry was held 
into the events of the previous day. The murderers and the instigators of the movement 
were arrested, and some of them were executed. It was established that the Greek prelate 
was the chief leader, and that he had set the example to the rebels by himself firing the 
iirst shots from his window against soldiers who were passing his house. Further, a re- 
volver was found in his pocket, with several of its cartridges used. 

To explain the severities employed in restoring order at Demir-Hissar, it must be 
added that on the same day, July 9, Greek troops burned the Bulgarian villages in the 
neighborhood of Demir-Hissar, notably Gorni-Poroi, Dolni-Porio, Starochevo and Ke- 

28a. The following supplementary narrative from Bulgarian official sources has been 
communicated to us: 

On July 5, as our troops were withdrawing towards the defile of Rupel, a panic, oc- 
curred in Demir-Hissar, and some shots were fired in the Greek quarter. There were, 
however, no casualties, and order was speedily restored by the civil administration, which 
remained in the town (see No. 46). From July 5 to July 9 the town was relatively calm. 


Troops retreating on Djumaia were continually passing through it, and the bakeries were 
working to supply our troops at Rupel. During these days Major Stephanov of the gen- 
eral staff of the second army passed twice through the town; he states that no one in 
the town complained of ill treatment by our troops or officials. Meanwhile, the Greek 
army advancing along the Salonica-Serres road toward the bridge over the Struma, at 
Orhak, was driving the fugitive population before it (see Nos. 33 and 35). On July 7, 
the Greek artillery on the right bank near the burned bridge of Orliak, fired on the fugi- 
tives and on the villages in the plain of the Struma (see Greek soldiers' letters, No. 51), 
and this increased the stream of fugitives, some of whom passed through the town itself. 
The panic in Demir-Hissar now became irresistible, and the administration abandoned it. 
The Greek population thus became the master of the town, and rushed through the 
streets with the Greek flag, firing on our wounded soldiers, our baggage and ambulance 
trains, and on the fugitive population. A body of from 120 to 150 andartes under the 
command of a Greek officer arrived in the town, from the direction of the plain. At this 
moment the Greek bishop went into the streets at the head of about twenty armed Greeks, 
and gave the order to fall upon all Bulgarians. Fighting followed in the town. Two Bul- 
garian gendarmes who were guarding our military stores were killed; all the bakers were 
slaughtered at their ovens; many of our wounded were killed, and a large number of the 
peasant fugitives, including women and children. The street fighting, the massacres and 
general disorder continued all day, and many were killed on both sides. The Greek bishop 
was probably killed during this fighting. The Greek army entered Demir-Hissar in the 
evening of this day. What was left of the Bulgarian population in the town fled to the 
mountains, pursued by the Greek troops and armed civilians, who massacred it whenever 
they overtook it. 

There was no Bulgarian officer at Demir-Hissar after the evening of July 10, when 
the administration left the town. 

The Ministry of War states that Lieutenant Velikov was not there. No such name 
as Captain Anghel Dimitriev Bostanov is to be found in the registers of the active or re- 
serve army. It is not for the first time that this has happened. More than once in the 
telegrams of General Dousmanis, Generals Kovatchev and Voulkov are mentioned as 
being in the neighborhood of Demir-Hissar or Serres, when in fact they were either op- 
posing the Serbs or were at Dubnitsa. 

More than 250 wounded Bulgarian soldiers and peasants fleeing from Kukush, Doiran 
and Lagadina were killed at Demir-Hissar. 


Documents Relating to Chapter II 


No. 29. King Constantine's Telegram. July 12, 1913. 

The general commanding the Sixth Division informs me that Bulgarian soldiers under 
the command of a captain of gendarmes gathered in the yard of the school house at Demir- 
Hissar over one hundred notables of the town, the archbishop and two priests, and massa- 
cred them all. The headquarters staff ordered the exhumation of the bodies, with the 
result that the crime has been established. Further, Bulgarian soldiers violated young 
girls and massacred those who resisted them. Protest in my name to the representatives 
of the powers and to the whole civilized world against these abominations, and declare 
that to my great regret I shall find myself obliged to proceed to reprisals, in order to 
inspire their authors with a salutary fear, and to cause them to reflect before committing 
similar atrocities. The Bulgarians have surpassed all the horrors perpetrated by their 
barbarous hordes in the past, thus proving that they have not the right to be classed among 
civilized peoples. 

(Signed) Constantine, King. 

The above telegram was sent to the representatives of Greece in the European capitals. 

No. 30. Evidence of Father Joseph Radanov, of Kukush. 

On July 2 he could distinctly see from Kukush that the surrounding villages were on 
fire, Salamanli among others. Fields of corn and stacks of reaped corn had been set on 
fire even behind the Greek positions. The Greeks moreover had fired upon the reapers 
who had gone to work in the early morning in their fields. The refugees from the neigh- 
boring villages began to arrive upon the heights called Kara-Bunar about a mile away, 
and were there bombarded by artillery. 

Next day (July 3) the battle approached the town, but the Bulgarians retained their 
position. About midday the Greeks began to bombard Kukush, but when I left no house 
had taken fire. 

No. 31. Father Jean Chikitchev. 

I took refuge after midday on July 3 with Father Michel and meant to stay with him. 
I saw the shells falling upon the sisters' orphanage. I saw the hospital struck by a shell. 
There were at this time no Bulgarian troops in the town, although they were in their po- 
sitions in front of it. The town was unfortified. The bombardment seemed to be sys- 
tematic. It could not be explained as a mistake incidental to the finding of the range. 
Quite forty shells fell not far from the orphanage and three or possibly four houses were 
set on fire. At this point I left the town and fled with the refugees. Next night it looked 
as if the whole plain were burning. 

Note. — Both the above witnesses are priests of the Catholic Uniate Church. (See 
also 63a.) 


No. 32. Mr. C. [the name may not be published] a Catholic resident in the village of 
Todoraki near Kukush, states than on July 6 the Greek commandant of Kukush arrived 
accompanied by thirty infantrymen and eighty armed Turks. He was bound and left ex- 
posed to the full sun without food or water from 7 a.m. until 3 p.m. His house was pil- 
laged, and 200 francs taken with all his personal property. On being released he learnt 
from the villagers that they had lost in all £T300 during the pillage. Two men were 
beaten and twelve were bound and sent down to prison in Salonica. The women were 
not maltreated. 

No. 33. Peter Shapov, of Zarozo near Langaza, a shepherd. 

He was taking his sheep and goats on the road to Demir-Hissar when Greek cavalry 
overtook the refugees on the edge of the town and began to slash out with their sabres to 
left and right. They took 600 goats belonging to himself and his two brothers. One of 
his brothers was wounded by a cavalryman and died afterwards at the Bulgarian fron- 
tier. The Bulgarian army was quite half an hour's walk away. There were no Bulgarian 
troops near them. 

No. 34. Mate, Wife of Petro of Bogoroditsa, near Langaza. 

I saw the Greek cavalrymen when they entered our village. I fled and in my haste 
was obliged to leave a baby of eighteen months behind in the village in order to flee with 
this one which I have with me, a child of three. I saw our village in flames. I want my 

No. 35. Elisava, Wife of Georghi of Zarovo, near Langaza. 

We all fled when the shells began to fall in our village and got safely to Demir-His- 
sar. Then T heard people saying the Greek cavalry are coming. There was a panic; chil- 
dren fell on the ground and horsemen rode over them. I lost my children, save one whom 
I was able to carry. My husband had two others with him. I do not know what has be- 
come of him, and have not seen him since that day. 

No. 36. Mito Kolev, a boy of fourteen from the village of Gavaliantsi, near Kukush. 

On Wednesday, July 2, after the fighting at Kukush, the peasants fled from our 
village except a few old people. I fled with the rest and reached Kilindir. On Thursday 
I went back three hours' walk to our village to collect our beasts and find my mother. 
I found her and was going along the road back to Kilindir with others. As we were leav- 
ing our village I saw a Greek cavalryman in uniform on horseback. He fired his rifle at: 
me and missed. I threw myself on the road, pretending to be dead. He then shot my 
mother in the breast and I heard her say as she fell beside me, "Mito, are you alive?" and' 
that was the last word she spoke. Another boy came up and ran away, when he saw what 
had happened. The soldier pursued him, shot him, and then killed him with his sword 
without dismounting. Then I saw a little cripple girl named Kata Gosheva, who was in 
front of us hiding in a ravine. The soldier went after her, but I do not know whether 
he killed her. He then came back, passed us and met other cavalrymen. A certain miller 
of the village named Kaliu, who could speak both Greek and Bulgarian, then came up 
and lifted me up. The miller had a Mauser rifle. He hid in the ravine when he saw that 
the two troopers were hurrying back and I hid in some hay. I heard the horses' hoofs 
going towards the miller. They talked, and I suppose he must have surrendered. He then 
came back to where I was and the miller said, "Mito, Mito, come out or the cavalry will 
kill you." So T came out. We both then went to the school house where we found other 
Greek troopers. I was quite sure they were Greeks because I recognized the uniform. 


They used to come to our village sometimes before the war broke out. They questioned 
the miller in Greek and wrote something and gave it to him. The miller then said, "Let's 
go to the mill. It is about fifteen minutes from the village." We stayed there for an hour. 
In the meantime, three other Greek troopers came up from another direction. The miller 
went to meet them and showed them his piece of paper. The miller told me to gather 
straw, and he did the same. The troopers set fire to it so as to burn down the mill. [In 
reply to a question, Mito explained that the mill was not the miller's personal property. 
It belonged to the village community, which employed him.] The miller took away his 
mattress on his horse, which was at the mill. The troopers then left us and went to 
the village. We followed and the miller said to me, "We had better ask them for another 
bit of paper so that they will let us go to Salonica." Then some cartridges which had 
been left behind began to explode in the mill. This brought up other troopers at a 
gallop. They fired on us. The miller said something to them in Greek, showed them the 
paper and they chatted. [Mito only speaks Bulgarian.] I saw them looking at me. Then 
one of them drew his revolver and fired. The ball went through my clothes without 
wounding me. I fell down, pretending to be dead. He fired again and this time the 
ball went in at my back and came out at my breast. Then, still on horseback, he struck 
me on the shoulder with his sabre and the same blow wounded my finger. [Mito lay down 
and showed exactly how it happened. He still had the scars of all these wounds. The 
position was perfectly possible.] Blood was flowing from my mouth. I hid in the corn 
all the rest of the day and saw the village take fire in three places. The cavalry then 
gathered together and then rode off. I was in pain, but managed to walk away. I met 
two Bulgarian neighbors on my way and one of them took me in his cart to Doiran. 
There I met my father and had my wounds dressed in the military hospital. We fled 
•through the mountains, and I was taken to the hospital in Sofia. 

No. 37. Vladimir Georghiev, of Dragomirtsi, near Kukush. 

I left the village when the war began and afterwards went back to find some of my 
property. I saw the Greek cavalry, perhaps a whole regiment of them. There were ten 
in our village with officers. I managed to hide in some reeds near the village. 1 saw Gava- 
liantsi burning. About 2 o'clock eight cavalrymen passed and burned the mill. They 
then went into the village to finish the burning. I also saw our own village Dragomirtsi 
burning, and heard two or three shots fired. Toward 6 o'clock I fled and on my way 
met Mito Kolev, who was wounded and could hardly walk. Mito said he could not ride, so 
•it was no use to offer him my beast. I left him and went on. (See also 63d.) 

No. 38. Christo Andonov, of Gavaliantsi. 

He was beaten by the Greek soldiers. He saw the mother of Mito Kolev near the 
'Greek cavalrymen and supposes she must have been killed. He did not see what happened 
very distinctly as he was at considerable distance. He saw the boy named Georghi Tassev 
killed with a sabre thrust by a trooper who was one of five. Some way off Kata Gosheva, 
the lame girl, was killed with a sword. This he saw quite distinctly. He was hidden in the 
ravine at the time. 

Note. — These two witnesses were in a crowd of refugees at Samakov. In passing 
through the market place we inquired whether anyone present came from the village of 
Gavaliantsi. They stepped forward and told the above stories when asked to explain what 
happened to them after the battle of Kukush. See also the evidence of Lazar Tomov, 
Ho. 25. 

The Affair of Akangeli 

No. 39. Mr. G., a Catholic inhabitant of Kukush, interviewed at Salonica, made the 
following statement : 


"After fleeing from Kukush, I arrived at Akangeli with some thousands of refugees 
from all the surrounding villages. It is close to the station of Doiran. Between two and 
three p.m. on Sunday afternoon (July 6) the Greek cavalry arrived, possibly 300 of them, 
with officers. The inhabitants went out to meet them with white flags and the priest at 
their head. About 120 people of the village were told off to look after the cavalry horses. 
These people disappeared and no trace could be found of them next day. That evening the 
women, both natives and refugees, were all violated, often repeatedly. The soldiers pil- 
laged and killed, but would spare a man's life for five piastres or so. Probably fifty inhab- 
itants of Akangeli were killed. I and another man were bound together by the cavalry. 
Six piastres and a watch were taken from me and my life was spared, but my companion 
was killed at my side. Women and girls were stripped and searched to find money. 1 
saw many cases of violation myself, it was done more or less publicly, sometimes in the 
houses but sometimes in the fields and on the roads. I saw the village burnt and witnessed 
another case of the murder of a peasant." 

In reply to questions he stated that he saw the corpses of the fifty inhabitants after 
they had been killed. Some were shot and some were bayoneted. Again in reply to a ques- 
tion he was certain there was no conflict in the neighborhood and no shots were fired, but 
the villagers were told to collect their rifles and surrender them. They did so and one went 
off accidentally in the hands of an officer who was breaking it. He was wounded, and the 
soldiers at once killed a boy who was standing near. Turks joined with Greeks in the pil- 
lage and so did the infantry, which arrived next day. 

No. 40. Georghi Charisanov, of Selo-Surlevo. 

He took refuge in Akangeli. A squadron of Greek cavalry arrived on Sunday after- 
noon, gathered the refugees together and demanded arms, telling them not to fear. They 
then began to beat and rob. The Turks who followed them assisted in the pillage. On 
Monday, Greek infantry came and joined in sacking the village. Anyone who resisted was 
killed. There was a general panic and everyone fled who could. There were refugees from 
quite fifteen villages in the place. The soldiers violated women all the time, even little 
children. The soldiers went round from house to house on Sunday night and ordered the 
people to open the doors. They had a native of the village with them in order to give 
confidence to the people. Women were searched for money. About one hundred men 
were taken to look after the horses of the cavalry and these disappeared. On Monday 
the village was burned. We had given ourselves up quite voluntarily to the cavalry and 
welcomed them, and had surrendered about one hundred rifles. There was no excuse for 
what the soldiers did. 

No. 41. Mito Iliev, a butcher of Akangeli. 

I was there when the Greek army arrived on Sunday afternoon towards four o'clock. 
Reckoning from St. Peter's day it must have been July 6. The village was filled with refu- 
gees from Kukush district, perhaps 4,000 altogether. The people went out to meet the cav- 
alry by each of three roads. There were about 400 of them. We made a white flag and 
showed the Greek colors. Everything went quietly at first. The commandant asked for 
the mayor, and inquired in Turkish whether he would surrender and give up the arms of 
the village. We fetched our rifles (generally old Martinis) and piled them on a cart. 
The soldiers called for bread and cheese which were brought out. They then said, "Who 
is the butcher here, that he may kill sheep for us/' I was chosen and troopers went with 
me to fetch and kill thirty sheep. Meanwhile the soldiers began to demand money from 
everybody. I saw a young man, a refugee from another village, whose name I do not 
know, killed with a sword because he had nothing. I was told that a boy of fifteen was 
killed about this time, but did not see it. The people were now gathered together in the 


square of the village and told to sit down. This I witnessed. The Greek commandant then 
came and asked, "Where do all these people come from?" Then he separated the men of 
Akangeli from the rest to the number of about sixty and sent them to a wood called Chaluk. 
Nothing more was ever heard of them. 1 went on cooking the sheep. Then the soldiers, 
began to violate all the women. I heard cries going on all night, especially about 11 o'clock. 
The soldiers were not drunk, and they had officers with them. I stayed all night at my 
oven, and saw the two daughters-in-law of Stovan Popovali violated in front of me, a few 
paces away by three soldiers. Next morning, when we talked together in the village, I heard 
of many other violations. On Monday the Greek infantry arrived, seized me and told me 
to lead them to Dourbali. I led them there, and as I went off Akangeli began to blaze. 
I heard cries and rifle shots on all hands. When I got to Dourbali I fled to Atli, half an. 
hour away, and hid in the house of my partner Saduk, a Turk. I sent Saduk to see what 
had become of my wife and family. He came back and said that everyone was being killed, 
in the village, that he had seen many corpses, that my house was not burnt, but that there 
were three dead bodies in front of it. Saduk advised me to flee, and I did so. The Turks 
in our own village (Akangeli) behaved well, but strangers from other Turkish villages, 
came and joined in the pillage. 

In reply to questions the witness stated that an officer was accidentally wounded in the 
arm while examining one of the revolvers which had been given up. This he saw per- 
sonally, but denied that it explains the killing of the young man who was the first to be 
killed with a sword. That happened some distance away. 

No. 42. Stoyan Stoyev, aged 18, of Akangeli. 

This witness, at Dubnitsa, in reply to a question addressed to the group of refugees,, 
whether any of those present came from this village or had passed through it in their 
flight, related in outline almost exactly the same story as the last witness, including, 
the details about the conversation between the commandant and the mayor. The pillage, he- 
said, began while the arms were being gathered. A rifle went off accidentally, and an of- 
ficer was wounded, while the Greek soldier was emptying it. This he saw from a distance 
of about forty meters. Then the cavalry drew their swords and some people were- 
killed, certainly two youths. At this point he hid and saw little more He heard from a 
friend of his, a youth who came running out of the house of Dine Popov, that his wife- 
was being violated. He then fled to a Turkish village. (See also 63b.) 

No. 43. An astasia Pavlova, a widow of Ghcvgheli. 

Shortly before the outbreak of the second war I was staying with my daughter, a Bul- 
garian school teacher in the village of Boinitsa. A Greek lady came from Salonica, and 
distributed money and uniforms to the Turks of the place some six or eight days before- 
the outbreak of the second war. She also called the Bulgarians of the village together, 
i.nd told them that they must, not imagine that this village would belong to Bulgaria. She- 
summoned the Bulgarian priest, and asked him if he would become a Greek. He replied, 
"We are all Bulgarians and Bulgarians we will remain." There were some Greek officers- 
with this lady who caught the priest by the beard. Then the men who were standing by, 
to the number of about fifty, had their hands bound behind their backs, and were beaten 
by the soldiers. They were told that they must sign a written statement that they would 
become Greeks. When they refused to do this they were all taken to Salonica. When the 
men were gone, the soldiers began to violate the women of the place, three soldiers usually 
to one girl. [She named several cases which she witnessed.] The soldiers came in due 
course to my house and asked where my daughter was. I said she was ill and had gene: 
to Ghevgheli. They insisted that I should bring her to them. The Greek teacher of the 
village, Christo Poparov, who was with the soldiers, was the most offensive of them all. 


They threatened to kill me if ] would not produce her. The soldiers then came into the 
room and beat me with the butts of their rifles and I fell. "Now," they said, "you belong 
to the Greeks, your house and everything in it," and they sacked the house. Then sixteen 
soldiers came and again called for my daughter, and since they could not find her they 
used me instead. I was imprisoned in my own house and never left alone. Four days 
before the war I was allowed to go to Ghevgheli by rail with two soldiers to fetch my daugh- 
ter. She was really in the village of Djavato. At Ghevgheli, the soldiers gave me permis- 
sion to go alone to the village to fetch her. Outside the village I met five Greek soldiers, 
who greeted me civilly and asked for the news. Suddenly they fired a rifle and called out, 
"Stop, old woman." They then fired six shots to frighten me. I hurried on and got into 
the village just before the soldiers. They bound my hands, began to beat me, undressed 
me, and flung me down on the ground. Some Servian soldiers were in the village and in- 
terfered with the Greeks and saved my life. My daughter was hidden in the village and 
she saw what was happening to me and came running out to give herself up, in order to 
save her mother. She made a speech to the soldiers and said, "Brothers, when we have 
worked so long together as allies, why do you kill my mother?" The soldiers only answered, 
that they would kill her too. I then showed them the passport which had been given 
to me at Boinitsa. I can not read Greek and did not know what was on it. It seems that 
what was written there was "This is a mother who is to go and find her daughter and bring 
her back to us." The Greek soldiers then saw that it was my daughter, and not I, who was 
wanted and my daughter cried, "Now I am lost." The soldiers offered me the choice of 
staying in the village or going with my daughter to Ghevgheli. I begged that they would 
leave us alone together where we were until the morning, and to this they agreed. In the 
night I fled with my daughter, who disguised herself in boy's clothes, to a place two hours 
away which was occupied by Bulgarian soldiers. I then went myself to Ghevgheli and im- 
mediately afterwards, the second war broke out. The Bulgarians took the town and then 
retired from it, and the Greeks entered it. The moment they came in they began killing 
people indiscriminately in the street. One man named Anton Bakharji was killed before 
my eyes. I also saw a Greek woman named Helena kill a rich Bulgarian named Hadji 
Tano, with her revolver. Another, whose name I do not know, was wounded by a soldier. 
A panic followed in the town and a -general flight. Outside the town I met a number of 
Greek soldiers who had with them sixteen Bulgarian girls as their prisoners. All of them 
were crying, several of them were undressed, and some were covered with blood. The 
soldiers were so much occupied with these girls that they did not interfere with us, and al- 
lowed us to flee past them. As w,e crossed the bridge over the Vardar, we saw little chil- 
dren who had been abandoned and one girl lying as if dead on the ground. The cavalry 
were coming up behind us. There was no time to help. A long way off a battle was going 
on and we could hear the cannon, but nobody fired upon us. For eight days we fled to 
Bulgaria and many died on the way. The Bulgarian soldiers gave us bread. I found my 
daughter at Samakov. My one consolation is that I saved her honor. 

No. 44. Athanas Ivanov, of Kirtchevo, near Demir-Hissar. ♦ 

Our village is purely Bulgarian and consists of 190 houses. I am a shepherd and look 
after the sheep of the village. When the Greek army approached, most of the other vil- 
lagers fled, but I was late in going and remained behind to see that' my family had all got 
safely away. On July 16, while my wife was gathering her belongings, the Greek soidiers 
arrived. Some of them told a young woman, a relative of ours, who was in front of the 
house, to go and find bread for them. Her husband had already been seized. I went to 
look for her. I found a sentinel with a fixed bayonet in front of her house. I rushed past 
him, and found that she had just been violated by a soldier, while another stood over her 
with his bayonet, and then the second soldier also violated her. She had had a baby only- 


three days before. I then met Peniu Penev, who said to me, "You can speak Greek. All 
•our wives are being violated; come and talk to the soldiers." I entered the courtyard of 
a house and saw three women on the ground who were being violated. One was wounded 
in the leg and another in the arm. [We took the names, but see no object in publishing 
them.] This was about three p.m. Many other women were there, crying. I then went out 
in fear, and when I had gone some distance, saw that the village was burning. I met a 
woman trying to put out the fire with water. The soldiers came up and violated her. I saw 
six soldiers trying to violate a young girl. Another soldier protested, but they threatened 
him with their bayonets. A sergeant then told this man to stop interfering and ordered him 
to arrest me and take me to the officers, who were at a place some half an hour's distance 
from the village. [In reply to questions, the witness stated that two cavalry officers were 
in the village, but were not in the courtyard, where most of the violations were going on. 
There were, however, non-commissioned officers among the infantry in the village.] When 
I got to the camp and was brought before the officers, the officers said, "Take him away 
and fling him into the flames." On my way back to the village, I met nine other villagers 
and saw them all killed with the bayonet. Their names were Ivan Michailov, Angel Dou- 
rov, Pavlo Zivantikov, Ilio Piliouv, Peniu Penev, Peniu Christev, Athanas Belcov, Thodor 
Kandjilov, Gafio Demetrev. 1 escaped at the moment by saying I was a Greek, when 
the soldiers asked, "What kind of creatures are these?" I can speak a little Greek. At dusk 
1 managed to run away. They fired but missed me. I know nothing of what happened to 
my wife, but my children are saved. (See also Nos. 59-62.) 

No. 45. A Woman from Ijilar, near Kukush, seen at Salonica. Name suppressed. 

Everything in our village was plundered and burnt including the school and the church. 
All this was done by Greek soldiers of the regular army. The inhabitants mostly disap- 
peared. Soldiers kept sending for peasants to supply them with sheep. Four would go and 
never return, and so on at short intervals until hardly anyone was left. "What am I to do 
now? I have nothing left but the clothes I wear." 

No. 46. Anton Michailov and Demetri Gheorghiev, of German, near Demir-Hissar. 
{See also Nos. 59-62.) 

On July 5 (Saturday), we went to the market at Demir-Hissar. A panic presently took 
place. Everybody said that the Greek cavalry was coming. We went up to a height from 
which the plain was visible. We could see no cavalry, but a lot of refugees coming from 
the other direction, from Barakli Djumaia. The Greeks of German, when the town was 
cleared, began to pillage the Bulgarian shops. They armSd themselves and distributed arms 
to the Turks. We found the corpses of two Bulgarian soldiers in the garden of Doctor 
Christoteles. The refugees whom we met from the country all said that the Greeks were 
everywhere killing and burning; so we returned to our village which was still intact, gath- 
ered our things together and fled. 

Some of the villagers, however, remained in German. Some days after we had left, 
Greeks and Turks arrived together and began to pillage, burn and kill. We believe that 
180 men, women and children were killed. German had 100 houses, and about half the 
population remained. We heard of the fate of the others from a young man named Demi- 
tri Gheorghiev [not to be confused with our witness of the same name], who told us that 
the people were gathered together by the Greeks and Turks, the men in the church and the 
women in the house of Papa Georghi. Some of the men tried to escape from the church, but 
were all shot at once. This was a signal for the massacre. The men were first searched 
and robbed, and then killed. Young Demetri jumped from the window of the church and 
had the good sense to lie down as if he were dead when he was shot at. He told us that 
some insurgents (andartes) had arrived from Athens and organized everything. There is 
only one other survivor of the massacre, namely, Papa Georghi. 


Note. We made a uniform rule of refusing to allow witnesses to give us any informa- 
tion at second hand, but in this instance (and also in No. 50) since the alleged massacre 
had been so complete the circumstances seemed exceptional. 

No. 47. Anton Sotirov, a Priest from the village of Kalcndra near Serres, stated that 
Greek regulars and Turks came and burnt the Bulgarian houses at their village and killed 1 
an old man, the only one of the inhabitants who remained behind. This he saw from some 
little distance. 

No. 48. Georghi Dimitriev, of Drenovo near Serres, stated that his village was burnt 
by Greek infantry on a Tuesday about noon. He saw an old women named Helena Te- 
melcova, aged about 80, shot and then beheaded by a Greek soldier. He was hidden be- 
hind some stones on rising ground and shortly afterward managed to flee. He saw the 
village burnt by the Greeks. 

No. 4Q. Mr. V. Seen at Salonica. Name suppressed. Was made prisoner by the Greeks 
at Pancherovo. He speaks Greek well and pretended to be a Greek and was released. He 
saw three men of the village killed, apparently for motives of robbery. Their names were 
Angel Michail, Athanas Bateto, and the latter's son. Athanas had £T21. The peasants of 
this village had gone out to meet the troops with a white flag. This occurred on July 23. 
Eleven prisoners, who were taken at the same time as himself, were all killed on the 
hillside in the Kresna pass. These were armed men. 

No. 50. Nicola Temelcov, of Melnik, formerly a teacher, now a merchant. 

Between July 11 and July 16, last, all the Bulgarian inhabitants of the Melnik district 
fled to Old Bulgaria, and he went with them, but had recently visited Melnik. In the village 
of Sklava, as he passed through it, all the women were gathered by the Greek soldiers in 
the house of Mito Constantinov, and the women were distributed among thirty soldiers. 
One girl of eighteen named Matsa Anton Mancheva resisted stoutly and offered money to 
the amount of iT60. The Greeks took her money and still attempted to violate her. She 
resisted and was killed. Melnik has not been burnt, with the exception of the officers' 
club, the hotel and the post office. The Greek houses are empty and the furniture gone. 
His father and mother remained in the town and told him their story. The Greeks said 
to them, "We do not wish to have bears living in our country. We want men." By "bears" 
they meant the Bulgarians. The officers took everything belonging to the witness on the 
pretense that he had fled. They demanded produce belonging to his father to the amount 
of 18 napoleons. They then took him out to his farm at Orman-Tchiflik and threatened 
him with death. He paid £T180 for his life and was taken back to Melnik. All this 
was done by officers. They took quantities of wheat, rice and barley from his father's farm 
and also the buffaloes. The order was given that everything and everybody must be cleared 
out of Melnik and go to Demir-Hissar, and the government put both automobiles and wagons 
at the disposal of the Greek inhabitants for this journey. Those who were unwilling to go- 
were beaten. This his father related to him. His father, an old man, has since died 
from exhaustion and mental worry. 

No. 51. Extracts from Letters of Greek Soldiers found in the mail of the nineteenth 
regiment of the Greek seventh division, captured by the Bulgarians in the region of Razlog. 

(1) Rhodope, 11th July, 1913. 

This war has been very painful. We have burnt all the villages abandoned by the Bul- 
garians. They burn the Greek villages and we the Bulgarian. They massacre, we massacre,. 


.and against all those of that dishonest nation, who fell into our hands, the Mannlicher 
rifle has done its work. Of the 1,200 prisoners we took at Nigrita, only forty-one remain in 
-the prisons, and everywhere we have been, we have not left a single root of this race. 

I embrace you tenderly, also 
your brother and your wife 
Spiliotopoulos Philippos. 

(<?) Mr. Panaghi Leventi, 

I also enclose herewith, the letter of congratulation from my commandant, Mr. Conto- 
ghiri in which he praises my squadron, which on the occasion of the short stay of a few 
•days of our division, received the order at five o'clock, to march to the north of Serres. 
During the march, we engaged in a fight with the Bulgarian comitadjis, whom we dispersed, 
after having killed the greater part. We burnt the two villages of Doutlii and Banitza, the 
homes of the formidable comitadjis, and passed everything through the fire, sparing only 
the women, the children, the old people, and the churches. All this was done without pity 
>or mercy, executed with a cruel heart, and with a condemnation still more cruel. 
Merocostenitza, 12th July, 1913. 
The outposts of the Army. 

Love to you and also the others, 
(signature unreadable) 

( (3) Mr. Sotir Pana'ioannou, 

in the village of Vitziano, parish Ithicou 
Tricala de Thessalie. 
River Nesto, 12th July, 1913. 
Here at Vrondou (Brodi) I took five Bulgarians and a girl from Serres. We shut 
them up in a prison and kept them there. The girl was killed and the Bulgarians also 
suffered. We picked out their eyes while they were still alive. 

Yours affectionately: Costi. 

'(4) Bulgarian Frontier, 11th July, 1913. 

Dear Brother Joani: 

Here is where the archie omitadjis live. We have massacred them all. And the places 

•we have passed will remain in my memory forever. 

Ser. Cletanis. 

'(5) Rhodope, Bulgarian Frontier, 

11th July, 1913. 
Brother Mitzo: 

And from Serres to the frontier, we have burnt all the Bulgarian villages. ... 
My address remains the same: 7th Division, 19th Regt; 12 Battalion at Rhodope. 

Joan Christo Tsigaridis. t 

<6) Nestos, 13th July, 1913. 

Village Bansta, 
If you want to know about the parts where we are marching, all are Bulgarian villages, 


and everyone has fled. Those who remain are "eaten" by the Mannlicher rifle and we have 
•also burnt a few villages. The Bulgarians suffered the same fate at the hands of the Ser- 

S. Nakis. 

((7) In the desert, 12th July, 1913. 

. . in Bulgarian territory, we are beating the Bulgarians who are continually re- 
treating, and we are on the point of going to Sofia. We enraged them by burning the vil- 
lages, and now and again when we found one or two, we killed them like sparrows 

Your brother George (name unreadable) 
I am writing you in haste. 

i(8) Zissis Coutoumas to Nicolas Coutoumas. 

With the present I give you some news about the war that we have made against the 
Bulgarians. We have beaten them and have reached the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier. They 
fled into Bulgaria and we massacred those who remained. Further, we have burnt the vil- 
lages. Not a single Bulgarian has been left. God only knows what will come of it. I 
have nothing more to write you. I remain, your Son Zissis Coutoumas. Many compli- 
ments from Thimios. He is well as also the other young men here. 

12th July, 1913. 

<(o) M. Zaharia Kalivanis, 

Erf os — Milip tamos, 

Rethimo, Crete. 
Rhodope, 13th July, 1913. 
-of the Commandant of 
Public Safety, Salonica 

We burn all the Bulgarian villages that we occupy, and kill all the Bulgarians that fall 
into our hands. We have taken Nevrocop and were well received by the Turks, many of 
whom came to our ranks to fight against the Bulgarians. Our army is in touch with the 
Servian and Roumanian armies, who are 32 kilometers from Sofia. With regard to our- 
selves we are near the ancient frontier. 

S. Z. Kaliyanis. 

(10) July 15th, 1913. 

My Brother Sotir: 

Thanks to God, I am well at the moment of writing you. We are at present on the 
Bulgarian-Thracian frontier. As far as the war is concerned, I can not tell you anything 
about the situation and what takes place. The things that happen are such that have never 
occurred since the days of Jesus Christ. The Greek army sets fire to all the villages where 
there are Bulgarians and massacres all it meets. It is impossible to describe what happens. 
God knows where this will end. The time of . . . has come for us to start eating one 

Love from your brother Panaghis Beglikis. 

I am writing you in haste. 

■(//) Bulgarian Frontier, 

Everywhere we pass, not even the cats escape. We have burnt all the Bulgarian vil- 
lages that we have traversed. 1 can not describe it to you any better. 

Your loving brother 

Georges (corporal). 


My address is as follows: 
To Corporal 
Sterghiou George, 
12th Squadron, 3d Battalion, 19th Regt. 
7th Division — if away, send on. 

(/<?) Rhodope, 13th July, 1913. 

My Dear Leonidas : 

Keep well, as I am. That is what I wish you. I received your letter, which gave me 
great pleasure. I also received one from Aristides, who is well, and writes that he has 
also been enrolled, which pains me, because my sufferings are such that could not be con- 
soled by tears, because everything is lost, because you can not imagine what takes place in 
a war. Villages are burnt, and also men, and we ourselves set fire and do worse than the 

Your affectionate brother, 

Thomas Zapantiotis. 

(ij) Mr. Demetrios Chr. Tsigarida 

For the Greek Army, at Mexiata 

as souvenir of the Hypati — Phtiotis. 

Turco-Bulgarian war. Copriva (?), 11th July, 1913. 

of the Commandant 
of the 19th Regt. 

I was given 16 prisoners to take to the division and I only arrived with 2. The others- 
were killed in the darkness, massacred by me. 

Nico Theophilatos. 

(14) In Bulgaria, 13th July, 1913. 
What a cruel war is taking place with the Bulgarians. We have burnt everything be- 
longing to them, villages and men. That is to say, we massacre the Bulgarians. How 
cruel ! The country is inundated with Bulgarians. If you ask how many young Greeks 
have perished, the number exceeds 10,000 men. 

Your Son, Tsantilas Nicolaos. 
P. S. Write me about the enrolments that are taking place. They are surely on the 
point of enlisting old men. Curses on Venizelos. 

(15) To Georgi D. Karka (Soldier) 

First Section of the Sanitary Corps, 9th Division. 


The River Nestor, 

12th July, 1913. 
Dear Brother Georgi: 

Thank God I am quite well after coming through these five engagements. Let me tell 
you that our division has reached the river Nestor, that is to say, the old Bulgarian Fron- 
tier, and the Royal Army has passed this frontier. By the King's orders we are setting 
fire to all the Bulgarian villages, because the Bulgarians burned the beautiful town 


Serres, also Nigrita and a lot of Greek villages. We have turned out much crueller than 
the Bulgars — we violated every girl we met. Our division took 18 pieces of artillery in 
good condition and two worn out pieces, altogether 20 cannon and 4 machine guns. It is 
impossible to describe how the Bulgars went to pieces and ran away. We are all well, ex- 
cept that K. Kalourioti was wounded at Nigrita and Evang the Macedonian got a bay- 
onet wound while on outpost duty, but both are slight cases. Remember me to our coun- 
trymen and friends, although after coming through so much, thank God I am not afraid 
of the Bulgars. I have taken what I had a right to after all they did to us at Panghaion. 

My greeting to you, 

N. Zervas. 
(Some illegible words follow.) ' 

(16) M. Aristidi Thanassia, 

Commune of Athanamow, 

14 July, 1913. 
Dear Cousin: 

I have received your letter of the 1st and I am very glad that you are well, as, 
after all, so are we up to now. Let me tell you, Aristidi, all we are going through during 
this Bulgarian War. Night and day we press on right into Bulgarian territory and at any 
moment we engage in a fight; but the man who gets through will be a hero for his coun- 
try. My dear cousin, here we are burning villages and killing Bulgarians, women and 
children. Let me tell you, too, that cousin G. Kiritzis has a slight wound in his foot and 
that all the rest of us, friends and relations are very well including our son-in-law Yani. 
Give my greeting to your father and mother and your whole household, as well as my 
cousin Olga. 

That is all I have to say, 

With a hearty hug. Your brother, 

Anastase Ath. Patros. 

(17) M. George P. Soumbli, 

Megali Anastassova, 

Alagonia, Calamas. 
Rhodope, 12th July, 1913. 
Dear Parents: 

* * * We got to Nevrokop, where again we were expected, for again we fought 
the entire day, and we chased them (the enemy) to a place where we set on them 
with our bayonets and took eighteen cannon and six machine guns. They managed 
to get away and we were not able to take prisoners. We only took a few, whom we killed, 
for those are our orders. Wherever there was a Bulgarian village, we set fire to it and 
burned it, so that this dirty race of Bulgars couldn't spring up again. Now we are at the 
Bulgarian frontier, and if they don't mend their manners, we shall go to Sofia. 
With an embrace, 

Your son, 

Pericli Soumelis 
7th Division, 19th Regiment, 12th Company, 



(18) M. Christopher Kranea, 

Rue Aristotle et de l'Epire 48. 


Rhodope, 14th July, 1913. 
Dear Brother Christopher: 

I am writing from Rhodope, a Bulgarian position, two hours away from the old Bu; 
garian frontier. If God spares me I shall write again. I don't know how much further 
we shall go into Bulgarian territory or if we are to have any more fights, as I don't know 
what further resistance we shall have to meet. If this war is to be the end of me, I pray 
the Almighty to comfort you greatly; and above all my mother and the relatives; but I hope 
that God will preserve my life. The money you speak of has not come yet. I have sent 
a few "bear-leaders" into a better world. A few days back my god-father Vassil Christon, 
tried his hand at shooting eight comiiadjis. We had taken fifty whom we shared among 
us. For my share I had six of them and I did polish them off. 

That is all I have to say. 

Greeting from your brother, 

Dim. Kraneas. 

(jo) M. Georges N. Yrikaki, 

Vari-Petro, Cydonia, 

Canea, Crete. 

Macedonia, July 12, 1913. 
Dear George: 

* * * After that we went forward and occupied the bridge over the Strouma. A 
lot of Bulgars were hidden in different spots. After we had occupied the bridge we found 
numbers of them every day, and killed them. The Bulgars have burned the bridge to stop 
our advance towards Serres. 

With greetings, 

F. Valantinaki. 
This is my address — 
Stilian Valantino, 

19th Regiment, 3d Battalion, 9th Company, 7th Division. 

(20) To A. M. Nicolas Hartaloupa, 

Tricala, Corinth. 

Rhodopian Mountains, 18/7/1913. 
Dear Brother Nicolas: 

I am very well and I hope you are as well as I am. We have turned up close to the 
Bulgarian frontier. We are constantly pressing on and putting the enemy to flight. . . . 
When we pass Bulgarian villages we set fire to them all and lay them waste. 

With an embrace, 

Your brother, 

A. V. Thodoropoulos. 

(Same address.) 


(21) To Mme. Angheliki K. Lihouidi, 


Ksiromera — Vonitza. 
Rhodope, July 13, 1913. 
Dear Mother: 

I send you my greetings. I am in good health. * * * We have to — such is the order 
— burn the villages, massacre the young, only sparing the aged and children. But we are 
hungry. * * * 
With greeting, 

Your son, 

Jean Likouidis. 

{22) To M. Christo Tchiopra, 

Petrilo, Arghitea, 

The River Nestor, 
July 13, 1913. 
Dear Kinsfolk: 

My greeting to you. I am well and hope you are in good health. * * * 
This is something like real war, not like that with the Turks. We fight day and night and 
we have burned all the villages. 

With greetings, 

Kambas Nicolaos. 

(25) Independant Cretan Regiment, 

12th Company, 
Corporal Em. N. Loghiadi. 
Leaskoviki, Epirus. 
Dobrisnitza, 12th July, 1913. 

* * * today I am answering your letters of the 22nd of May and the 21st of 
June. * * * We have had a little engagement near the Strouma with the refugees from 
Koukouch and Lahna. The guns mowed them down on the road. We did not succeed in 
occupying the bridge, which they burned in their retreat toward Serres. 
This letter is being sent from Mehomia. 

Greeting from, 

E. N. Loghiadis. 

(24) To M. Dimitri Koskinaki, 

Skardelo, Milopotamo, 



July 12, 1913. 
Dear Cousin : 

I am well and I hope you are, too. * * * We burned all the Bulgarian villages on 
our route and we have almost reached the old frontiers of Bulgaria. 
With an embrace, 

Your cousin, 

S. Kalighepsis. 


(25) U July, 1913. 

I have not time to write much; you will probably find these things in the papers. * * * 
It is impossible to describe how the Bulgarians are being treated. Even the villagers — 
it is butchery — not a town or village may hope to escape being burned. I am well and so is 
cousin S. Kolovelonis. 

With a loving embrace, 

Your brother, 

N. Brinia. 

(26) The Bulgarian Frontier, 

11th July, 1913. 
Dear Brother Anastase: 

I hope you are well. Don't worry, I am all right. We have had a lot of engage- 
ments, but God has spared my life. We had a fight at Nevrokop and took 22 cannon and 
a lot of booty. They can't stand up to us anywhere, they are running everywhere. We 
massacre all the Bulgarians that fall into our clutches and burn the villages. Our hard- 
ships are beyond words. 

Your brother, 

Nicolas Anghelis. 
I embrace you and kiss my father's hand. 

(2/) Dobrountzi, 

13th July. 1913. 
Dear Brother: 

All the villages here are Bulgarian, and the inhabitants have taken to flight as they 
did not wish to surrender. We set fire to all the villages and smash them up, — an inhuman 
business; and I must tell you, brother, that we shoot all the Bulgarians we take, and there 
are a good number of them. 
With an embrace, 

Your brother, 

Al. D geas. 


(28) Banitza, 

11th July, 1913. 
My Dear Leonidas:' 

I can't find paper to write to you, for all the villages here are burnt and all the in- 
habitants have run away. We burn all their villages, and now we don't meet a living soul. 
1 must tell you that we are close upon the old frontiers of Bulgaria. We have occupied 
the whole of Macedonia except Thrace. * * * 
I want an immediate answer. 
This is my address, 

Corporal George Korkotzi, 

19th Regiment, 3d Battalion, 11th Company, 7th Division — wherever we may be. 

No. 52. — A. Burned Villages in Bulgarian Territory, District of Strumnitsa 
The list of burned villages which follows will be found to be accurate, in the sense 
that it includes no villages which have not been burned. But it is far from complete, save 
as regards the Kukush and Strumnitsa regions. Many other Bulgarian villages were burned, 


particularly in the Serres and Drama districts. In many cases we have not been able to 
discover the exact number of houses in a village. It will be noted that the list includes 
a few Turkish villages in Bulgarian territory burned by the Greeks, and a few villages 
burned by the Servians. The immense majority of the villages are, however, Bulgarian 
villages burned by the Greek army in its northward march. 

The number of burned villages included in this list is 161, and the number of houses 
burned is approximately 14,480. 

We estimate that the number of houses burned by the Greeks in the second war can not 
fall short of 16,000. 

The figures which follow the names indicate the number of houses in each village. 

Eleven Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks, with number of houses in each : 
Dabilia (50), Novo-selo (160), Veliussa, Monastira, Svrabite, Popchevo (43), Kostourmo 
(130). Rabortsi (15), Cham-Tchiflik (20), Baldevtsi (2), Zoubovo (30). 

Nine Turkish villages burned by the Greeks: Amzali (150), Guetcherli (5), Tchanakli 
(2), Novo-Mahala (2), Ednokoukovo (80), Sekirnik (30), Souchitsa (10), Svidovitsa 
(10), Borissovo (15). 

Two Patriarchist villages, Mokreni (16), and Makrievo (10), with three-fourths of the 
town of Strumnitsa, about 1,000 houses and shops. 

In all over 1,620 houses. 

District of Petrits. — Fourteen villages burned by the Greeks : Charbanovo, Breznitsa, 
Mouraski, Mitinovo, Ormanli, Michnevo, Starochevo, Klutch, Koniarene, Kalarevo, Mikrevo, 
Gabrene, Skrit and Smolare (the two last partially). 

District of Razlog.— Dobrinishta (298). 

District of Gorna. — Djoumaia, Simitli, Dolno-Souchitsa and Srbinovo (200) — the last 
burned by the Greeks after the peace of Bucharest. 

District of Melnik. — Sixteen Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks : Spatovo, Makriko- 
stenovo, Sklave (30), Sveti-Vratch (200), Livounovo (60), Dolni-Orman (90), Tchiflitsite, 
Prepetcheno (20), Kapotovo, Kromidovo, Harsovo (100), Dolna-Oumitsa, Hotovo, Spatovo 
(16), Spanchevo (30), Otovo (60). 

District of Nczrokop. — Seven Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks : Dolna-Brodi 
(300), Libiachovo (400), Kara-Keu'i (40), Godlevo, Tarlis '(10), Obidin, Tcham-Tchiflik, 
and ten houses in the town of Nevrokop ; also the Turkish village of Koprivnik (100). 

B. Burned Villages of Bulgarian Nationality in Greek Territory 

District of Salonica. — Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks: Negovan, Ravna, 

District of Ziliahovo. — Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks: Skrijevo, Libechovo, 
Kalapot (partially), Alistratik (partially), and Guredjik. 

District of Kukush. — Forty Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks: Kukush town 
1,846 houses, 612 shops, 5 mills. Idjilar (70), Aliodjalar (50), Goliabache (40), Salamanli 
(15), Ambar-Keui (35), Karaja-Kadar (25), Alchaklish (13), Seslovo (30), Stresovo (20), 
Chikirlia (15), Irikli (20), Gramadna (100), Alexovo (100), Morartsi (350), Roschlevo 
(40), Motolevo (250), Planitsa in part (180), Nimantsi (40), Postolar (38), Yensko (45), 
Koujoumarli (30), Bigliria (18), Kazanovo (20), Dramomirtsi (115) in part, Gavalantsi 
(45), Kretsovo (45), Michailovo (15), Kalinovo (35), Tsigountsi (35), Harsovo (50), 
Novoseleni in part (20), Malovtsi (20), Vrighitourtsi (15), Garbachel (30), Haidarli (10), 
Daoutli (18), Tchtemnitsa (40), Rayahovo (150) in part, Gola (15). 

In all 4,725 buildings. 

District of Doiran. — Eleven Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks: Akanjeli (150), 
Dourbali, Nicolits, Pataros, Sonrlevo, Popovo, Hassanli, Brest. Vladaia, Dimontsi, Ratartsi. 


District of Demir-Hissar. — Five Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks: Kruchevo 
(800), Kirchevo (180), Tchervishta (170), German (80), and Djouta-Mahala. 

District of Serres. — Six Bulgarian villages burned by the Greeks: Doutli (100), 
Orehovatz (130), Drenovo, Moklen, Frouchtani, Banitsa (120). 

District of Gevgheli. — Fifteen Bulgarian and three Vlach villages burned, mainly by 
the Greeks, but in two cases by the Servians: Sehovo, Schlopentsi, Matchoukovo, Smol, 
Baialtsi, Marventsi, Orehovitsa, Smokvitsa, Balentsi, Braikovtsi, Kostourino, Mouine, 
Stoyacovo, Fourca, and Ohani, Houma and Longountsa (vlach). 

C. Burned Villages of Bulgarian Nationality in Servian Territory 

District of Tikvcsh. — Five Bulgarian villages burned by the Servians: Negotin (800), 
Kamendol, Gorna-Dissol, Haskovo, Cavadartsi (in part) (15), etc. 

District of Kotchana. — Three Bulgarian villages burned by the Servians: Sletovoy 
Besikovo, Priseka, etc. 


Documents Relating to Chapter II 


No. 53. — Evidence of Geoghi Varnaliev, Headmaster of the Bulgarian School at 
Kavadartsi, near Tikvesh. 

On July 1; when the battle of Krivolak began, he was arrested with seven other Bul- 
garian notables and informed by the prefect that a state of siege existed, and that they 
would be kept as hostages till the end of the war. They were three days in prison, but 
were released after the Servian defeat. The secretary of the Servian prefect did every- 
thing possible to ensure their safety. Some drunken gendarmes were, however, left behind 
in the Servian retreat, and these killed the servant of the mayor and wounded a woman. 
The Macedonian volunteers of the Bulgarian army then occupied the town and behaved well, 
but left on July 7. There then began a systematic burning of all the Bulgarian villages in 
the neighborhood. This was carried out by Turks, accompanied by Servian soldiers and 
officers. Among the villages burned were Negotin (800 houses), Kamendol, Gornodissal, 
Haskovo, etc. The peasants from these places came to their town and told their stories 
of massacre and pillage. On July 8, the Servians arrived in Kavadartsi and killed twenty- 
five Bulgarians, mostly refugees from neighboring villages, among them were the mayor 
and five notables of their own town. The mayor was accused of tearing up a Servian 
flag and helping the Macedonians. Two lads aged thirteen and fifteen, named Dorev, 
were killed because a bomb had exploded near their house, and they were absurdly sus- 
pected. He saw the bodies, which were all buried, still bound, just outside the town. He 
witnessed the pillage of about thirty shops and the burning of fifteen houses. Four women 
went mad from fear in their flight from Kavadartsi and two of them are said to have 
killed their own children, lest they should fall into the hands of the Servians. 

No. 54. — Evidence of Two Old Villagers, natives of Istip, who walked to Sofia, a 
journey of three days and three nights, in order to give their testimony to the Commission; 
their names must be suppressed since they live in Servian territory. 

They stated that they left Istip with the Bulgarian troops and sought refuge in the 
neighboring villages. Bands of Turks arrived and went round from village to village, 
burning the houses and violating the women. In the village Liubotrn, which was burned, 
eleven men and three women were killed and most of the women were violated. The 
leader of the Turkish band was a certain Yaha, of Veles, who had always led the bashi- 
bazouks under the Turks. He had under him about 300 men, and laid waste all the country 
around Istip, Radovishta and Kochana. Many women were carried off by the Turks to 
their own villages. Later on the pomaks of Tikvesh arrived with wagons and did much 
plundering. The district was now relatively calm and the Servians were disarming the 
Turks, but they believed that the arms taken from some Turks were secretly given back 
to others. 

[Note. — The above evidence, general in its character, relates to much that the wit- 
nesses saw and to much which they learned from others. It does not all rank as first- 
hand evidence, but appeared to be too serious to be disregarded.] 


No. 55. — Evidence of Lieutenant R. Wadham Fisher (see also No. 9). 

After the conclusion of peace Lieutenant Fisher visited the district overrun by the 
Servian army in the second war. He found the village of Sletovo near Kotchana, which he 
knew well, burnt down. He also visited the village Besikovo. Here the Montenegrins 
had killed twenty-eight of the villagers, a child had been burned alive in a house, and 
four women had died as the result of violation. In the next village, Priseka, five or six 
men had been killed and four women had died as the result of violation. In these villages 
everything had been taken, crops, clothes and money, and the people were starving, with- 
out shelter, on the mountain side. The Servians had used their corn in the trenches as 
bedding, and the peasants were reduced to picking out the grains from it. The Servians 
were levying a house-tax of five francs, even on burned houses. 

Extracts from the Evidence Collected by Professor Miletits 

No. 56. — The Schoolhouse Massacre at Serres. Deposition of George T. Belev, 
of Strumnitsa, a Protestant, aged 32. (See also Nos. 18-26.) 

Mr. Belev was serving as a bearer in the medical corps attached to the Seventieth 
Bulgarian regiment. He had transported two wounded soldiers from Nigrita to Serres. 
In Serres, on Friday, June 21, he entered the bakery of an acquaintance, a man from his 
native town. He was there arrested by Greeks and confined for two days, together with 
four other Bulgarian soldiers. 

The deposition continues thus: 

On Tuesday, June 25, we were taken to the bishop's palace to appear before a com- 
mission. In the hall there were several men sitting at a table in a corner, among them an 
ecclesiastic. They looked at us and said, "Take them away." From there we were taken 
to the girls' school, near the bishopric. The door was shut, and we were given the word 
of command in Bulgarian, "March. Form ranks." The following eight persons had been 
brought from the bakery [the names follow]. We found there four soldiers from Old 
Bulgaria. When we had formed our ranks, an evzone came up to us, and with him a 
certain Captain Doukas, and many Greeks of the town. They took from us one by one 
our coats and belts and all the money we had. From Theodore Inegilisov they took eight 
Napoleons and a watch, and from me a silver watch worth thirty francs, and ten francs 
which were in my purse. Then they placed us beside the staircase, drew their Turkish 
sabres, and ordered us to mount. Two of them with drawn sabres took up position on 
either side of the stairs, and as we went up they rained blows upon us. I received a blow 
on the left hand. Pando Abrachev had his right hand broken and his head cut open, and 
the others were also struck. We were then driven into a room about twenty-five meters 
square, where we were kept during Tuesday and Wednesday. 

On Tuesday, we had nothing to eat and were not allowed to go to the lavatory * * * 
[He explains how he dressed Abrachev's wound.] * * * On Wednesday, we each re- 
ceived half a loaf and were allowed to go to the lavatory under escort. On Thursday, 
the Greek bishop arrived and went over all the rooms. He made a sort of speech to the 
prisoners. "We are Christians. Our Holy Gospel forbids us to massacre. We are not 
like the Bulgarians, we shall allow you all to return to your homes. Fear nothing, we shall 
do you no harm." He added, "Give them bread and water," and went away. We felt more 
at ease, believing that a bishop would not lie, and passed the rest of the day in hope ; 
But in the evening, men were chosen from all the rooms and taken away, to the number 
of fourteen. They selected the Bulgarian gendarmes who had been arrested and the 
militant comitadjis, including Christo Dimitrov, who had a mill in which he used to shelter 
revolutionaries. * * * Thirteen of these were slaughtered on the second story, and we 
heard their cries. We still hoped that a selection would be made, and that we should not 
all be killed. * * * 


Next day (Friday, June 28) Dimitrov was brought back alive to our room. After him 
came a Greek priest. He opened the door of our room, and said in mockery, "Good day, 
lads." We did not answer. He repeated it, and still we were silent. Then he said, "Why 
don't you answer? 'Good day' is a civil word. Aren't you Bulgarians?" We did not 
answer. Then he asked us, "Would you like to see your glorious Tsar Ferdinand? Would 
you like to enter Salonica. So you shall, quite soon." Then the priest went away. 

Two hours later we heard firing. Our troops were entering the town. We were sure 
that it was our army, for the Greek guns could not have been heard from that particular 
quarter. As soon as the Bulgarian guns came into action, the Greeks ran all over the build- 
ing to gather us together in one room. We were seventy persons, pressed like herrings in 
a little room and there we remained for half an hour. Meanwhile they ran to see whether 
the Bulgarians were coming in. When they had ascertained this, they made us come out 
two by two, to bind our hands. Then those who were bound were led up to the upper 
story and killed. The first to be taken up was a little Greek of the village of Kolechino, 
near Strumnitsa, who had lived in Serres for seven years. He had been imprisoned by mis- 
take. He begged for his liberty, explaining that everyone knew he was a Greek, that he 
was married and was a rich merchant. But no heed was paid to him, and he was killed. 
There was time to massacre all the seventy persons; it did not take more than an hour. 
There were plenty of executioners, and they worked quickly. Thirty men were bound, and 
then when they saw that this took too long, they stopped binding us. 

Among the executioners was Charalambi Popov, a Grecized Bulgarian, the same baker 
in whose house I was arrested. The others were inhabitants of Serres, and two vlachs 
belonging to the Greek party from Poroi. One named Christo often came to Strumnitsa, 
and many a time I have gone surety for him. The other who is lame is named Tzeru, and 
knows no Greek. He killed with a yataghan, with which he severed the head from the body. 
The others used Martini bayonets, but some had Bulgarian Mannlicher bayonets. * * * 
I was taken with three others, two of them men from Dibra, and none of us were bound. 
We mounted the stairs, crossed a large hall and entered a big room. I went first and the 
executioner followed with his bayonet in his hand. * * * We were half dead with fear, 
and could hardly walk. Through the door of the room I could see slaughtered men, and 
some who were still alive and groaning. One was decapitated. The room was full, and 
the bodies lay two or three on top of each other. There was no room for me. Then the 
executioner made me go to another little room which was empty. It was my acquaintance 
the vlach, Christo. I took one step into the room, and at the next step he struck me in the 
neck. The force of the blow was broken by my collar, but I fell on my face. He then put 
his foot on my back, and struck me six blows with the bayonet, on my back, behind my 
ear, under the right jaw, and in the throat. When the sisters of charity afterwards gave 
me milk, it flowed through this last wound. I don't remember crying, and did not feel 
it when the index finger of my right hand was cut off, nor did I lose consciousness 
* * * In the big room three or four people were killed at once, but in this little room the 
other victims had to look on while I was dealt with. I heard one of the men of Dibra 
struggling at the door of the room and trying to snatch the bayonet, until another execu- 
tioner came up to help, and then they beat him pitilessly. He cried out, "What harm have 
I done to you. Leave me alone." Then they caught his hands, and flung him on top of 
me. I felt a heavy weight. They cut his throat and finished him by thrusts in his back. 
His blood flowed all ever me and soaked my coat until I felt the warm stream wetting my 
body. He died on the spot and never stirred. Two others were then brought in and killed 
on top of us. They did not struggle; they were already half dead from fear. Then came 

Some time afterwards there was a dead silence. I heard nothing but the firing of 
rifles and cannon. When I realized that there was none left in the building I decided to 


get out from under the heap of bodies which had been weighing on me and drenching me 
with blood for about an hour. I rose with difficulty, sat down in a corner, and dressed my 
wounds, knotting a handkerchief round my neck from which the blood was flowing. It hurt 
a good deal, but I drew the handkerchief tight. I got up, found that I could walk, and 
went into the next room. There I found Christo Dimitrov sitting among forty dead bodies. 
He got up and began to walk, and others also stirred. * * * From the window no one 
was to be seen, and shells and balls were flying. A shell fell near our building and set it 
on fire, and we saw that we should be burned alive unless we went out * * * Eight 
men gathered at the door. There were about twenty wounded men who might have been 
saved, if there had been anyone to help. One, the ninth, Ilia, a tilemaker of Gevgheli, 
came down the stairs, but fell near the door. * * * [He goes on to relate how he found 
the Bulgarian troops and was placed in a vehicle, and ultimately, after much suffering, 
reached Mehomia and eventually was nursed at Tatar-Bazardjik.] 

No. 57. — Extracts from a Deposition by Dr. P. G. Laznev, a Russian physician in 
charge of the Bulgarian Hospital at Serres. 

After complaining that the Greek women of Serres pillaged the hospital, and stating 
that the Greek andartes behaved well in their dealings with it after the Bulgarian evacua- 
tion Dr. Laznev continues : 

"On July 11, the Bulgarian infantry with mountain guns appeared on the heights which 
command the hospital, and a fight ensued between them and the Greek insurgents who 
were sheltered behind the hospital. The insurgents were driven back, and the hospital was in 
the possession of the Bulgarians. That lasted only for a half an hour, for stronger de- 
tachments of Greek infantry and cavalry arrived, and a continuous exchange of rifle and 
gun fire went on from three to six p.m. As before, the hospital was the center of the fight- 
ing. Our windows were broken and I was obliged to lay the sick on the floor in order to 
shelter them. One of them was wounded. Neither Greeks nor Bulgarians would listen 
to my remonstrances. At the end of the fight the Bulgarians withdrew. About an hour 
before their withdrawal the town was set on fire. Then came the victors, fatigued and 
excited by the fighting. They burst in, knocked our orderly down and beat him cruelly, 
threatened to kill the sick 'because the Bulgarians had burned the town'; struck my 
assistant Komarov on the chest and shoulders with the butts of their rifles, and pointed 
the barrels of their rifles at my breast. Finally I induced them to go away. Others mean- 
while pillaged the upper story of the hospital, and stole everything, including my personal 
property. [Details follow of the difficulties which the doctor experienced in dealing with 
the Greek authorities.] As to the burning of Serres, I am obliged to declare that I do not 
know its causes. I can only make guesses. It may have been caused by the Bulgarian 
shells. As a strong wind was blowing, a fire started in one place would spread easily to 
the neighboring buildings. I can not accept the theory of the Bishop of Serres (that the 
Bulgarians first sprinkled the houses with petroleum and then two days later set them on 
fire). In that case the conflagration would have started simultaneously in the several quar- 
ters of the town." 

No. 58. — Deposition of Ilia Petrov Limonev, a fisherman of Doiran, serving in the 
70th Bulgarian Regiment (Fourth Battalion, Fifteenth Company), was imprisoned in the 
School at Serres, and succeeded in breaking out and disarming the sentries. His narrative 
contains two interesting details. His detachment, reduced to thirty-two men, was separated 
from its battalion, and retreated through Demir-Hissar to the village of Kavakli. On July 
6, it was surrounded by a Greek company numbering 200 men, and surrendered. "After 
disarming the Bulgarian soldiers, the Greeks bound them and massacred them. In this 


fashion twenty- four Bulgarian soldiers were slaughtered in the most barbarous fashion,, 
when at length a Greek officer arrived, and said that that was enough. The eight men 
who survived, including Limonev himself, were brought to Serres on the 8th, cruelly 
beaten and shut up in the girls' school." Among the sixty Bulgarian civilians imprisoned 
with them in an upper room, were four women, one of them very old. Describing what 
he saw after his escape, Limonev states that the Greek artillery mistook the Greek refugees 
near the station for Bulgarians, turned their machine-guns upon them, and killed an im- 
mense number. 

No. 58a. — Dimitri Auguelov, wine merchant of Serres, arrested on July 7, was shut 
up in the school, escaped with a Jewish prisoner on Friday, and was concealed by Jews of 
the town. 

No. 58b. Strati Georghiev, of the Dibra district, was arrested on July 10 by ten 
armed Greeks and five Turks. A Turk told him that all who wore the costume of Dibra' 
would be put to death, because they were Bulgarians. Among the corpses on Friday he 
saw an old woman with her head cut open, and three young women, all killed. There 
were fifty corpses in the room. He escaped with Belev and the others, severely wounded. 

No. 59. — Events Around Demir-Hissar. 

A group of Bulgarian villages in the neighborhood of Demir-Hissar was the scene of a; 
systematic massacre. Most of the inhabitants of these villages, German, Kruchevo, Kirt- 
chevo, and Tchervishta, had fled early in the second war. Letters were then sent out over the 
signature of Dr. Christoteles, ' an influential Greek doctor of Demir-Hissar, which invited 
them to return and assured them of safety. (See No. 44.) Marko Bourakchiev, of Kirt- 
chevo (180 houses) had returned to his village with about eighty other families. On the 
arrival of the Greek troops on July 15 (he states), the villagers made them welcome and 
brought all they called for. Suddenly he heard the roll of a drum and an indescribable 
tumult followed, amid which he heard the cries and groans of the dying. He left his 
house and saw his neighbor Stoiaria Tchalikova in a pool of blood, dead of bayonet 
wounds, and the corpse of little Anghel Paskov. He went back to his own house and saw 
two or three soldiers searching his grandmother for money. She had none and they cut 
her throat and plunged their bayonets into her breast. They then seized him and took 
him into another house, where were other soldiers and andartes. They began to discuss 
something which seemed important. He was forgotten and a soldier made him pour out 
water for him to wash his blood stained hands. Then the soldier made a sign to him,, 
and pointed to the door. He fled as fast as he could, and those who pursued failed to- 
overtake him. From a hill he saw the village in flames. 

Dimitri Guidichov and Ivan Radev, who also escaped from the village, relate that 
the men were shut up in two houses and burned alive. Forty women were shut up in 
the house of Anghel Douriov and there beaten, undressed, and violated. Four women 
(named) were killed, and four (named) were carried off by the soldiers. Twenty peas- 
ants of Tchervishta and Kruchevo were also massacred at Kirtchevo, together with two 

Paul Chavkov adds that he saw the soldiers taking seven or eight women naked to- 
Gorno-Brodi. (See also No. 44.) 

No. 60. — At German the sarru procedure was followed. Thirty families returned as the 
result of Dr. Christoteles' letter and welcomed the Greek troops. The men were shut 


up in the church and the women in the priests' house. One of the men, Dimitri Georg- 
hiev, escaped from the church and afterwards met Apostol Kostov of German, to whom 
he told his story. One woman also escaped, Stoianka Konstantinova, aged twenty. It is 
not known where she is at present. Some distance outside the village, as she was fleeing, 
she met her uncle, Thorma Ivanov, who was returning to it. She could hardly speak 
in her terror, and her uncle quotes these words : "I can't, I can't tell you anything. There's 
no describing what I've seen. God! how they tortured us, undressed us naked, while we 
cried and wept. * * * I am saved, but the others. * * * The village is burning. 
They were killing in the streets. Cries and the sound of shots were coming from the 
church. All the men were massacred there." The uncle and the niece fled together. He 
reached Bulgaria, but she remained behind on the way with some other peasants of Ger- 
man. (See also No. 46.) 

No. 61. — Ilia Konstantinov, of Tchervishta, relates that when the peasants of his 
village returned in response to the doctor's letters, twenty of their notables, himself among 
them, were taken to Kirtchevo. He saw them all massacred, the women led away, and the 
village burned, but managed himself to escape. 

No. 62. — The same thing happened at Kruchevo. Nearly all the inhabitants returned 
and welcomed the Greek troops. The officer made them a speech, in which he told them that 
they were all Greeks and not Bulgarians. That same evening, the soldiers forced their way 
into all the houses (800 houses), pillaged everything and violated all the women and car- 
ried off the prettiest girls. 

Ivan Bojov and Haralampi Jankoulov relate some incidents which they witnessed in the 
sack of Kruchevo. The soldiers (1) robbed George Tochev of £T250; (2) robbed Ivan 
Kakidine and killed him and his wife; (3) killed the widow, Ransa Hadjieva, because she 
had less money than they demanded; (4) killed Soultana Xalianova because she locked her 
house to protect her two daughters and daughter-in-law; (5) violated and then killed 
Vela Harmanova and Ransa Souchova; (6) took the daughter of the priest, Theodore 
Staev, gouged out his eyes, and two days later took him to Kirtchevo, where he was 
killed with the other notables. 

No. 63. — Summary of Evidence Collected by Professor Miletits. 

(a) Athanase Ivanov of Kukush who fled from the town on July 4, saw from his 
brother's house at a distance of three or four hundred paces the slaughter of two old 
men, three women and a little girl, by the Greek cavalry. The Greeks were then driven 
back by Bulgarian cavalry and the witness fled with the latter. 

(b) Kolio Delikirov and Ivan Milev, of Akangeli, state that the Greek officer (see Nos. 
39-43) ordered the villagers to bring their arms and all the money they possessed. The 
arms were given to the Turks, and the money kept by the Greeks. Four peasants (named) 
brought each of them from £T100 to £T150. While the arms were being given up, a rifle 
went off by accident, and the Greek soldiers fell upon the peasants, who fled in every direc- 
tion. But they were soon surrounded and bound. Fifteen only were released, in order to 
fetch food for the soldiers; some of these fled and hid. Those who remained in the hands 
of the Greeks were massacred. * * * The young women were taken to a place called 
Karakol and violated. Two girls from Pataros, who were in the house of the teacher, 
Dimo Christov, were violated until they died. 

(c) Vanghel Kazanski, of Kazanovo, saw the Greek cavalry between Gavalantsi and 
Dragomirtsi riding down old men and women who were fleeing. They shot Mitza Kou- 
schinov, and then dismounted, but he could not see what followed. 


(d) Mito P. Stoyanov, of Moritolovo, states that Greek cavalry killed the mayor and 
gendarme of the village with their sabres. 

(e) Mito Nicolov and his brother, Petro, of Doiran, in their flight, saw three Bul- 
garian villagers fleeing from Kodjamatli overtaken by Greek cavalry and killed. 

(f) Thomas Pop Stoyanov, son of the priest of Dolna Djoumaia, states that his 
father and twenty-five notables of the village were killed by the Greek troops, and that four 
women were beaten or violated until they died [gives names], 

(g) Gotze Ivanov, of Popovo, who left his village on July 6, states that the Greeks 
gathered the arms of the peasants and pillaged. The men were separated from the women 
and on the first day thirty disappeared. The women and girls were gathered in the house 
of Colio Theodorov and violated. Slava Coleva was violated and then killed in the street. 
Only three men escaped alive. The village was burned. 

(h) Eftim Mitev, of Moklen, states that fifteen shepherds of his village, whom he 
names, were caught by the Greeks near Kalapot and massacred. 

(i) Nicholas Anastasov, of Alistratik, states that Greek troops killed nine Bulgarian 
villagers, after first imprisoning them, also two young women and four children. 

(j) Ivan Christodorov, of Guredjik, states that he saw Greek soldiers enter the houses 
of the village and begin to violate all the women. He fled. 

(k) G. Markov, of Pleva, states that forty men of his village were taken outside it 
by the Greeks and slaughtered. 

(1) Blagoi Ikonomov, of Mehomia, names four men killed and two women violated in 
his town. There were others. 

(m) Dinka Ivanov, of Marikostenovo, states that all the women in his village were 
violated. He fled, was fired on, but escaped. 

(n) Ivan Stoitchev, of Sveti-Vratch, says that the same thing happened there, and also 
at Polenitsa. 

(o) At Pancherevo, the people awaited the Greeks and welcomed them, and were 
rewarded by the killing of six, and the carrying off of ten, of whom three escaped. 

(p) At Grada, all the women were violated. At Matchevo, four villagers were killed. 

(q) At Roussinovo, a woman died as the result of violation, three men were killed, 
and two women and a girl were carried off by the Greeks. The village was burned. 

(r) At Smoimirtsi, the priest and people went out to meet the Greeks. The priest 
was tortured and died. A man was killed. 

(s) From Vladimirovo, fourteen girls and an old woman were carried off by the 

(t) The people of Oumlena met the Greek troops. All the women were violated. Two 
were carried off, and kept for six days by the officers. One old woman died of ill-treat- 
ment, two men killed and five houses were burned. 

No. 64. — From the official reports of some of the Bulgarian prefects in the new terri- 
tories, we extract the following statements : 

(a) The losses due to the systematic pillage by the Greek army in the following places 
is estimated thus in francs : 

Mehomia. Grain, 356,850 fr.; cattle, 164 fr.; household goods, 402,200 fr.; 
merchandise, 160.24 fr. ; total, 759,374.24 fr. 

Bansko. Grain, 350,000 fr.; cattle, 200,000 fr.; household goods, 340,000 f r. ; mer- 
chandise, 200,000 fr.; total, 1,090,000 fr. 

Nania. Grain, 30,000 f r. ; cattle, 35,000 fr.; household goods, 41,000 f r. ; merchan- 
dise, 5,000 fr.; total, 111,000 fr. 


Dobrinishta. Loss by burning, 1,145,000 f r. ; by pillage of grain, 200,000 fr. ; 
cattle, 40,000 fr.; total, 1,385,000 fr. 

Further, in Mehomia, seven old men were killed, two women beaten to death, and 
eleven old women violated. At Bansko five men were killed and four old women 

(b) At Petrits, twenty of the Bulgarian citizens were tortured by the Greeks to ex- 
tort money. The method was to bind their arms behind their backs and then to twist the 
ropes with an iron instrument, one specimen of which was left behind. Twenty names are 
.given, with the sums extorted, which range from £T3 to £T25. Four were killed. There 
were many violations, but the victims conceal their names. 

(c) In the Strumnitsa district, occupied partly by Greeks and partly by Servians, 
iT90 in money was taken by soldiers from seven men [named] in the village of Rablich, 
iT160 at Smiliantsi, £T100 at Inevo, £T200 at Yargorilitsa, £170 at Radovitsa, etc. Six 
men, three women, and several children [named] were killed at Loubnitsa, five men and a 
woman [named] at Radovitch, two women [named] at Oraovitsa, and seven inhabitants 
(no names] at Pideresch. 

No. 65. — Extracts from an Official Report {communicated) by Officer Candidate 
Penev, Aide-de-Camp of the first battalion of the 26th Infantry. 

On the road leading to Strumnitsa, between the villages Ormanovo and Novo Selo, 
in the defile on the right bank of the river, I found a soldier of the Tenth (Rhodope) In- 
fantry crucified on a poplar tree by means of telegraph wires. His face had been sprinkled 
with petroleum and burned. I recognized that he was a soldier from the epaulettes which 
had been torn off and flung down near him. The body was already in a state of decom- 
position. Further to the west I found another soldier of the Thirtieth Infantry. His body 
was buried in the sand, and nothing was visible but the head, which had been sprinkled 
with petroleum and burned. The eyes, nose and ears had disappeared. A soldier of the 
First (Prince Alexander's) Infantry was hanging head downwards, with his feet bound with 
telegraph wire. The epaulettes lying in the mud showed that the unhappy man was a 
mechanician. His ears and hands had been cut off, and his eyes torn out. Further along the 
same road I found many other unburied bodies mutilated, belonging to soldiers of the 
Second, Sixth and Eighth divisions. 

(Note. — It is proper to note that the authors of these disgusting outrages may possibly 
have been Turks.) 

On the way the peasants told us with tears in their eyes of the inhuman treatment 
which they had met with from Greek officers and soldiers. At Ormanovo, the comman- 
dant of Petrits had all the men imprisoned in the police office, where they were kept without 
food for three days, and ill-treated by the Greek soldiers. They were made to pay £Tl 
(23 fr.) for a drink of water. All the women and all the girls over eight years of age, 
were shut up in a house and violated. The same thing happened in Bossilovo, Dabine 
and Robovo. In this last village the Greek soldiers bound the priest and violated first his 
daughter and then the other women before his eyes. They then shot the priest and his 
daughter and burned the village. 

Two-thirds of the town of Strumnitsa has been burned, notably the "Grecoman" and, 
Turkish quarters, and some Greek houses in the Bulgarian quarter, together with the 
public buildings and the barracks. At the moment when the Greeks were about to set 
fire to the Bulgarian quarter, where several houses were already in flames, Mr. Cooper, 
the American Protestant missionary, arrived from Salonica. Mr. Cooper went to the Greek 
commandant and begged him to stop the burning, declaring that he would appeal to the 


British consul at Salonica. The fire was stopped by order of the commandant. I have 
this statement from Mr. Cooper himself, who sent photographs of the town burned by the 
Greeks to the British consul. The new Bulgarian church, a solid stone building, is half de- 
stroyed by three bombs which the Greeks placed in it to blow it up. The Bulgarian hospitals 
are also in ashes, and the Bulgarian wounded who had remained there were left without 
care or food. The Greek sentinels appropriated all the bread, milk, etc., which the good 
women of the town brought to the soldiers. Finally the wounded soldiers were shut up in 
the Turkish tower, which was set on fire. Their charred bodies were still lying there on 
September 16, when the Greeks evacuated the town. * * * A school teacher informed me 
that on the night of August 23, she was taken to the barracks, where she was first outraged 
by the Greek commander and then by twenty-four soldiers, one after the other. She is now 
in a pitiful condition. 

Documents Relating to Chapter III 


Report by a Russian Officer 
(From Lc Jeune-Turc, August 26 and 27, 1913) 

On August 20 the London Daily Telegraph published an interesting report on the 
Bulgarian atrocities in Thrace, and particularly at Adrianople. 

This report, of which the text is given below, came from a Russian official and was 
transmitted to St. Petersburg. 

I had occasion to visit Adrianople and its environs in company with ten or more 
foreign correspondents representing the largest newspapers and telegraphic agencies. 
The eager readiness with which the Turkish government gave us the necessary per- 
mits and afforded us facilities for making our inquiries, prove that the Turks felt 
sure that we could make no discoveries that would harm them ; that on the con- 
trary, publication of the truth could only be to their interest; a most thorough and 
detailed inquiry proved that in this the Turks were right. I shall say nothing of 
the atrocious manner in which 15,000 Turkish prisoners and some 5,000 Turkish 
civilians were treated in the first four days during which they were mewed up like 
cattle in the island of Sarai, where, in the rain, they perished of cold and hunger, 
with no food but the bark of trees and the soles of their old shoes. They died in 
hundreds every day, so that when the time for departure to Bulgaria came, there 
were but some 10,000 of them left. That is well known. 

I shall confine myself to facts not hitherto published. The diplomatic corps 
and the inhabitants, whether Turkish, Greek or Israelite, are unanimous in the 
indignation with which they describe the excesses of the Bulgarian occupation. 

In most of the better Mussulman houses the windows and doors were battered 
in, the furniture taken away; even the houses of the generals were plundered, as 
for example that of Abouk Pasha, who commanded the Fourth Army Corps. 

Not a single valuable carpet was left in any of the mosques, including the cele- 
brated mosque of Sultan Selim. 

The library belonging to the latter, a collection in its kind unique, was also 
very severely handled. Burglary was not confined to the houses of the Turks. Those 
belonging to Greeks and Israelites suffered in the same way. Train loads of so-called 
war booty were sent to Sofia. These are concrete facts. Soldiers armed with rifles 
carried off a quantity of jewels and precious antiques from the house of two Greeks, 
the brothers Alexandre and Jean Thalassinos. These soldiers also tore rings and 
bracelets from the hands of the sister of the Thalassinos. A patrol appearing in the 
i house of the merchant Avramidi on the usual pretext of searching for arms, carried 

off £T70 in a trunk. 

Colonel Zlatanov, head of the gendarmerie, put the brothers Athanasius and 
Chritodoulos Stavridis in prison, and only set them free on payment of forty pounds. 

A rich Austrian-Israelite, Rodrigues, left his house in the charge of three Bul- 
garian officers on his departure for Constantinople; on his return he found his 
house empty. Everything, even the piano, had disappeared and been sent to Sofia. 
In the same way the houses of two rich Israelites, Moses Behmoiras and Benaroya, 
were plundered. Rich property owners, particularly Moslems, were forced by threats 
of death to consent to fictitious sales or long lease of their holdings. A case of this 


kind is that of Ibrahim-bey, a man of large independent means, living in Abdula- 
Hamam Street. Chopov, the head of police, himself sent three cases of stolen carpets 
to Sofia, using a Russian subject as his intermediary. 

Every morning the dead bodies of numerous Moslems killed in the night, were 
found. Even now the corpses of Turkish prisoners covered with wounds are pulled 
out of the public wells. The authorities never troubled about trifles of this kind. 

Among the most revolting and best known cases is that of the murder of a 
captive Turkish officer by a Bulgarian soldier in the middle of the open street on the 
first day of the Bulgarian occupation. He was an old man, so worn by the privations 
and fatigue of the siege that he had not the strength to walk. The soldier forced 
him on by hitting him with the butt end of his musket. An Israelite, Salomon 
Behmi, implored the soldier to have pity and let the old man rest. Enraged by this 
intervention, the soldier killed both men with his bayonet. On the same day eight 
soldiers plundered the house of three Turkish brothers, clockmakers, and carried off 
more than 500 watches. One of them, Aziz Ahmed, they killed with their bayonets 
and went on striking him even after he was dead. The others escaped by flight. 

On the third day of the occupation some twenty Bulgarian soldiers first 
plundered and then hideously butchered thirteen Turks, three being Mollahs, and 
Aziz Youssouv, the Muezzin, in the Miri-Miran mosque. I saw the traces of blood 
there myself and my colleagues photographed them. 

An even more revolting story is that of ten Turkish soldiers who are at this 
moment undergoing treatment in the Egyptian Red Cross hospital. 

On evacuating Adrianople, the Bulgarians sent 200 Turkish prisoners, under 
escort, to Mustapha Pasha; all the sick and wounded who had not sufficient strength 
to march were killed on the way. 

The column was then divided into three; the body containing the ten soldiers 
referred to above, was composed of sixty prisoners. At a given moment the Bul- 
garians told them that they were free and could go where they would. The wretches 
were not given time to take a dozen steps before the Bulgarians opened fire on them 
by their officers' orders. They were all killed with the exception of ten, who were 
severely wounded and pretended to be dead. For four whole days they lay hidden 
in the forest, without any food. Among them were Camber Ouglou Camber, Hassan 
Ouglou Hay, Emis Ouglou Emin, belonging to the first and second battalions of the 
Kirk Kilisse redifs. [The other names follow.] Almost all of them suffered from 
gangrene, from which two have already died. The fate of the other two bodies is 
unknown. The Greek Metropolitan describes how two priests sent out with gendarmes 
in search of mishandled Greeks, discovered dozens of corpses of captives, riddled 
with bullets and bayonet wounds, on the banks of the Maritza. Hassiz Effendi, school- 
master in the village of Kourriarli, reports officially that the retreating Bulgarians 
collected some fifty Moslems in the mosque under pretext of searching them for 
arms, and massacred them there; further that in the village of Amour, the Bul- 
garians carried off two Mussulman girls, the eldest being twelve years old. Their 
fate is unknown. 

Hassiz Effendi further notes with satisfaction that in many villages numbers of 
Moslems were rescued by the Greek women. 

In bringing this martyrology to a close, I should like to mention a fact of in- 
credible atrocity. On the first news of the approach of the Turks — Sunday, July 
7 — the Bulgarians set fire to the provision depot at the Karagatch station. 

Some starving Greeks saved several sacks of meal. On the following Monday 
the Bulgarians returned, arrested forty-five of th